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SHALL IT BE AGAIN? 



BY 



JOHN KENNETH TURNER 




NEW YORK B. W. H U E B S C H, I N C . MCMXXII 



t,AMi ^J 



M' 






COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY B. W. HUEBSCH, INC. 
PRINTED IN U. S. A. 



JUL i? 1922^ 

©Ci.A674938 



To 

The Lads Who Will Come 
Under the Next Draft 



"I get a great many letters, my fellow-citizens, from 
important and influential men in this country; but I get a 
great many other letters. I get letters from unknown men, 
from humble women, from people whose names have never 
been heard and will never be recorded, and there is but 
one prayer in all of these letters: *Mr. President, do not 
allow anybody to persuade you that the people of this 
country want war with anybody.' " — Woodrow Wilson, 
to the Neiv York Press Club, June 30, 1916. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB PAGE 

I The Author Explains i 

II Did the American People Want War? . . 6 

III Was America Ever in Danger? i3 

DEMOCRACY AND GETTING INTO WAR 

IV The Responsibility of one Man .... 20 

V Presidential Usurpations to Achieve Bel- 
ligerency 26 

VI Our Stealthy Approach to War . . . .32 

VII The 1916 Election 39 

DEMOCRACY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR 

VIII Executive Duplicity in Imposing the War 

Policies 47 

IX ''Democratic" Czarism in War-Time ... 54 

X The War Terror ^4 

OUR WAR "CAUSES" 

XI Motives Claimed for Belligerency ... 80 

XII Protection op American Commerce ... 86 

XIII Preservation of American Lives .... 97 

XIV War for International Law 104 

XV International Law — Our Reversals on the 

Law in 1915 and 1916 108 

XVI International Law — British and German 

Violations Compared 115 



CONTENTS 

OHAPTXB PAOB 

XVII International Law — ^America's Offenses as a 

Belligerent 128 

XVIII Other "Intolerable Wrongs" 139 

OUR "OBJECTIVES" 
XIX War for Democracy 151 

XX Peace Without Victory Versus Peace from 

Victory 155 

XXI The German World Peril Bugaboo . . .166 

XXII Our Myth of the War's Beginning . . .183 

XXIII The Noble Democracies — Scraps of Paper; 

Atrocities 199 

XXIV The Noble Democracies and Small Nations . 215 
XXV What Really Started It 224 

XXVI Promise and Performance 237 

OUR WAR AND BUSINESS 

XXVII Patriotism of the Profit-Makers .... 256 

XXVIII The Profits of Patriotism 272 

XXIX Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server .... 285 

XXX Secret of the War Profits 311 

XXXI Wilson Imperialism 319 

XXXII Mexico 330 

XXXI I I Virgin Islands, Haiti, Santo Domingo and 

Nicaragua 343 

XXXIV Strictly Business 362 

XXXV "The Enemy at Home" 371 

XXXVI Proof of the Pudding 388 

XXXVII "Reconstruction" 406 

APPENDIX 

A Few Deadly Parallels of Woodrow Wilson 419 
INDEX 445 



i 1 

'I I J) 



SHALL IT BE AGAIN ? 



SHALL IT BE AGAIN? 



THE AUTHOR EXPLAINS 

Were any excuse deemed necessary for this book, it would 
be enough to point to the likelihood of another war. No 
one will dispute that, notwithstanding complete victory was 
accorded us, the promised goal, permanent peace, was not 
attained. If, indeed, we are to judge by the demands of 
the Executive for greater armament, the danger of future 
war at once became from three to five times as great as be- 
fore we took up arms to repel such danger. These de- 
mands were scaled down, but our peace-time armament re- 
mained far heavier than before. Those of us who, a little 
while ago, were most confident in asserting that our war 
would end war are the same who, as soon as it was over, 
became most certain that we must be ready for the next 
one. 

But if the goal was not reached, our war could not have 
been in every respect the glorious thing we were told it was. 
Nor will any one dispute that many of the other promised 
benefits are not forthcoming. Nearly all of us seem to be 
willing to assume — or to permit our neighbors to assume, 
which comes to the same thing — that the "reasons" justify- 
ing our war are sound. But if such "reasons" are sound 
how is it that the results are so disappointing? 

The question cannot be dismissed simply by blaming 
Wilson, or the Republican party, or Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau. Did we not fight on the theory of the perfect 



2 Shall It Be Again? 

wisdom and purity of Wilson and the Entente statesmen — 
and, for that matter, of ourselves, which includes the Re- 
publican party? 

If we have been betrayed. It is not sufficient merely to 
acknowledge the fact, but to determine how and why, in 
order that provision may be made against betrayal in the 
future. Nor is it sufficient to look for the secret in what 
happened at Paris. The great settlement — which, in the 
main, still stands — was the logical and almost certain result 
of what had gone before. 

Although it will be pleasant for all who served or sacri- 
ficed in the late war always to believe the best of it, no one 
who really sacrificed will wish for another such experience ; 
nor would any one wish to continue believing well of recent 
events if such belief were to add to the danger of a repeti- 
tion. 

Remember that for more than four years one side was 
permitted to speak and the other forced to remain silent. 
*'The perspective that only time can give," some say, "is 
necessary before the true history of our war can be written, 
and before proper criticism can be made." But the end of 
the fighting saw a vast and complicated machine feverishly 
at work to crystallize into "history" the story of the war 
as It was told to us as propaganda in the heat thereof. If 
we wait a generation to face the whole truth we shall prob- 
ably never face it. 

If any of the "reasons" justifying our recent war is valid, 
it Is not unlikely that one or more of them will again apply, 
and another war will become both necessary and desirable. 
If, on the other hand, none of such "reasons" will bear the 
test of scrutiny, any probable future war will be inexcus- 
able, since all probable "causes" and "objectives" were 
urged for the recent one. 

How, then, did it come about that America, in 19 17, 



The Author Explains 3 

found itself a partisan in a conflict which evoked only hor- 
ror here in 19 14 — a conflict which not one in one thousand 
dreamed we could ever enter — which not one in a million 
had the temerity to advocate entering? How did it come 
about that America was plunging ahead in pohcies which 
not a single public man dared openly favor in 19 14? 

In this book are set forth the essential facts tending to 
prove what many people already beheve, though on incom- 
plete evidence, that ours was a war for business. If, how- 
ever, any of the non-business motives mentioned in justifica- 
tion for our war is sound, the theory of a war for business 
cannot stand. Thus it is that the first parts of the book are 
devoted to an examination of such alleged motives. 

Business, of course, was farthest from the minds of the 
masses of the American people. But the relationship be- 
tween the masses, the government, and business becomes 
clear. Although millions fought and served, the millions 
decided absolutely nothing except the physical victory. 
One man chose war for America, dictated the war policies, 
arrogated to himself the sole power to arrange the condi- 
tions of peace. The motives of the men who fought in 
Europe, and of the folks who served at home, did not de- 
termine what the real motives of their war should be. 
The real motives of their war were the motives which 
Woodrow Wilson personally chose to serve, whether in 
public or in secret, and only those. 

From this it must not be imagined that Wilson is to re- 
ceive the entire blame for the delinquencies of our war and 
our peace. Although the responsibility lies as heavy 
upon Wilson as could be upon any individual, the culpa- 
bility of Wilson explains only one-third of the riddle. As 
for ourselves, the motives that we professed are the same 
as the professed motives of Wilson. Is it already forgot- 
ten that the rest of us also swore allegiance to the principles 



// 



4, Shall It Be Again? 

by which Wilson claimed to be guided in entering and pros- 
ecuting the war "to make the world safe for democracy"; 
that the propaganda of "loyal patriots" everywhere, even 
among his bitterest political opponents, was little more 
than an echo of the President's words; that "Stand Behind 
the President !" was the war slogan while the issue was in 
the balance, and trust in the President the acid test of pa- 
triotism after we were in; that it was because of his pro- 
claimed war motives that we glorified Wilson beyond any 
other man in history? 

The question of Presidential fraud is determined by the 
discrepancy between the motives professed and the motives 
served. The question of national fraud is determined by 
the discrepancy between the motives professed and the mo- 
tives to whose service we complacently agree. For the 
fruit that Wilson plucked for us we still retain. Although 
the Republican party altered, in outward detail, the written 
forms of peace, it did not change the general nature of the 
settlement, nor attempt nor wish to do so. Although the 
phraseology varies at times, our foreign policies remain in 
principle the same. Although a Republican Congress went 
through motions intended to discredit Wilson, it met, in a 
large measure, his wishes as to "reconstruction" legislation. 
Regardless of the judgment of a national election, Wilson's 
work, on the whole, has been accepted by the "leaders of 
the people" and is tolerated by the country. 

Although it is of importance to present in a true light 
the most misunderstood figure in American history, the 
theme is much broader than that. Instead of laying the 
foundations for future peace, our war set up the ground- 
w£rk for more and more war. This groundwork must be 
cleared away or there is no hope. Only after the shams 
of the past war have been exploded, its true motives re- 
vealed, and its methods and results shine clear in the light 



The Author Explains 5 

of those motives, can a beginning be made towards ways 
that will insure us against future horrors. 

Instead of being a dead issue, therefore, our late war Is 
the livest issue of the day, and it will remain an issue so 
long as future war is in the reckoning. Its lessons hold not 
only the secret of averting future war, but also the solution 
of other public questions of a pressing nature. 



II 

DID THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT WAR? 

It was invariably assumed during our war against Ger- 
many, as well as afterwards — and countless times asserted 
— that the American people went willingly into the war. 
Said President Wilson, for example : "I say that the heart 
of the country Is In this war because It would not have gone 
into it If Its heart had not been prepared for it." (Red 
Cross Memorial Building dedication, May 12, 19 17.) 
While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty whether a 
majority would have voted for or against war on April 6, 
19 17 — since they were not accorded an opportunity to vote 
— there Is a collection of circumstances which, when brought 
together, would seem to leave no reasonable doubt that the 
American people would not have chosen to enter the fight. 
Some of these circumstances are: 

I. The Reelection of Wilson. 

Wilson, candidate of a minority party, was elected orig- 
inally because of a split In the majority party. Facing a 
united Republican party In 19 16, his only chance for victory 
lay in espousing a cause appealing so powerfully to the mas- 
ses as to Induce at least a million voters to break away 
from party affiliations. In choosing to make peace his 
paramount Issue, Wilson correctly guessed the most fer- 
vent wish of the people at large. His slogan, "He kept us 
out of war," and his promise to continue to "keep us out of 
war," won him reelection. In November, 19 16, the 
American electorate spoke for peace and against war with 

6 



Did the American People Want War? 7 

Germany, as definitely as it was possible for it to speak at 
that or any other time. 

2. Our Stealthy Approach to War. 

The successive steps by which President Wilson arrived 
at war were screened by voluble assurances of peaceful 
intention. (See Chapter VI.) The nation was almost 
wholly, and Congress partly, deceived by these assurances. 
The President continued to reiterate that he was treading 
the path of peace even after he broke diplomatic relations 
— even when he sought the consent of Congress to arm pri- 
vate ships with naval crews — even after that. What other 
interpretation is to be placed upon this except that he him- 
self believed that the masses were still opposed to war? 
In his message to Congress of February 26, the President 
admitted: '^The American people do not desire it.'^ Be- 
tween this date and April 2, there is no evidence that the 
sentiment of the masses changed. No new issue whatever 
arose to change it. For his casus belli, President Wilson 
himself went back to the German proclamation of Jan. 31. 

3. Refusal to Submit any War Issue to the Public. 

While the declaration of war was impending, and during 
the weeks immediately succeeding it — when President 
Wilson's war plans were being revealed — numerous pro- 
posals were made, usually taking the form of resolutions 
or amendments introduced in Congress, providing that the 
public be given some say in these momentous matters. 
Some of these proposals were: that the choice of war or 
peace be decided by referendum; that the question of send- 
ing an army overseas be submitted to referendum; that 
service overseas be limited to volunteers. That the 
Executive stood uncompromisingly against all such propo- 
sals furnishes a strong presumption of a conviction in his 



8 Shall It Be Again? 

own mind that, if afforded an opportunity, the people would 
have repudiated his war programme and his war. 

4. Government Press Agency, War Education, and Repres- 
sion. 

With America's declaration of war, the government or- 
ganized the most complete and expensive press agency ever 
seen anywhere on the globe. More money was spent for 
the manufacture of public opinion, and more men and 
women were employed, than in any previous publicity cam- 
paign in history. Of the official publicity organizations, 
the Bureau of Information was but one of many depart- 
ments. Added to the purely government press bureaus, 
were the voluntary war committees, organized by the gov- 
ernment and directed by pne department or another. 
Every postmaster In America was forced to serve the gov- 
ernment as a press agent. The press, as a whole, the thea- 
tres, and even the public schools, became a part of the ma- 
chine. With their teachers as officers, the school-children 
were obliged to assist the government in the imposition of 
its propaganda. Every person In America was reached, 
in one way or another, and almost daily. Is not the exist- 
ence of such a press agency a virtual admission that America 
went into the war unconvinced of its righteoushess? 
Coupled with the violent suppression of all opposition to 
the war, is it not material evidence of a determination to 
force distasteful beliefs upon an unwilling people? 

5. Circumstances of the "Liberty Loans." 

The large number of bond purchasers was mentioned as 
evidence of the popularity of the war. It is no evidence of 
such popularity, since, all Liberty Loans were floated chiefly 
by coercion. All the publicity, agitation, and appeals both 
to patriotism and cupidity, all the posters and literature, 



Did the American People Want War? 9 

all the personal solicitation, were not considered sufficient 
to sell the bonds. Coercion was resorted to as a policy. 
What is said of the Liberty Loan applies, in a somewhat 
lesser degree, to the Red Cross. Neither the large number 
of subscriptions to Liberty Bonds, nor those to the Red 
Cross are any evidence of the popularity of the war. 

6. The New York Municipal Election. 

After America's declaration of war, the only important 
election in which peace was permitted to become the issue, 
and in which freedom of discussion was allowed the candi- 
dates, was the election in New York, November, 19 17. 
The Mayor, Mr. Mitchel, deliberately chose to make his 
fight on the issue of patriotism. He directly charged his 
chief opponent, Hylan, with abetting German propaganda, 
and "exposed" him as an associate of "paid enemies of 
America." Mitchel was vigorously supported by conspicu- 
ous patriots, patriotic societies, and all the "loyal" city 
newspapers. The latter expressly warned the public that 
the defeat of Mitchel would be a virtual repudiation of the 
war by New York. Nevertheless, Hylan achieved the 
most decisive victory ever given to a party in the American 
metropolis, while the Socialist party, which frankly attacked 
the war, became a factor for the first time. The Socialist 
candidate, Hillquit, who had announced from the platform 
his refusal to buy Liberty Bonds, received 93 per cent, of 
the vote given Mitchel, while, of the 28,937 soldiers and sail- 
ors who voted in New York, but 6,226, or less than twenty- 
two out of each one hundred, cast their ballot for Mitchel. 

7. Circumstances of the Draft. 

Of the total number called in the first draft, more than 
one-half (50.62 per cent.) put In formal claims for exemp- 



10 Shall It Be Again? 

tlon. More than a quarter of a million (252,294), or 
eight per cent., failed to appear and succeeded in escaping 
arrest. The former figure, of course, does not represent 
all of the registrants who did not want to go to war, while 
the latter figure represents only a fraction of those willing 
to risk terms in the penitentiary rather than go, for the 
number evading registration is unknown. 

Many thousands who failed to register, and many thou- 
sands who registered but failed to respond to the call, were 
arrested. In the "slacker round-ups," staged in New York 
City alone, in the last days of August, 19 18, 16,000 men 
were held for offenses of this kind. So many men of draft 
age fled the country that it became expedient to promulgate 
an order forbidding the departure of such men, and to es- 
tablish an elaborate system of espionage, patrol, and pass- 
ports to enforce the order. In a statement issued Septem- 
ber 3, 19 1 8, the War Department said: "The Department 
of Justice has on file the names of 3000 slackers who fled 
to Mexico before June 5, 19 17, to escape registration." 
So many married to avoid the draft in the early months 
that it became expedient to serve notice on the country that 
eleventh-hour marriages would save no one from service. 
So many had their teeth extracted to render themselves 
physically ineligible that the War Department issued a 
warning to dentists that they were liable to prosecution for 
complicity in this form of draft evasion. 

In the ten months ending May i, 19 18, over 14,000 
desertions were reported from the army. The numbers 
seeking dishonorable discharge were even greater. At the 
end of December, 19 17, we were told that "for several 
weeks the army has been losing men at the rate of 100 to 
150 a day. They chose to commit offenses which led to 
their dishonorable discharge." The newspapers gave us 
instances of suicide and self-mutilations which were resorted 



Did the American People Want War? ii 

to as a means to escape the draft, and of men turning to 
crime with the deliberate intention of getting into the peni- 
tentiary and so escaping the draft. There were a number 
of anti-draft riots, and so much anti-draft sentiment that 
it became expedient to prevent, with an iron hand, the pub- 
lic assembly of persons opposing the draft, and to prose- 
cute and imprison hundreds of those most conspicuous in 
anti-draft agitation. There was also uncovered a thriving 
trade in exemption affidavits, involving^the crime of per- 
jury. 

When the draft bill became a law. President Wilson 
told the world: *'It [the draft] is in no sense a conscription 
of the unwilling; it is, rather, selection from a nation that 
has volunteered in mass" (Registration Proclamation, 
May 1 8, 19 17). Thereafter, an elaborate effort was 
made to throw a glamor about the draft, to make it appear 
that submission to the draft was, on the whole, voluntary 
and without compulsion. The large registration was 
pointed to as an evidence of the patriotism of America's 
young men. But under the circumstances the large regis- 
tration was no proof of willingness to serve; It showed, 
rather, that, in general, the opposition to service was over- 
come by fear of punishment, of which the President and 
patriotic leaders were careful to give repeated warning. 

The fact that severe penalties faced America's young 
men at every turn is itself evidence that the war leaders 
were well aware that, without coercion, they would have 
been unable to raise an army. Out of the first draft of 
three million men, not fewer than 300,000, and probably 
500,000, made themselves liable to punishment in the peni- 
tentiary in their efforts to evade service. In order to carry 
through our European adventure, it became necessary to 
subject millions to involuntary servitude, on the one hand, 
and to create a multitude of felons on the other. 



12 Shall It Be Again? 

8. Failure of Voluntary Enlistments. 

It is supposed that the people can be depended on to vol- 
unteer for a people's war. But, although the army recruit- 
ing service was extremely active throughout nearly all of 
the war period, and although special inducements were held 
out for volunteers, army enlistments from the date of the 
war message to the date of the armistice reached only the 
insignificant total of 393,931. 

Beginning February 3, after the severance of diplomatic 
relations, extraordinary efforts were put forth by the army, 
assisted by patriotic organizations and great business 
houses, to stimulate recruiting. But during February, the 
army received only 4,852 recruits, a figure not noticeably 
above the normal. From April i to May 14, the enlist- 
ments numbered only 67,443. A supreme effort was made 
during the last week of June, which the President desig- 
hated as Recruiting Week. But Recruiting Week netted 
only 9,043 men for the army. Between April i and July 
I, only 133,992 enlistments were received, and it is certain 
that many of these were prompted by the impending draft. 
At that rate it would have taken eighteen months to raise 
the first one million men. However, by July i recruiting 
had come almost to a standstill. Volunteering had been 
tried and proven a failure. When only one out of every 
one hundred men of the most courageous, adventurous, and 
self-sacrificing age responds to the repeated calls of his gov- 
ernment, during the first three months of a foreign war, it 
is a point against the popularity of the war which no rhet- 
oric can explain away. 

The impulse for America's war certainly did not come 
from the common people. 



Ill 

WAS AMERICA EVER IN DANGER? 

Why, my friends, we ought not to turn to those people [the na- 
tions at war] in fear, but in sympathy. We ought to realize that 
after this exhaustion they will need us, and that we need not fear 
them. — Woodrow Wilson, in speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 19 16. 

The American people were told that they were forced into 
war by the Kaiser; that America had been attacked, and 
that there was no other recourse except to defend itself 
against aggression; that the very sovereignty of the coun- 
try was imperiled; even that we were threatened with actual 
invasion and domination by German armies. 

President Wilson personally gave the signal for this 
particular note in the official and unofficial propaganda, as 
for all others. In asking for war he advised: ''That the 
Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German 
Government to he in fact nothing less than war. against the 
government and people of the United States; that if for- 
mally accept the status of belligerent that has thus been 
thrust upon it.'* In his message of December 4, 19 17, he 
asserted: ''JVe have been forced into it [the war] to save 
the very institutions we live under from corruption and de- 
struction'' At Urbana, January 31, 19 18, he told us: 
*'We are fighting y therefore^ as truly for the liberty and 
self-government of the United States as if the war of our 
own Revolution had to be fought over again." 

This doctrine was preached from thousands of platforms, 
thousands of pulpits, thousands of movie screens, millions 
of posters, in the daily newspapers, and in every vehicle of 

13 



14 Shall It Be Again? 

the propaganda. To carry out the idea, our war councils 
were called "defense councils," our private patriotic socie- 
ties "defense societies." The necessity for defense against 
invasion and outrage became, as intended, a fixed assump- 
tion of millions of perfectly sincere and truth-loving Ameri- 
cans. 

But what are the facts? 

1. Germany had not attacked the .territory of the 
United States, nor threatened to attack it. The only sug- 
gestion of the kind was contained in the proposal for a 
German-Mexican alliance, and this was expressly contin- 
gent upon America's first making war on Germany. (See 
Chapter XVIII.) 

2. Germany had perpetrated no injury against an Ameri- 
can not perpetrated also against neutrals generally, and 
such injuries as she had perpetrated were wholly incidental 
to the war against the Entente governments. 

3. Germany had not declared war against the United 
States. The German government had striven to avoid war, 
offering every concession short of abandoning subniarine 
operations in European waters, even making overtures for 
a peaceful understanding subsequently to the breaking of 
diplomatic relations. 

4. Germany was physically incapable of invading 
America at the time when some of us were asserting that 
our war was to repel invasion. 

5. Germany would have been physically incapable of 
invading America even had she possessed no other ene- 
mies. This was the judgment of the highest experts in the 
service of America, sworn to before Congressional com- 
mittees while this country was neutral. 

December 9, 19 14, Admiral Fletcher, who was at that 
time the highest active officer of the navy, informed the 
House Naval Affairs Committee that, even were it possible 



Was America Ever in Danger? 15 

for the entire German navy to take the high seas and attack, 
not a single German could be landed on American soil, 
since the American navy, being stronger, would defeat it. 
In April, 19 17, the relative strength of the American navy 
was greater than in December, 19 14. 

During these Congressional investigations, it was shown 
that, to carry a little army of 96,000 men across the sea 
would require 270 troop transport vessels, a greater col- 
lection of ships than had ever sailed together in the annals 
of naval warfare ; and that an army had never been moved 
successfully overseas and landed under hostile guns, the 
Dardanelles catastrophe having been the result of the only 
great undertaking of that character. 

Admiral Fletcher testified that the war in Europe had 
^* conclusively demonstrated zvhat every military strategist 
knew before, that it is impossible for sea craft successfully 
to attack land fortifications J' 

As to our land fortifications, General Weaver testified 
that they were already ^Uhe best in the world/' The guns 
mounted and contemplated in the appropriations for our 
coast defenses, he said, would give us "an entirely satis- 
factory defense." 

Admiral Knight characterized the difficulties of trans- 
porting a fleet across either the Atlantic or Pacific ocean 
and maintaining it in American waters — a necessary feat in 
a successful invasion — as "almost insuperable." 

Corroborating Knight, General Miles testified: 

I will suppose an unsupposable case. Suppose they could put an 
army on a fleet of 500 ships and move it across the Atlantic without 
being disturbed by -any naval power, and they could land. They 
certainly could not go into any port. They could not go into our 
ports any more than they could go through the Dardanelles. That 
has been demonstrated. Our forts are equipped and fortified as 
well as the Dardanelles. Suppose they got that far — as to landing 



i6 Shall It Be Again? 

at some remote point — if we could not gather enough men in the 
army and militia, and by other means, to destroy that army before 
they could send their ships back and get another load, I would want 
to move to another country. 

May I, 19 17, Admiral Chocherprat of the French navy, 
here with the French war mission, told the newspaper cor- 
respondents: "The United States is in possession of the 
most powerful fleet in the world next to the British." 

This disposes also of the assertion, heard so many times 
from 19 14 on, that the United States owed its immunity 
from German invasion to the protection of the British 
navy. 

Finally, when the German high seas fleet fell into Allied 
hands at the end of the war, it was discovered that the 
bunker capacity of the German battleships was extremely 
small, demonstrating that they had been designed for use 
only near the home ports. The very structure of these 
great ships rendered impracticable any sustained or ex- 
tended operations In distant waters. Of themselves they 
are proof that the German government had not entertained 
a thought of attacking the territory of the United States. 

President Wilson himself, In the period preceding war, 
repeatedly rejected the Idea of a possible Invasion of this 
country. In his message of December 8, 19 14, he said: 
'Wo one who speaks counsel based on facts or drawn from 
a just and candid interpretation of the realities can say that 
there is any reason to fear that from any quarter our inde- 
pendence or the integrity of our territory is threatened. 
Dread of the power of other nations we are incapable of** 
To a New York audience, January 27, 19 17, he declared: 
**Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United 
States needs to fear an invasion of its own territory.** 

We find the leaders of our allies in agreement with this 



Was America Ever in Danger? 17 

view, even after our war declaration. In the speeches 
delivered in the British Parliament, April i8, 19 17, acclaim- 
ing our participation, it was held that the United States had 
not been directly attacked in any way, much less invaded or 
threatened with invasion. 

Mr. Asquith said that the war **was doing little appre- 
ciable harm to the material fortunes and prosperity of 
the American people. Nor were American interests, at 
home or abroad, directly imperiled, least of all the greatest 
interest of a democratic community, the maintenance of 
domestic independence and liberty." 

Earl Curzon said: 

The case of America entering the war is widely difFerentiated 
from that of any of the other allied countries. All of the latter 
had a direct personal interest in the war, but America's interest is 
secondary and remote. 

A month after the declaration of war. President Wilson 
used the words: *'We have gone in with no special griev- 
ance of our own." Challenged for appearing to suggest 
that we had gone into the war for no cause at all, he 
answered that we had grievances, but none that was not 
shared generally by the neutral countries. 

Finally, after the fighting was over, President Wilson 
confessed: ^^ America was not immediately in danger. . . . 
America was not directly attacked/^ (At Billings, Sept. 
II, 1919.) 

The undeniable truth is that, in order to come to grips 
with the enemy, it was necessary to send our forces across 
a great ocean, into another hemisphere, and either hunt him 
down on a narrow strip of sea or attack him in his own 
trenches, dug In another continent. Instead of the enemy's 
carrying the war to us, it was we who carried the war to the 
enemy. Instead of being placed In the position of defend- 



i8 Shall It Be Again? 

ing our soil against German armies, we placed the Germans 
in the position of defending their soil against American 
armies. 

Where was the element of self-defense? 

There was asserted a necessity for defense of the alleged 
rights to trade and travel through a narrow zone of sea, 
three thousand miles from American territory. But what 
has this to do with the horrible pictures of German fire 
and sword in American cities? 

The nearest connection is found in the theory that the 
Kaiser and his people were inflamed with an ambition to 
conquer and rule the world, and that there was a possi- 
bility of their doing it at some future time. Even were 
there a reasonable basis for such a hypothesis (and there 
was not) , it would not have justified war, either under exist- 
ing principles of international law, the common practices 
of modern governments, or in common sense. For to pro- 
ceed consistently upon such a principle would require us to 
attack every other powerful nation, and attempt at once 
to assert a world supremacy for ourselves. 

America was never in danger even after we went to war 
with Germany, for we were never placed beyond the pos- 
sibility of turning back without serious hurt. At all times 
we were in a position to make peace and withdraw without 
vital injury from the enemy. 

After we had gone to war, the imposition of onerous 
terms upon the Russian Soviet Government, in the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk, was seized upon as a horrible example of 
what would happen to America should she not put her heel 
upon the neck of the Kaiser. The comparison was Inept; 
the Kaiser's armies were never in America and there was 
never the remotest probability of their coming to America 
or attempting to do so. Will any one contend that the 



Was America Ever in Danger? 19 

German government was at any time unwilling to conclude 
the same terms of peace that we rejected in the first months 
of 19 17 — friendship on any basis short of giving up the 
submarine blockade of England and her allies? (See 
Chapter XVI.) 

The point is important ; for the bludgeoning down of all 
domestic opposition to the war was excused only on the 
plea that, once we were at war, there was no choice except 
between victory and disaster. It was upon this assumption 
that so many prominent persons, who opposed war up to 
the declaration, became "now-that-we're-in" patriots. 
They were willing to support a war which they believed 
to be unjust, merely because it had begun. Under the cir- 
cumstances that America happened to be in, there was no 
defensible reason why any one who opposed the war before 
April 6, 1 9 17, should have favored it after that date. 

Whatever the merits of the issues with the Kaiser, there 
was no issue of invasion, no issue of territorial integ- 
rity, no issue of domination or destruction of American 
institutions, no immediate and pressing danger of any kind. 
Self-defense was a catchword. The Hun invasion was a 
gigantic hoax. The scare propaganda was created out of 
whole cloth. These stories were told us only because the 
element of fear was considered necessary for patriotic pur- 
poses. The great American public had to be frightened 
in order to induce it to take the war programme. 



DEMOCRACY AND GETTING INTO WAR 

IV 

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE MAN 

Governments have gone to war with one another. Peoples, so 
far as I can remember, have not, and this is a government of the 
people, and this people is not going to choose wslt. — ^Woodrov^^ 
Wilson, at Milw^aukee, Jan. 31, 19 16. 

America's declaration of war was adopted, as it had to 
be, by Congress, but only after Congress had been called 
upon to do so by the President, who had so set the stage 
as to render it extremely humiliating to himself, and politi- 
cally embarrassing to his party, to turn back. The decla- 
ration was carried by a vote of 373 to 50 in the House, and 
82 to 6 in the Senate, a large majority for an ordinary mea- 
sure, but not so large for a declaration of war, where the 
pressure for unanimity is always nearly overwhelming. 
The author sat in the Senate gallery throughout the war 
debate. A most frequent argument in favor of the res- 
olution was that it was a question of standing behind the 
President in a controversy with a foreign power. Speakers 
who announced their intention of voting "yes" expressly as- 
serted that they would vote "no," except for the fact that 
war had already been decided on, the resolution was going 
through, and opposition was useless. 

President Wilson had complete control of our end of 
the diplomatic negotiations which failed of their professed 
object, peace, and by progressive steps carried the nation 
into belligerency. 

20 



The Responsibility of One Man 21 

It was Wilson who sent the ^'strict-accountability" note; 
Wilson's uncompromising attitude that caused the resig- 
nation of Secretary of State Bryan; Wilson who threatened 
to sever diplomatic relations in 191 6, unless Germany 
should "now immediately declare and effect an abandon- 
ment of its present methods of warfare against passenger 
and freight carrying vessels." 

It was Wilson who led the preparedness agitation, who 
oversaw the drafting of bills providing for the largest 
mlHtary and naval appropriations ever expended by any 
nation in the world In peace times, and urged these bills 
through Congress. 

It was Wilson who omitted to hold England to the strict 
accountability which he exacted of Germany; Wilson who 
broke off diplomatic relations when Germany announced 
its purpose of waging submarine warfare unrestricted; 
Wilson who rejected Germany's offer to reopen relations 
looking towards a continuation of American neutrality. It 
was Wilson who requested from Congress the power to en- 
gage in hostilities at his own discretion; Wilson who, when 
that request was not acceded to, assumed the power that 
Congress had failed to grant, and placed public fighting 
men upon private ships. It was Wilson who finally de- 
manded of Congress a declaration of war against Germany. 

It may be thought that President Wilson was forced 
Into belligerent measures,, or Into measures leading towards,^ 
belligerency, by some other public factor. Of these other 
factors there existed three: 

1. Congress. 

2. The general public. 

3. A minority of the public having an Interest in bellig- 
erency. 

But whenever our controversy with Germany found Its 
way before Congress, it invariably appeared that Congress 



22 Shall It Be Again? 

was more pacifically inclined than was the President. Dur- 
ing the period of diplomatic strife, the President engaged 
in two notable contests with Congress in which his aggres- 
sive attitude toward Germany was seriously opposed. 

The first of these contests occurred early in 191 6, and 
was occasioned by the announcement of Germany that the 
armed merchant vessels of its enemies would be regarded 
as ships of war. A strong opinion developed, both in and 
out of Congress, that persons taking passage on such armed 
ships should do so at their own risk, and the chairman of 
each of the Foreign Relations Committees notified the Pres- 
ident that a clear majority of his respective committee 
and house favored a formal warning to American citizens 
against risking their lives on such vessels. Speaker Clark 
told the President that Congress was "three to one" in 
favor of such a warning. 

But the President opposed warning Americans against 
taking passage on armed ships, and insisted that the pend- 
ing resolutions asking him to warn them be voted down 
"to prove that there were no divided councils in Congress 
in regard to the foreign policy of the government." 

During this struggle between the comparatively bellig- 
erent President and the comparatively pacific Congress, 
Senator Gore charged the President with telling various 
Senators and Representatives that war with Germany 
"might not be an evil." The testimony of Senator Gore 
was confirmed publicly and privately by other Senators. 
Following the tabling of the Gore and McLemore resolu- 
tions, three members of Mr. Wilson's party — two of whom 
had voted to table the resolutions "for party reasons" — 
announced their intention of retiring from Congress be- 
cause of their belief that the President was directing the 
course of the country into war. ^ 

1 Representatives R. Page (N. C), I. Sherwood (O.), and J. Eagle (Tex.). 



The Responsibility of One Man 23 

The President's other notable contest with Congress oc- 
curred over his request for a grant of power "to supply 
our merchant ships with defensive arms . . . and to em- 
ploy any other instrumentalities or methods that may be nec- 
essary or adequate to protect our ships and our people in 
their legitimate and peaceful pursuits of the seas." (Feb. 
26, 19 17.) A bill, the Armed Ships Bill, drawn at the 
White House, brought out the President's wishes a little 
more definitely. It authorized the Executive to supply 
private vessels "with arms and also the necessary ammuni- 
tion and means for making use of them," and "to employ 
such other instrumentalities and methods as may in his 
judgment and discretion seem necessary and adequate to 
protect such vessels," as well as a grant of $100,000,000 
"for the purpose of carrying into effect the foregoing pro- 
visions." 

The Congressional Record, and the newspapers of the 
day, show that a large number of Senators and Represen- 
tatives believed that war would inevitably result were the 
President permitted to carry out his plans, and that it was 
due chiefly to this belief that the bill was generally opposed 
in the beginning. Chairman Flood, of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, was sent to interview the President and 
induce him to modify his demands, but failed. Senator 
Stone, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, 
refused to handle the bill on the floor. 

It was only under the President's whip that in the end 
the House paissed the bill, but so modified that the use of 
"other instrumentalities" was not authorized. In the 
Senate, numerous amendments were offered seeking to re- 
strict the possible belligerent action of the President. The 
bill failed of final passage through the opposition of twelve 
Senators, who pinned their hope of peace on forcing the 
President to call an extra session of Congress. 



24 Shall It Be Again? 

The tactics of the President at the time led to the con- 
clusion, freely expressed in newspapers, friendly as well as 
unfriendly, that he preferred not to, call an extra session 
for fear Congress would interfere with the vigorous mea- 
sures that he had determined to take against Germany. 

When, February 13, minority-leader Mann inserted in 
the Navy Bill an amendment, reaf^rming it to be the policy 
of the United States "to adjust and settle its international 
disputes through mediation or arbitration, to the end that 
war may be honorably avoided," it was characterized as 
"a pacifist ruse," and "a slap at Wilson." Who will not 
recall that during the last few weeks before the declaration 
of war, every element that had been advocating war, in- 
cluding notable political opponents of the President, joined 
in execration of the Congressmen who were "causing de- 
lay," and of pacifism and pacifists; in a chorus of praise of 
Wilson, and of supplication to the nation to "stand behind 
the President?" What else could that mean except that 
those who wanted war judged that the course of the Presi- 
dent led to war, and were fearful lest Congress might "keep 
us out of war," in spite of the President? 

From the above, it is clear that Congress did not force 
the Executive into war or any of the measures that led to it. 
The pacific wish of the people has already been pointed out. 
Did any minority of the public force the President into 
steps that led to war? 

Did Wall Street force the President Into war? 

The collected facts presented In later chapters will an- 
swer the question of Wall Street's part in the responsibility 
for war. Meanwhile, a moment's thought on the com- 
manding position in which the President stood is sufliclent 
to bring the conclusion that the primary responsibility can- 
not be shifted to the shoulders of Wall Street. Whatever 



The Responsibility of One Man 25 

pressure Wall Street may have exerted upon the President, 
Wall Street did not have the power to compel action. 

The President hacj been reelected for a period of four 
years on a peace platform. He was commander-in-chief 
of the army and navy, which were not threatening rebel- 
lion. Had President Wilson chosen to pursue policies simi- 
lar to those of Switzerland, or Holland, or Sweden, or Den- 
mark, or Spain, which kTept those countries out of war, he 
would have met with criticism, but no means short of revo- 
lution could have changed the course of the country. 
There is no evidence that Wall Street was threatening 
revolution, or that it would have been successful in a revolu- 
tion had it started one. 

Congress and every other element of influence in 
American life must bear its share of the responsibiHty for 
our European adventure, but the political and moral 
responsibility lies first upon Woodrow Wilson. 



PRESIDENTIAL USURPATIONS TO ACHIEVE BELLIGERENCY 

The provision of the Constitution giving the w^ar-making power ta 
Congress w^as dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: 
Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in 
wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the peo- 
ple was the object. This our convention understood to be the most 
oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved so to frame 
the Constitution that no man should hold the power of bringing 
this oppression upon us. — Abraham Lincoln. 

"The Congress shall have power ... to declare war," 
says the Constitution. Is, or is not, the power to declare 
war inclusive of the power to make war? And is, or is 
not, the Executive excluded from exercising such power? 
President Wilson's own answer was given to the public a 
number of times during his preparedness tour. At Chi- 
cago, January 31, 19 16, he said: 

This war was brought on by rulers, not by the people, and I 
thank God that there is no man in America who has the authority 
to bring on war without the consent of the people. 

And the following night at Des Moines : 

I was saying the other night that I know of no case where one 
people made war upon another people. No government can make 
war in the United States. The people make war through their 
representatives. The Constitution of the United States does not 
give the President even a participating part in the making of war. 
War can be declared only by Congress, by an action which the 
President does not take part in, and cannot veto. I am literally, by 
constitutional arrangement, the mere servant of the people's repre- 
sentatives. 

j6 



Presidential Usurpations 27 

But Wilson never followed this theory in action. From 
the beginning of his administration, the Congressional de- 
bates frequently brought put a feeling of resentment 
against his assumption of all power over foreign relations, 
and his disinclination to take Congress into his confidence in 
such matters. As early as October, 19 14, we find him is- 
suing the warning: "The foreign policy of the government 
. . . lies outside the field of legislation." (Letter to floor- 
leader Underwood.) 

In the dispute with Germany, we find him asserting the 
question of warning Americans against traveling on the 
armed ships of the Entente to be "clearly within the field 
of Executive initiative," (Letter to Representative Pou) ; 
although it was conceded at the time that this issue was 
likely to determine the question of peace or war. During 
the same period. Senator Jones of Washington introduced 
a resolution asking the President not to break off relations 
with any country, nor to place America in any other posi- 
tion where it could not with honor avoid war. But the 
resolution was not accorded the Presidential favor. 

When an executive ( i ) sends an ultimatum to a foreign 
power (threatening to sever diplomatic relations) without 
first notifying or seeking the advice of the people's repre- 
sentatives; (2) breaks diplomatic relations without first 
notifying or seeking the advice of the people's representa- 
tives; (3) refuses mediation without notifying or seeking 
the advice of the people's representatives; (4) arms pri- 
vate ships with naval crews without the consent of the 
people's representatives, and sends these ships to sea with 
orders to the crews to fire at sight on the vessels of another 
nation technically at peace with us, it can hardly be main- 
tained that he is acting as "the mere servant of the people's 
representatives," or that he is not exercising "even a 
participating part in the making ot war." 



28 Shall It Be Again? 

In overruling Congress on the question of warning 
American citizens against taking passage on the armed 
ships of belligerent countries, President Wilson was pro- 
ceeding from an assumption that Germany's use of the sub- 
marine was an offense against "the sacred and indisputable 
rules of international law." (Note of Apr. i8, 19 16.) 
But as Wilson himself had substantially admitted, (Note 
of July 21, 1915), the legal and illegal uses of the sub- 
marine had not been adjudicated in any international court, 
treaty, or In any other way. The President had no right 
whatever to create, by Executive fiat, a new international 
law for the world to go by. ^^Congress shall have power 
... to define and punish . . . offenses against the law 
of nations." His extreme recourse would have been to go 
before Congress and ask that body to lay down a law on 
the submarine, and to direct him as to any procedure to be 
taken to meet its illegal use. 

Again, in the debates on the Armed Ships Bill, it was 
repeatedly admitted that the President's request for a 
grant of power was a request for the war-making power, 
which Congress cannot constitutionally relinquish or give 
away. Subsequently, in explaining to his constituents his 
opposition to the bill, Senator LaFollette quoted two deci- 
sions of the United States Supreme Court. The first held 
that when Congress authorized private armed ships of the 
United States to defend themselves against the armed ships 
of France, it constituted a declaration of war, the court 
asserting: "Every contention by force, between two nations. 
In external matters, under the authority of their respective 
governments, is not only war, but public war." The sec- 
ond held: "To the legislative power alone it must belong 
to determine when the violence of other nations Is to be 
met with violence." 

In the same debates, It was generally conceded that the 



Presidential Usurpations 29 

arming or convoying of munitions ships would constitute 
an aggressive act, since munitions, being absolute contra- 
band, were subject to seizure and destruction under all in- 
terpretations of international law. The President, never- 
theless, refused to accept an amendment prohibiting the 
arming or convoying of ships carrying munitions. 

During the week ending March 4, therefore. President 
Wilson violated his oath of office by asking Congress for 
authority which It was constitutionally precluded from 
granting. He planned a violation of the Constitution, by 
the uncontrolled exercise of the war-making power. He 
planned a violation of international law, In seeking to be- 
gin hostilities without a formal declaration. This record, 
however, was surpassed in the following week. The Armed 
Ships Bill failed, and the President usurped the authority 
which Congress had failed to grant, arming private ships 
with naval guns, and making no distinction between muni- 
tions ships and others. 

Not only had members of the national law-making body 
taken the view that any armament upon munitions ships 
would transform such ships into ships of war, and that any 
use of such armament would constitute an act of war, but 
an examination of the American White Book discloses the 
fact that President Wilson had also taken this view; more- 
over, that the other conditions under which our armed ships 
put to sea — armament fore and aft, orders to fire before be- 
ing fired upon, naval crews, submarine chasers — swept 
away all the salient distinctions which the American govern- 
ment and the British government had previously drawn 
between armed merchant ships and war vessels. (See 
Chapter XV.) 

The conclusion must be that our war with Germany 
dates, not from April 6, 19 17, but from March 17, when 
our first "armed merchantman" put to sea; that, in sending 



30 Shall It Be Again? 

this ship to sea, the President knowingly usurped the war- 
making power. 

By the same act, also, the President violated definite 
Federal statutes which prohibit a merchant vessel of the 
United States, whether carrying contraband or not, from 
defending itself against the fighting craft of a nation with 
which this country is not at war. This was admitted by 
the President himself, March 4, in a "supplementary state- 
ment from the White House," in which the President con- 
ceded that ^'there were certain old statutes as yet unre- 
pealed which raised insuperable practical obstacles and vir- 
tually nullified his power/^ 

True, the President made a slight modification of this 
statement a few hours later, and five days later he reversed 
himself completely. (For quotations see Appendix, p. 
435.) But the statutes to which the President referred in 
his "supplementary statement from the White House" are 
so clear that a layman can be as sure of their meaning as a 
Supreme Court Judge. Enacted to permit the arming of 
merchant vessels against pirates, in the days of pirates, they 
expressly prohibit the use of such armament, even for de- 
fense, against a "public armed vessel of a nation in amity 
with the United States." Although in March, 19 17, a 
German submarine was certainly a "public armed vessel," 
and Germany under the law "a nation in amity with the 
United States," there appeared, from various pro-war sa- 
vants, arguments upholding the right of the President to 
arm private ships and send them to sea. All of such argu- 
ments were based upon one or more of three theories : that 
(i) the statute is inapplicable, because of old age; (2) 
submarines are pirate ships and Germany a nation of pi- 
rates; or (3) Germany was already waging war against 
the United States. 

The answer to the first proposition Is that all statutes 



Presidential Usurpations 31 

are equally binding until repealed; the answer to the second 
that, even did the German submarine warfare correspond, 
in essential details, with the practice of piracy, the Presi- 
dent did not possess the authority to act upon any judgment 
of his own that it was piracy. ^^Congress shall have power 
... to define and punish piracies and felonies committed 
on the high seas." Congress had not defined German sub- 
marine warfare as piracy. As to the third proposition, 
the same answer applies. The Constitution precluded the 
Executive from defining the submarine operations as war- 
fare against the United States. Had he believed the oper- 
ations to be war, his only legal recourse was to go before 
Congress and ask for a declaration of war against Ger- 
many. 

Why, then, did not President Wilson ask Congress to 
declare war on February 26, 19 17, instead of requesting 
a grant of power to start war at his own discretion? 

The answer is clearly revealed in the Congressional de- 
bates of that period — because Congress could not have 
been persuaded to declare war on that date. It was easier 
to procure the vote of a Senator or Congressman for a 
proposition to trust the Executive with extraordinary 
powers, than to obtain that vote for a declaration of war. 

On February 26, Congress had not been sufficiently 
brought under control. The time was not quite ripe. 

The nation had not been sufficiently excited, confused and 
frightened. The Armed Ships Bill, and after that, the 
arming of the ships, were a part of the process of prepara- 
tion, as were other Presidential maneuvers that will next 
be recalled. 



VI 

OUR STEALTHY APPROACH TO WAR 

*'The rupture of diplomatic relations is a serious step, 
which generally ends in war," says Professor Lawrence. 
("Principles of International Law," p. 301.) Yet in his 
address to Congress announcing the rupture of relations 
with Germany (Feb. 3, 19 17), President Wilson gave the 
most direct assurances of peaceful purpose: 

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German 
Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people, 
and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the government which 
speaks for them. 

During the following week nothing whatever happened 
to change the situation internationally. The German gov- 
ernment then made an effort, through the Swiss legation, 
which was in charge of its affairs at Washington, to resume 
peaceful relations, the following being the text of the mem- 
orandum addressed to the American government: 

The Swiss government has been requested by the German govern- 
ment to say that the latter is now, as before, willing to negotiate, 
formally or informally, with the United States, provided that the 
commercial blockade against England will not be broken thereby. 

This offer was rejected by President Wilson, whose an- 
swer contained the following words: 

The government of the United States would gladly discuss with 
the German government any questions it might propose for discussion 
were it to withdraw its proclamation of the 31st of January [an- 

32 



Our Stealthy Approach to War 33 

nouncing unrestricted submarine warfare] . . . but ... it does 
not feel that it can enter into any discussion with the German gov- 
ernment concerning the policy of submarine warfare against neutrals 
which it is now pursuing unless and until the German government 
renews its assurances of the 4th of May, and acts upon this assurance. 

No Issue could be clearer. Germany was determined to 
meet the British commercial blockade of Germany with a 
German commercial blockade of England, while Wilson 
was insisting that the German blockade be raised, after 
having receded from his Insistence that the British blockade 
be raised. Until this time, any theory that the President 
did not yet foresee war must give him credit for a far- 
fetched hope that Germany would consent to abandon per- 
manently her blockade, notwithstanding the refusal of 
England to abandon her blockade, which In the beginning 
Wilson had Inveighed against on similar grounds and with 
almost equal vigor. After this there remained not a 
shadow of an excuse for such a hope. Nevertheless, while 
moving with deadly accuracy towards war, the President 
continued to assure the country that he was treading the 
path of peace. 

His next belligerent step came In the request for a grant 
of power. This step was taken In spite of the virtual prom- 
ise, given February 3, that no further moves would be 
made until Germany should commit "actual overt acts." 
In the speech of February 26, Indeed, the President admit- 
ted that "the overt act which I have ventured to hope the 
German commanders would in fact avoid has not occurred." 
The hostile nature of the request for a grant of power was 
covered by another eloquent declaration of pacific purpose, 
as follows: 

There may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we shall 
know how to maintain, and for which there is abundant American 



34 Shall It Be Again? 

precedent. It is devoutly to be hoped that it will not be necessary 
to put armed forces anywhere into action. The American people do 
not desire it, and our desire is not different from theirs. ... I am a 
friend of peace, and mean to preserve it for America as long as I 
am able. I am not now proposing or contemplating war, or any 
steps that lead to it. . . . No course of my choosing will lead to 
war. ... I believe that the people will trust me to act with re- 
straint, with prudence, and in the true spirit of amity and good faith 
that they have themselves displayed throughout these trying months. 

But if the President did not expect war to begin when 
one of his naval crews upon a munitions ship, sighting a 
submarine, fired upon it, what did he think would happen? 

Had the fighting begun In this way, of course, the claim 
would have been made that the conflict had been initiated 
by an act of Germany. Even had this been true, it would 
not have changed the fact that no surer road to war could 
have been chosen than the one contemplated. 

But it would not have been true. For the President's 
plans were not in any legal sense defensive. Not only was 
it his purpose to arm the private ships fore and aft, but he 
had other plans of so aggressive a nature that he attempted, 
guiltily, to conceal them from Congress. The plan to use 
submarine chasers had been confided to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee only, and when Senator Stone re- 
vealed it, there was an uproar against him from Adminis- 
tration supporters. It was also denied that the President 
Intended to arm munitions ships. President Wilson could 
not but have known that he intended to initiate technical 
war against Germany; that by the very act of sending the 
armed ships to sea, under such conditions, he was making a 
belligerent attack upon a technically friendly power, as 
clearly so as If he had sent a fleet of battleships to bombard 
the German coasts. 

Throughout the speech of February 26, the President 



Our Stealthy Approach to War 35 

rang the changes upon the idea of American rights. But, 
under the circumstances planned by him, America would 
possess no rights whatever, no matter what the merits of 
the issue with the Kaiser, and would remain altogether in 
the wrong until a legal declaration of war should be made. 

The term, "armed neutrality," itself was highly mis- 
leading. For there is no precedent, "abundant" or other- 
wise, for such an armed neutrality as was proposed, either 
in American history or in the history of other countries. 
An armed neutrality is an alliance of powers banded to- 
gether to enforce their views of neutral rights on the high 
seas. In all history there have been but two, that of 1780 
and that of 1800. In both cases they came into existence 
in an effort to curb British lawlessness. Both were fail- 
ures; both were broken up and the component parts drawn 
into war itself. During the frantic efforts to put forth a 
plausible precedent for the President's scheme, the ac- 
tion of America in 1798 was called into comparison, and 
was tarred with the name, "armed neutrality." The act 
of Congress of 1798 was directed against France, which 
was seizing neutral shipping engaged in the British trade; 
it empowered the President to take hostile measures on be- 
half of American shipping. It was this very action which 
our Attorney-General and our courts interpreted as war, 
and not neutrality, armed or unarmed. The President put 
into effect the measures authorized, and war was actually 
carried on upon the seas for a considerable period. Nei- 
ther of these cases furnishes a precedent upon which any 
sane executive would act with a view to preserving peace. 

Continuing his protestations of peaceful intention, the 
President denounced the Senators who defeated the Armed 
Ships Bill, not on the ground that they had made war more 
difficult, but on the ground that they had made peace more 
difficult! In his inaugural address, March 5, he assured 



36 Shall It Be Again? 

the country: "We stand firm in armed neutrality." 
Whereupon he proceeded to the next hostile step, the arm- 
ing of the ships. 

The first armed ship that the President started for the 
barred zone was the "St. Louis," which belonged to the 
American Line, a subsidiary to the International Mercan- 
tile Marine Company, whose stock control was held in 
England, and whose financial head in the United States was 
J. P. Morgan, financial agent of the British government. 
The beautiful processes of our armed "neutrality" were 
pictured by Senator LaFollette in a letter explaining his 
opposition to the Armed Ships Bill: 

Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, whose visits to the Navy Department to 
secure guns for his ships, whose interviews and movements have 
been featured as though he were the head and front of the American 
merchant marine, is the active manager of these combined properties 
— British, Belgian, and American. When one of the American 
Line ships, armed with United States guns, sails out to sea, the 
orders to fire will be given by Mr. Franklin's master of the ship, 
not by the United States gunner. The English owners give orders 
to Franklin. The English owners take their orders from the Bri- 
tish Admiralty. Hence we, professing to be a neutral nation, are 
placing American guns and American gunners practically under the 
orders of the British Admiralty. 

By April 2, however, matters had progressed so far 
that President Wilson himself was ready to admit the 
very worst that had been said, or could be said, about his 
scheme to "save the nation from war." Said he on that 
date : 

Armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable . . . because 
... it is impossible to defend ships against their [submarines'] 
attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would 
defend themselves. . . . Armed neutrality ... is practically cer- 
tain to draw us into the war. 



Our Stealthy Approach to War 37 

Which is precisely what he had denounced the 'Vilful 
twelve" for saying. 

What had happened to cause the President to see the 
light? Had anything happened to test the practicability of 
his "armed neutrality?" Not one of his armed ships had 
yet met a submarine ! 

The enormity of the thing can be grasped only when it 
is remembered that the end of the 64th Congress was near. 
The Armed Ships Bill reached the House and Senate 
sixty-eight and fifty hours, respectively, before ad- 
journment. Meanwhile, Administration leaders had de- 
layed many important bills, among them the great appro- 
priation bills. What deduction is to be drawn from this 
except that there was a studied purpose to limit debate and 
rush the bill through along with necessary bills, at the last 
moment, to let Congress go, leaving the President in con- 
trol of the situation, with the country confident of his in- 
tent for peace, while he stood clothed with the power and 
intent to make war? What other conclusion is possible ex- 
cept that the term, "armed neutrality," was chosen only be- 
cause it sounded like peace, and for the moment served to 
cloak a belligerent purpose? 

The defeat of the Armed Ships Bill prevented the plan 
from working in exactly that way. But the end was 
reached by a slightly different path. The President began 
by sending the armed ships to sea without authorization. 
Forced to call an extra session, he at first set the date for 
April 16, when it was to be expected that the first gun 
would have been fired in "defense" of an "American mer- 
chant" ship "attacked" by a submarine, and that it would 
then be possible to inform Congress that we were already 
at war by virtue of aggression on the part of Germany. 

The order to our naval crews was to fire at sight. But, 
whether by design or accident, German submarines kept 



38 Shall It Be Again? 

out of sight. The arming of the ships served its purpose, 
nevertheless; for it rendered an ultimate clash certain. 
Since war was assured, to stand for peace was to stand for 
the enemy; to stand for war was to stand for the country; 
to stand behind the President was to stand for war. 

The press finished the business — the press, the suddenly 
swarming patriotic societies, the suddenly awakened coun- 
cils of defense, the suddenly omnipresent Department of 
Justice. It is true that the "leaders" of the people proved 
to be for war. The public was confused, frightened, dis- 
organized; the cry for war deafened every other sound — 
until, presently, the President dared call Congress for an 
earlier date, dared confess his "armed neutrality" "Imprac- 
ticable," dared acknowledge the fraudulent nature of all of 
his pacific utterances, from February 3 on, by going hack 
for his casus belli to the German proclamation of January 
57 announcing unrestricted submarine warfare. 



VII 

THE 19 I 6 ELECTION 

When I have made a promise as a man I try to keep it, and I 
know of no other rule permissible to a nation. The most distin- 
guished nation in the world is the nation that can and will keep its 
promises, even to its own hurt. — Woodrow Wilson, in address at 
Philadelphia, July 4, 19 14. 

British statesmen agree with the conclusion that the re- 
sponsibility for America's participation in the war rests first 
upon Woodrow Wilson, even that the President plotted 
war long before it was possible to bring it about. Here 
are three quotations from leading members of the British 
government, made in speeches in the British Parliament, 
April 18, 19 1 7, acclaiming America's participation: 

A twice-elected President, representing 100,000,000 people of the 
most peace-loving and least aggressive nation of the earth, has sum- 
moned his people to arms with a trumpet call. — Earl Curzon. 

WTiat, then, has enabled the President, after waiting with the 
patience which Pitt described as the first virtue of statesmanship — to 
carry with him a united nation into the hazards and horrors of the 
greatest war in history? — Mr. Asquith. 

The difficulties with which President Wilson has been confronted 
in the last two and one-half years have not been sufficiently ap- 
preciated in this country. He had to keep the nation uni'.ed and 
bring it united into the war. He had to deal with a people who 
had a deep-seated and ineradicable hatred of war. To bring the 
United States into the war was to make them go against one of the 
deepest instincts of the soul of the race. — John Dillon. 

39 



40 Shall It Be Again? 

The speech of the Honorable John Dillon is a polite 
suggestion that the President consciously deceived the 
American people for two and one-half years, with a view ul- 
timately to bringing it into the war on the side of England. 

The fact that the most emphasized w^ar motives claimed 
by the Administration after April, 19 17 (a crusade against 
German autocracy, militarism and imperialism), run far 
back of two and one-half years — far back even of 19 14 
— gives ground for the Dillon theory. For any assump- 
tion that these professed motives were sincere would neces- 
sarily include an admission either that the President plan- 
ned war on Germany during all the period in which he was 
promising peace, or that he was profoundly ignorant of 
what was going on in the world prior to August, 19 14, as 
well as subsequently to that time. 

During the first several months following August, 19 14, 
however, President Wilson apparently had no idea of in- 
volving America in the European struggle. He not only 
declared repeatedly that the war was no business of ours, 
that its causes could not touch us, that America could not 
be endangered by it, that we had no interest in its out- 
come, that war was invariably futile, anyhow; not only sug- 
gested that both sides were at fault, and urged many rea- 
sons why America could best serve the world by holding 
aloof, but acted accordingly; he opposed preparedness, 
and took a high and far-seeing stand in announcing that 
Wall Street loans to either side would be "inconsistent 
with the spirit of neutrality." 

It is interesting to recall that, in the Congressional cam- 
paign of 19 14, President Wilson was claiming votes for his 
party on his stand on the war loan question. In the Demo- 
cratic Congressional campaign book of that year appears 
an extended explanation by Secretary of State Bryan of 
the Wilson position. Said the Secretary in part: 



The 1916 Election 41 

It is Inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality for a neutral nation 
to make loans to belligerent nations, for money is the worst of 
contrabands — it commands all other things. A very forcible illus- 
tration has been used in support of this proposition, namely, that, 
as a neutral government does all in its power to discourage its citi- 
zens from enlisting in the armies of other countries, it should dis- 
courage those who, by loaning money, would do more harm than 
they could do by enlisting. The government withdraws the pro- 
tection of citizenship from those who enlist under other flags — why 
should it give protection to money when it enters into foreign 
military service? There is only one answer. 

Could this argument be sound in 19 14, and unsound in 
1915? 

President Wilson's first reversal on the war occurred 
when he gave his consent to the first Anglo-French loan. 
From this moment his war-deceptions began. In his an- 
nual message to Congress, December 7, 19 15, he declared: 
'We have stood apart studiously neutral. It was our mani- 
fest duty to do so." But, in withdrawing his opposition to 
the Anglo-French loan, had he, or had he not, violated his 
own interpretation of neutrality? From the arrangement 
of that first loan, also, dates the Wilson deviation in gen- 
eral from equal treatment of the opposing sides, which is 
the essence of neutrality. 

Mr. Wilson's second notable reversal on the war was, 
no doubt, a direct consequence of the first. In 19 14 and 
during a part of 19 15 he had been against any noticeable 
increase in the army or navy establishments. But when 
Wall Street began loaning large sums to the Entente, the 
President suddenly became a preparedness convert. In 
the early months of 19 16 he toured the country on the pre- 
paredness issue. 

From early in 19 15, the President's diplomacy had been 
at variance with the pacific utterances made to his own peo- 



42 Shall It Be Again? 

pie. His first submarine note to Germany was a threat. 
But his attitude towards England was almost equally threat- 
ening. Not until the first months of 191 6, when he re- 
versed himself on essential points in the dispute with both 
sides, swinging into a position less out of harmony with 
England, and of greater hostility towards Germany, was it 
quite plain that he "contemplated war" with Germany. In 
his handling of the armed ships question, early in 19 16, he 
notified both Germany and America that he was willing to 
go to war in defense of his stand upon this issue. 

Shortly afterwards, the President put his preparedness 
programme through Congress. This programme included 
the National Defense Act, providing for a council of na- 
tional defense in time of national "danger." It included 
other measures hardly conceivable by any administration 
not seriously contemplating war in the near future. 

In a letter dated April 15, 19 17, and read in the House 
of Representatives, Attorney-General Gregory revealed 
the fact that "long before we entered the war" his depart- 
ment, in anticipation of war, had begun "to strengthen and 
build up its bureau of investigation." 

In spite of all such circumstances, except to a few of us, 
the war came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky, with 
stunning and inexplicable suddenness. How did the Presi- 
dent manage it? How (Mr. Asquith's question) did he 
solve the "difficulties" with which he was "confronted" in 
"the two and one-half years" before April, 19 17? How 
did he "deal with" "the most peace-loving and least aggres- 
sive nation on earth," in order to "carry" it "into the haz- 
ards and horrors of the greatest war in history?" 

The answer is that the tactics followed throughout were 
the same as those described in the preceding chapter. The 
President sought to create the impression that his prepar- 
edness measures were for peace, instead of war; that his 



The 1916 Election 43 

diplomacy was calculated to preserve the peace, instead 
of getting us into the war. Only after the fighting was 
over did we learn that the advisory commission of the 
Council of National Defense, consisting of seven men, had 
secretly worked out the details of the war legislation 
months before war was declared, and at a time when the 
President was still promising to keep the country out of 
war. (Report of Rep. W. J. Graham, chairman. Select 
Committee on Expenditures in War Department, July 7, 
1919.) 

Finally, in his September treaty tour (1919), in boasting 
that he "waited on" the American people a long time be- 
fore calling for the war declaration, the President himself 
acknowledged, in effect, that he had been ''contemplating" 
war at the very time that he was solemnly asserting the 
contrary. 

As an incident in the Presidential policy indicated, occur- 
red the election of 19 16. President Wilson chose the is- 
sue of 19 1 6. As is generally known, he absolutely domi- 
nated his party convention of that year. He approved 
the selection of ex-Governor. Glynn of New York as tem- 
porary chairman, and in uttering the keynote speech Glynn 
was. simply Wilson's mouthpiece. The paramount issue of 
the campaign, as laid down by Glynn, was ^Uhat the United 
States is constrained by the traditions of its past, by the 
logic of its present, and by the promise of its future, to 
hold itself apart from the conflict that now devastates the 
nations across the seas.** 

The Glynn keynote speech was nothing more nor less 
than a defense, an historical justification, and a glorifica- 
tion of the policy of American neutrality, which he asserted 
President Wilson had faithfully followed and would con- 
tinue to follow. The Glynn speech may be found in the 
Congressional Record of June 15, 19 16. It was a master- 



44 Shall It Be Again? 

piece of convincing eloquence and historical data. It was 
printed by hundreds of thousands, and distributed through- 
out the country. It furnished the material for thousands 
of campaign speeches. It furnished the basis for the Wil- 
son campaign, and next to Wilson's personal utterances, 
was undoubtedly a determining factor in his election. 

It ought to be obvious that an executive can hardly be 
credited with keeping his country out of war when a vast 
majority of his own people are definitely against war, when 
the other party to the dispute is anxious to avoid war, and 
when the only factors favoring war are a small minority of 
his own people and the influence of certain Interested for- 
eign governments. The truth is that it is doubtful whether 
President Wilson could have departed farther than he did 
from neutrality, or proceeded towards war any faster than 
he did, without jeopardizing his control of the country 
and encompassing his own defeat in the election of 191 6. 

Wilson's belligerent record — his insistence on courses 
of procedure highly calculated to embroil us in the Euro- 
pean struggle — were well known to his political enemies in 
the campaign of 19 16. Why, then, did they not explode 
the myth of his having "kept us out of war," demolish his 
paramount issue, and so insure the defeat of Wilson? 

The answer simply is that the dominant faction in the 
Republican party approved of this part of the Wilson rec- 
ord; they and their candidate had taken a frankly bellig- 
erent position, and an exposure of Wilson's spurious paci- 
fism would have placed them in a ridiculous situation. 

Although President Wilson did not "keep us out of 
war," he did lead us into war, and with the material as- 
sistance of our leading peace advocates. Although Mr. 
Hughes was more frankly inclined towards belligerency 
than was Wilson, it is barely possible that, had Hughes 



The 1916 Election 45 

been elected, the history of America and of the world might 
have been somewhat different from 19 17 on. For had 
Wilson failed of reelection, he would have had much more 
difficulty in executing the various belligerent steps, taken 
between February i and March 4, which were such impor- 
tant factors in the attainment of war in April. Hughes, 
moreover, on assuming charge March 4, would have faced a 
decidedly less pliant Congress than did Wilson. For in 
his approach towards belligerency, the Democratic Sena- 
tors and Representatives gave Wilson more trouble than 
did the Republicans. Had Wilson's demand for a declara- 
tion of war failed, it would have been a party calamity. 
But had the demand come from a Republican President, it 
is not unlikely that he would have been opposed not only 
by such Progressive Republicans as opposed Wilson, but by 
the Democratic party as a group. Again, neither the pub- 
lic nor Congress would ever have been misled as to the aims 
of Hughes, to the extent that they were misled as to the 
aims of Wilson. It seems certain, at least, that a longer 
period of preparation would have been necessary. 

But had America not entered the European war in April, 
1917, or very soon thereafter, it is not improbable that the 
war would have ended in that year. (See Chapter 
XXVI.) If this judgment is correct, it was by the votes of 
pacifists that America went to war, and by the votes of 
pacifists that world peace failed in 19 17. 

There is no intention here to reflect upon the good faith 
of the gentlemen who in past years were notable in their 
advocacy of peace. But a reflection upon their intelligence 
is in order, since, while assuming to be students of modern 
statesmanship, they overlooked the first trick in the trade 
of statesmen — duplicity. Our leading peace advocates 
took Wilson at his word. , Worse than that, they paid at- 



46 Shall It Be Again? 

tention only to such words as pleased them. They over- 
looked other words that contradicted the pleasing words, as 
well as his action in the matter of preparedness, his man- 
euvers in the armed ships dispute, and, above all, his tell- 
tale diplomacy. 



DEMOCRACY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR 

VIII 

EXECUTIVE DUPLICITY IN IMPOSING THE WAR POLICIES 

If it be contended that the war, having once commenced, the 
President of the United States may direct it to the accomplishment 
of any object he pleases, without consulting and without regard to 
the will of Congress, the [Constitutional] convention will have ut- 
terly failed in guarding the nation against the abuses and ambitions 
of a single individual. Either Congress or the President must have 
the right of determining upon the objects for which a war shall 
be prosecuted. There is no other alternative. If the President 
possess it . . . where is the difference between our free government 
and that of any other nation which may be governed by an absolute 
czar, emperor or king? It is the privilege of the people in their 
primary assemblies, and of every private man, however humble, to 
express an opinion in regard to the purposes for which the war 
should be continued. — Henry Clay, in speech on the Mexican War, 
Nov. 13, 1847. 

The obligation of the chief executive of a democracy, to 
comport his acts and policies with previous promises and 
pronouncements, had been many times acknowledged by 
President Wilson. For example, on one occasion he spoke 
as follows : 

I set myself this very strict rule . . . that I am not at liberty to 
urge upon Congress, in messages, policies which have not had the 
organic consideration of those for whom I am spokesman. For that 
reason, you see, I am by my own principles shut out, in the language 
of the street, from 'starting anything.' I have to confine myself ta 
those things which have been embodied as promises to the people 
at an election. That is the strict rule I set for myself. (Speech 
to delegation of suffragists, White House, Dec. 8, 1913.) 

47 



48 Shall It Be Again? 

But not one of the salient war policies of Wilson ever 
had "the organic consideration" of those for whom he was 
'^spokesman." Not one was embodied as a promise to the 
people at an election. 

Nor can this be excused on the plea of sudden and un- 
foreseen contingency. The 191 6 election occurred only 
five months before war was declared. During the cam- 
paign the question of war was constantly before the people. 
It was inevitable that, in case of war, the question of con- 
scription should arise. But the question of conscription 
was not given "organic consideration" in the Democratic 
Convention of 19 16. 

Do not imagine that the question of conscription was 
overlooked in that period. Wilson did not overlook it. 
He pronounced against the policy. Early in the year he 
had told the people: "Every true believer in democracy be- 
lieves that it is upon the voluntary action of the men of 
a great nation like this that it must depend for its military 
force." (Milwaukee, Jan. 31, 19 16.) And in his Memo- 
rial Day address: *^ America does not want anything hut 
the compulsion of the spirit,'* 

If the President experienced a change of mind upon this 
vital policy later, would not democratic ethics require him 
at once and publicly to acknowledge the fact? But not 
until the night of April 2, while in the actual delivery of 
the war message, did the American public, or any part 
thereof, learn that the President would favor conscrip- 
tion. 

What other conclusion is possible except that the Presi- 
dent was well aware that the idea of conscription was 
repugnant to the masses of the people; that a pro- 
posal, at an earlier juncture, to conscript Americans would 
jeopardize the plan to go into the war itself; that he pur- 
posefully kept the people and Congress in the dark, know- 



Executive Duplicity 49 

ing that the longer he waited the better chance he would 
have to impose the policy? 

After the President came out for conscription, it was still 
not too late, in the opinion of various members of Con- 
gress, to procure a form of "organic consideration" of the 
proposal. Bills were introduced providing for an advisory 
referendum on conscription. But the President was not 
for "organic consideration," now, and all such measures 
were smothered. 

Likewise, the public was misled as to the extent to which 
the Administration contemplated cooperating with the 
Entente governments. 

The President had pronounced definitely against entan- 
gling alliances, and indeed, against alliances of any kind 
with any nation. He had declared that we had no interest 
in the outcome of the European quarrel. He had even 
declared, in effect, that the aims and purposes of Germany 
were as clean as those of England. By a hundred such pro- 
nouncements he had created the assumption that, should 
America be drawn into the war, it would participate inde- 
pendently and only to a limited degree, and with the single 
purpose of protecting American commerce and passengers 
in actual transit through the zone of submarine warfare. 

In the last days before the war, the Administration 
actually took occasion to strengthen this assumption by 
causing the newspaper correspondents at Washington to 
send out reports that the government did not intend to be- 
come an ally of the Entente, but in case of a declaration of 
war would, in fact, confine its warfare to naval operations 
directed solely towards protecting American rights on the 
high seas immediately menaced by Germany and her allies. 

Nothing whatever was said about a vast military crusade 
against autocracy, or anything of that sort. Nothing was 
said about sending an army overseas. Not even in his war 



50 Shall It Be Again? 

message did the President hint at sending soldiers to 
France. Even in the war debates, the fact that the Admin- 
istration planned to rush an army to France was hidden 
from the Senators and Congressmen themselves. The 
great American "democracy" went to war without a sus- 
picion among the public at large that the Executive — whom 
they had reelected to keep them out of war, to save them 
from entangling alliances, and to protect them from con- 
scription and every war terror — had chosen to rush a great 
conscript army overseas and make America a partisan in the 
European "chaos of competing and hostile ambitions"! 

No military reason can be urged as an excuse for this 
secrecy. The reason was political. To have admitted the 
truth before the declaration of war would have vastly in- 
creased public opposition to taking up the cudgels. 

As with the draft, efforts were made to obtain a form 
of "organic consideration" of the project to send an army' 
overseas. Bills were introduced, providing that no con- 
script be sent overseas without his consent. But all such 
bills were smothered at the dictation of the President. 
The President denied even the right of Congress to pro- 
nounce upon this question. American forces were sent 
overseas by Executive direction. Here, again, the public 
was misled. For, at first, the public was told that the 
American flag was going to France chiefly for its "moral 
effect," and that our army overseas would be small. Only 
a little at a time, as our war autocracy fixed its hold more 
and more firmly upon the country, was the truth permitted 
to reach the people of America. 

Farthest from the public mind had been the thought that 
the wishes of any other government could influence America 
to go to war. It remained for Lloyd George to tell us: 
"We not only desired the entrance of the United States into 



Executive Duplicity 51 

the war; we solicited it." (Interview in Paris Matin, July 

4,1917-) 

The drafting of the State militia organizations into the 

national service, andi the obligatory employment of the 
militiamen abroad, is another illustration of the President's 
ease at reversal and his contempt for his own interpreta- 
tions of the Constitution. During his preparedness tour, 
while urging public support for an increase in the regular 
army, the President repeatedly discounted the value of the 
National Guard, explaining that the Constitution prohib- 
ited him from calling on it except in case of actual inva- 
sion. At New York, for example, January 27, 19 16, he 
said: 

Under the Constitution . . . only upon occasion of actual in- 
vasion has the President of the United States the right to ask these 
men [members of the National Guard] to leave their respective 
States. 

But this did not prevent him from writing into his Con- 
scription Bill the following words: 

The President ... is hereby authorized ... to draft into the 
military service of the United States, organize and officer . . . any 
and all members of the National Guard and of the National Guard 
Reserves, and said members so drafted into the military service of 
the United States shall serve therein for the existing emergency. 

The law was passed in this form. The President imme- 
diately, by proclamation, drafted the National Guard, in 
its entirety, and within a few weeks various units thereof 
were on their way, under compulsion, to France. The Con- 
stitution had not been amended, meanwhile, and no other 
formalities had occurred than those set forth above. 

The American people had been in the habit of express- 
ing their honest opinions freely, without persecution or 



52 Shall It Be Again? 

punishment. How many of us had any inkling that, after 
war was declared, we might speak of the war only in terms 
of approval? 

How many had any idea that we would be suffered to 
mention the President of the United States only in adula- 
tion? 

How many would have supposed that it would become a 
crime to quote our own school textbooks against England? 

How many would have thought that every word spoken 
of our enemies must be charged with execration? 

How many imagined that they would be prohibited from 
putting forth any efforts towards peace, or mentioning 
terms of peace except as a question to be determined ex- 
clusively by one man in all our hundred millions? 

How many would have believed that a public endorse- 
ment of principles for which Woodrow Wilson assumed to 
stand before the war — and upon which he gained reelec- 
tion — would have swiftly and surely landed the offender in 
prison? 

President Wilson's declamations on free speech, both 
before and after we entered the European war, are too 
numerous and well remembered to require quotation. 
While the Espionage Act was in the balance he wrote to 
Arthur Brisbane saying that he could ^'imagine no greater 
disservice to the country than to establish a censorship that 
would deny to the people of a free republic their indisputa- 
ble right to criticize their own public officials/' and defi- 
nitely promised: '7 shall not expect or permit any part of 
this law to apply to me or any of my official acts or in any 
way to be used as a shield against criticism.'' 

Nevertheless, under the Espionage Act, numerous per- 
sons were prosecuted and imprisoned for no other cause 
than criticism of President Wilson. 



Executive Duplicity 53 

A study of each Presidential deception of this character 
reveals the fact that its aim was to concentrate all power 
and all discretion in the hands of one Woodrow Wilson. 
Here again the policy of the President is a contradiction of 
his stand while campaigning for reelection: 

If I understand the life of America, the central principle is this, 
that no small body of persons, however influential, shall be trusted 
to determine . . . the policy of America. — (Address before Asso- 
ciated Advertising Clubs of the World, Philadelphia, June 29, 
1916.) . ^ j4 

The Constitution does not hold that this principle may 
be set aside in time of war. Nor do the great interpreters 
of democracy. Nor did Woodrow Wilson himself. On 
the other hand, the President particularly called attention 
to the democratic necessity for preventing the control in 
a few hands of a nation at war; to wit : 

I should say that it was not inconsistent with the traditions of the 
country that the people should know how to take care of themselves ; 
but it is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their 
knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental organization 
which would make and organize a great army subject to orders to do 
what a particular group of men might at the time think it was best 
to have them do. 

That is the militarism of Europe, where a few persons can deter- 
mine what an armed nation is to do. 

That Is what I understand militarism to be. — (Statement made 
to a committee from the American Union Against Militarism, White 
House, May 9, 19 16,) 

In other words, the policy which President Wilson In- 
sisted that he be allowed to follow in 19 17 and 19 18 is 
precisely the policy which he defined as militarism in 19 16. 



IX 



It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free 
country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its adminstra- 
tion, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional 
spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to 
encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consol- 
idate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, 
whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just esti- 
mate of the love of power and proneness to abuse it, which predom- 
inate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of 
this position. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or 
modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, 
let it be corrected by an amendment in the way in which the Con- 
stitution designates, but let there be no change by usurpation, for 
though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is 
the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. 
The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil 
any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield. 
— George Washington, in his Farewell Address. 

In the first session of the war Congress, all legislation that 
passed was either approved by the President or written at 
his direction. Although not quite all of the President's 
programme went through, the powers which he procured 
in that session — powers everywhere bristling with the most 
drastic repressive provisions — were far greater than those 
ever voted to or exercised by any previous American Exec- 
utive. At the conclusion of that session, the President of 
the American republic — in the name of a war for democ- 

54 



''Democratic" Czarism in War-Time 55 

racy — stood out as the most unrestrained autocrat to be 
found In any great country in the world. 

These extraordinary powers were not procured with- 
out a constant, and sometimes bitter, struggle with Con- 
gress, in which at times the President was opposed even by 
his own party leaders. The struggles over conscription, 
the embargo, censorship, and food-control, were especially 
closely contested. At the beginning, the House Military 
Affairs Committee actually recorded an adverse vote 
against conscription. Chairman Dent, Speaker Clark, and 
majority-leader Kitchin all opposed it, and the latter in- 
formed the President that, if an immediate vote were taken, 
the House as a whole would reject the proposition. On 
behalf of this and other bills, the President made repeated 
visits to the Capitol, an unusual proceeding. The Presi- 
dent was forced to put the Conscription Bill in the hands 
of a Republican to be piloted through; in fact, it was due 
to the rallying of the Republicans that the bill went over. 

In a statement to the public on behalf of the Food-Con- 
trol Bill, the President admitted that "these powers [which 
he asked for] are very great." Senator Owen offered an 
amendment to this bill, creating a joint committee to super- 
vise the financial conduct of the war. The President con- 
tested the point, declaring in a letter to Mr. Lever (July 
23, 1917) : "I could only interpret the final adoption of 
Section 23 as arising from a lack of confidence In myself." 
Which quite astonished various of the national legislators. 
Said Senator Hardwick (Aug. 6) : 

It is incomprehensible to me how any one anywhere could oppose 
a proposal to have Congress share with him [the President] respon- 
sibility for war expenditures. 

Senator LaFoUette Introduced a resolution declaring 
that Congress has complete authority under the Constitu- 



56 Shall It Be Again? 

tion to state the objects of the war. It was smothered, 
with the approval of the President. 

On every important point of conflict with Congress the 
President ultimately won, and at the end of that first ses- 
sion he was able to announce that what he called "the war- 
making branch of the government," meaning himself, "has 
been abundantly equipped with the powers that were neces- 
sary to make the action of the nation effective." This was 
an expression of satisfaction, from which it was to be ex- 
pected that the Executive Department not only would con- 
fine its activities within the limits set by the legislation re- 
ferred to, but also that it would refrain from demanding 
any notable enlargements of power at the following session. 

The Executive Department, however, at once proceeded 
(to employ the words of Senator Hiram Johnson) to 
"do what it wished to do, law or no law, authority or no au- 
thority." 

Moreover, when the second war session convened, it 
sought from Congress grants of power so sweeping as to 
be undefinable, except in a general way — limited neither by 
Congress itself, by the Constitution, by the rights of States 
or of individuals, nor by any other means except the will of 
the individual occupying the White House. 

What the Administration asked of the second war ses- 
sion — and the manner of its asking — is the best evidence 
that it had been unwilling to wait for legal additions to the 
extraordinary powers already voted, and was then follow- 
ing a course of lawless usurpation in domestic affairs. 

In urging the passage of the Passport Act, Attorney- 
General Gregory wrote (Apr. 12, 191 8) that ^' there is no 
law providing for the control of departures from or en- 
tries into the United States by persons other than those who 
are alien enemies!* But the Executive Department had 
for many months been actually preventing the departure 



"Democratic" Czarism in War-Time 57 

from the United States of not only men of draft age, but 
of every one else excepting persons whose business had been 
particularly examined into and approved by it. 

During the efforts of the Administration to procure the 
enactment of what was in that period known as its Sedition 
Bill, Attorney-General Gregory declared (Official Bulle- 
tin, Apr. 19, 1918), that ^^Not all unpatriotic utterances 
subject the author to criminal prosecution.'^ But "unpa- 
triotic" utterances of every kind were at that time actually 
subjecting the authors thereof to criminal proceedings under 
the Espionage Act. 

The President took over the railroads of the country, 
December 26, 19 17. In February, 19 18, we find him urg- 
ing the passage of a bill to legalize this action. March 2, 
191 8, we discover Federal Judge Walter Evans, at Louis- 
ville, Kentucky, handing down a decision containing the 
words: "We can find no statute authorizing the control of 
the railroads under the Treasury Department nor by the 
Director General of the railroads." During the discussion 
of the Railroad Bill in Congress, it was repeatedly admitted 
that the President had overstepped his authority in the 
means by which he had assumed control of the roads. 

During the second war session, efforts were made by Ad- 
ministration supporters, although not with the open ap- 
proval of the President, to put through a law prohibiting 
strikes in any industrial plants holding war contracts, as 
had already been provided for in plants operated directly 
by the government. Although no such law was enacted, 
the President and his subordinates repeatedly prohibited 
strikes In such industries, and, through threats and coer- 
cion, the right to strike was In practice taken away by the 
Executive power. 

September 13, 1918, the President addressed a letter 
to striking workmen at Bridgeport, Connecticut, ordering 



58, Shall It Be Again? 

them to return to work, threatening all with blacklisting, 
and threatening all of draft age with the revocation of any 
deferred classification based on their usefulness in war pro- 
duction. The strikers returned to their jobs. February 
17, 19 1 8, the President addressed a telegram to the general 
president of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners of America, telling the latter significantly that, un- 
less he advised the men whom he represented to return to 
work, he was *' giving aid and comfort to the enemy J^ The 
official advised his men to return to work. Similar tactics 
were employed by officials of the Fuel and Food Adminis- 
trations, the President's Mediation Commission, and other 
subordinates of the President, as a means to preventing or 
breaking strikes. 

I mention only a few signal instances of a policy that was 
generally followed. Even the legality of the "work or 
fight" regulations of the army was questioned, and a 
"work or fight" clause was placed in the new Conscription 
Bill, with the avowed purpose of legahzing the Executive 
manipulation of the existing law. The clause, however, 
was stricken out, but the "work or fight" policy was not 
abandoned. In a report on the Administration's propo- 
sals to amend the draft law, giving greater power over 
draft registrants, March 13, 19 18, six members of the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee declared the powers 
sought for "unheard of," and argued that the proposal 
would subject "to the arbitrary will and authority of those 
in control of the nation's military power the 9,000,000 men 
registered"; also: 

If Congress is prepared to deliver the bodies of these 9,000,000 
men into the hands of the military authorities without condition or 
limitation, then it should pass this joint resolution; if not, it should 
be defeated. 



"Democratic'' Czarism in War-Time 59 

In urging the passage of the Food-Control Bill, Mr. 
Hoover sought to create the impression that its primary 
purpose was to protect both the producer and consumer 
from speculators. That it did not accomplish this pur- 
pose satisfactorily was virtually admitted by Hoover him- 
self eight months later, when engaged in an effort to pro- 
cure an enlargement of his powers. In a statement issued 
Feburary 21, 19 18, Hoover admitted that "the [price] 
margins between the farmer and the consumer in many 
localities were never wider than to-day." 

In a letter to the President, July lo, 19 17, intended to 
Influence Congress and the public In favor of the Food- 
Control Bill, Hoover wrote : 

It is absolutely vital that we shall protect the farmer from a 
slump in prices this year due to a glut. . . . Unless some strong and 
eflicient government action is Immediately settled and brought into 
play, the American producer will face a slump In wheat. 

The "strong and efficient government action" was soon 
"settled." That is, the Food-Control Bill was passed. 
But, Instead of preventing a slump In wheat, the passage 
of the bill was manipulated to cause It. One of the first 
steps of the President was to fix the price of wheat. The 
figure fixed by the President was $1.05 per bushel lower 
thkn It had been at the very time that the President, 
Hoover, and others, were asserting that a primary pur- 
pose of the bill was to protect the wheat farmer from a 
slump In prices! 

Naturally, there was great dissatisfaction among the 
farmers, and so many refused to market their wheat that 
the great mills of the country were reported as threatened 
with a shut-down at the busiest season of the year. 

Some of our wheat growers may be surprised, even at 
this late day, to know that the Administration was clothed 



6o Shall It Be Again? 

with no authority to seize their wheat or even to fix the 
price" thereof. In the hearings on the Food-Control Bill, 
Mr. Hoover assured Congress that the bill carried no au- 
thority to fix wheat prices. Several months later, testify- 
ing before the Sugar Investigating Committee of the Sen- 
ate, he was forced to admit that the price had been fixed 
in violation of the law. When Senator Reed suggested 
that Hoover had been guilty of a criminal act, his excuse 
was: "Whatever I have done has been done with the ap- 
proval of the President." (Jan. 3, 191 8.) 

The Food-Control Bill carried a limited authority to 
{\x food prices, but no authority to fix prices to the farmer. 
In his first public statement on behalf of that bill (May 
19, 1917), the President pointed out that this limited 
authority was asked for "not in order to limit the profits of 
the farmers, but only to guarantee them, when necessary, 
a minimum priced* 

The law gave a limited authority to seize food to pre- 
vent hoarding. But Section 6 specifically exempted farm 
products from seizure on such ground: 

Sec. 6. . . . Provided, however, that any accumulating or with- 
holding by any farmer or gardener, cooperative association of farmers 
or gardeners. Including live-stock farmers, or any other person, of 
the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased or 
cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be hoarding within the 
meaning of this act. 

September 13, 19 17, Hoover admitted that he was help- 
less to force the farmers to sell their wheat. Neverthe- 
less, before the 19 17-18 winter was over, the Administra- 
tion was seizing the wheat on the farms, as a means to 
breaking the wheat strike, and compelling the farmers to 
accept the President's price. 

Hoover and his aides also repeatedly promised that the 



"Democratic" Czarism in War-Time 6i 

American householder would not be put on rations. In 
the hearings on the Food-Control Bill, Hoover assured 
Congress that he did not purpose fixing consumers' rations, 
and that the law did not contemplate any such authority, 
nor should it. (June 19, 19 17.) Section 10 of the bill, 
in fact, contained a clause intended to exempt householders 
from seizure of food stocks : 

Provided, that nothing in this section, or in the section that fol- 
lows, shall be construed to require any natural person to furnish to 
the government any necessaries held by him and reasonably required 
for consumption or use by himself and dependents. 

But many Americans will not soon forget the system of 
rationing put into effect by Hoover's responsible aides, the 
espionage, the brutal invasions of homes, the prosecutions 
and threats of prosecutions, and at times the seizure of 
stocks of flour or sugar in ridiculously small amounts. 

The history of the second war session of Congress is 
a history of successful efforts, on the part of the Executive, 
to wring from the legislative branch enlargements of power 
wrung from it in the first war session. Nearly every piece 
of war legislation of the first session was amended, and al- 
ways to give the Executive greater power, never to limit it. 
The efforts of the President were constantly directed, with 
success, towards taking from the legislative branch of the 
government its constitutional powers, and towards concen- 
trating these powers in himself, towards shutting out Con- 
gress from any part whatever in the war policy and pro- 
gramme, domestic or foreign, towards reducing it to the 
impotent position of having nothing left to vote upon ex- 
cept appropriations and more appropriations — towards 
placing the legislative power, the military, and the civil 
community, completely at the mercy of the Executive 
bureaucracy. 



62 Shall It Be Again? 

Due, evidently, to a realization that too great authority- 
had already been voted the Executive, and that this au- 
thority had been abused, the second war session began with 
committee investigations of various phases of the conduct 
of the war, and with efforts towards retaining for Congress 
a modicum of control. 

Although the investigations brought out some scandal- 
ous truths, revealing mismanagement and graft on a large 
scale, the President resented them, denounced them, and 
finally succeeded in throttling them. 

In debating the powers demanded for the President in 
the Railroad Bill, Senator Underwood, one of Wilson's 
party leaders, issued a solemn warning, declaring that 
'^when Congress reaches the point where it is prepared to 
abandon constitutional limitations, and surrender govern- 
ment of law for government by a man, then danger is ahead 
for the people of the United States J* (Feb. 20, 19 18.) 

In speaking on the War Finance Corporation Bill, Rep- 
resentative Longworth pointed out that ^'No war lord in 
history, no kaiser, no czar, ever had such power. . . . The 
mere transmittal to Congress of such a bill is illustrative 
of a danger every day growing in menace to the institu- 
tions bequeathed to us by our fathers. I mean the continu- 
ous reaching out of the executive branch of this government 
for more and more power. It is a danger not to be lightly 
passed over!^ (Mar. 16, 19 18.) 

The climax of the President's efforts for absolute power 
came with the bill introduced by Senator Overman, after 
floor-leader Martin and other Senators had refused to pilot 
it because of its autocratic features. In the beginning, the 
Overman Bill was hooted by both Democratic and Republi- 
can members. Even Senator Hitchcock, Wilson's most 
conspicuous and steady support throughout the war, as- 
serted: ^^It would mean nothing but an abdication by Con- 



"Democratic" Czarism in War-Time 63 

gress of its law-making power. It is the most astonishing 
piece of legislation Fve ever heard of ; while Senator Over- 
man himself urged, on behalf of the bill: "Now let's be 
done with it by passing a bill that will let the President or- 
ganize things the way he wants, so he won't have to ask 
any more legislation from us." 

In spite of all predictions to the contrary, the President 
whipped Congress into Hne in the end, and the Overman 
Bill became a law. Only one conceivable measure re- 
mained to render the President's conduct of the war and his 
control of the country practically absolute. That was to 
widen the draft ages to include all males between boyhood 
and senility, and to give over to the Executive power to 
draw upon them at his own discretion, and in unlimited 
numbers. In a typical protest against Wilson's "Man 
Power Bill," Chairman Dent of the House Military Af- 
fairs Committee exclaimed passionately: 

I am willing to vote for an army of 5,000,000. ... I would 
willingly vote for even more. But I will not vote for an indefinite 
proposition, a bill which says that a department may do as it wishes 
without check of any kind. Congress might as well be abolished. 

Here, as elsewhere, the Executive's wishes, in the end, 
were enacted into law. 



X 

THE WAR TERROR 

The means of defense against foreign danger have always been 
the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans, it was 
a standing maxim to excite w^ar whenever a revolt was apprehended. 
Throughout all Europe, the armies, kept up under the pretext of 
defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable 
whether the best concerted system of absolute power in Europe could 
maintain itself in a situation where no alarms of external danger 
could tame the people to the domestic yoke. — James Madison. 

After our war declaration, the Conscription Bill embodied 
the first notable attack, directly involving "American liber- 
ties," upon the document towards which our patriots of 
19 17-192 1 professed such exaggerated reverence. 

Conscription had been resorted to in America before, 
when, however, it had been contested energetically on con- 
stitutional grounds. But the fact that it had been resorted 
to before established no valid precedent, inasmuch as it 
had not been resorted to since the adoption of the Thir- 
teenth Amendment: ^'Neither slavery nor involuntary ser- 
vitude^ except as punishment for crime, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.*^ 

In a test case, the United States Supreme Court (Jan. 7, 
1918), declared the Wilson conscription law constitutional. 
Referring to the power vested in Congress to "raise and 
support armies," Chief Justice White argued: "As the mind 
cannot conceive of an army without the men to compose It, 
on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does 

64 



The War Terror 65 

not give the power to provide for such men would seem too 
frivolous for further notice." 

But a moment's thought is sufficient to reveal this dictum 
of the Chief Justice as too frivolous for further notice. 
The Constitution gives Congress power to raise and sup- 
port armies, but only within all limits set by the other pro- 
visions of the Constitution. No power vested in Congress 
or any other authority under the Constitution carries with 
it a license to disregard any of the prohibitions thereof. 
Involuntary servitude is forbiddefn for all purposes and 
under all circumstances, except as punishment for crime, 
and if Congress cannot get sufficient men for a large army 
without involuntary servitude, it must be content to raise as 
large an army as it can within the means not forbidden it. 

The decision of America's august Supreme Court is not 
surprising, inasmuch as Chief Justice White conspicuously 
led the applause on the occasion of the President's war mes- 
sage, and was enthusiastically seconded by his associates. 
The childish reasoning of these eminent gentlemen is only 
evidence of their own prejudiced determination to bolster 
up an untenable cause. Under such circumstances, the lay- 
man is justified in feeling that he understands the meaning 
of the words "involuntary servitude" quite as well as any 
sophist masquerading in the black gown of a Supreme 
Court Judge. (To condemn our draft law, indeed, one 
would not need to go farther than the President's own word 
that "Under the Constitution . . . only upon occasion of 
actual invasion has the President of the United States the 
right to ask these men [militiamen] to leave their respec- 
tive States.") 

When, near the end of the War of 1812, a conscription 
bill was placed before Congress, Daniel Webster, on the 
floor of the House (Dec. 9, 18 14), denounced it as in fla- 
grant opposition to the spirit of the Constitution, and de- 



66 Shall It Be Again? 

clared that the adoption of such a measure would oblige a 
free people to resist It even to the extent of Insurrection: 

That measures of this nature should be debated at all in the 
councils of a free government, is a cause for dismay. The question 
is nothing less than whether the most essential rights of personal 
liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in its worst 
form. ... I express the sentiments here as I shall express them to 
my constituents. . . . With the same earnestness with which I now 
exhort you to forbear from these measures, I shall exhort them, to 
exercise their unquestionable right of providing for the security of 
their liberty. 

The first amendment to the Constitution says: "Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
or of the press." But in the Wilson Sedition Law (after- 
wards known as the amended Espionage Act) we find the 
words : 

. . . and whoever, when the -United States is at war, shall wilfully 
utter, print. Write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous or 
abusive language about the form of government of the United States, 
or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval 
forces of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the 
uniform of the army or navy of the United States; or any language 
intended to bring the form of government of the United States, or 
the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces 
of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uni- 
form of the army or navy of the United States into contempt, scorn, 
contumely or disrepute . . . or . . . shall . . . by word or act op- 
pose the cause of the United Stares therein [in the war] shall be pun- 
ished by a fine of not more than $io,ooo, or imprisonment for not 
more than twenty years, or both. 

Any person competent to understand the meaning of the 
English language Is competent to judge whether or not the 
above law abridges the freedom of speech or of the press. 

The Fifth Amendment says: 



The War Terror 67 

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other infamous 
crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury; except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in 
actual service . . . nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation. 

"Due process of law" is a legal term comprehending an 
adequate hearing before a judicial tribunal. The provi- 
sions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, under which the 
Executive confiscated alien enemy property, without due 
process of law, and without compensation, as well as the 
internment of alien enemies by Executive whim, without 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury and without due 
process of law, constitute not only an abuse of treaty obliga- 
tions and of international law (see Chapter XVII) but 
also a gross violation of the Fifth Amendment. 

Article : J of the Constitution says: 

He [the President] shall have power, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the 
Senators present concur. 

By implication, the above words prohibit the President 
from making any treaty without the advice and consent of 
the Senate, expressed in a two-thirds majority vote. Nev- 
ertheless, at the outset of our war, the President entered 
into certain arrangements, understandings, and compacts 
with the various Entente governments — the terms of which 
are unknown because kept a profound secret — without the 
advice or consent of the Senate, and without even consult- 
ing that body or taking it into his confidence. Through 
his State Department, he entered into a written agreement 
with Japan, a version of which was published, without the 
advice or consent of the Senate. These arrangements, 



68 Shall It Be Again? 

understandings, and compacts, if not technically treaties, 
are substantially so. If not in technical violation of the 
Constitution, they are an evasion of its provisions and an 
offense against its spirit. 

Section 8 of the Constitution, indeed, seems to vest in 
Congress a general authority over the affairs of state, in 
peace as well as in war. 

Congress can impeach the President, but the President 
cannot impeach Congress. There is nothing in the Consti- 
tution that gives the President authority to decide whether 
or not the army shall be sent to fight on another continent, 
to decide when the fighting shall begin, or under what con- 
ditions and terms it shall cease. The President is com- 
mander-in-chief of the military forces, but apparently the 
Constitution-makers intended that Congress should be com- 
mander-in-chief of the President. 

The purpose of President Wilson's struggle for unlim- 
ited power became more and more clear — to carry on war 
when, where, and how he pleased, for as long as he pleased, 
for such ends as pleased him; to employ the entire military 
power of the nation, its police power, its industrial power, 
every power of whatever kind possessed by it, the flesh and 
blood and wealth of 105,000,000 people, for objects de- 
fined and limited only by himself, changeable only by him- 
self, known only to himself. 

To attain this end it was necessary to reduce not only 
Congress to submission, but the masses also. 

To make war in Europe as Woodrow Wilson wished to 
make war, it was necessary, in the words of Senator Hiram 
Johnson, first to ''make war on the American people/* 
(Speech against Sedition Bill, Apr. 24, 19 18.) 

It was not, of course, within the power of any one man 
alone to impose such a despotism upon America. But it 
was within the power of one man, backed by a minority 



The War Terror 69 

in control of the finances of the country, the press, and the 
public offices. 

Our war Terror began during the critical weeks of 
March, 19 17, and was unquestionably helpful in dissipating 
the efforts towards a united expression of real public opinion 
against entering the war. The Terror of those first days 
took the form chiefly of personal assaults, invasions of pri- 
vate homes, threats, mobbings, raiding of public halls, 
breaking up of meetings and demonstrations, by private 
persons or mobs, led or instigated by members of the official 
or semi-official bodies. 

Soldiers of the regular army and of the militia, also, 
organized in squads, under the command of non-commis- 
sioned officers, conducted regular raids to break up public 
meetings, on the streets as well as in halls, wrecked offices 
of organizations working against war, and in a number of 
cases invaded private homes. This outrageous misuse of 
the uniform could not have been carried as far as it was 
carried without the approval of responsible military officers, 
and the tacit consent of the Federal Administration. 

Except for its pursuit of alien enemies, the part of the 
Federal government in the Terror became more or less 
open only with the passage of the war legislation. In pro- 
curing the enactment of such repressive legislation as 
passed the first session of the war Congress, the President 
and his supporters had given the fullest assurances that 
there was no intent to override constitutional rights. At 
the beginning, therefore, here and there was found a judge 
so artless as to interpret the Constitution as it had always 
been interpreted, and to lay down the law strictly as it 
read — and here and there was found a patriotic newspaper 
so lacking in logic as to suggest mildly that the Constitution 
was still in force until abolished by the specific means set 
forth in the document itself. 



70 Shall It Be Again? 

A police judge of New York sentenced a young man to 
ninety days in the workhouse for distributing extracts from 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, in 
which emphasis was placed upon certain passages. The 
case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, the 
young man was freed, and the Supreme Court Justice 
(Hendrick) set forth the rights of the people in part as 
follows : 

Aliens have the right to criticize the law the same as citizens. . . . 
Every one in this country has the right to criticize the government 
and the laws that exist, and has the right to agitate for the repeal 
of a law so long as those acts are not accompanied by violence or 
statements which might be interpreted as inciting other people to 
break the law. . . . We still have free speech and a free press In 
the United States. 

But this sort of foolish honesty was frowned down. It 
was expedient that Terror be Imposed, law or no law, Con- 
stitution or no Constitution. In a letter to Congressman 
Currie, April 12, 19 18, Attorney-General Gregory com- 
plained that the clause In section 3 of the Espionage Act, 
aimed to prevent obstruction of enlistment and recruiting, 
"has been the only weapon with which the government 
could attack this dangerous evil [disloyal utterances]." 
This situation obtained until the so-called Sedition Act be- 
came a law, thirteen months after the declaration of war. 

Americans are more or less aware, however, of what ac- 
tually happened. "Disloyal utterances" were, in fact, at- 
tacked. All "disloyal utterances" were attacked. No ut- 
terance of "disloyalty" was permitted to pass. In the cam- 
paign against "disloyalty," every legal safeguard, Federal, 
State, and local, intended to protect personal liberty against 
official outrage, was ridden down. It may be Imagined 
that this lawless Terror was due to an over-zealous patrlo- 



The War Terror 71 

tism of State and local officials, or even to a spontaneous 
rising of popular anger against "disloyalty." It will be of 
importance, then, to read this description of the situation, 
written by Attorney-General Gregory himself : 

To meet these demands [of the war upon the Department of 
Justice] we have been compelled to increase many fold the personnel 
of certain branches of the work, and to encourage the organization 
of patriotic bodies, and to secure the cooperation of these bodies, as 
well as that of national. State, county, municipal, and private organi- 
zations, on a hitherto unprecedented scale. 

One patriotic association has a membership of over 200,000, with 
branches in over 1,100 cities and towns; it Is truly national; it keeps 
tens of thousands of individuals under observation; it reports dis- 
loyalty and other violations of law to the official representatives of 
the Department; it develops the facts involved in hundreds of thou- 
sands of complaints; and It does all this and much more at its own 
expense, with little publicity. ... It is but one of several such bod- 
ies, and when to their membership is added that of the various State 
Councils for national defense, the State, municipal and county con- 
stabulary, and the various other intelligence agencies, which are 
cooperating in the performance of the duties involved, the United 
States marshals and their deputies, the agents of the investigating- 
bureau of the Department of Justice, and individuals who are lend- 
ing their assistance, the number of men assisting the government in 
this capacity aggregates several hundred thousand. 

The Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice works 
in close cooperation with the Intelligence Service of the other bran- 
ches of the government. If it were possible to give details, the 
public would be amazed at the success of the results secured. This 
country was never so thoroughly policed In its history, and it is 
doubtful if any nation in the world is to-day more carefully guarded 
than the United States. — (Statement in Official Bulletin ^ Apr. 19, 
1918.) 

From which it is clear that the Federal government was 
In active control of the situation in every State, city, county 



72 Shall It Be Again? 

and community in Am'erica; that the system of espionage 
was organized by it throughout; that the Federal govern- 
ment not only formed but directed the work of such "pa- 
triotic" bodies as were classified as unofficial; that no policy 
of lawlessness against "disloyalty" could have been effective 
in any community without the approval of subordinates of 
Mr. Gregory; that every agency of Terror, of whatever 
kind, even to the lynching parties of the night, must have 
worked either under the direction, or with the connivance, 
of Federal officials; that, therefore. Terror must have been 
a policy, planned by the Federal government, worked out 
by the Federal government, imposed by the Federal govern- 
ment, directed by the Federal government. 

The President himself gave the Terror signal in his Flag 
Day address: *'Woe he to the man or group of men that 
seeks to stand in our way. . . .'' And the vast organiza- 
tion which Mr. Gregory describes, and which is so reminis- 
cent of Russia in the days of the Czar, proceeded to admin- 
ister the woe, "law or no law, authority or no authority." 

But Mr. Gregory's list of the instruments of Terror is 
not complete. The courts of the country belong to the 
list; the Terror would have been impossible without them. 
America heard no more such pronouncements as that of 
Justice Hendrick. Judges who did not become quickly 
subservient were disciplined. In one case a judge was 
actually impeached for appearing as a character witness for 
a man accused of "disloyalty." 

Pretending to interpret the law, we find a Federal judge 
announcing from the bench: ^'Persons expressing opposi- 
tion to policies of the government, whether aliens or not, 
should be indicted.'* (Rose Pastor Stokes case.) We 
find another eminent judge advocating mob violence from 
the public platform. 

Judges habitually made patriotic speeches from the 



The War Terror 73 

bench, habitually refused to listen to any argument involv- 
ing the constitutional rights of persons prosecuted for "dis- 
loyalty," habitually refused to protect the rights of the ac- 
cused from violation by police or mobs, habitually fixed ex- 
cessive bail, habitually misrepresented the law in instruct- 
ing juries, habitually incited juries against the defendants, 
habitually Imposed harsh punishments. 

A few sahent acts of Mr. Gregory himself, and other 
cabinet heads, at the beginning, gave the cue to all Terror- 
ists. In the month following the declaration of war, the 
government refused passports to a committee of Socialists 
who wished to attend a Socialist peace conference at 
Stockholm, a neutral capital — and Mr. Gregory threatened 
the committee with prosecution If It took part in any con- 
ference of the kind anywhere. So America received Its 
first formal notification that terms of peace were to be left 
to the President alone, and were not even to be discussed 
except in the form of parroting the President's phrases. 

On the day the Espionage Act went Into effect, the Post- 
master-General ordered the suspension of the greater part 
of the "unpatriotic" press. So America received Its first 
formal notice that no question either of peace or of war 
was to be discussed through the printed page except in a 
manner satisfactory to the Administration. 

During the first few weeks of the war, an organization 
known as "The People's Council on Democracy and Terms 
of Peace" assumed notable proportions throughout the 
country. On the announcement that It Intended to enter 
the political field and to send pacifists to Congress, the Ad- 
ministration proceeded vigorously against it. Conven- 
tions were invaded, broken up, or prevented, by police and 
mlHtary, and leaders were placed under arrest. The move- 
ment was reduced to inactivity solely by the Iron heel. 
So America was notified that the people were not to be 



74 Shall It Be Again? 

permitted to express their wishes even at the polls — that 
political liberty was to be suspended for the period of the 
war. 

Another unpatriotic organization of national scope, the 
Industrial Workers of the World, was assailed in its en- 
tirety as a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. Thou- 
sands of members were jailed simultaneously. The simple 
possession of a membership card was treated as justifying 
the most extravagant brutalities. The avowed purpose of 
the hunt was to extirpate the organization, root and branch. 
More than one hundred leaders thereof were assembled 
before one court, convicted after a grossly unfair trial, 
and sentenced to prison terms running up to twenty years. 
One of the most hideous outrages of America's war despo- 
tism was the systematic destruction of the means of de- 
fense of accused Industrial Workers, through the arrest 
as co-conspirators of persons who attempted to hire law- 
yers, collect money, or in any way assist in, or prepare for, 
the legal defense of the accused. Scores of such persons 
were jailed and thousands of dollars of defense money 
were seized and held. So America was notified that nei- 
ther laws nor constitutions were to be allowed to stand in 
the way of crushing out all opposition to the incumbent of 
the White House — even to stamping out all organizations 
whose principles might at some future date bring them into 
conflict with his plans. 

Hand in hand with the policy of nipping in the bud all 
opposition of whatever kind, went the policy of compelling 
cooperation. Military conscription, of course, was the 
centre of the scheme. The power of conscription was ap- 
plied with singular ruthlessness. A price of $50 was 
placed upon the head of each and every American within 



The War Terror 75 

the prescribed ages who failed to register or who evaded 
service at any stage. So cupidity became a motive in a 
country-wide "slacker hunt" which never ended. 

In the beginning, it was the policy to throw every sus- 
pected "slacker" in jail for a period of days, without per- 
mitting him to communicate with his relatives or an at- 
torney, or to procure the evidence that might free him. 
Later, America was presented with a spectacle of gigantic 
"slacker raids," in which squads of police, soldiers and citi- 
zens, violated the homes of the people and dragged them to 
jail by the thousands. In denouncing such raids on the 
floor of the Senate (Sept. 5, 1918), Senator Hiram John- 
son said that it was like a chapter from the French Reign 
of Terror, when the "law of suspects" was in full swing and 
the prisons were crowded with innocent victims : 

No man would have said it were possible in our country. . . . 
The very purpose, according to my idea, of this kind of proceeding, is 
the purpose that has ever attended this kind of thing the world over 
— terrorism — the same sort of terrorism that makes it impossible 
to-day for any newspaper in this land to print what it desires; the 
same sort of terrorism that makes it a crime for any citizen in this 
nation, loyally, legitimately and honestly to speak his sentiments 
upon the rostrum or to his neighbors. . . . Was ever any such pre- 
sentation made in any government under the sun that made a pre- 
tense of freedom? 

The cruel and unusual punishments meted out by the 
drumhead courts were a part of the Terror also. Not all 
thel "slackers" were sent to prison; there were too many 
of them. But terrible examples were frequently made. 
Defiant slackers were given thirty years and even life im- 
prisonment. After the fighting was over. Senator Cham- 
berlain revealed the fact that 15,000 of our young men 
had become "victims" of army courts-martial. Whole- 



76 Shall It Be Again? 

sale and almost unbelievable brutality visited upon young 
conscripts, in camps and guardhouses overseas, was admit- 
ted by responsible officers. 

At home, the draft law was abused to facilitate the in- 
duction of pacifists into the military organization, where 
they could be better controlled. As, through Terror, the 
war despotism fixed its grip more and more firmly upon 
the throat of the nation, the law was abused again to com- 
pel workmen to concentrate in the war Industries. While 
the purpose to conscript labor was denied, conscription of 
labor was put into operation on a larger and larger scale. 
Only the early ending of the war prevented the system 
from being put into general practice. 

The policy of forced cooperation extended throughout 
every phase of the war activities. The law required the 
public to cooperate in a multitude of ways, but forced co- 
operation was applied as a policy even in the fields that 
were legally prescribed as voluntary. Federal espionage 
was applied to persons who refused to sign the "voluntary" 
food pledge cards. Federal espionage was applied to per- 
sons who refused to subscribe to "voluntary" funds. The 
world looked on in grim humor while the "great democ- 
racy" of the western hemisphere compelled the people to 
subscribe to its Liberty Bonds! 

The President's dictum: "Woe be to the man or group 
of men who seeks to stand in our way," was echoed by per- 
sons of power and eminence in every walk of life. It was 
interpreted by them, unrebuked, to mean that there was to 
be an open season for pacifists. The Vice-President, two 
ex-Presidents, Senators, governors of States, presidents of 
famous colleges, ministers of the gospel, and eminent 
judges, joined In violent denunciations of every form of 
"disloyalty," and voiced suggestions of punishment that 
can only be interpreted as deliberate incitement to lawless 



The War Terror 77 

proceedings. The heads of the President's departments 
themselves gave the cue; their immediate subordinates set 
the styles. The hundreds of thousands of members of the 
propaganda machine and the Terror machine passed the 
word. 

And the open season for pacifists came to pass. Cow- 
ards were in clover. Gangs of self-constituted police, 
prosecutors, judges, and executioners, were let loose in 
every State. Murder became heroism, if only patriotism 
was named as the motive. To dissent in any regard from 
the programme of the Administration meant to suffer as 
a pro^German and a traitor. It became impossible even 
to protest against the Terror itself. An opposition polit- 
ical party became as much a practical impossibility as it 
was in Mexico in the days of Diaz. Socialist candidates 
who dared appear before the people were indicted under the 
Espionage Act. Councils of defense terrorized farmers 
to stop the spread of a political organization known as 
the Non-partisan League. Even the right to choose one's 
own vocation was denied. When the work-or-fight regula- 
tion could not be applied, and where no special State law 
had been enacted, councils of defense at times undertook 
to tell citizens what work they should engage in. 

They were not councils of defense, but councils of terror. 
In the newspapers, from day to day, were paraded a long 
list of outrages, perpetrated by members of these bodies, 
or at their instigation. Even freedom of conscience, en- 
joyed in silence, was not tolerated; for those who failed to 
proclaim their "loyalty" in words, and to back those words 
with "voluntary" contributions, were listed and persecuted 
in their business relations or private lives. The Terror 
extended to the halls of Congress. The rights of a Sena- 
tor were so far forgotten that he was officially threatened 
with expulsion, and unofficially with hanging. It became 



78 Shall It Be Again? 

dangerous and inexpedient for him or for any other Sena- 
tor or Representative to express any general opposition to 
the policies of the ex-college-professor who had termed 
himself "a mere servant of the people's representatives." 

It is impossible here to present an adequate picture of 
the American war Terror. The present effort is to point 
out merely the responsibility, the purpose, and the effects. 
The primary responsibility of the Federal government can- 
not be evaded. The final item of proof is the fact that 
crimes of Terror were never punished. After an out- 
rage, if the authorities put any one in jail, it was almost in- 
variably the victim, not the criminals. The bands of 
masked assassins themselves were the agents of the Ameri- 
can autocracy as directly as the Russian Black Hundreds 
were the agents of the Czar. ^ 

But the President issued a magnificent manifesto against 
mob violence. Yes, after looking passively on for seven- 
teen months ! When the President issued his manifesto 
(July 26, 19 1 8), the Terror had accomplished its purpose. 
The people had been reduced to submission. The country 
was under control. Congress was also under control. 

"This disgraceful evil [mob violence]," said the Presi- 
dent in his manifesto, "cannot live where the community 
does not countenance it." Under the circumstances that 
existed, it could not possibly have lived where the Federal 
government did not countenance it. But by July, 19 18, the 
President was ready to pretend that he had never approved 
of it, and to order it discontinued. The President now 
held in his hands every power that he coveted. Having 
made successful war on the American people, he was in a 

1 This lawlessness, inspired and stimulated by our government and our 
"best people" for war purposes in 1917 and 1918, was a major cause of the 
long period of civil violence following the war, so solemnly and gravely 
deprecated under the name of "the spirit of lawlessness" by some of the 
very eminent persons who were responsible for it. 



The War Terror 79 

position to make war as he wished In Europe. So disor- 
derly terror gave place to orderly absolutism. 

Apologists for America's situation at the end of 191 8 
win suggest that similar conditions obtained in the other 
countries at war. If It were true, that would be no justi- 
fication. But it was not true. In England, France, and 
other countries, extra war-time powers were exercised, not 
by a single man, holding office for four years, regardless of 
the approval of the country or of Congress, but by a cabinet, 
whose existence from day to day depended upon the con- 
tinued support of the legislative body. 

In no European country were free speech and a free 
press so ruthlessly stamped under foot. The writings of 
LIchnowsky, Harden, and the press attacks upon the Kai- 
ser, prove that freedom of discussion In the enemy coun- 
tries existed to an extent unknown in the United States. 

For the autocracy that was imposed upon America in 
19 1 7 and 19 1 8 there Is no palliation In the fact that the 
President was elected, that the Congress which yielded to 
him was elected. Since they were elected on their promise 
to do the diametrically opposite thing, their offense Is as 
great as If they had overturned an existing Constitutional 
government by a military coup, and Installed themselves in 
power to carry out policies which the people had pro- 
nounced against. 

In no modern country can autocracy sit in the saddle as 
autocracy. It must masquerade as democracy. So the 
machinery of deceit Is set up. And for those who cannot 
be deceived there must be Terror. 

No one had the temerity to defend the system under 
which America found Itself at the end of 19 18 on any 
other ground than that the end justified the means. The 
means themselves tend to throw suspicion upon the ends. 
What are the ends? 



OUR WAR ''CAUSES" 
XI 

MOTIVES CLAIMED FOR BELLIGERENCY 

In examining our excuses for war, the first noticeable cir- 
cumstance is their great number and variety. The number 
rendered it easy for our propagandists to shift, to leap 
about from one point to another, to dodge about in a maze 
of affirmation and denunciation; while the variety was cal- 
culated to raise some consideration appealing to every class, 
temperament, and type of mind. 

On many occasions we proclaimed the utter unselfishness 
of our motives. Yet on other occasions we urged motives 
as selfish as can well be imagined. Where selfish motives 
are acknowledged, however justifiable they may be, com- 
mon decency would seem to require that no profession of 
unselfishness be made. 

In his message of December 4, 19 17, President Wilson 
divided our claimed war motives into two classes, causes 
and objectives; the causes comprising the motives men- 
tioned in the pre-war disputes, the objectives comprising 
those which were brought forward only after we were in. 
Since the former were urged exclusively before the Ameri- 
can people and the American Congress, in defense of each 
and every step towards belligerency, it would be only just to 
test our sincerity strictly by them. These were the only 
motives of which America was officially told, and of which 
Germany was told. 

80 



Motives Claimed for Belligerency 8i 

Wars are always preceded — and always ought to be — 
by disputes, recitals of specific grievances, or ultimatums set- 
ting forth the course which the offending government may 
pursue in order to avoid war. But our official spokesman 
did not demand that Germany get out of Belgium; he did 
not demand that the Kaiser resign or reorganize his gov- 
ernment along more democratic lines; he did not demand 
that Germany cede France Alsace-Lorraine, he did not de- 
mand that Italy be given parts of Austria; he did not de- 
mand that Germany renounce her alliance with Austria, 
Turkey, and Bulgaria, or that Germany abandon imperial- 
ism. His quarrel was concerned entirely with Germany's 
use of the submarine, and almost entirely with America's 
rights involved therewith. Not a single complaint was of- 
fered that was not professedly based upon some specific in- 
jury to American lives, or trade, or danger thereto. On 
several occasions, the President did assume to stand as the 
champion of the rights of neutral nations in general, or as 
the defender of international law as such, but on every such 
occasion his complaints proceeded from alleged injury to 
selfish interests of certain Americans, and were scrupulously 
confined to submarine issues. 

In strict justice, our objectives are invalidated at the 
beginning by the very fact that they are after-thought rea- 
sons. They will not, however, be so treated here. 

America having ridden into war on the submarine issue, 
that issue will be examined first. The motives urged in 
the submarine dispute were : 

1. Protection of American commerce. 

2. Preservation of American lives. 

3. Championship of international law. 

4. Maintenance of American honor. 

On a number of occasions, both before and after April, 
19 17, our spokesman proclaimed the sufficiency of these 



82 Shall It Be Again? 

causes. For example, at Urbana (Jan. 31, 19 18), he told 
his audience: 

You will not need to be convinced that it was necessary for us 
as a free people to take part in this war. It had raised its evil hand 
against us. The rulers of Germany had sought to exercise their 
power in such a way as to shut ofiE our economic life, so far as 
our intercourse with Europe was concerned. 

And in a letter to Congressman Heflin, May 22, 19 17, he 
wrote : 

I have again and again stated the very serious and long continued 
wrongs which the Imperial German Government has perpetrated 
against the rights, the commerce, and the citizens of the United 
States. The list Is long and overwhelming. No nation that re- 
spected itself or the rights of humanity could have borne these 
wrongs any longer. 

Previously, in each successive step towards belligerency, 
the President had hinted that he was willing to go to war 
strictly on the submarine issue. As far back as February, 
19 1 5, he uttered this threat to Germany, conditioned 
wholly upon the protection of selfish American rights: 

The government of the United States would be constrained to 
hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for 
such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps It might 
be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property, and 
to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowl- 
edged rights on the high seas. (Strict-accountability note.) 

Looking over his preparedness-tour speeches, we find 
that the President presented the following propositions, to 
each of his audiences, practically in the same terms: 

1. He asked the country to prepare for war. 

2. He promised to keep the country out of war. 



Motives Claimed for Belligerency 83 

3. He hinted at danger of war. 

4. In promising to keep the country out of war, he left 
a loophole — war for the maintenance of American honor. 

5. He made it plain that, by American honor, he meant 
the obligation to protect American rights to trade and 
travel upon the high seas, as these rights are defined by 
international law. 

Here is the argument in typical quotations: 

Country Must Prepare. 

I should feel that I was guilty of an unpardonable omission if 
I did not go out and tell my fellow-countrymen that new circum- 
stances have arisen which make it absolutely necessary that this 
country should prepare herself. (Pittsburgh speech) 

Yet He Will Keep Us Out of War. 

I pledge you that, God helping me, I will keep you out of war. 
(Milwaukee speech) 

Still There May Be Trouble. 

I cannot tell twenty-four hours at a time whether there is going 
to be trouble or not. (Kansas City speech) 

For Honor May Require War. 

You have laid upon me this double obligation: 'We are relying 
upon you, Mr. President, to keep us out of this war, but we are 
relying upon you, Mr. President, to keep the honor of the nation 
unstained.' Do you not see that a time may come when it is im- 
possible to do both of these things? (Cleveland speech) 

Although There is No Danger of Invasion. 

Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States 
needs to fear an invasion of its own territory. (New York speech) 

Rights Abroad Must be Protected^ by Force, if Necessary. 

It may be necessary to use the forces of the United States to vin- 
dicate the rights of American citizens everywhere to enjoy the rights 
of international law. (Topeka speech) 



84 Shall It Be Again? 

For We are Morally Obliged to Protect Commerce. 

There is a moral obligation laid upon us to keep free the courses 
of our commerce and our finance, and I believe that America stands 
ready to vindicate those rights. (Topeka speech) 

The Destruction of Even One American Cargo May Mean War. 
One commander of a submarine . . . might set the world on fire. 
. . . There are cargoes of cotton on the seas; there are cargoes of 
wheat on the seas; there are cargoes of manufactured articles on the 
seas; and any one of those cargoes may be the point of ignition. 
(St. Louis speech) 

For We Must Maintain Our Right to Ship Products Abroad. 

There is one thing Kansas ought to be interested in, and that is 
that we must maintain our rights to sell our products to any neutral 
country anywhere in the world. We should be allowed to send the 
wheat that grows on the Kansas fields and the cotton in our south- 
ern states to neutrals who need them, without interference from any 
of the warring nations. (Topeka speech) 

And See that Americans Everywhere are Respected. 

Americans have gone to all quarters of the world. Americans are 
serving the business of the w^orld . . . and every one of these 
men ... is our ward and we must see to his rights and that they 
are respected. (Cleveland speech) 

That the true import of the President's preparedness 
speeches was not grasped by his audiences was due only to 
his policy of mixing such remarks with sentiments that 
seemed to lead to a diametrically opposite conclusion. 

Growing directly out of the President's determination 
to champion the interests of certain Americans was his as- 
sertion of those Interests as rights under International law. 
Growing directly out of his determination to champion 
these specified American "rights" was his assumption of 
the championship of law on principle. Growing out of 
this position was his assumption of the championship of the 



Motives Claimed for Belligerency 85 

rights of neutrals in general, although neutral nations were 
not asking for his peculiar kind of championship. Grow- 
ing out of this position was his championship of that all- 
embracing thing, "humanity." 

The apparently contradictory role of champion of others 
and champion of ourselves, apostle of unselfishness and 
apostle of selfishness, our Executive played throughout the 
pre-war disputes. It would appear, therefore, that the 
best means of testing the validity of our professed motives 
is to segregate and examine them one by one. 



XII 

PROTECTION OF AMERICAN COMMERCE 

Can the protection of American commerce from U-boat 
attacks be defended as a valid cause — as one of the causes 
— for our war with Germany? 

Our war represents an infinitely greater expense than 
the gross value of American commerce concerned in the 
dispute. 

Compare the cost of war with the value of the com- 
merce that we entered the arena to protect. Forget the 
blood-cost and every other cost except in immediate dol- 
lars and cents. The gross value of all exports from the 
United States to Great Britain and France, for the record- 
breaking year of 1916, was only $2,155,537,090, or but 
one-ninth of the appropriations of the first session of the 
war Congress. 

Consider the volume of commerce at issue, in comparison 
with the entire volume of America's commerce. In a 
speech at Cincinnati, October 26, 19 16 — less than one hun- 
dred days before he broke relations with Germany— Presi- 
dent Wilson said: 

If you take the figures of our commerce, domestic and foreign 
included, jou will find that the foreign commerce, even upon the 
modest reckoning of our domestic commerce, does not include four 
per cent, of the total, and the exports in munitions — and not merely 
in munitions, but in everything that goes to supply armies — draft ani- 
mals, automobile trucks, food directly intended for that purpose, 
shoes, clothes, everything that is needed by the commissary of an 

86 



Protection of American Commerce 87 

army, that all of these things put together do not constitute one 
per cent, of the total of our commerce. 

And only a fraction of this very small portion of Ameri- 
ca's total commerce passed through the submarine zone. 
The great Increase in America's foreign commerce between 
1 9 13 and 1 9 16 was due only in part to the war trade with 
the Entente countries. A portion of it was represented by 
an inflation of neutral trade, due to the disappearance of 
competition for world trade on the part of some of the 
warring nations. For his "modest reckoning of our domes- 
tic commerce" the President took the New York Annalist 
figures for the year ending June 30, 19 16 — five hundred 
billion dollars. American exports to England and France, 
during the same period, represented less than one-half of 
one per cent, of this sum. 

And even that one-half of one per cent, represents a 
great deal more than the fraction of America's export 
trade covered by American representations to Germany on 
behalf of American commerce. In making such represen- 
tations, the government of the United States concerned it- 
self only with the safety of American ships and their car- 
goes. Where ships flying other flags came into the dispute, 
the theme was not commerce, but lives. The ships which 
carried American goods through the U-boat zone were, 
more than ten to one, of foreign registry, sailing under 
foreign flags. The "American commerce" at issue as such 
was less than one-twentieth of one per cent, of the total 
commerce of America. 

American commerce thrived and expanded without war, 
and its growth^ even through the war area, was never en- 
dangered by the enemy. 

The entire loss of one-twentieth of one per cent, of a 



88 , Shall It Be Again? 

country's commerce could hardly be a staggering blow to 
that country as a whole. Such a loss, however, never 
occurred. America's trade with England and France was 
not destroyed by the submarine. It was never In danger 
of destruction as a whole. Interference with it was never 
so serious as to prevent its steady growth. 

In February, 19 17, following the breaking of relations 
with Germany, the National Association of Manufacturers 
issued a special bulletin characterizing the submarine war- 
fare, up to the Intensified period, as a "failure." 

And, from the beginning of the intensified period, it was 
the same kind of a failure. Although the trade of Febru- 
ary fell of! from that of January, this was not due to any 
increased destruction on the part of the submarine, but to 
a conspiracy of certain shipping and financial Interests, al- 
lied with the British government, to coerce America into 
more war-like action. (See Chapter XXVII.) 

But even then, the value of February exports was greater 
than that of the same month of the previous year, and the 
recovery in succeeding months — ^before America began to 
assist in combating the submarine — was complete. 

In an interview in the New York Times , February 18, 
19 1 7, the editor of Export American Industries ^ organ of 
the National Association of Manufacturers, said: 

Our regular export trade has suffered but little from the new 
German blockade. Without any possibility of interruption, the lines 
to the great neutral markets and to the colonies of the warring na- 
tions are open to our shipments. It is too bad the steamship news 
and the sailings cannot have a prominent place in the papers, as it 
would go far in offsetting the idea that our export trade is killed 
by the new submarine zone. Every day, from New York harbor 
alone, there are sailings of dozens of big cargo carriers that leave for 
Latin America, the West Indies, Australia, South Africa, and the 
Orient, and these are not mentioned in the newspapers. And this 



Protection of American Commerce 89 

does not include the shipments going out from Boston, Balti- 
more, Savannah, and our other Atlantic ports, or from the Pacific 
Coast. 

The trade routes from our different ports spread out like the 
delta of a great river. The most aggressive submarine warfare may 
dam some of these channels, but the current of our export trade will 
seek other outlets, and the result will be a deepening and broadening 
of the channels that cannot be obstructed. The coast line of the 
United States is too extensive, the ports are too widely separated, to 
make any submarine blockade effective in the slightest degree. 

Consider what England has done in continuing her export trade 
since the war. Hampered by an ebbing labor market and the highest 
insurance rates, and surrounded by the submarine zone, her foreign 
sales have steadily increased until her exports stand at approximately 
the same figure as in 191 3- If Germany could not retard this 
foreign trade of England, then how little have we to fear for the 
interruption of our export trade! 

In spite of all the hullaballoo that was raised, up to 
America's declaration of war but seventeen ships flying the 
American flag were attacked by U-boats. (State Depart- 
ment figures presented during war debates by Representa- 
tive Rogers of Massachusetts.) 

Actually, our war protection did not protect. Destruc- 
tion of '^our^' merchant ships in war became immediately 
greater than it had been in peace. 

Over against the seventeen American merchant ships at- 
tacked by Germany In nearly three years before our declara- 
tion of war, we find sixty-three American merchant ships 
sunk in the ten months following. 

During the first two months of Germany's Intensified 
campaign — which were the last two before America went 
to war — six ships were attacked, or three per month. But 
in the following ten months — the first ten months of our 
war "protection" — ^Germany sank an average of six and 



90 Shall It Be Again? 

one-half per month. (Department of Commerce figures 
published Jan. 30, 19 18.) 

The war Wade was of no value whatever to America 
as a whole, but an injury per se, and the nation would have 
lost nothing by its disappearance. 

Not only were the ships which sailed the U-boat zone, 
in overwhelming majority, of foreign registry, but the ships 
flying the American flag belonged, in a great part, to for- 
eigners, including the seventeen ships attacked by Germany. 

The majority stock of the organization sometimes known 
as the ^'Shipping Ti^ust''' — the International Mercantijie 
Marine Company and its subsidiaries — was owned in Eng- 
land. Although its American head was an American citi- 
zen, J. P. Morgan, a large share of the profits of this or- 
ganization went to foreigners. 

To what extent were the American people interested in 
the shipping profits of Mr. Morgan and his partners, for- 
eign and American? President Wilson on at least two 
occasions gave a partial answer to this question — once in 
the early days of the war trade, and again after America 
became a belligerent. In a speech at Indianapolis, Jan- 
uary 8, 19 1 5, the President told his audience: 

Do you know that the ocean freight rates have gone up in some- 
instances to ten times their ordinary figures? And that the farmers » 
of the United States, those who raise grain and those who raise 1 
cotton, cannot get any profit out of the great prices that the world) 
is willing to pay for these things, because the whole profit is eaten ( 
up by the extortionate charges for ocean carriage? 

And in his statement to American business interests, Julyf 
II, 19 1 7, the President said: 

The ship owners of the United States ... are doing everythii 
that high freight charges can do to make the war a failure, to mJ 
it impossible. . . . The fact is that those who have fixed the wai 



Protection of American Commerce 91 

freight rates have taken the most effective means in their power to 
defeat the armies engaged against Germany. 

Yet the protection of the business of these very people 
was one of the President's excuses for our war ! 

Not only was the American public as a whole precluded 
from sharing in any degree in the war-trade profits of Mor- 
gan and his partners, but that war trade actually put the 
American public out of pocket. This is proven by a com- 
parison of the increase in the prices of the necessaries of 
life, with the increase in returns to the numerically large 
classes that constitute the American public. 

There were some notable increases in wages, and some 
considerable increases in the returns for certain farm prod- 
ucts, but millions of Americans had been unable to add a 
penny to their incomes. In general, the rise in prices was 
not offset by corresponding Increases In wages. In prices 
of farm products, and in the returns to the other numer- 
ically large classes. 

It can be conceded that a certain measure of foreign 
commerce Is beneficial to the country at large, that when 
such commerce falls below a certain point It may be Inju- 
rious to the body politic generally; and at the same time It 
may be proven that when foreign trade rises beyond a cer- 
tain level It does so at the expense of the public at home, 
though the few directly participating in such trade may be 
reaping tremendous profits. Especially did that part 
of America's foreign trade classed as war trade react un- 
favorably upon the public pocketbook. The chief reason 
Is that the greater part of such trade — far exceeding even 
the trade In munitions — consisted of food and other nec- 
essaries of the American people. 

The result was the high prices which caused wide-spread 
suffering and numerous food riots during the weeks just 
preceding America's declaration of war. 



92 Shall It Be Again? 

We did not think it necessary to go to war with England, 
although the latter interfered with American commerce to 
a much greater degree than did Germany. 

England's Interference with American commerce repre- 
sented infinitely greater sums in dollars and cents than 
Germany's interference with American commerce. 

Moreover, while American trade with England contin- 
ued to grow in the face of the submarine peril, American 
trade with Germany completely disappeared in the face of 
the mine and cruiser peril. 

While Germany's interference with American trade was 
confined altogether to trade with Germany's enemies, Eng- 
land's interference with American trade extended to our 
trade with neutral countries. In the first eleven months of 
the European war, England seized 2,000 ships with Ameri- 
can cargoes bound for Europe. (State Department figures 
quoted by Prof. Edwin J. Clapp, "Economic Aspects of the 
War," p. 53.) 

Practical means were open to the United States for the 
protection of American commerce from all belligerents 
without war. 

From the beginning of the European conflict in August, 
19 14, until America herself became an enemy, Germany 
made repeated efforts to bring about practicable arrange- 
ments for the protection of all American commerce from 
interference by any belligerent. 

Immediately after the initiation of hostilities, the Ameri- 
can government, on behalf of American commercial inter- 
ests, proposed that all belligerents agree to conduct their 
naval warfare In conformity with the Declaration of Lon- 
don. Germany assented unconditionally to the proposal; 
her enemies refused to do so. 

When Germany estabHshed a military area on the high 



Protection of American Commerce 93 

seas, in retaliation for England's military area on the high 
seas, although England was already Intercepting nearly all 
neutral commerce to Germany, the latter announced that 
^Uhe Gerfnan navy has received instructions to abstain from 
all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such/' 
(German memorial, Feb. 4, 19 15.) At the same time it 
recommended that the American government convoy Ameri- 
can ships to insure their recognition, in order that they 
might proceed unharmed. 

The German memorial establishing a war zone was an- 
swered by our "strict-accountability note." (Feb. 10.) 
This marked the beginning of the dispute with Germany. 
Replying to the "strict-accountability note," the German 
government offered definitely to withdraw its war-zone 
decree if the United States should succeed in bringing 
about an acceptance of the Declaration of London, on the 
part of its enemies. Furthermore, it declared: 

The German government is prepared to accord, In conjunction 
with the American government, the most earnest consideration to 
a?iy measure that might be calculated to insure the safety of legit- 
imate shipping of neutrals within the seat of war. (Note of Feb. 
16, 1915.) 

Proceeding on the above suggestion, the American gov- 
ernment proposed to the belligerents (Feb. 20, 1915), ^'a 
basis of agreement" to safeguard neutral shipping, and ob- 
viate disputes between neutrals and belligerents. Reply- 
ing (Feb. 28), Germany characterized the proposal as ^^a 
suitable basis for the practical solution of the questions 
which have arisen.'^ Taking up the American points seri- 
atim, it agreed in essentials, declaring: "The German gov- 
ernment would undertake not to use its submarines to at- 
tack mercantile of any flag except when necessary to en- 
force the right of visit and search." Which is all that 



94 Shall It Be Again? 

the American government was at the time contending for 
regarding submarines. 

These negotiations fell through only because the British 
reply was a peremptory rejection. (Note of Mar. i.) 

Nevertheless, thereafter the German government con- 
tinued to try to meet the demands of the American govern- 
ment in its undersea warfare. In its note of May 9, 1915, 
it disclaimed any intention of attacking neutral ships, de- 
clared that it had given orders to the contrary, and prom- 
ised to pay for all damages to American ships caused by 
mistakes of submarine commanders. In its note of Sep- 
tember I, 19 1 5, it quoted its orders to submarine com- 
manders, instructing them to follow the rules of cruiser 
warfare in dealing with neutrals. That these orders were 
sincerely given and carried out is evidenced by the fact that, 
in the two years of submarine activity up to the beginning 
of the ''intensified" period, of the many hundreds of ves- 
sels attacked by submarines, but eleven were American, and 
a majority of these were sunk in conformity with the rules 
of cruiser warfare, against which the United States govern- 
ment could make no complaint and did not do so. 

In fact, so little fault was found with the German policy^ 
so far as its effect upon American commerce was concerned, 
that the United States practically changed the basis of the 
dispute. A relatively greater stress was laid upon com- 
plaints on behalf of American rights to travel on belliger- 
ent ships, and greater emphasis upon its assumption of 
championship of neutral rights In general and "the sacred 
and Indisputable rules of International law." 

Following the German announcement of intensified war- 
fare, the protection of American commerce again came to 
the fore as an acknowledged motive for our successive steps 
towards belligerency. The German announcement of in- 



Protection of American Commerce 95 

tensified warfare was made only after two years of nego- 
tiations in which Germany sought to arrive at an under- 
standing that would safeguard American commerce within 
the zone of warfare. It was made only after Germany 
had every reason to despair of obtaining impartial and neu- 
tral treatment from this country. It was the direct and 
logical result of the German failure to obtain such treat- 
ment from the Wilson Government. 

The responsibility for the intensified policy lies, there- 
fore, largely upon ourselves. For throughout the entire 
dispute, another course lay open and clear for America — 
an Impartial and feasible course that would have assured 
the safety of American commerce from all belligerents, 
without the abandonment of neutrality, and without war. 
That course was to stand by the Declaration of London, 
to accept Germany's consent to conform to it, to compel 
England to conform to It — to compel, not by war or threats 
of war, or any hostile, unneutral, or dishonorable act, but 
by the simple pressure of economic force, the application of 
the sovereign right of embargo, which would have been suf- 
ficient, as every American government official knew at the 
time. 

What is the answer to all this? 

When it becomes evident that the war cannot be justified 
on any basis of immediate dollars and cents, Is the answer 
that future dollars and cents will make it worth while? 

When It is shown that the nation was not profiting but 
was losing by the war trade. Is the answer that we had to 
fight for that trade, nevertheless, in order to protect the 
"right" of such trade to pass unmolested, on the theory that 
in some future war the trade of this class might become 
nationally profitable? Will any one dare contend that the 
American people stood to reap financial benefits from our 



96 Shall It Be Again? 

war, in this or any future generation, sufficient to compen- 
sate it for the blood and treasure that it proceeded to pour 
out]? 

Or is the answer that it was a question of honor? But 
if a question of honor, why mention commerce unless honor 
is in some way involved with commerce ? In what manner 
are commerce and honor related in the dispute that carried 
America into the most terrible war in history? 

Commerce was one immediate subject of contention in 
the submarine dispute; the other was American lives. 



XIII 

PRESERVATION OF AMERICAN LIVES 

Can the preservation of American lives be defended as 
a cause for our war with Germany? 

This point is disposed of on grounds similar to those ap- 
plied to commerce. Our war, of course, represents an ex- 
penditure of many more American lives than were con- 
cerned in the dispute. 

Our war protection did not even protect from the partic- 
ular kind of danger from which the obligation to protect 
was alleged. Before April, 19 17, but 226 American lives 
were lost on all ships, American and foreign, as a result of 
Germany's action; this Includes the 114 American lives lost 
on the "Lusitanla." (State Department figures presented 
during war debates by Representative Rogers of Massachu- 
setts.) But in the first ten months of American belliger- 
ency, more than 300 American lives were lost as a result 
of Germany's operations upon the seas. (Department of 
Commerce figures published Feb. i, 19 18.) 

Moreover, practicable means were always open to the 
United States for the preservation of American lives from 
any of the incidents of the European conflict. Had the 
preservation of American lives been at any time a real con- 
sideration our government would have taken one or the 
other of two courses : 

1. It would have notified American citizens to travel 
within the barred zone only at their own risk. 

2. It would have accepted the means offered by Germany 

97 



98 Shall It Be Again? 

for safe travel for American citizens through the barred 
zone. 

Many Americans have no doubt forgotten that the Ger- 
man government repeatedly expressed a willingness to 
enter into any arrangements whatever — short of abandon- 
ing her commercial blockade — looking towards the preser- 
vation of the lives of neutrals. 

In its note of July 8, 19 15, the German government of- 
fered to give its submarine commanders instructions ^Uo 
permit the free and safe passage of American passenger 
steamers when made recognizable by special markings and 
notified a reasonable time in advance.^' It proposed that 
an arrangement be entered into covering details. It went 
farther and expressed a willingness to agree to "the installa- 
tion in the passenger service of neutral steamers, the exact 
number to be agreed upon, under the American flag under 
the same conditions as the American steamers above men- 
tioned." It even offered: 

If, howjever, it should not be possible for the American govern- 
ment to acquire an adequate number of neutral passenger steamers> 
the Imperial Government is prepared to interpose no objections to 
the placing under the American flag by the American government of 
four enemy passenger steamers for the passenger traffic between 
America and England. The assurances of free and safe passage for 
American passenger steamers would then be extended to apply under 
the identical pre-conditions to these formerly hostile passenger 
ships. 

In the note of May 4, 19 16, the German government 
pointed out that It had made "several proposals to the gov- 
ernment of the United States In order to reduce to a mini- 
mum for American travelers the inherent dangers of naval 
warfare," all of which proposals we had declined; neverthe- 
less it declared that "the German government still stands 
by its offer to come to an agreement along these lines." 



Preservation of American Lives 99 

Finally, in announcing the intensified commercial block- 
ade — ^which furnished the occasion for President Wilson to 
break diplomatic relations and move rapidly towards war — 
Germany laid down conditions under which American pas- 
sengers could still travel. (See annex to note of Jan. 31, 
1917.) 

We had a dispute with England, as well as with Germany. 
In comparing the wrongs which we suffered from each, a 
great point was made of the fact that, while England may 
have interfered with American commerce quite as flagrantly 
as did Germany, our grievance against the latter was very 
much greater by reason of the fact that Germany's interfer- 
ence involved the sacrifice of American lives, while that of 
England did not. 

It was pointed out at the time that this contention was not 
true, American lives having been lost from British mines in 
at least two instances, in the sinking of the American ships 
"Evelyn" and "Carib." Supposing, however, it were true, 
the answer would be that, if the German sea warfare re- 
sulted in the sacrifice of American lives and the British war- 
fare did not, it was not because of any difference in goodwill 
between Germany and England, hut it was wholly due to 
the choice of Americans. 

No informed persons will seriously contend that Germany 
wished to kill Americans — any more than that England 
wished to kill Americans. The blockade on each side was 
aimed solely at commerce. Both wished to avoid causing 
the loss of neutral lives, but both were determined to hurt 
the commerce of the other, even though it cost the lives of 
neutrals. Both laid down conditions for neutral commerce 
which, if disregarded, would result in the loss of neutral 
lives, and, if obeyed, would mean that no neutral lives 
would be lost. Had Americans persisted in sailing the 



100 Shall It Be Again? 

North Sea in defiance of British orders they would surely 
have been sunk by mines; or if they avoided mines they 
would have been pursued by cruisers, and if they attempted 
to escape they would have been fired upon. The sole 
reason why Americans were killed by Germans and not by 
Britons was that they persisted in disregarding the German 
orders, while carefully complying with the British orders. 
American citizens took such a course for several reasons. 
First, the chances of successfully evading the German or- 
ders were greater. Second, the American government en- 
couraged them to attempt to evade the German orders while 
not encouraging them to attempt to evade the British or- 
ders. 

For not only did our government unconditionally reject 
all German offers for the safeguarding of American lives, 
but it used American lives as pawns in the dispute. It de- 
liberately encouraged Americans to go into danger. In 
this it cooperated with England, whose policy could have 
been dictated only by a desire to embroil the United States 
with Germany. 

Great Britain placed restrictions upon the travel of Brit- 
ish women and children through the barred zone. In this 
policy it was acting out of consideration for British lives. 
But it had no such consideration for American lives. Nor 
did our own government. Great Britain was quite will- 
ing for American citizens to be killed, if that would only 
pave the way to American hostility to Germany. And the 
Wilson Administration played into the hands of England. 
Meanwhile, Germany was begging the United States not 
to send its citizens into danger. Germany was showing 
more consideration for American lives than was the Ameri- 
can government. Of course it was doing this in the hope 



Preservation of American Lives loi 

of avoiding war with us. But what was the motive for our 
peculiar policy? 

President Wilson was so willing for our citizens to risk 
their lives that he permitted them to do so even in violation 
of our own statutes. A notable case is that of the *'LusI- 
tania." In the words of Senator LaFollette: 

Four days before the Xusitania' sailed, President Wilson was 
warned in person by Secretary of State Bryan that the 'Lusitania' 
had six million rounds of ammunition aboard, besides explosives, and 
that the passengers who proposed to sail on that vessel were sailing 
in violation of a statute of this country, 'that no passenger shall 
travel upon a railroad train or sail upon a vessel that carries dan- 
gerous explosives. And Mr. Bryan appealed to President Wilson to 
stop passengers from sailing upon the 'Lusitania.' (Speech at St. 
Paul, Sept. 20, 19 1 7.) 

Two weeks before the "Lusitania*' sailed, the passen- 
gers had been warned also from German sources. Who, 
then, was primarily responsible for the loss of American 
lives on the "Lusitania"? 

A year later the issue was even more clearly defined. In 
opposition to the view of Congress, the President Insisted 
on the ''right" of American citizens to travel as passengers 
upon the fighting "merchant" ships of the warring coun- 
tries, encouraging them to risk their lives in this manner. 

From all this it is obvious that the preservation of 
American lives was only a pretext. Did the President de- 
liberately seek to use American lives to protect the muni- 
tions trade as such? Certainly he used American lives for 
some other purpose than for the preservation of American 
lives, for the way to protect life is to protect it, and not 
send it into danger. 

In its note of July 8, 191 5, the German government de- 



102 Shall It Be Again? 

clared Itself "unable to admit that American citizens can 
protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their pres- 
ence on board." If President Wilson's willingness to sac- 
rifice American life in opposition to this view was not due 
to a determination to protect the American war trade, even 
that carried in belligerent ships, what was the motive? 

Again — as with commerce — was it a question of honor? 

In what manner are trade and travel within the barred 
zone related with honor, in the dispute that carried America 
into the most terrible war in history? 

We find Wilson's own answer in his famous letter to 
Senator Stone, opposing a warning to American citizens 
against traveling as passengers on the armed ships of the 
Entente allies. Here is the most complete existing ampli- 
fication of President Wilson's position as the professed 
champion of international law, and his most connected ex- 
position of the relationship which this professed champion- 
ship bears to the selfish American interests of trade and 
travel; the relationship which these selfish interests bear to 
American honor, and the relationship between the sup- 
posedly unselfish championship of neutral rights gener- 
ally, and the obviously selfish interest of American sover- 
eignty. Said President Wilson to Senator Stone (Feb. 24, 
1916) : 

I cannot consent to zny abridgement of the rights of American citi- 
zens in any respect. The honor and self-respect of the nation is in- 
volved. We covet peace and shall preserve it at any cost but the loss 
of honor. To forbid our people to exercise their rights for fear we 
might be called upon to vindicate them would be ... an implicit, 
all but explicit, acquiescence in the violation of the rights of man- 
kind everywhere and of whatever nation or allegiance. It would 
be a deliberate abdication of our hitherto proud position as spokesman 
even amidst the turmoil of war for the law and the right. ... It 
is important to reflect that, if in this instance we allowed expediency' 



Preservation of American Lives 103 

to take the place of principle, the door would inevitably be opened t3 
still further concessions. Once accept a single abatement of right, 
and many other humiliations would certainly follow and the whole 
fine fabric of international law would crumble under our hands, 
piece by piece. What we are contending for in this matter is of the 
the very essence of the things that have made America a sovereign 
nation. She cannot yield them without conceding her own impo- 
tency as a nation and making vital surrender of her independent 
position among the nations of the world. 

If you follow this, you get the official theory almost 
clear. Honor is involved with trade and travel because 
trade and travel are involved with international law, and 
international law is involved with sovereignty. For our 
own sakes we must maintain our proud position as cham- 
pion of neutral rights and of humanity. 

We do not pretend that Americans must be left to trade 
and travel under all circumstances. It is not the actual 
interference with commerce and lives that obliges us to 
fight; it Is the method — and the method stands or falls by 
the rules of international law. Of such overshadowing im- 
portance is international law, indeed, that we must stand 
prepared to sacrifice both commerce and lives to it. We 
must stand prepared to spend even "our last man and our 
last dollar" in order to maintain the simple right, under 
international law, of any American to ship the food we need 
to other countries, or the simple right of the same Ameri- 
can to travel anywhere upon the high seas, in pursuit of 
the patriotic business of causing a scarcity of food and high 
prices within his own country. 

Very well, all motives of the submarine dispute are re- 
duced to terms of international law. 



XIV 

WAR FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 

In view of the universally admitted fact that international 
law had largely gone by the board, as a result of the war 
measures of both belligerents, and the universal belief that 
after the war, a new and more definite code would be 
drawn up, was it not a bit ridiculous to pretend to go to 
war to save the existing code from the scrap-heap? 

In the British note of February lo, 19 15, appears the 
following: 'Wo war has yet been waged in which neutral 
individuals have not occasionally suffered from unjustifiable 
action/' Supposing America had not gone to war with 
Germany, there is no ground whatever for the theory that 
Germany would then have gone out of her way to violate 
other American "rights" than those involved in the sub- 
marine dispute, or would in any way have assailed the in- 
dependence of this country. 

It would seem to be obvious that, under the circumstan- 
ces, expediency should have been the guide. It would seem 
to have been expedient to keep out of the war except for 
some interest immediately vital to sovereignty, or for some 
practicable ideal impossible to arrive at through any alter- 
native course. 

Every one surely knows that governments do not habit- 
ually rush into war on any such principle as that enunciated 
by Wilson. Nor had America in the past followed any 
such policy. Justification of a diametrically opposite course 
was the main thesis of the campaign upon which Wilson was 
reelected In 19 16, although at that very time he had given 
enunciation to his war-for-the-championship-of-interna- 

104 



War for International Law 105 

tlonal-law theory. In the keynote speech, at the St. Louis 
convention, Governor Glynn sought to show that his chief 
was following the course of expediency, wisely pursued by 
his Illustrious predecessors. In support of his argument, 
Glynn gave a long list of Instances from our history, in 
which America had suffered grievous Injury, chiefly from 
England and France,^ during the presidential terms of 
Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Van Buren, Pierce, Lincoln, 
Harrison, and Grant, in which our disputes had been set- 
tled by negotiation, without resort to war. 

Do not forget that the expedient course was always open 
to our Executive, that it v/as made easily possible by the 
conciliatory; attitude of Germany, and that a numerous 
group within his own party urged it from the start, and con- 
tinued to urge it down to the very verge of war. 

In support of his resolution seeking to warn American 
citizens against traveling as passengers in armed belliger- 
ent ships, Senator Gore had argued (Mar. 2, 1916) : 

The progress of civilization consists of the withdrawal of individ- 
ual rights when they become incompatible with the paramount in- 

1 Among other things, Mr. Glynn referred to the efforts of the French 
minister during Washington's administration, to "rally this country to the 
support of France in return for the help France gavei us in the revolution- 
ary war." "Our debt to France" was a special reason frequently pro- 
claimed by our war propagandists for American intervention against Ger- 
many. On one occasion President Wilson asserted that the American 
people had been waiting for more than a century an opportunity to repay 
the alleged debt. President Harding expressed himself in similar terms 
in a speech, October 19, 1921. On arriving in France, General Pershing 
shouted loudly, "Lafayette, we are here !" The gesture was not without its 
sentimental effect. But for more than a century the prevailing American 
view had been that we owed France nothing, as the French official help 
to the colonies in the Revolutionary War was given selfishly, as an in- 
cident in the French war with England, which happened at the time to be 
more "democratic" than France. The "opportunity" mentioned by Wilson 
had come to President Washington himself, who rejected it. Had there 
been any debt to France, moreover, it would have been wiped off the slate 
generations ago by the unfriendly acts mentioned by Wilson's spokesman at 
St. Louis. 



\ 



io6 Shall It Be Again? 

terests of organized society. It is perhaps true that any one of the 
100,000,000 American citizens has a right to travel on an armed 
merchant ship. He has the right to run the risk of losing his life 
and engulfing this republic in a sea of carnage and blood, but I be- 
lieve that the 100,000,000 citizens have a right to be protected 
against his recklessness. The right of 100,000,000 to be protected 
from butchery is not to be weighed in the balance with the sacred 
and inherited right to imperil his own life. 

A few days earlier, Senator Stone, chairman of the For- 
eign Relations Committee, had argued with the President 
as follows: 

I find it difficult for my sense of duty and responsibility to con- 
sent to plunge this nation into the vortex of this world war be- 
cause of the unreasonable obstinacy of any of the powers, upon the 
one hand, or upon the other hand, of foolhardiness, amounting to a 
sort of moral treason against the republic, of our people recklessly 
risking their lives on armed belligerent ships. I cannot escape the 
conviction that such would be so monstrous as to be indefensible. I 
insist that neither a private citizen nor the President nor the Con- 
gress of the United States can be justified in driving this nation into 
war or endangering its peace by any such false sense of courage or 
national prestige or dignity. (Letter of Feb. 24, 19 16.) 
^^^- ■ , • 

A similar position was taken by many Republicans, a 
large proportion of whom held to it even after the Presi- 
dent had broken diplomatic relations, and almost down to 
the day when he had practically embroiled us. Had the 
President himself taken this position, it would have been 
difficult for him to have found grounds for a serious quar- 
rel. Moreover, there is no evidence that he would have 
lost his leadership by doing so.^ 

2 According to Joseph P. Tumulty, President Wilson's secretary ("Wood- 
row Wilson as I Know Him," Chapter XXIV.), the members of Wilson's 
own cabinet advised him against the belligerent position which he took 



War for International Law 107 

In the keynote speech previously referred to, President 
Wilson's mouthpiece accused the political opposition of urg- 
ing the very theory that "a single abatement of right" 
would require America to plunge into the war, and pointed 
where such a policy, if carried out, would inevitably lead: 

Fighting for every degree of injury would mean perpetual war, 
and this is the policy of our opponents, deny it how they will. It 
would not allow the United States to keep the sword in the scabbard 
as long as there remains an unrighted wrong or an unsatisfied hope 
between the snowy wastes of Siberia or the jungled hills of Borneo. 
... It would give us a war abroad each time the fighting cock of 
the European weather vane shifted with the breeze. It would 
make America the cockpit of the world. It would mean the reversal 
of our traditional policy of government. It would mean the adopt- 
tion of imperialistic doctrines which we have denounced for over a 
century. ... In a word, this policy of our opponents would make 
the United States the policeman of the world. Rome tried to be 
policeman of the world, and went down ; Portugal tried to be police- 
man of the world, and went down ; Spain tried, and went down ; 
and the United States proposes to profit by the experience of the 
ages and avoid ambitions whose reward is sorrow and whose crown 
is death. 

upon this crucial occasion, on the very ground that he might thereby suffer 
defeat and lose his leadership. 



XV 



mXERNATIONAL LAW OUR REVERSALS ON THE LAW 

IN 1915 AND 1916 

Our dispute with Germany hinged upon three legal points : 
the law of the submarine, the law of the armed merchant- 
man, and the principle of equal treatment as an attribute 
of neutrality. On all three of these points, the Adminis- 
tration at Washington flagrantly reversed itself during the 
course of the controversy. 

At one time our spokesman virtually admitted that the 
law of the submarine had never been fixed, in the following 
words : 

The government of the United States is not unmindful of the ex- 
traordinary conditions created by this war, or of the radical altera- 
tions of circumstances and methods of attack produced by the use 
of Instrumentalities of warfare which the nations of the world can- 
not have had in view when the existing rules of International law 
w)ere formulated, and It Is ready to make every reasonable allowance 
for these novel and unexpected aspects of war at sea. (Note to 
Germany, July 21, 19 15.) 

Notwithstanding this admission, he proceeded to form- 
ulate rules of submarine procedure and to put forth these 
rules as a part of "the fine fabric of international law!" 

In doing so, far from holding the submarine to be an 
outlaw, he conceded it to be a proper weapon of warfare, 
and at times conceded that it could properly be employed in 
operations against commerce. On one occasion he de- 
clared: 

108 



Our Reversals on the Law 109 

The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it 
is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as 
have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy within 
the so-called zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices 
of regulated w^arfare. (Note of July 21, 19 15, to Germany.) 

On another occasion he declared: 

I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper 
use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce. (Letter, 
of Secretary Lansing to British ambassador, Jan. 18, 1916.) 

But at another time he held : 

Manifestly submarines cannot be used against merchantmen . . . 
without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice 
and humanity. (Note of May 13, 19 15, to Germany.) 

And at another time he held : 

The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's com- 
merce is . . . utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, 
the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the 
sacred immunities of non-combatants. (Note of Apr. 18, 191 6, to 
Germany. ) 

A comparison of these four quotations shows that, in 
attempting to lay down the law of the submarine, we flatly 
reversed ourselves, first in 19 15, and again in 191 6, on thei 
legality of the submarine for the destruction of com- 
merce. 

The law of the armed merchantman was of prime im- 
portance In the dispute with Germany because It Involved 
the question of the right of attack without warning. The 
most unfavorable view ever held of the submarine by our 
government was that It must not be employed at all against 
bona fide merchant vessels; at no time did we hold that Its 
unrestricted use against war vessels was not legitimate. 

We never, of course, claimed that American citizens had 



no Shall It Be Again? 

any right to protection when found upon enemy war vessels. 
The question was, therefore, when does a merchant ship be- 
come a warship? May a merchant vessel arm purely for 
defense and fight defensively? And if so, what procedure 
must it follow in order to retain its character as a merchant- 
man, and continue in the enjoyment of the immunities of a 
merchantman ? 

On this point our reversal was even more flagrant than 
upon the law of the submarine. In the beginning (Memo- 
randum of Sept. 19, 1914) we held that the mere presence 
of any armament on board a merchant vessel would create 
a presumption of offensive purpose, and that this presump- 
tion could be overcome only by the marshalling of concrete 
evidence to prove that the armament was intended "solely 
for defense." Such evidence, we held, must include the 
facts ^'that no guns are mounted on the forward part of the 
vesseV^ ; ^'that the calibre of the guns carried does not ex- 
ceed six inches'^' ^'that the guns and small arms carried are 
few in number^' ; ^'that the quantity of ammunition carried 
is smair' ; ''that the speed of the ship is slow'\- that the ves- 
sel is manned only by its usual crew, follows the usual 
route of a merchant vessel, engages in regular trade, etc. 
etc. 

This position was concurred in by the British govern- 
ment. In a memorandum dated August 25, 19 14, the Brit- 
ish ambassador notified us that he had been instructed to 
give ''the fullest assurances that British merchant vessels 
will never be used for purposes of attack . . . that they 
will never fire unless fired upon, and that they will 
never under any circumstances attack any vessel.'^ In a 
memorandum dated September 7, he admitted the impro- 
priety of an armed merchantman's carrying war material 
or military forces. And in a memorandum dated Septem- 
ber 9, he defined defensively armed craft as "merchant ves- 



Our Reversals on the Law iii 

sels which are bona fide engaged in commerce and carry 
guns at the stern only J* 

For a brief period, indeed, we took the position that 
no armament whatever could be considered defensive, and 
that the so-called armed merchantman was never a mer- 
chantman at all, but always a ship of war: 

The placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day of sub- 
marine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to 
render merchantmen superior in force to submarines, and to prevent 
warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, 
on a merchant vessel, would seem to have the character of an of- 
fensive armament. ... I should add that my government is im- 
pressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant 
vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of 
submarine warfare and the weakness of undersea craft, should be 
held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as 
by a belligerent government, and is seriously considering instructing 
its officials accordingly. (Letter of the Secretary of State to the 
British Ambassador. Jan. i8, 191 6.) 

A complete reversal from this position came only sixty- 
seven days later. In a memorandum dated March 25, 
19 1 6, we not only abandoned our stand of January 18, but 
conceded to armed merchant vessels greater freedom of ac- 
tion than we had conceded them originally, greater freedom 
even than the British government had dared to ask. From 
holding that merchantmen could not arm against subma- 
rines at all we faced squarely about to the position that 
merchantmen might not only arm against submarines, but 
might fire before being fired upon ; that, in effect, while the 
armed merchantman was entitled to attack without warn- 
ing, the submarine was not entitled to do so; that neutral 
persons traveling as passengers upon such armed ships were 
entitled to the same immunities as if traveling upon peace- 
ful passenger-vessels. 



112 Shall It Be Again? 

On the question of the presumption to be drawn from 
the presence of armament, the two memoranda present a 
perfect deadly parallel. (See appendix, p. 433.) The 
new ruling, indeed, would not permit the submarine to fire 
upon the "merchantman" under any circumstances, until 
after it had been attacked by the latter. 

It was in support of this reversal, and no other, that 
Wilson threatened to break diplomatic relations with Ger- 
many in 19 1 6. It was this kind of law that Wilson charac- 
terized as "sacred and indisputable." It was this kind of 
championship of "immutable" principles by which the Pres- 
ident sought to explain our alliance with England and our 
war with Germany. 

In the diplomatic controversies which preceded war, our 
official spokesman unfitted us for the role of knightly cru- 
sader for international law, not only by disputing and 
changing his own position on essential questions of princi- 
ple, but by presenting an unequally inflexible front toward 
different offenders against his various positions upon such 
questions. 

When a neutral nation fails to maintain its claimed 
rights against one belligerent, only to quarrel with another 
belligerent over rights of a similar character, and finally go 
to war with it, becoming an ally of the first, its course can- 
not be justified on any ground of championship for inter- 
national right. 

At the beginning of the European war our government 
observed this principle in action, and at times also pro- 
claimed it in words. For example, in the note of Febru- 
ary 20, 19 1 5, to England, we find: 

To admit (any) claim on the part of Great Britain of justifica- 
tion for interfering with these clear rights of the United States and 



Our Reversals on the Law 113 

its citizens as neutrals . . . would be to assume an attitude of un- 
neutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain, which would 
be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this govern- 
ment. 

Fifteen months later, however, we find President Wilson 
putting forth this astonishing proposition: 

In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the 
government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government 
that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a sug- 
gestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of 
citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or 
in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any 
other government afFecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. 
Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not rela- 
tive. (Note of May 8, 191 6.) 

Even the British government, which profited so greatly 
by this reversal, had expressed the opposite view. In 
pleading justification of Its own violations of international 
law, on the ground that Germany had violated Interna- 
tional law. It urged (Note of Feb. 10, 1915) : 

It is impossible for one belligerent to depart from rules and prece- 
dents and for the other to remain bound by them. 

Neither then nor at any other time did President Wilson 
contend against this plea of England, although contending 
against the self-same plea by Germany, and ultimately man- 
euvering America into the European zvar by means of such 
contention. 

President Wilson's reversal on this point would seem 
to constitute nothing less than a confession of a conscious 
abandonment of a single standard of international morality, 
and the application of a double standard, In favor of the 
enemies of Germany; a confession, therefore, of a depar- 



114 Shall It Be Again? 

ture from neutrality, although for nearly a year longer he 
continued telling his own people and the world that we 
were neutral.^ 

^ The account of Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, although self- 
contradictory at times, bears out the view that the President was deliber- 
ately unneutral almost from the beginning. ("Woodrow Wilson as I Know 
Him," Chapters XXIII to XXVI.) 



XVI 



INTERNATIONAL LAW BRITISH AND GERMAN VIOLATIONS 

COMPARED 

Now what led to our remarkable reversals on the points 
of law involved in the dispute with Germanyi? 

Was it principle — or expediency? 

Were England's violations of international law, in rela- 
tion to American rights, any less clear or pervasive than 
those of Germany? Were they less reprehensible, either 
in number or degree, or by any other material or moral 
measure? 

On the other hand, in the beginning we characterized 
the British offenses in quite as emphatic terms as we did 
those of Germany; we asserted the same obligation to re- 
sist them. Here are some notable quotations : 

Protest against seizures and detentions, December 26, 
1914: 

The present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral 
ships and cargoes . . . constitutes restrictions upon the rights of 
American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the 
rules of international law or required under the principles of self- 
preservation. 

Blockade note, March 30, 19 15: 

The Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, 
w»ere its provisions to be actually carried into effect as they stand, 
a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral 
commerce within the whole European area, and an almost unquali- 
fied denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now at peace. . . . 
It is manifest that such limitations, risks and liabilities, placed upon 

IIS 



ii6 Shall It Be Again? 

the ships of a neutral power on the high seas ... are a distinct 
invasion of the sovereign rights of the nation vv^hose ships, trade, or 
commerce, is interfered with . . . [The] course of action [of the 
British government] is without precedent in modern warfare . . . 
[and] clearly subversive of the rights of neutral nations on the 
high seas. 

Protest against prize-court confiscations, July 14, 191 5: 

Insofar as the interests of American citizens are concerned, the 
government of the United States will insist upon their rights under 
the principles and rules of international law as hitherto established, 
governing neutral trade in time of war, without limitation or impair- 
ment by Orders in Council or other municipal legislation by the 
British government, and will not recognize the validity of prize- 
court proceedings taken under restraints imposed by British munici- 
pal law in derogation of the rights of American citizens under 
international law. 

Blockade note, October 21, 1915: 

It has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be em- 
ployed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destina- 
tion of cargoes bound for neutral ports, and to impose a contraband 
character upon such cargoes, are without justification; that the 
blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, is ineffec- 
tive, illegal and indefensible; that the judicial procedure offered as 
a means of reparation for an international injury is inherently defec- 
tive for the purpose, and that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted 
in violation of the law of nations. The United States, therefore, 
cannot submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these 
measures. . . . The United States . . . cannot with complacence 
suffer subordination of its rights and interests to the plea that the 
exceptional geographical position of the enemies of Great Britain 
requires or justifies oppressive and illegal practices. ... It is of the 
highest importance to neutrals not only of the present day but of 
the future that the principles of international law be maintained 
unimpaired. 



British and German Violations 117 

This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which 
have received the sanction of the civilized v^rorld against the law- 
less conduct of belligerents arising out of the bitterness of the 
great conflict which is now wasting the countries of Europe, the 
United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of 
that task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartial- 
ity which from the outbreak of the war it has sought to exercise 
in its relations with the warring nations. 

Note of May 24, 1916: 

The present practice [of seizing ships on high seas, taking them 
into port, and there confiscating mail] is a violation of . . . the 
Hague convention . . . The government of the United States . . . 
can no longer tolerate the wrongs which citizens have suffered and 
continue to suffer through these methods. . . . Manifestly, a neutral 
nation cannot permit its rights on the high seas to be determined by 
belligerents, or the exercise of those rights to be permitted or denied 
arbitrarily by the government of a warring nation. The rights 
of neutrals are as sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be as 
strictly observed. . . . Only a radical change in the present British 
and French policy, restoring to the United States its full rights 
as a neutral power, will satisfy this government. 

The arguments upon which these denunciations of Eng- 
land are based are infinitely better reasoned and supported 
than the arguments upon which the denunciations of Ger- 
many are based. Against England, we were able to cite 
copiously from authority and precedent, to quote British 
statesmen against Britain, to call up England's record with 
telling effect; while against Germany, we were forced to 
lay down new principles, which we dubbed International 
law, bolstering them up with rhetoric; and even upon these 
we put ourselves out of court by reversals on essential 
points. 

The only fair conclusion to be drawn from a study of 
this pre-war correspondence is that the record of England, 



ii8 Shall It Be Again? 

in trampling upon American rights, is not only as vulnerable 
and reprehensible as that of Germany, but far more so. 
The very points of law which America alleged against 
Germany could be brought against England with greater 
reason. 

Our complaints against England specified violations in 
definition of contraband; seizures and detentions, instead 
of visit and search upon the high seas; practices of British 
prize courts in condemning ships and cargoes; hovering of 
British warships off American coasts; misuse of the neutral 
flag; confiscation of American mail from ships illegally de- 
tained; the blacklist; and the so-called blockade; while the 
single complaint against Germany was that at times she 
failed to conduct her submarine operations in conformity 
with the accepted practices of cruiser warfare. 

But England also failed to conduct her operations in con- 
formity with the accepted practices of cruiser warfare. 
Moreover, England, operating with cruisers, could not urge 
the extenuating circumstances which America had (at 
times) admitted applied to submarines. When America 
complained to England — on precisely the same grounds 
under international law upon which all of the complaints 
against Germany were based — England's only defense was 
convenience. Said England complacently to America: 

To do so [bring ships into port without evidence] is not to be 
looked upon as a belligerent right, but as an adaptation of the 
existing right to the modern conditions of commerce. (British note 
of Feb. lo, 1915.) 

Germany could have used precisely the same words, with 
better justice, in excusing her submarine policy. England 
never gave up the practice which she here admits is illegal. 
But our President claimed justification for war in the fact 



British and German Violations 119 

that Germany finally refused to yield on exactly the same 
principle. 

To allege a difference, it was necessary to shift from 
questions of principle to questions of effect. "How about 
the ^Lusitania'?" But the question of effect is irrelevant, 
since the effect, as has been pointed out, was not chosen by 
the offending party. As Senator Norris demanded, in the 
debate on the Armed Ships Bill: 

Why have we kept out of the North Sea? . . . Simply because 
it is altogether more dangerous for ships to go through a mine field 
than it is for ships to go through a submarine field. Mining the 
high seas is incomparably more inhuman and ruthless than warfare 
by means of submarines. 

In the matter of warning, Germany invariably showed 
greater concern for preventing injuries to neutrals than did 
England. England gave the world but three days' notice 
of the establishment of her military area upon the high 
seas. Her "blockade" went into effect on the day of its 
announcement, and was applied retroactively upon all ships 
which had left their ports later than two weeks previously. 
Many enlargements in England's contraband lists, and new 
"wrinkles" in her aggressions upon neutrals, were not an- 
nounced at all until after she had put them into practice 
and made neutrals suffer from them. 

On the other hand, Germany gave the world fourteen 
days' notice of the establishment of her military area upon 
the high seas, and twenty-one days' notice of her determina- 
tion to deal with all armed merchant ships as ships of war. 
Of her "unrestricted warfare," only one day's notice was 
given, but, in practice, action against neutral ships was with- 
held for a reasonable period, as was promised in the noti- 
fication. 



120 Shall It Be Again? 

In its effort to retain the friendship of the United States 
(Note of Mar. 6, 19 17), Austria-Hungary argued that 
the submarines of the Teutonic powers had never really at- 
tacked any merchant vessel without adequate warning. As 
it was suicidal — because of the vulnerability of undersea 
craft — for the submarine to attempt always to give warn- 
ing immediately before an attack, the governments of the 
Central Powers took great pains to give general warning 
beforehand. Austria-Hungary pointed out that such warn- 
ing was more humane and considerate if given before the 
embarkation of the passengers, than if reserved until im- 
mediately before the destruction of the vessel, as was the 
practice in cruiser warfare. The note pointed out that, 
under the latter circumstances, it is impossible absolutely 
to guarantee the lives of passengers, since the best thing 
that can be done is to take the passengers aboard the war- 
ship, which is subject to fire in case of meeting an enemy 
before reaching port. 

American war propagandists, during the first few months 
after our declaration of war, habitually worked themselves 
into a great heat over the proposition that Germany broke 
some very solemn promises which she had made to the 
United States. This accusation originated with the Pres- 
ident, who, in announcing to Congress his break with Ger- 
many (Feb. 3, 19 17), asserted that the declaration of Ger- 
many, initiating unrestricted submarine warfare '^withdraws 
the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's 
note of the 4th of May, igi6." 

Taking the cue, Secretary Lansing was found declar- 
ing a little later: ''Of course, the immediate cause of our 
war against Germany was the announced purpose of the 
German government to break its promise as to indiscrim- 
inate war f are. ^^ {War-Information Series, No. 5, p. 3.) 



British and German Violations 121 

This alleged action he further characterized as a ^^deliher- 
ate breach of faith^^ and an '^act of perfidy, ^^ even declar- 
ing it to be *Hn itself sufficient to force us to enter the war if 
we would preserve our self-respect.^' 

What are the facts? 

Here is the alleged "solemn promise" of May 4, ex- 
actly as it was made : 

As the Germani government repeatedly declared, it cannot dis- 
pense with the use of the submarine weapon in the conduct of 
warfare against enemy trade. The German government, however, 
has now decided to make a further concession, adapting methods of 
submarine warfare to the interests of neutrals. . . . The German 
government, guided by this idea, notifies the government of the 
United States that German naval forces have received the following 
order: 

'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and 
the destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, 
such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval 
war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without safe- 
guarding human lives, unless the ship attempt to escape or offer re- 
sistance.' 

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for 
existence, shall for the sake of neutral interests restrict the use of 
an effective weapon, if the enemy is permitted to continue to apply 
at will methods of warfare violating rules of international law. 
Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neu- 
trality. . . . Accordingly, the German government does not doubt 
that the government of the United States will now demand and 
insist that the British government shall forthwith observe the rules 
of international law universally recognized before the \^ar, as are 
laid down in the notes presented by the government of the United 
States to the British government December 28, 1914, and November 
5, 1915. 

Should steps taken by the government of the United States not at- 
tain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by 



122 Shall It Be Again? 

all helligerent nations^ the German government would then be fac- 
ing a new situation in which it must reserve to itself complete lib- 
erty of decision. r-" 4.4.1- u t 
^,^, Lrottlieb von Jagow. 

This was the last of a long series of appeals to the 
United States for the equal and impartial treatment which 
neutrality requires. When, after nine months of wait- 
ing, in which the equal and impartial treatment was not 
forthcoming, Germany announced the unrestricted use of 
her submarines, she pointed out distinctly the situation 
which, to use her own words, 'Ogives hack to Germany the 
freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed 
to the government of the United States on May 4, igi6J* 

Where is the "breach of faith?" Where is the "per- 
fidy?" Where are the "broken promises?" 

Nothing could be more eloquent of the weakness of the 
case against Germany than this stock charge, known by 
every American government official and every student of 
the war to be baseless. 

Did the breaking of promises, with regard to the con- 
duct of warfare affecting American rights, require us to 
go to war "if we would preserve our self-respect," then 
America would have been at war with England before the 
end of 1914. For in the note of October 21, 1915, we 
find America protesting against the breaking of two prom- 
ises, made and broken in 19 14: the first that England 
would not "interfere with trade with the countries con- 
tiguous to the territories of the enemies of Great Britain"; 
the second, that "inconvenience would be minimized by the 
discretion left to the courts in the application of the Order 
in Council, and by the instructions which it was said would 
be issued [as to the execution of the blockade of Ger- 
many]." 

The promise of August 25, 19 14, that "British mer- 



British and German Violations 123 

chant vessels .... will never fire unless fired upon, and 
that they will never under any circumstances attack any 
vessel," was also habitually broken, and by express orders 
from the British government, as is shown by the "confiden- 
tial instructions" reproduced in the American White Book, 
(vol. Ill, p. 181). 

Regarding the Declaration of London, England com- 
menced breaking promises during the first days of the war, 
and broke them repeatedly thereafter. 

Much was made of the fact, by apologists for Eng- 
land, that the latter country never ratified the Declara- 
tion of London. Even were this strictly true, it would 
be scant extenuation for British violations thereof; for 
the Declaration of London was not a new code of laws, 
but simply '^an agreement as to what are the generally 
recognized rules of international law'^ — to employ the 
words of the document itself. The fact is that, at the out- 
break of the war, the British government did agree to 
abide by the Declaration of London, with certain speci- 
fied amendments, then and there set down. We were so 
notified in the note of August 22, 19 14. In the Order 
In Council of August 20, 19 14, the thing was put in this 
way: 

Whereas, the governments of France and Russia have informed 
His Majesty's Government that during the present hostilities it is 
their intention to act in accordance with the provisions of the con- 
vention known as the Declaration of London, signed on the 26th day 
of February, 1909, so far as may be practicable. 

Now, therefore. His Majesty, by and with the advice of his 
Privy Council, is pleased to order, and it is hereby ordered, that 
during the present hostilities the convention known as the Declara- 
tion of London shall, subject to the following additions and modifica- 
tions, be adopted as if the same had been ratified by His Majesty. 



124 Shall It Be Again? 

But the promise was broken by further "modifications," 
which followed, one after another — all dictated purely by 
British convenience — until it became too ridiculous to pre- 
tend any regard whatever for the document in question. 

The first violations of American rights in the European 
war consisted in the sowing of mines upon the high seas. 
The question as to whether England or Germany sowed 
the first of these mines is a matter of dispute, the merits 
of which may never be determined. But the point is not 
essential In determining to which side belongs the defense 
of retaliation., The essential question Is not who per- 
petrated the original violation of International law, but 
( I ) who perpetrated the violations against which Amer- 
ica first protested, and (2) who held most tenaciously to 
the course which America contended against as unlawful. 

An examination of the American White Book shows 
that, until February 10, 19 15, America had no complaint 
whatever against Germany an grounds of international 
law, while she was at variance with England on questions 
of international law from the first week of the war. 

When, February 4, Germany Issued her military-area 
proclamation, frankly defending it as a retaliatory meas- 
ure, she had America's own condemnation of her adver- 
sary's measures in support of her stand. But when, Feb- 
ruary 10, England for the first time advanced retaliation 
as a defense for her own violations of International law, 
she had no American protests whatever upon which to base 
her claim — no argument that was admissible from the 
American point of view. 

The evidence of the relative tractablllty of Germany 
is no less overwhelming. In the early months of the war 
the United States was continually striving to procure for 
neutrals ^^a standard by which to measure their rights or 



British and German Violations 125 

to avoid danger to their ships and cargoes.** (Note of 
Mar. 5, 19 1 5.) Germany was continually trying to do 
the same. England was continually refusing. 

England's military area upon the high seas was estab- 
lished November 5, 19 14; Germany's was established Feb- 
ruary 18, 19 1 5. But even then Germany showed a 
greater regard for neutral rights, since Germany's war 
was declared only against enemy vessels. England's war, 
however, was declared against neutral vessels. 

In its note of May 4, 19 16, Germany pointed out: 

The German government will only state that it has imposed far- 
reaching restraints upon the use of the submarine weapon, solely in 
consideration of neutrals' interests, in spite of the fact that these 
restrictions are necessarily of advantage to Germany's enemies. No 
such consideration has ever been shown neutrals by Great Brit- 
ain and her allies. 

Three months previously. President Wilson had pubHcly 
admitted that the instructions given to commanders of 
German submarines ^'are consistent for the most part with 
the law of nations.** (Speech at St. Louis, Feb. 3, 19 16.) 

One cannot read the diplomatic correspondence between 
America and England, and between America and Ger- 
many, without reaching the conclusion that the Wilson 
Administration was fully aware that it was closer to Ger- 
many than to England, in matters of principle. This fact 
was at times even acknowledged in words. For example : 

The government of the United States and the Imperial German 
Government are contending for the same great object; have long 
stood together in urging the very principles upon which the govern- 
ment of the United States now so solemnly insists. They are both 
contending for the freedom of the seas. (American note to Ger- 
many, July 21, 1915.) 

Not at any time, nor for any period, until February i. 



126 Shall It Be Again? 

19 17, did Germany stand as squarely against America's 
contentions as England stood from November 5, 19 14. 
Germany's unrestricted warfare against merchant ves- 
sels, within a certain area upon the high seas, began Feb- 
ruary I, 1917. England's began November 5, 1914. 
There is not an iota of difference in principle between these 
two decrees — and to Germany belongs the defense of re- 
taliation. 

Why did not America break diplomatic relations with 
England, November 5, 19 14, and move rapidly toward 
war? Why did not the United States insist, as it re- 
peatedly told England that it would, "that the relations 
between it and His Majesty's Government be governed, 
not by a policy of expediency, but by those established rules 
of international conduct upon which Great Britain in the 
past has held the United States to account when the latter 
nation was engaged in a struggle for national existence?" 
(Note of Oct. 21, 1915.) 

Why did America reverse itself suddenly on the status 
of armed merchant ships, on the use of the submarine for 
operations against commerce, and on the single standard 
as a condition of neutrality, thus swinging itself around 
into less glaring inharmony with the British position, and 
squarely against the German position? 

We happen to have the answer of President Wilson him- 
self, as given by his State Department to the United States 
Senate, which had propounded similar questions to the 
above : 

The fact that the commerce of the United States is interrupted by 
Great Britain is consequent upon the superiority of her navy upon 
the high seas. History shows that whenever a country has possessed 
that superiority, our trade has been interrupted, and that few arti- 
cles essential to the prosecution of the war have been allowed to 



British and German Violations 127 

reach its enemy from this country. (Answer of American Secre- 
tary of State to U. S. Senate, Jan. 20, 19 15 — ^American White Book, 
vol. II. p. 59.) 

In a word, we are guided, not by principle, but by — ex- 
pediency. We yield to superior force, and fight the infe- 
rior — on the same principle. 

The fact stands out, dodge as one may, that the only 
cause in dispute between the United States and Germany, 
was the right to ship supplies and passengers to the ene- 
mies of Germany, in the face of having given up the right 
to ship supplies and passengers to Germany Itself. 

Our own record puts us out of court. The British proc- 
lamation of November, 19 14, establishing a military area 
upon the high seas, was not Included In the American White 
Book. So Important a paper could hardly have been omit- 
ted without deliberate Intent. The purpose must have 
been to conceal, In a measure, our diplomatic Inconsisten- 
cies. But, in spite of the suppression, the official record 
is completely self-convlctlng. Our own White Book for- 
ever disposes of any claim to championship of International 
law as a cause for America's war. 



I 



XVII 

INTERNATIONAL LAW AMERICA'S OFFENSES AS A 

BELLIGERENT 

If offenses against the law of nations required the Ameri- 
can people, In honor, to go to war with the offender, then 
we would have gone to war not only with Germany and her 
allies, but with England and her allies, and with our own 
government as well. 

In his war message. President Wilson made this solemn 
promise: "We shall ... as belligerents . . . observe 
with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play 
we profess to be fighting for." 

In actual practice he perpetrated many infractions of 
these principles not only in relation to our enemies, but in 
relation to the world of neutrals. Far from championing 
the rights of neutrals, if the standards which we ourselves 
laid down in our pre-war disputes had been accepted and 
applied by the neutral nations of the earth, every neutral 
flying a flag upon the high seas would have been compelled 
to go to war against us. 

So far as our declared enemies were concerned, our Presi- 
dent began to offend, under "the principles of right and 
fair play," long before we formally entered war. He be- 
gan to offend on the day he withdrew his opposition to 
the loaning of money by American bankers to belligerent 
governments, and so departed from his own interpretation 
of strict neutrality. 

128 



America's Offenses As a Belligerent 129 

Against the letter of the law, he began to offend when he 
ceased to preserve an equally inflexible front toward viola- 
tions of American rights, respectively, by Germany and 
England, and — in order to conceal this offense — he set up 
the ridiculous "single, not joint; absolute, not relative" 
theory of responsibility. 

Quotations from the letter of international law in this 
chapter are taken from Professor T. J. Lawrence, whose 
writings are used as textbooks both by the English Admi- 
ralty and the American navy. Dealing with the law of 
neutrality, Professor Lawrence lays down as a primary 
duty of a nation to ^'refrain from giving to one side, in mat- 
ters connected with hostilities, privileges which it denies 
to others/^ 

The same position had been taken by George Washing- 
ton more than a century before. When, in the eighteenth 
century, England attempted to stop all American commerce 
with France, just as in 19 15 she attempted to stop all 
American commerce with Germany, Thomas Jefferson, 
Washington's Secretary of State, wrote into his protest to 
England (Sept. 7, 1793) : 'Were we to withhold from her 
[France] supplies of provisions we should in like manner 
be hound to withhold them from her enemies also.** 

As to the deliberate plan of President Wilson to begin 
hostilities without first declaring war, the third convention 
of the Hague Conference of 1907, signed by both the 
United States and Germany, laid down the principle that 
hostilities 'Unust not commence without previous and expli- 
cit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war with 
the reasons assigned for it, or of an ultimatum with condi- 
tional declaration of war*' 

America has her scraps of paper, as well as other coun- 
tries. Our Treaty of 1828 with the Kingdom of Prussia 



130 Shall It Be Again? 

is one of them. In a note to Germany dated May 13, 
19 15, the Wilson Government admitted that the Treaty of 
1828 was still in force: 

The United States and Germany are bound together not only 
by special ties of friendship, but also by the explicit stipulations of 
the Treaty of 1828 between the United States and the Kingdom of 
Prussia. 

But the Treaty of 1828 revives parts of the Treaty 
of 1799 with the Kingdom of Prussia, including the whole 
of Articles 23 and 24. Article 23 reads: 

If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the 
merchants of either country then residing In the other shall be 
allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle 
their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects 
without molestation or hindrance; and all the women and children, 
scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufac- 
turers and fishermen, unarmed and Inhabiting unfortified towns, 
villages or places, and, in general, all others whose occupations are 
for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be al- 
lowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be 
molested In their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burnt 
or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of 
the enemy Into whose power by the events of war they may happen to 
fall; but If anything Is necessary to be taken from them for the use 
of such armed force the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price. 

But upon declaring war, we prohibited the departure of 
any German subject from the territory of the United States. 
We placed German subjects under restriction. We seized 
more than one hundred ships belonging to German subjects, 
in American harbors, and used them in the war against 
Germany. We confiscated many millions of dollars' worth 
of property of German subjects, of all kinds and in all 
parts of the United States. We sold many millions of dol- 



America's Offenses As a Belligerent 131 

lars' worth of this property, and used the money to fight 
Germany. We so arranged the circumstances of such sales 
that the owners will probably never be able to recover their 
possessions. Not a dollar of compensation was given, and 
there was no pretense that adequate compensation would 
ever be given. 

President Wilson offered, at the time, what may be 
termed an excuse for tearing up the Treaty of 1828. It 
was that Germany had violated American rights.^ The 
point is irrelevant, since the stipulation in question was 
framed exclusively for a state of war; by its very provi- 
sions it begins to operate only when war begins, and pre- 
war differences cannot call its validity into question. This 
is acknowledged in the treaty, itself ; Article 24 concludes 
with the following words : 

And it is declared that neither the pretense that war dissolves 
treaties, nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or 
suspending this and the next preceding article; but on the contrary, 
that the state of war is precisely that for which they are provided, 
and during which they are to be as sacredly observed as the most 
acknowledged articles in the law of nations. 

Such stipulations as those quoted above, providing for the 
safety of alien enemies, are to be found in almost innumer- 
able treaties between governments. In discussing them, 
Lawrence says: 

Such stipulations are hardly needed now; for the old right of 
arrest has been rendered obsolete by the continuous contrary custom 
of nearly a hundred and fifty years. The only case of detention to 
be found in modern times occurred in 1803, when Napoleon ar- 
rested the British subjects found in France after the rupture of the 
Treaty of Amiens; but this was placed on the ground of reprisal, 
and has almost always been regarded as a violent proceeding in de- 
fiance of right. (''Principles of International Law," p. 388.) 

1 Reply to German protocol. Mar. 20, 1917. 



132 Shall It Be Again? 

Regarding the rightful policy to be pursued toward 
enemy property in general, he says : 

In modern times, the real property of enemy subjects has not 
been interfered with by the belligerent states in whose territory it was 
situated, even when the owners resided in their own or neutral states, 
the one exception being an act of the Confederate Congress passed 
in 1 86 1 for the appropriation of all enemy property, found within 
the Confederacy, except public stocks and securities. This proceed- 
ing was deemed unwarrantably severe; and contrary usage has been 
so uniform that we may safely regard the old right to confiscate or 
sequestrate as having become obsolete through disuse. . . . What is 
done by a weaker party in a bitter civil war is hardly a guide for 
ordinary belligerents in a struggle between independent states. If 
it is right to argue from the practice of nations to the law of nations, 
we may join the great majority of continental publicists, in the 
assertion that the international law of our own times does not per- 
mit of the confiscation of the private property of enemy subjects 
found on the land territory of the state, at the outbreak of war. 
(pp. 424-426.) 

Regarding merchantmen which are found in an enemy 
port at the commencement of hostilities, in the sixth Hague 
convention of 1907, appear the following clauses: 

(a) When a merchant ship belonging to one of the belligerent 
powers is at the commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is 
desirable that it should be allowed to depart freely, either imme- 
diately, or after a reasonable number of days of grace, and to pro- 
ceed, after being furnished with a pass, direct to its port of destina- 
tion or any other port indicated. . . . 

(b) A merchant ship unable, owing to circumstances of force 
majeure, to leave the enemy port within the period contemplated in 
the above article, or which was not allowed to leave, cannot be 
confiscated. 

When war was declared against Spain in 1898, a Presi- 
dential proclamation allowed Spanish ships thirty days In 



America's Offenses As a Belligerent 133 

which to depart from our harbors and reach home. Enemy 
aliens were disturbed neither In their persons nor in their 
property. 

By one who holds the extreme theory that the German 
people are a race of savages, bent on the destruction of 
the world, that they had to be exterminated or brought 
to their knees at all costs, it may be that any offense under 
international law against these people will be condoned, 
but what excuse can be given for our offenses against the 
world of neutrals? 

The President's own answer, on July 24, 19 15, was that 
there can be no excuse : 

Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought 
to be against an enemy who is believed to have acted in contraven- 
tion of law and humanity, are manifestly indefensible when they 
deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights. (Note to Germany.) 

Before April, 19 17, we professed to be guided by con- 
sideration for the rights of neutrals in general. We noti- 
fied the world that we stood ready to go to war in defense 
of neutral rights. We even professed to go to war as a 
champion of neutral rights. But after April, 19 17, what 
treatment did neutral rights receive at our hands? 

After April, 19 17, England did not abate in a single de- 
tail her violations of neutral rights; yet we became an ally 
of England and joined heartily in trampling upon the very 
rights which we had so loftily promised to defend. We 
even carried our ov/n aggressions upon neutral rights to 
greater extremes than they had ever been carried against 
us. 

We had signed the Declaration of London ourselves. 
We had asked the belligerents to abide by it. Germany and 
her allies had at all times been willing to abide by it, pro- 



134 Shall It Be Again? 

vided their enemies would abide by It, also. When we be- 
came an ally of Germany's enemies, did we again propose 
that all belligerents abide by the Declaration of London? 
Would we have accepted such a proposal made by Ger- 
many? When we went to war we paid no heed whatever 
to the provisions of the Declaration of London. It was 
an offense against Germany for which retaliation cannot be 
offered as an excuse. It was an offense against neutrals 
absolutely Indefensible, when judged either by our own pre- 
viously professed standards of International conduct, or by 
the letter of the law Itself. 

Again, In January, 191 6, England announced her Trad- 
ing with the Enemy Act, which contemplated a blacklist. 
After the act had been In force for six months, America de- 
nounced it in the following terms: 

It is evident that they [the blacklist measures] are inevitably and 
essentially inconsistent with the rights of the citizens of all the na- 
tions not involved in war . . . [and] . . . inconsistent with that 
true justice, sincere amity, and impartial fairness which should char- 
acterize the dealings of friendly governments with one another. 
(Note of July 26, 1 91 6, to England.) 

Yet our own Trading with the Enemy Act, Including 
the blacklist features, was a copy of England's, and we 
applied It to neutrals more severely than England ever ap- 
plied It to us. 

In Its protest of December 26, 19 14, to England, Amer- 
ica quoted a pronouncement of the British Premier, Lord 
Salisbury, during the South African war, as follows: 

Foodstuffs, though they have a hostile destination, can be con- 
sidered as contraband of war only if they are for the enemy's 
forces; it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used; 
it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the 
time of their seizure. 



America's Offenses As a Belligerent 135 

In reply England admitted : 

No country has maintained more stoutly than Great Britain, in 
modern times, the principle that a belligerent should abstain from 
interference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. 
(Note of Feb. lo, 1915.) 

Yet England only made more and more stringent her 
measures of starvation against Germany; while America, 
on becoming an ally of England, took drastic action to 
make the system of starvation absolutely complete. Not 
only did we offend against Germany, but we offended 
against the entire neutral world in precisely the same man- 
ner as England had offended against us. 

Our blockade note to England, of October 21, 19 15, 
ought to be read by every patriot who really cares for his 
country's honor. That note is unanswerable. It outlaws 
the British paper blockade on half a dozen counts. The 
British precedent, which America quotes, alone constitutes 
an overwhelming case. 

'^Blockades,'' says the Declaration of Paris, which Brit- 
ain signed, ^'in order to be binding ^ must be effective; that 
is to say, maintained by force sufficient really to prevent ac- 
cess to the coasts of the enemy/' But America pointed 
out that the coasts of Germany had always been open to 
Scandinavian trade. 

^'There is no better settled principle of the law of na- 
tions than that which forbids the blockade of neutral ports 
in time of war,'' urged America. Against the blockade 
of Scandinavian ports, we quoted the instructions of Sir 
Edward Grey to the British delegates to the London con- 
ference, "setting out the views of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, founded on the decisions of the British courts," as fol- 
lows : "A blockade must be confined to the ports and coasts 
of the enemy," and ^ Where the ship does not intend to 



136 Shall It Be Again? 

proceed to the blockaded port, the fact that goods are to 
be sent by sea, or inland transport, is no ground for con- 
demnation.^* 

We showed that the blockade of Scandinavian ports was 
intentionally not applied by JEngland to her own ships, 
doubly condemning it under a decision of England during 
the Crimean War, that '^if belligerents themselves traded 
with blockaded ports they cannot be regarded as effectively 
blockaded/* 

It was on grounds like these that President Wilson based 
his conclusion that the British blockade was "ineffective, il- 
legal, and indefensible," and announced his high decision to 
devote the energies of America to the vindication of neu- 
tral rights. Yet when we went to war, we devoted our 
energies largely to making more completely operative this 
very "indefensible" aggression upon such rights. 

One of the most remarkable offenses ever perpetrated 
against a neutral nation was our seizure of a large fraction 
of the merchant fleet of Holland, and our employment of 
these vessels in the war against Germany. Previously to 
our becoming her ally, England had confiscated a number 
of American ships, but she had made no wholesale grabs 
of shipping, and in each case she had offered a specific 
pretext, against which America had protested under the 
rules of international law. But when President Wilson 
took the merchant vessels of Holland, he gathered in all 
he could lay his hands on — sixty-eight ships, totaling in 
round numbers, half a million tons. 

If, in confiscating the merchant vessels of German sub- 
jects found in our harbors at the outbreak of the war, we 
trampled upon international law, how much more flagrantly 
must we have trampled upon international law in confiscat- 
ing ships of neutrals whom we had invited to trade with us ! 

True, the President professed to act "in accordance with 



America's Offenses As a Belligerent 137 

international law and practice." (Proclamation taking over 
Dutch ships, Mar. 20, 19 18.) And the newspapers, day 
after day, referred to the action as being within our rights 
under international law, and mentioned the *'law of an- 
gary," as if it were a common and accepted course of 
belligerents in time of war. 

It may be that this particular deception did not pass dis- 
cerning laymen as successfully as certain others. It may be 
that the inconsistency, not to say rank injustice, of our pro- 
ceeding was sensed by many. We confiscate outright many 
millions of dollars' worth of the property of neutral peo- 
ples, whose conduct toward us is without reproach, whose 
vessels enjoy a certain guarantee of safety in our ports 
under commercial treaty. We strike a staggering blow at 
that nation's foreign commerce, which happens to be of 
very much greater importance to it than our own foreign 
commerce ever was to us. We do this with no other ex- 
cuse than that we can use these foreign ships to our own 
advantage, and we defend our action under the pretense 
that we are within our rights under international law 1 

Discerning laymen may also remember that, in all the 
official and press camouflage connected with the taking over 
of the Dutch ships, only one international precedent for the 
action was mentioned, and that precedent came from Ger- 
many, against whom we were making the most exaggerated 
charges of lawlessness! 

The "law of angary!" Is it a law? Here is what 
Lawrence has to say of the grabbing of neutral ships by 
countries at war, of the "law of angary," and the "German 
precedent," which we refer to in defense of our own ac- 
tion : 

No recent case of such a high-handed proceeding is to be found. 
Treaty after treaty forbids it. . . . We may imagine how fiercely 
it might be resented if we contemplate for a moment what would 



138 Shall It Be Again? 

be the consequences of, say, the seizure by the United States govern- 
ment of all the liners in the port of New York, in order to carry to 
its destination an expedition against a Central American republic 
hastily planned in a sudden emergency. Half the civilized world 
would suffer, and the other half would make common cause with it. 
Even the milder manifestations of the power to seize are looked 
on askance, and provoke so much controversy that belligerent states 
will be unwilling to resort to them in the future. The last in- 
stance bears out this view. In 1870, the Germans sank six English 
colliers in the Seine at Duclair to stop the advance up the river of 
some French gunboats. Compensation was demanded, and after 
some hesitation given ; and the act was excused on the ground that 
the danger was pressing and could not be met in any other way. . . . 
The practice ... is so indefensible that it is now scarcely defended. 
Belligerents must make war with their own resources, and what they 
can capture from the enemy, not with neutral property which is 
unfortunate enough to be for the moment in their power. ... In 
the vigorous words of Dana, ' "angary" is not a right at all, but an 
act resorted to from necessity, for which apology and compensation 
must be made at the peril of war.' (pp. 626-628.) 

We cannot defend the seizure of the Dutch ships on the 
ground of immediate necessity. We did not apologize 
for their seizure; we preferred hypocritically to pretend 
that our wrong was a right. We promised compensation, 
"at the end of the war," but it is easy to understand that 
such compensation, based on the assessed value of the ships, 
in view of the existing need of the Dutch nation, could not 
be satisfactory. 



XVIII 



^'I SHALL not go back to debate the causes of the war," said 
President Wilson, in his message to Congress, December 4, 
19 17. **The intolerable wrongs done and planned against 
lis by the sinister masters of Germany have long since he- 
come too grossly obvious and odious to every true American 
to need to be rehearsed.'^ 

We have disposed of the ''intolerable wrongs" involved 
in the submarine dispute. What others appear in the of- 
ficial list of America's war causes? 

The President's most complete statement of them ap- 
pears in his Flag Day address, June 14, 19 17: 

It is plain how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary 
insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us 
no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights 
as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The 
military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They 
filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspira- 
tors and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own be- 
half. When they found that they could not do that, their agents 
diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own 
citizens from their allegiance. . . . They sought by violence to de- 
stroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite 
Mexico to take up arms against us and draw Japan Into a hostile al- 
liance with her. . . . They impudently denied us the use of the 
high seas, and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send 
to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts 
of Europe. . . . What great nation, In such circumstances, would 
not have taken up arms? 

139 



140 Shall It Be Again? 

Stripped of rhetoric, the "Intolerable wrongs," the "ex- 
traordinary Insults and aggressions" — aside from those per- 
taining to the submarine issue — are reduced to the follow- 
ing terms : 

1. Spies In America. 

2. Pro-German propaganda. 

3. Bomb plots against munition works and ships supply- 
ing Germany's enemies. 

4. Conspiracy to cause Mexico and Japan to become 
enemies of America. 

If the maintenance of spies in a foreign country be a 
cause for war, then every neutral nation on earth has a 
cause for war against America ; since we maintain spies all 
over the world, and especially- in the countries directly 
south of us. Whether German spies may be termed vi- 
cious, or whether American spies may be termed vicious, 
depends, obviously, not upon their being spies, but upon 
their acts and purposes as such. 

And what acts and purposes were alleged against the 
'Vicious" German spies and conspirators? First, that they 
'^sought to corrupt the opinion of our own people in their 
behalf/^' A terrible crime, surely, inasmuch as Germany's 
enemies were doing exactly the same thing In America, 
and as America proceeded to do exactly the same thing in 
every neutral country. 

Everybody knows that Wilson's Bureau of Information 
sent propagandists all over the world, and that all consular 
officers, Secret Service men, and government agents of all 
kinds abroad, engaged, more or less, in "corrupting the 
opinion" of the neutral peoples In our behalf — quite natur- 
ally. When they found that they could not "corrupt the 
opinion of our people in their behalf," what did they do, 
these vicious spies and conspirators? They ^^ diligently 



Other "Intolerable Wrongs" 141 

spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own 
citizens from their allegiance J* 

It sounds quite terrible. But the President could not 
have been thinking of anything more heinous than the peace- 
ful and lawful efforts of Germans within the United States 
to avert war with Germany; for nothing more heinous 
than that occurred. Everybody knows that there was no 
actual seditious uprising against the government for the 
purpose of forcing America to become a vassal of Germany, 
or any attempt at anything of the kind. 

The President possibly had in mind the "Bernstorff 
peace plot." On January 22, 19 17, Mr. Bernstorff, the 
German ambassador, wrote to his government asking for 
$50,000 to assist peace societies in the United States to 
spread propaganda intended to keep America out of war. 
The Bernstorff letter, published the following September, 
was put out by the Administration as proof of a heinous 
German plot directed against the peace and security of 
the United States, and was so treated by the newspapers. 
It happens that, on January 22, President Wilson's own pro- 
fessed purposes were precisely those for which Bernstorff 
wanted his $50,000. Wherefore, if the interpretation 
placed upon the Bernstorff letter is just, the President him- 
self was implicated in a German plot directed against the 
peace and security of the United States! 

Third, there were the bomb plots against munitions 
works and ships supplying Germany's enemies. But Wil- 
son never brought the bomb plots diplomatically to the 
attention of the Kaiser, claiming them as offenses requiring 
reparation, with war as the alternative. Wilson's govern- 
ment did obtain some evidence of unneutral activities on the 
part of a number of acknowledged representatives of Ger- 
many and Austria. But Its manner of dealing with these 



142 Shall It Be Again? 

cases proves that it did not consider that war was required 
as an answer to them. Bomb plots and offenses of that 
sort were, in general, dealt with as crimes of individuals; if 
the government had actual evidence of guilt, it sent the indi- 
vidual to prison, and that was the end of it. 

In the cases of Ambassador Dumba, of Austria, and Cap- 
tains Von Papen and Boy-Ed, German military and naval 
attaches, diplomatic representations were made. Against 
Dumba it was alleged that he had "admitted that he had 
proposed to his government plans to instigate strikes in 
American manufacturing plants"; Von Papen and Boy-Ed 
were accused of having connection "with the illegal and 
questionable acts of certain persons within the United 
States." America asked reparation in the recall of the of- 
fending officials. That reparation was given. No further 
reparation of any kind was asked, and the incident was 
closed. To bring such matters up again, and list them 
among our official war causes, is only additional evidence 
of the frantic extremities to which the President was driven 
in the effort to justify the war. 

While German spies, German propaganda, and bomb 
plots were never officially suggested as a possible cause for 
war until the war message, what was known as the "Ger- 
man-Mexican plot" was brought forward during the debate 
on the Armed Ships Bill, and was adroitly used to manu- 
facture belligerent sentiment, and to coerce Congress into 
permitting one of the unconstitutional steps by which the 
President achieved belligerency for America. During the 
debate on the Armed Ships Bill, Senator Works of Cali- 
fornia charged that the Zimmermann letter had been pro- 
duced to influence votes and secure the passage of the bill; 
that it had been used to line up both Democrats and Repub- 
licans, and had lined them up; that, although a half-dozen 



Other "Intolerable Wrongs" 143 

votes could not be mustered in the Senate for a declaration 
of war, the Senate was being persuaded, under cover of the 
excitement stirred up by the Zimmermann letter, "to do 
something that will lead us just as surely and certainly to 
war as if we had openly declared it." The newspaper re- 
ports of the day tell the same story. The Washington dis- 
patch to the New York Tribune on February 28, 19 17, 
said: 

It was a disheartening spectacle that was presented in Congress 
to-day before the news of the German-Mexican plot came. In the 
Capitol, the pro-Germans and the pacifists were making all the noise 
and there seemed no possibility of a declaration of war by Congress. 
There was not even a chance to vote upon the legislation conferring 
(upon the President authority to arm merchant ships . . . The com- 
ing of the news of the plot changed all this, and it seems now that 
real action will be taken almost by acclamation. 

Although the Armed Ships Bill barely failed to pass, 
in spite of the Zimmermann letter, that missive greatly as- 
sisted in reaching the end for which it was employed. 
Many Senators and Representatives who had not yet dared 
to go against the peace spirit of their constituencies, now 
dared to go against it. President Wilson, his hand greatly 
strengthened, dared embark upon his misnamed policy of 
armed neutrality, even without express authority from 
Congress. The path to war became far less thorny. 

After we were at war, our propagandists continued pas- 
sionately to ring the changes upon the horrible "German- 
Mexican plot." Said President Wilson in the message of 
December 4, 1917: "Their [the Germans'] sinister and 
secret diplomacy has sought to take the very territory away 
from us, and disrupt the union of our States." 

What are the merits of the charge? 



144 Shall It Be Again? 

Here Is the famous ZImmermann letter in full, as the 
Wilson Administration gave it to the press : 

Berlin, January 19, 1917. 

On the first of February, we intend to begin submarine warfare 
unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to keep neutral the 
United States of America. 

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the 
following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together 
and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, 
and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory 
in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you 
for settlement. 

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above 
in the greatest confidence, as soon as it is certain that there will be 
an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the 
President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate 
with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same 
time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. 

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the 
employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel 
England to make peace in a few months. 

(Signed) 
Zimmermann. 

The letter is from the German Foreign Secretary at 
Berlin to the German ambassador at Mexico. It is seen 
that the proposal of an alliance is conditional on the United 
States' declaring war on Germany, and that the matter is 
not to be broached at all, unless it becomes "certain that 
there will be an outbreak of war with the United States" 
— a thing that the German government will try to avoid. 

How did this precautionary measure of the German gov- 
ernment differ from the efforts that governments habitually 
put forth to procure the assistance of as many other coun- 
tries as possible on the eve of a serious conflict? How did 



Other '^Intolerable Wrongs" 145 

It differ from the effort that the Entente governments ha- 
bitually and frankly made from the beginning to draw in as 
large a fraction of the world as possible against their ene- 
mies? How did it differ from the efforts that President 
Wilson himself put forth to turn as many of the neutrals 
as possible against the Central Powers? 

Compare the Zimmermann letter with the message that 
President Wilson sent to all the neutral governments in the 
world, on severing diplomatic relations with Germany. In 
that message, the President flatly requested all other neu- 
trals to follow the example of America, and break rela- 
tions with Germany. While it is theoretically conceivable 
that America might have broken relations and kept out of 
war, It Is not conceivable that such a course would have been 
possible for Holland, Switzerland, or any other neutral 
on the borders of Germany. Practically, then, the Presi- 
dent was asking these countries to go to war, although at 
the time, and for nearly two months afterwards, he was 
disclaiming any intention of going to war himself. 

Moreover, while the German government merely re- 
quested Mexico to join her, In the event of war, we employed 
coercion in the effort to compel other nations to go in 
against the Central Powers. By various means we induced 
China and some Latin American countries to join us. The 
most flagrant example of such coercion, however, Is found 
In our manner of applying the embargo to the European 
neutrals. 

The domestic right of a country to prohibit exports of its 
products, either In peace or war, Is unquestionable. The 
international right or wrong of such a procedure depends 
upon its purpose and effects. 

When a country at peace resorts to an embargo either to 
conserve its products for Its own use, to maintain Its neutral- 
ity, or to compel another country to respect its commercial 



146 Shall It Be Again? 

or other prerogatives under international law, it is clearly 
within its rights. When a country at war resorts to em- 
bargo to conserve its own products for its own use, it is 
clearly within its rights. 

But when a country at war resorts to embargo in pur- 
suance of a general policy of violation of the rights of neu- 
tral countries, and employs the embargo as a means to de- 
stroying neutral rights, to punishing neutrals for being neu- 
tral,- and to bribing or coercing them into unneutrality — 
seeking to range them on its own side, whether they will or 
no — the offense can never be condoned. 

No serious criticism can be made of the purposes acknowl- 
edged in President Wilson's statement explaining the 
American embargo. (July 8, 19 17.) But the embargo 
was not limited to its acknowledged purposes. At the very 
time that the President's statement was Issued, neutral 
ships in American ports were refused clearance, and condi- 
tions were laid down to neutrals requiring them to submit 
to and aid the blockade of Germany — the same blockade 
that America had characterized as "Ineffective, illegal, and 
indefensible," "a practical assertion of unlimited belligerent 
rights over neutral commerce," "an almost unqualified de- 
nial of the sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, 
or commerce, is interfered with." 

Not only that, but we proceeded to erect an illegal block- 
ade upon the land, as well as upon the sea; to compel the 
neutral nations to surrender their right to trade with our 
enemies by sea or land, and to compel them to trade with 
us instead, and on our own terms. 

That the chief purpose of our embargo was to coerce un- 
willing neutrals into the war was admitted, behind closed 
doors, by the Administration itself. On May 9, 19 17, af- 
ter what the newspapers described as a stormy secret ses- 
sion of the Senate, Senator Townsend insisted on debating 



Other ''Intolerable Wrongs'' 147 

the subject matter of the secret session in the open. In 
the course of his remarks on the Senate floor, Senator 
Townsend said: 

I am not willing to vote for the very German methods wt have 
condemned. I understand that this provision now before us is not 
to be used for the protection of American products, or to protect 
the American supply, but to coerce neutral countries. 

We stood for neutrality, and urged the nations of the world to 
support neutrality. Now that we are engaged in the war, we ought 
not to coerce other nations and force them to enter the struggle. 
I can't believe that a war of this sort would result in good to the 
world. If this is the purpose of the United States, we have aban- 
doned the high ideal we set as our reason for going to war. 

I don't want to seem antagonistic to the President or to the gov- 
ernment in their prosecution of this war. But it seems to me that 
this measure will intensify the war. Even though I subject myself 
to criticism I cannot vote for something that is unjust. I am not 
willing to force war upon those neutral countries — especially little 
countries — by methods we have condemned. If there is a God in 
Heaven, whose aid we are invoking, we will hardly get His aid by 
these measures, which are unjust, unfair, and uncivilized. 

Although we did not succeed in bringing the European 
neutrals formally into the war on our side, we did push 
them into a position of unneutrality, and forced them to sup- 
port our illegal blockade. We accomplished this through 
our control, in conjunction with our allies, of the available 
food supplies of the earth, and of the ships upon the seas. 
We refused to allow any of the food under our control to 
go to the neutral countries in question, or any of the ships 
under our control to carry food to the neutral countries in 
question. We refused to allow any of the coal under our 
control to bunker any ships whatever intending to carry 
food to the neutral countries in question. 

But this was not enough. We refused to allow these 



148 Shall It Be Again? 

countries to use their own ships and their own coal to carry 
their own food to one another, or to themselves. To in- 
sure the attainment of this purpose we held the merchant 
ships of these neutral countries in our ports. 

Our terms specifically were, that these neutral countries 
lease the greater part of their merchant fleets to us for the 
period of the w^ar, turn over their commerce to us and the 
control of their trade, submit to a system of rationing for 
themselves, formally surrender their right to trade with 
Germany in all commodities carried in our ships or theirs, 
and deliver their own surplus products to us, under terms 
and conditions which we laid down. 

What President Wilson asked these neutral nations to 
"agree" to was the same thing in principle as, though more 
offensive in effect than, the thing which he himself had char- 
acterized as "an attitude of unneutraHty toward the pres- 
ent enemies of Great Britain which would be obviously in- 
consistent with the solemn obligations of this government." 
It was on this ground that the European neutrals all re- 
fused, at first, to enter into any such "agreement." 

But we held the whip hand — we had their ships. Our 
atCtion compelled these neutrals to choose between four 
courses: war on the side of the Entente; war on the side of 
Germany; national starvation; or a perilous unneutrality 
favorable to the Entente and an offense against Germany. 

At no time had either Germany or England so contemp- 
tuously ridden over the rights of America. The "negotia- 
tions" continued for months. Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark surrendered only when face to face with starva- 
tion. Holland held out, and its ships were confiscated with- 
out the formality of an "agreement." The neutrals 
yielded because they were intent on avoiding war at all 
costs. They had suffered from Germany, but Germany 



Other "Intolerable Wrongs" 149 

had never demanded of them any such surrender of their 
neutral rights as did we. 

America's offenses against the neutral world come out in 
their most unlovely proportions only when it is remembered 
with what self-righteousness they were perpetrated. 
Through our spokesman, President Wilson, we declared 
ourselves '^the trustees of the moral judgments of the 
world/' proclaimed ''our proud position even amidst the 
turmoil of war for the law and the right/' pledged our 
country to the golden rule in international affairs, asserting 
the "basis of honor" as ''the treatment of others as we 
would he treated ourselves.'' 

For ourselves we declared that "the first and primary 
obligation is the maintenance of our own sovereignty." 
Yet we violated the sovereignty of others. "The territory 
of a neutral power is inviolable," said the second Hague 
convention. We signed it, and we professed to go to war 
"to assert the principles of law in a world in which the 
principles of law have broken down." 

Yet we violated the territory of a neutral, Russia. We 
proclaimed the international code: "First, that every peo- 
ple has the right to choose the sovereignty under which they 
Hve." Yet we intervened in Russia, hoping to overthrow 
the constituted government and to replace it with one that 
would serve our interests better. 

While killing Russians, we disclaimed intervention, dis- 
claimed wrong, and spoke of aid. "Any intervention in an 
internal struggle," says Lawrence, "is an attempt to pre- 
vent the people of a state from settling their own affairs in 
their own way. ... It is an attack upon independence 
. . . and consequently a gross violation of international 
law." ("Principles of International Law," pp. 134-135.) 

With our embargo we make Mexico feel the pinch of 



150 Shall It Be Again? 

hunger; our embargo is our right. At the same time we 
let Mexico understand that we will permit no Mexican em- 
bargo on oil; Mexico has no right to an embargo. 

We confiscate the Dutch ships, asserting: "By exercising 
in this crisis our admitted right to control all property 
within our territory we do no wrong to Holland." At 
the same time we threaten Mexico with intervention, as- 
serting that certain taxes are "confiscatory." 

The other "intolerable wrongs" justify our war as inad- 
equately as the wrongs of the submarine dispute. As for 
American honor, instead of being maintained, it was de- 
based exactly to the extent that principle was outraged, 
pledges were broken, and high professions proven a mock- 
ery. 



OUR "OBJECTIVES" 
XIX 

WAR FOR DEMOCRACY 

Our professed objectives, as voiced by President Wilson, 
and echoed by all "loyal patriots" who "stood behind" him, 
do not admit of dispute as to their nature, so long as they 
were expressed in abstract terms. From the beginning of 
the war to its finish, all declarations of aim were put for- 
ward as leading to the same ends — democracy — permanent 
peace. Permanent peace was laid down as essential to the 
safety of democracy — and a certain measure of democracy 
was laid down as essential to permanent peace. Absolute 
equality among nations, great and small; equal and absolute 
independence in domestic affairs; freedom of the seas for 
all, upon terms of equality, in peace and in war; the self- 
determination of peoples; some international understand- 
ing for the enforcement of these principles; open diplo- 
macy, the abolition of militarism and autocracy — these 
were put forward simply as conditions of that measure of 
democracy which a permanent peace requires. 

These principles of a permanent peace were not new. 
They are not Wilson creations or discoveries. They were 
urged upon the world by a few men in all countries before 
the outbreak of the war, and during the war they were ac- 
cepted — in words — by the leading statesmen of both sides. 

We have the word of President Wilson himself that: 
"The objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on 
both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, 

isi 



152 Shall It Be Again? 

as stated in general terms to their own people and to the 
world." (Dec. i8, 19 16.) What governments, if any, 
in fact went to war for democracy? It is obvious that the 
answer is to be found, not in the abstract professions of 
statesmen, but in the record of concrete performances. 

Even had President Wilson been sincere in his professed 
regard for the principles of democracy and permanent 
peace, that alone would not have justified him in leading 
America into war. He would still have been under the 
obligation to arrive at war through constitutional and hon- 
est means. Furthermore, the practicability of reaching 
the desired ends through war would have had to be over- 
whelmingly clear. 

It happens that we have Wilson's own word on the inex- 
pediency of going to war for democracy, permanent peace, 
or for almost any other end, however desirable. Although, 
from the beginning of his tenure of office, the President 
proclaimed adherence to the same principles of international 
conduct as he later translated into war objectives, until 
April, 19 1 7, he not only refrained from going to war for 
their attainment, but argued copiously and eloquently upon 
the futility of such a course. ''There is nothing that the 
United States wants that it has to get by war. . . . Force 
will not accomplish anything that is permanent, . . . fVe 
are not interested in seeing one group of nations prevail 
over another. . . . I challenge you to cite me an instance 
in the history of the world where liberty was handed down 
from above.*' Even after April, 19 17, President Wilson, 
at times, pronounced against a crusade at arms to impose 
democracy upon other countries, as we shall soon see. 

Even were a government to be found unselfish enough to 



War for Democracy 153 

assume the fearful cost of war, simply for the sake of ex- 
tending democracy, the very attempt to impose democracy 
upon another nation would constitute a violation of sover- 
eignty, which happens to be one of the conditions of de- 
mocracy which President Wilson laid down as a prerequi- 
site to permanent peace. 

How, for that matter, can autocracy and militarism be 
banished from the earth, by opposing the autocracy and 
militarism of one country, with autocracy and militarism 
set up in other countries? During the fighting, the beau- 
ties in the so-called German system were urged upon us, no- 
tably in the President's proclamation of May i8, 19 17, and 
frequently by such men as James W. Gerard, ex-ambassa- 
dor to Germany, and one of the President's most trusted 
propagandists. But if the system is so fine, why should we 
wish to destroy it, in Germany or anywhere else? If it be 
desirable for us, why not for our neighbors? For the very 
gentlemen who shouted most violently for the overthrow 
of German militarism advocated the same system for 
America, not merely as a temporary measure for the over- 
throw of German militarism; after German militarism was 
overthrown they continued to advocate it as a permanent 
feature of American "democracy" 1 

One of the most universally accepted principles of the 
international law for which we professed to fight was that 
one country may not attempt to dictate the form of govern- 
ment of another, or any of its internal affairs, or find a basis 
for dispute in any of its policies except where the latter may 
involve either a direct infringement of the sovereignty of 
the first country, or an attack upon its vital interests. The 
principle of self-determination precludes any government 
from attempting to serve democracy abroad by force, ex- 
cept as that might be possible in the adjustment of the 



154 Shall It Be Again? 

external affairs of nations. The question of reform within 
anv country must be left strictly to be worked out by the 
population of that country. The very term, "a war for 
democracy," carries a contradiction withm itself; tor the 
act destroys the aim. 



XX 

PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY VERSUS PEACE FROM VICTORY 

President Wilson's first formal and comprehensive state- 
ment of the terms requisite for a permanent peace, and the 
means for attaining such a peace, was made January 22, 
19 1 7, In the famous Senate address In which originated the 
phrase, "peace without victory." On going to war he did 
not repudiate his peace-wlthout-vlctory speech as such, nor 
at any time confess himself wrong In the basic principles 
there laid down. On the contrary, in the war message he 
assured us: "I have exactly the same thing in mind now that 
I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the 22nd of 
January last." In the message of December 4, of the same 
year, he again referred to the January address, asserting 
positively: "Our entrance Into the war has not altered our 
attitude toward the settlement that must come when It Is 
over." 

Accordingly, here and there among the President's later 
pronouncements appear declarations that prove to be 
strictly in harmony with the original formula. Yet, side 
by side with these, appear others of a flatly contradictory 
nature. 

The principle of first importance in the President's origi- 
nal formula related, not to the actual conditions of a demo- 
cratic and permanent peace, but to the means for attaining 
it, and was expressed by the phrase itself, "peace without 
victory" : 

It must be a peace without victory. . . . Victory would mean 
peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the van- 

I5S 



156 Shall It Be Again? 

quished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an 
intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter 
memory, upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, 
but only as upon quicksand. 

Yet, in the war message, the President advised that Con- 
gress '^exert all its power and employ all its resources to 
bring the govermnent of the German Empire to terms'' ; and 
thereafter he repeated the sentiment innumerable times. 

Did the President change his convictions as to the means 
for attaining a permanent peace after January, 1917? 
Why, then, did he continue to affirm his allegiance to that 
original formula? How great the inconsistency, is seen 
from the President's elaboration of this article of his orig- 
inal book of faith: 

Fortunately . . . the statesmen of both of the groups of nations 
now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could 
not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in 
mind to crush their opponents. 

Yet, in the message of December 4, we find this declara- 
tion, characteristic of later utterances: 

The German power . . . must be crushed. 

Why should it be fortunate, at the beginning of 19 17, 
that England, France, and their allies did not wish to crush 
Germany? The President answ^ered as follows: 

Only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very 
principle of which is equality and a common participation in a com- 
mon benefit. . . . The equality of nations upon which peace must 
be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights. 

If this and previous quotations from the same address 
mean anything at all, they mean that the primary condition 
for the attainment of a permanent and democratic peace 
is that the various belligerents shall meet at the peace table 



Peace Without Victory 157 

on terms of absolute equality, that neither shall hold a 
military advantage over the other, that neither shall be in 
a position to dictate to the other. The corollary of this is 
that, should circumstances require America to enter the 
war, we would not be justified in continuing until victory, 
but only until such a time as the enemy became willing to 
meet us at the peace table on terms of equality. 

But, throughout the war addresses, the military advan- 
tages of victory were frequently urged, even for the specific 
purpose of dictating a permanent and democratic peace. 
"We are . . . seeking to make conquest of peace by arms," 
said the President, in the December 4 address. And in 
the Buffalo speech (Nov. 12, 19 17), he proclaimed that 
"the way to get peace, if you vv^ant it for more than a few 
minutes," would be to win the war. 

It was on this opposite theory that President Wilson 
acted in dealing with the enemy's overtures for peace. In 
the note of October 5, 19 18, he demanded that, as one of 
the conditions precedent to talking peace, the Germans 
withdraw from Allied soil. This demand would have been 
perfectly consistent with the permanent peace formula, had 
compliance with it equalized the position of the opposing 
sides; but it happened that it made for greater iwequality. 
So long as the powers associated with us occupied more 
German territory — to-wit, the German colonies — than the 
Allied territory occupied by Germany, and so long as the 
demand that Germany withdraw was not accompanied by 
an offer of the Allies to withdraw, the principle of "equality 
of rights" was flagrantly violated. 

Moreover, in subsequent notes, replying to Germany's 
consent to withdraw from invaded territory — and other 
concessions of Germany — the President acknowledged that 
iwequahty was the very thing he was seeking, and that, 
unless Germany would accept inequality at the peace 



158 Shall It Be Again? 

table, there would be no armistice and no peace. In the 
note of October 14, he insisted upon ^^ absolutely satisfac- 
tory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the 
present military supremacy of the United States and the 
Allies in the field'^ ; and in the note of October 23, upon a 
situation ''which would leave the United States and the 
powers associated with her in a position to enforce any ar- 
rangements that may he entered into.'^ 

The President's position in action, therefore, was that 
only a peace with victory would be considered, only a peace 
between wwequals, only such a peace as "would rest, not 
permanently, but only as upon quicksand." It was in ac- 
cordance with this formula that the armistice terms were 
framed and imposed. 

In spite of all this, during his exhortations to victory, 
President Wilson at times showed that he was fully aware 
that "peace without victory" signifies equality in the field as 
a means to arriving at equality in the terms— particularly 
in the reply to the Pope, and in the Baltimore speech (Apr. 
6, 1918). At the same time, he was advancing an argu- 
ment forecasting a refusal of equality for the Kaiser. 
This argument was that the word of the German govern- 
ment could not be trusted. "They observe no covenants," 
said he, September 27, 19 18. "We cannot 'come to terms' 
with them. They have made it impossible." 

In the course of such denunciations, however, it was al- 
ways made clear that the application was to the then exist- 
ing German government. Far from suggesting that the 
word of the German people was less trustworthy than the 
word of any other people, Wilson gave the world to under- 
stand that the word of a reformed German government 
would be worth as much as that of other governments. 
When it is remembered that the President did not, at any 
time, advance any other argument why a peace between 



Peace Without Victory 159 

««equals should be Imposed upon Germany, except that 
the word of the Kaiser's government was worthless, his 
war speeches have to be taken as embodying a most unequiv- 
ocal pledge to the German people that, on the day they 
overturned the Kaiser, they would be acceptable as equals 
at the peace table. 

As late as October 23, 19 18, we find the President re- 
fusing peace on the ground that "the nations of the world 
do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hith- 
erto been the masters of German policy." With this prop- 
osition held before them, in their desperate need for peace, 
the German people overthrew the Kaiser and his entire 
circle in a manner so emphatic that its genuineness was not 
questioned. 

What, then, became of the President's promises? What 
became of his eloquent differentiations between the Kaiser's 
government and the German people? Did he accord the 
reformed German government equality at the peace- 
table? Did he exert any effort in that direction? Did 
the German revolution make any difference whatever in 
his course of action? Were the armistice terms one whit 
less crushing than they would have been had the Kaiser him- 
self remained at Potsdam? Just how much was the word 
of Woodrow Wilson worth? 

The truth is that all of the President's utterances about 
the worthless word of the Kaiser standing as a bar to a dem- 
ocratic peace are answered by other utterances of the 
President. His original peace formula does not require 
that the word of any government whatever be taken as a 
means to guaranteeing the peace covenants. Fully recog- 
nizing that the peace of the world in the past has been dis- 
turbed by governments dishonoring their word — not the 
German government alone, but governments in general — 
it fully provides for means to compel all to keep their word, 



i6o Shall It Be Again? 

in spite of any possible lapses of conscience. Here is the 
provision: 

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created, as a guaran- 
tor of the permanency of the settlement, so much greater than the 
force of any nation now engaged, or any alliance hitherto formed 
or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, 
could face or v/ithstand it. If the peace presently made is to en- 
dure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of 
mankind. 

This scheme is either efficacious or it is not. If it is 
efficacious, then the question of the untrustworthiness of 
the word of the German government is irrelevant. If it is 
not efficacious, then it is ridiculous to continue advocating 
it. Nevertheless, along with his advocacy of a peace be- 
tween unequals because of the moral incapacity of our ene- 
mies, the President continued his advocacy of a scheme to 
enforce a peace between equals, regardless of moral incapa- 
cities, wherever found. Here is the form which this advo- 
cacy took as late as June 7, 191 8 : 

Very well, let us make an arrangement by which we will give 
bonds. Let us have a common guarantee that all of us will sign a 
declaration of poHtical independence and territorial Integrity. Let 
us agree that If any one of us, the United States included, violates 
the political Independence or territorial integrity of any of the others, 
all others will jump on her. . . . Now that Is the kind of an agree- 
ment that will have to be the foundation of the future life of the 
nations of the world, gentlemen. The whole family of nations will 
have to guarantee to each nation that no nation shall violate its 
political Independence or its territorial Integrity. That Is the basis 
— the only conceivable basis — for the future peace of the world. 
(Address to Mexican editors.) 

So much for the means requisite for attaining a perma- 
nent and democratic peace. Contradictions quite as re- 



Peace Without Victory i6i 

markable appear in the terms themselves, as soon as they 
begin to be stated in concrete form. 

As "equality of rights'' is the vital principle of both the 
means and the terms of the President's original peace creed, 
so equality of sovereignty is the primary essential of the 
terms. In the peace-without-victory address, the propo- 
sition was put in the following words : 

I am proposing . . . that all nations should henceforth with one 
accord adopt the doctrine . . . that no nation should seek to extend 
its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people 
should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of devel- 
opment, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid. 

This is a principle to which the President had frequently 
professed allegiance from the beginning of his tenure of 
office. That it means that one government may not at- 
tempt to abolish another government, however pernicious 
the latter may be — and however pure the former — is ob- 
vious, and it was so interpreted on almost innumerable oc- 
casions in pre-war days by the President himself. It was 
even interpreted by him as imposing ^'upon each nation the 
duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its 
own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in 
other states shall be sternly and effectually suppressed and 
prevented.'' (Inaugural address, 19 17.) 

After we entered the war, he pledged himself to apply 
the principle to our enemies, as a matter of course. In 
the message of December 4, 19 17, he made this sweeping 
commitment : 

We owe it, however, to ourselves to say that we do not wish in 
any way to impair or rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It 
is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either indus- 
trially or politically. We do not propose or desire to dictate to 
them in any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left 



i62 Shall It Be Again? 

in their own hands in all matters, great or small. . . . And our atti- 
tude and purpose with regard to Germany herself are of a like 
kind. We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no inter- 
ference with her internal affairs. We should deem either the one 
or the other absolutely unjustifiable, absolutely contrary to the prin- 
ciples we have professed to live by and to hold most sacred through- 
out our life as a nation. . . . No one is threatening the existence or 
the independence of the German Empire. . . . 

In the speech of the Fourteen Points, Jan. 8, 191 8, these 
promises were reaffirmed, both to Germany and to Austria. 

Presidential pronouncements alternating with these, in 
point of time, and flatly contradicting them, begin with the 
war message and do not cease. The war message is, in 
considerable part, an argument that America is justified 
in going to war to reform the German government, as well 
as other governments: "We shall fight . . . for the right 
of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their 
own governments." He even proceeded to make revolu- 
tion in Germany an objective in war, and a condition of 
peace. In the note of October 14, 19 18, he insisted that 
the German people "alter" their government. In the note 
of October 23 he laid down the ultimatum: 

The President deems it his duty to point out that, in concluding 
peace . . . the government of the United States cannot deal with 
any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been 
assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of 
Germany. 

Dismemberment itself became, in actual practice, a war 
aim of America, although it had been pronounced against, 
in one form or another, all the way from the peace-without- 
victory address, to the address of February 11, 19 18, and 
even afterwards. "The dismemberment of empires," the 
President told the Pope, "we deem inexpedient and in 



Peace Without Victory 163 

the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of 
any kind, least of all for an enduring peace," while in the 
message of December 4, 19 17, he quoted the phrase, "no 
annexations, no contributions, no indemnities," asserting 
that they expressed his own thought. Yet as early as his 
message to Russia (May 26, 19 17) he was, at times, shuf- 
fling on the whole matter. He was saying: "The status 
quo must be altered." Also: 

No territory must change hands except for the purpose of secur- 
ing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life and liberty. No in- 
demnities must be insisted upon except those that constitute pay- 
ment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must 
be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the 
world, and the future welfare and happiness of its peoples. 

We soon find that the President himself intends to deter- 
mine upon the exceptions, and that they are always to be 
at the expense of our enemies, never of our allies. Al- 
though in the message of February 11, 19 18, the President 
disclaimed any "desire to interfere in European affairs or 
to act as arbiter of European territorial disputes," he had 
already put forward his Fourteen Points, three of which 
forecasted the process of dismemberment. Germany must 
cede France Alsace-Lorraine. Austria must surrender to 
Italy territory that had never belonged to the kingdom of 
Italy. An independent Poland must be created, in part, 
out of territory long recognized as belonging to our ene- 
mies. In the message of December 4, the President had 
even announced the dissolution of the Quadruple Alliance 
as a war objective. Finally, in October, 19 18, he notified 
Austria-Hungary that the first condition of a cessation of 
hostilities must be a recognition of the Czecho-Slovak and 
iJugo-Slav "peoples" as "members of the family of na- 
tions." 



i64 Shall It Be Again? 

So, side by side, coming from the mouth of the same man, 
not separated by time, and reflected throughout our en- 
tire war propaganda, we find two distinct statements of 
war objectives and peace terms, absolutely inconsistent one 
with the other, diametrically opposed; two formulas cover- 
ing both the terms of a democratic and permanent peace, 
and the means for attaining it; two theories utterly irrecon- 
cilable. 

The first can only be based upon the assumption of the 
approximate moral equality of the opposing sides, not 
merely of the opposing peoples, but of the opposing govern- 
ments — on the assumption that the character, motives, 
aims, ambitions, purposes, and methods of the opposing 
sides were never essentially different. Necessarily, it re- 
jects the theory that the responsibility for the war lies 
wholly in any one quarter, or that the liberty of the world 
is or was particularly imperiled by the power and ambitions 
of any one or any group. It rests, instead, upon the theory 
that the great war was caused by things, by systems, by 
methods of action common to all; specifically, by the gen- 
eral practice of secret diplomacy, by a general lack of re- 
spect for the sovereignty of weaker peoples, by the general 
practice of backing up private investments in weaker coun- 
tries with armies and navies, by the inadequacy of existing 
international law, by the general practice of violating in- 
ternational covenants at will, by the common jealousies and 
hatreds growing out of former peaces from victory, by the 
absence of an effective concert of power to prevent war. 

The second is based upon the diametrically opposite as- 
sumption, that the character, ambitions, and methods of 
the German government were vitally different from those 
of her enemies; that the former governments of Germany 
and Austria are solely responsible for the great war; that 
the Germans literally plotted world domination by might of 



Peace Without Victory 165 

the sword; that the covenanted word of the enemies of the 
Kaiser was of distinctly greater value than the covenanted 
word of the Kaiser; that the German world peril was a 
fact; that world conquest by Germany was reasonably pos- 
sible ; that Germany represented the principle of autocracy 
In world affairs, and that her enemies represented the prin- 
ciple of democracy. 

To each of these theories the President pledged alle- 
giance upon alternate occasions, even in alternate phrases. 
If the first Is the correct one, then our war was a crime. If 
the second Is the correct one, then our neutrality for nearly 
three years was a crime. Of the first the President de- 
clared: 

I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United 
States would wish me to say. . . . These are American princi- 
ples, American policies. We can stand for no others. . . . They 
are the principles of mankind and must prevail. ( Peace-without- 
victory speech.) 

But he stood for the other theory whenever it came to 
action. We shall now examine the premises upon which 
that theory is based. 



XXI 

THE GERMAN WORLD PERIL BUGABOO 

Although, in the official propaganda, our motives, causes, 
and objectives, were stated in forms remarkably numerous 
and diverse, no theme was more frequently played upon 
than the German peril. No exhortation to patriotism in 
the years 1917 or 1918 was complete without its horrible 
picture of German domination. Every invocation to per- 
sonal sacrifice, to loyalty, to courage, to hatred, was accom- 
panied by an appeal to fear. Fear ! 

Was the fear justified? Did the youth of America pour 
out its blood in a fight against a reality, or against a man 
of straw? 

It is obvious that not absolute, but relative, depravity 
must be the point of inquiry; that the force of any indict- 
ment of a government or a nation can be gauged only by 
comparing it, on the same counts, with its neighbors. For 
it must be apparent that if the character, the methods, and 
the aims of the governments with which we associated our- 
selves in war, do not stand upon a distinctly higher plane 
than the character, the methods, and the aims of the gov- 
ernments they opposed, then a victory of the former and 
a humiliation of the latter must be absolutely futile. The 
causes of world war will not be abolished or abated. Hu- 
manity will not be benefited in any respect or degree. Civ- 
ilization will go on exactly as it has gone before, serenely 
traversing a cycle that will bring it inevitably around to 
another vast catastrophe of steel and blood. 

Insofar as they relate to the conduct of the Kaiser's 

166 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 167 

government toward America, the accusations of special 
depravity have already been exploded. If the German 
peril was ever a reality, therefore, it must have been so only 
in the remote sense — and if a reality in the remote sense, 
the evidence of the fact must be found exclusively in those 
issues which the President himself, up to the delivery of 
his war message, had a hundred times assured his people 
did not concern them. 

A brief but sufficient glance will now be given these is- 
sues. 

Democracy versus Autocracy. 

"We stand," said President Wilson to President Poin- 
care (Apr. 8, 19 17), "as partners of the noble democra- 
cies whose acts and aims make for the perpetuation of 
rights and freedom of man, and for the safeguarding of 
the true principles of human liberties." 

But whether we and our "noble" allies are, on the whole, 
more democratic than were our enemies, is a debatable ques- 
tion. Whether our most powerful ally is more democratic 
than was our most powerful enemy, even, is a debatable 
question. 

If to possess the more clearly defined leisure class be the 
measure of democracy, then England is more democratic 
than was the Kaiser's Germany. 

If the size of such leisure class — the proportion of the 
population that never does any useful thing, from the cradle 
to the grave, but draws its sustenance wholly from others 
— be the measure of democracy, then England is the most 
democratic of all modern nations. 

If the volume of unearned income drawn from overseas 
be the measure of the democracy of a country, then Eng- 
land is the most democratic country in the world. 

If the control and exploitation of the largest number of 



i68 « Shall It Be Again? 

subject peoples be the measure of democracy, then England 
is the most democratic nation on earth. 

If to have fought more wars of spoliation; to have taken 
by conquest, and held by force, the largest areas of the 
earth's surface; to have destroyed or overridden the larg- 
est number of small nations; to have interfered in the af- 
fairs of other peoples, great and small, the most flagrantly 
and the largest number of times; to have broken the most 
treaties; to have led the way in secret diplomacy; to have 
claimed the seas as its own; to have asserted its God-given 
right to rule the world — if any of these be the measure of 
democracy, then England is the most brilliant example of 
a noble democracy the world has ever seen. 

The government of England was slightly more demo- 
cratic in some respects — slightly, very slightly — at the be- 
ginning of the war than was Germany's. But the particular 
realm in which it excelled is of secondary importance. 
Governments are a menace to the peace and freedom of the 
world only as they are autocratic in their foreign relations. 

Who — and how many — hold in their hands the power 
to choose war for a given people? That is the pertinent 
question. What is the measure of the given government's 
responsibility to its people in the particular affairs which 
involve nations in war with one another? In this vital 
respect did Germany differ distinctly from its enemies? 

Responsibility versus Irresponsibility. 

We frequently pronounced against the right of the Ger- 
man "autocracy" to exist, expressly because of its irrespon- 
sibility to its people in its foreign relations. In the war 
message we find these words: 

We act . . . only in opposition to an irresponsible government. 
. . . We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 169 

feeling toward them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was 
not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this 
war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It 
was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in 
the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by 
their rulers and wars w^ere provoked and waged in the interests of 
dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed 
to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools. 

At Mt. Vernon, July 4, 19 18, President Wilson put it 
this way: 

These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world 
are fighting, and which must be conceded them before there can be 
peace : 

I. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can 
separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the 
world; or if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction 
to virtual impotence. 

The President presented this clause to Germany, on 
October 14, as one of the conditions which must be fulfilled 
contingent on the granting of an armistice. And when the 
German Foreign Secretary, in reply, outlined the constitu- 
tional reforms then being initiated, the President argued 
the matter, in part, as follows: 

It does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has 
been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under 
the control of the German people, but the present war has not been. 
... It is evident . . . that the determining initiative still remains 
with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. (Note 
of Oct. 23.) 

But it happens that the responsibility of the Kaiser's 
government in this particular realm had, at all times, been 
greater, in law, than the responsibility of its most powerful 



lyo Shall It Be Again? 

enemy, and fully equal, in practice, to the average respon- 
sibility found among the entire body of its enemies, includ- 
ing the United States. 

While the assent of the Reichstag was not required for 
a declaration of war, the assent of the Bundesrath was. 
The assent of Parliament was not required; no check ex- 
isted in England equal to the Bundesrath. 

As a matter of practice, all the belligerent governments 
entered war without any adequate consultation of the will 
of their various peoples. Although the Congress of the 
United States had to declare war, it was an empty formal- 
ity. As has been shown, America was legally at war, by 
illegal action of the President, and Congress was practically 
forced to go through the motions of legalizing an accom- 
plished fact. In electing the President, the American peo- 
ple had pronounced against war, not for it, and the Presi- 
dent was able to arrive at war only through a series of 
deceptions and usurpations, in which his "single choice" 
was pitted against the choice of both the public and of 
Congress. 

Our pronouncements on the irresponsibility of the Ger- 
man government imply responsibility on the part of the op- 
posing governments. There was — and is — no such re- 
sponsibility. 

Secret Diplomacy. 

The decisive importance of secret diplomacy as a cause 
of the European war was frequently asserted by our of- 
ficial spokesman. In an address before the League to En- 
force Peace, May 27, 19 16, he said: 

It is plain that this war could have only come as it did, suddenly 
and out of secret counsels. . . . The lesson ... is that the peace 
of the world must henceforth depend upon a new and more whole- 
some diplomacy. 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 171 

In his war message he said: 

Plans of aggression can be worked out and kept from the light only 
within the privacy of courts, or behind the carefully guarded con- 
fidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impos- 
sible where public opinion commands, and where it insists upon full 
information concerning all the nation's affairs. 

But was the secret diplomacy of the Kaiser any different 
from that of his enemies? Legally, "democratic" England 
is more autocratic, irresponsible, and secret In Its diplo- 
macy than was "autocratic" Germany. A treaty entered 
into by the Kaiser was not a legal document until ratified 
by the Reichstag. But In England the most vital engage- 
ments may be undertaken without the consent of any legis- 
lative body, and these engagements are binding upon suc- 
cessive governments. Theoretically, the King and the 
Foreign Secretary make these international contracts, with 
the consent of the cabinet. In practice, the Foreign Sec- 
retary makes them, frequently without the consent or even 
knowledge of the cabinet. 

The classic example in modern times of secret diplo- 
macy being carried to the limit of its possibilities — in se- 
crecy, in irresponsibility, in autocracy — was furnished by 
the British Foreign Secretary, Viscount Grey, in July and 
August, 19 14. One man shaped and conducted the con- 
versations, correspondence, and negotiations with the other 
powers, wholly uncontrolled by "democratic" England, 
wholly uncontrolled by Parliament, uncontrolled by the 
cabinet as a body, and in secret. He not only withheld 
the essential facts as to what had been going on, and what 
he was doing, from the Parliament and England, but, as 
Nellson has shown ("How Diplomats Make War") , he de- 
ceived them both, as well as a part of the cabinet. The 
truth became known, only after war was an accomplished 



172 Shall It Be Again? 

fact. "Separately," "secretly," and by his "single choice," 
Foreign Secretary Grey steered his country into war — as 
nearly so as such a thing is conceivable for any one human 
being to do in modern times. 

Secret diplomacy, as a means for achieving autocracy in 
foreign affairs, is as firmly established in the United States 
as elsewhere. Treaties are not binding unless ratified by 
the Senate, but the part which the Senate plays is nearly 
always perfunctory. The President arrogates to himself 
full power to conduct negotiations in secret, and, through 
his State Department, to frame treaties in secret. As in all 
other countries, more or less diplomatic correspondence is 
printed, but whenever the President chooses he suppresses 
these documents. A fraction of the diplomatic correspond- 
ence preceding war was never pubHshed and is still un- 
known outside of the State Department. The Senate may 
ask the Executive for diplomatic correspondence, but the 
latter can — and frequently does — refuse on the ground that 
it is "incompatible with the public interest." 

While pronouncing for open diplomacy, President Wil- 
son employed secret diplomacy in precisely the same manner 
as our allies and our enemies employed it. Many of the 
Wilson diplomatic moves in relation to Mexico are still 
shrouded in secrecy, and to this secrecy is partly due the 
almost universal misapprehension as to the true nature of 
his Mexican policy. Who knows the real circumstances of 
our acquisition of the Virgin Islands from Denmark, or of 
our military operations in Nicaragua? How many Ameri- 
cans were afforded an inkling of the real motives behind the 
■'Nicaraguan, the Haitian, and the Santo Domingan conven- 
tions, and the means by which these conventions were im- 
posed upon the inhabitants of these little countries? Did 
public opinion "command" in any of these matters? Did 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 173 

it insist upon full information? Did it get any information 
from Wilson or his subordinates? 

The acquisition of new territory is a matter of grave 
Import in the affairs of a nation, but in the "purchase" of 
the Virgin Islands, President Wilson took the American 
public into his confidence exactly to the extent that he would 
have taken it had he been buying a corner lot for a grand- 
child — and he took the Senate Into his confidence only to 
the extent that the naked forms of law required him to 
do. 

The very existence of the deal was unknown to the Senate 
itself, until the bill of sale was signed and In the hands of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In transmitting the 
document, the State Department expressly asked that Its 
terms be kept secret. The committee considered the docu- 
ment in secret, and the Senate ratified it In secret. Except 
for the bare purchase price, the only disclosure to reach the 
public regarding this Important matter reached It through 
the "indiscretion" of a Senator, and was contained in a 
single sentence in the letter of transmissal, viz: ^^The gov- 
ernment of the United States will not object to the Danish 
government^ s extending its political and economic interests 
in the whole of Greenland^' 

Except for these simple but significant words, all that 
ever reached the American people on the true Inwardness 
of their real-estate deal in the West Indies Is contained 
in admissions which members of the Danish cabinet made 
at the time to the Danish parliamentary houses. (See 
Chapter XXXIII.) 

Regarding our adventures in Nicaragua, Haiti, and 
Santo Domingo, we have for public consumption three brief 
documents known as the NIcaraguan, Haitian, and Santo 
Domingan conventions. These conventions followed a 
military occupation in each case; they did not precede it. 



174 Shall It Be Again? 

The function of each is to legalize acts of war and civil con- 
trol, in each instance planned and initiated by the Execu- 
tive Department in secret, and in violation of the clause 
of the Constitution which vests in Congress the war-making 
power. 

The conventions themselves were prepared in secret by 
the Ekecutive Department, and considered in secret by the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and ratified altogether 
**on faith" by the Senate. In each instance the Senate com- 
mittee conducted a hearing, in secret, in which it examined 
witnesses. In the case of Nicaragua, the testimony was 
printed. One copy of this testimony was allotted each 
member of the committee. No one else could obtain one, 
not even a member of the Senate. In the cases of Haiti 
and Santo Domingo, the testimony was not even printed, 
but remains a State Department secret. Through the ma- 
chinery of secret diplomacy, the essential facts of record 
regarding the circumstances and purposes of the military 
occupations of Nicaragua, Haiti and Santo Domingo, were 
completely withheld from the Ahierican people and their 
duly elected representatives. 

Sometimes we even disdain to go through the forms of 
Senatorial supervision, inadequate as that is. A formal 
treaty with Japan, recognizing the special interests of 
Japan in China, might have caused unpleasant discussion 
in the Senate and might have failed of ratification. So the 
President circumvents the Constitution; a State Depart- 
ment "agreement" is signed, of which nothing need be 
iknown until a version of it is ready for public consumption. 

The act of cooperating with the Entente governments in 
the prosecution of the war necessarily involved understand- 
ings on war and peace problems of vast moment. But the 
President snaps his fingers at the Constitution, ignores the 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 175 

Senate, and achieves absolute secrecy and absolute Irrespon- 
sibility in matters of unbounded Importance to America. 
In the realm of greatest Importance to the public welfare 
— In the realm of war and the policies that lead to war — 
the public commands as little here as In Germany, Austria, 
Turkey, England, or Japan; the President of the United 
States Is as Irresponsible an autocrat as the ruling monarch 
of the German Empire could ever have hoped to be. 

Militarism. 

At one time. President Wilson defined militarism as a 
monster whose essence Is size, at another time as a mon- 
ster whose essence Is form, at still another time as a 
monster whose essence is purpose. 

Here are the various quotations: 

1. Militarism consists in this, gentlemen: ft consists in preparing 
a great machine whose only use is for war. (Speech at New York, 
Jan. 27, 1916.) 

2. It is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their 
[the people's] knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental 
organization which would make and organize a great army subject 
to orders to do what a particular group of men might at the time 
think it best for it to do. That is the militarism of Europe, where a 
few persons can determine what an armed nation is to do. That is 
what I understand militarism to be. (Statement to Committee 
from American Union Against Militarism, White House, May 9, 
1916.) 

3. Militarism does not consist in the existence of an army, nor 
even in the existence of a very great army. Militarism is a spirit. 
It is a point of view. It is a system. It is a purpose. The pur- 
pose of militarism is to use armies for aggression. (Speech at West 
Point, June 13, 1916.) 

But In size the Kaiser's army was smaller than that of 



176 Shall It Be Again? 

Russia, and smaller In proportion to population than that 
of France. His navy was barely over half the size of 
England's, and only slightly larger than that of France. 

In form the Kaiser's army was, in 19 14, in every respect 
except one — conscription — the same as all modern armies, 
and in every respect the same as that of the majority of its 
enemies. Every army of every powerful government is 
organized from the top down, not from the bottom up; 
every one is a perfect autocracy. All are now based upon 
conscription, as were the majority when the war began in 

1914. 

The system of discipline Is the same in all — miUtary law, 
courts-martial, cruel and unusual punishments. Each has 
its officer caste, and the power and arrogance of the officer 
caste within the organization Itself is not different In one 
country from another. 

Outside the military establishment itself, the influence 
of the officer caste is Invariably towards reaction, and the 
best measure of that Influence is nothing more nor less than 
the size of the military establishment. In "democratic" 
England the navy has always been a power for reaction in 
the affairs of the nation. In France the political machina- 
tions of the officer caste — as exemplified In the Dreyfus af- 
fair — have been a constant threat to the existence of the 
republic. 

The essential question of form — we are told — Is whether 
a few persons can determine what an armed nation Is to do. 
In every great country a few persons can determine that 
thing, and during the late war a few persons determined it 
in every country, Including the United States of America. 

If German militarism was actually different from the mil- 
itarism of Germany's enemies, therefore, the difference 
must be found in Its purpose. How is the purpose of a 
military establishment revealed? 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 177 

^'Prepared for Forty Years." 

The ultimate purpose of every military establishment is, 
of course, war, either of defense or aggression. The pur- 
pose of a large military organization in times of peace is 
to be ready for war, either of defense or aggression. 
When two neighboring countries both have armies of large 
size, both built on the same model — when both are spend- 
ing large sums in order to be ready for war — the relative 
readiness and efficiency of one can hardly be taken as evi- 
dence of a relatively aggressive purpose. It is, rather, evi- 
dence of graft, incompetence, or laziness, on the part of the 
one that is less ready and efficient. 

If either the efficiency of a great fighting machine, or the 
period during which it has been built up is any evidence, in 
itself, of aggressive purpose, then by this test England 
stands thrice convicted of the charge that is made against 
Germany. In size and effectiveness, the British navy 
stands so far ahead of the other navies of the v/orld that 
the relative size and effectiveness of the Kaiser's army is 
not to be compared with it. The British navy reached its 
commanding position, not in forty years, but in a period 
covering centuries; and not alone by large expenditures and 
careful training at home, but by a policy of opposing, by 
threats of war, the growth of other navies, even by seeking 
out and destroying in war all other navies that seemed to 
threaten its supremacy. 

In August, 19 14, the German war machine was not dis- 
tinct in any essential from the war machines of its enemies. 
German diplomacy was not more secret than any other di- 
plomacy. The German government was not more irre- 
sponsible to its people in the conduct of international rela- 
tions. It was no more autocratic in the affairs of war or 
the policies that lead to war. 

In other words, in the means of aggression the Kaiser 



lyS Shall It Be Again? 

Stood on the same footing as his enemies. So far as pos-, 
session of the means of aggression reveal a purpose of ag- 
gression, the charge of special depravity against Germany 
fails. 

Confessed Ambition to Dominate the World. 

In August, 19 14, the American public for the first time 
heard of a retired officer of the German army named 
Bernhardi. It also heard, for the first time, of a German 
professor named Treitschke. Nietzsche, of whom it had 
heard before, went through a lightning change, to be intro- 
duced in a different garb. Before us were paraded all the 
bombastic sayings to which the Kaiser had ever given ex- 
pression, with annotations to show that he meant something 
very, very sinister. By courtesy of the British propaganda 
machine a great plot was suddenly revealed to us — world 
dominion by might of the sword, long planned, secretly pre- 
pared for, timed for a chosen moment, initiated by an un- 
provoked attack upon unsuspecting, unprepared, peace-lov- 
ing, lamblike neighbors, keepers of the holy urn of democ- 
racy. 

President Wilson, at the beginning and for a long time 
afterwards, told us, in effect, that it was all a hoax. Only 
when it became necessary to put fear into the hearts of the 
American people, as a means to accomplishing his own pur- 
poses, did he embrace this doctrine. 

Now how did we suddenly discover that the German 
government planned to dominate the world? Was it be- 
cause the Kaiser, or some member of his government, hinted 
at something of that sort? 

It is doubtful if anyone can produce a single avowal of 
any responsible German from which can be fairly deduced 
a dream, even on the part of that individual, of the sort of 



The German World Peril Bugaboo 179 

world domination which the German-peril theory presup- 
poses as a dream of the Kaiser, of all of his sons, all of his 
military chiefs, and a great number of his professors, edi- 
tors, and prominent men besides. 

On the other hand, the extreme result hoped for even by 
Bernhardi, from the war which he believed England, 
France, and Russia were determined to force upon Ger- 
many, was for his country to ^'attain a position as a world 
power by the side of, and in spite of, England J^ ("Ger- 
many and the Next War," p. 164.) 

Said Bernhardi, continuing (p. 165), ^'JVe shall, in this 
struggle, as so often before, represent the common inter- 
ests of the world, for it will be fought not only to win recog- 
nition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas!^ 

Disgusting as is the worst of the German jingoistic and 
chauvinistic literature of the Kaiser's day, it cannot be 
taken as evidence of especially aggressive purpose, so long 
as it is matched by a similar literature in all other great 
countries. 

Before August, 19 14, Americans heard a great deal more 
of this sort of thing from England than from Germany. 
"Germany had a Bernhardi," declared a member of the 
British Parliament in 19 15 (Francis Neilson, in "How 
Diplomats Make War," p. 134), "but Britain had a Bern- 
hardi class, which lived and moved and had its being in war. 
It thought of nothing else but war, and it was recruited 
from all sections of society." 

Every vain effusion upon German destiny can be matched 
by similar effusions upon British destiny, Russian destiny, 
Italian destiny, French destiny, and even American destiny. 
The phrase "Deutschland uber alles" is matched by "Rule, 
Britannia, rule the waves." German naval officers drank 
to "The Day" when the German fleet would be powerful 



i8o Shall It Be Again? 

enough to challenge Britain's mastership of the seas. Brit- 
ish naval officers drank to the existing mastership and to its 
perpetuation at all costs. 

Who can quote anything from an influential German 
more nearly approaching a propaganda for world domin- 
ion than the will of Cecil Rhodes, who directed that his 
great fortune be expended for the establishment of a se- 
cret society whose aim "shall be the extension of British 
rule throughout the world . . . and especially the occupa- 
tion by British settlers of the entire continent of Africa, 
the Holy Land, the Valley of the Euphrates, the islands 
of Cyprus and Candia, the whole of South America, the 
islands of the Pacific and heretofore possessed by Great 
Britain, the whole of the Malay archipelago, the seaboard 
of China and Japan, the ultimate recovery of the United 
States of America as an integral part of the British Em- 
pire"? 

When Americans were kindly told by Britons that the 
Germans thought themselves superior to other peoples, we 
were shocked and angered, because we had been taught that 
we ourselves were superior to other peoples. Self-praise 
Is not peculiar to any people. It Is one of the evidences 
of national egotism, as v/Ide as the world. Has any Ger- 
man writer, asks Georg Brandes ("The World at War," 
p. 209) gone farther in this kind of thing than one Leon 
Bloy, In the Mercure de France? Brandes then quotes 
Monsieur Bloy as follows : 

After Israel, who were called God's people by special favor, God 
has loved no nation on earth as much as France. Explain It who- 
ever can. To call this nation the most noble of all nations — which 
it undoubtedly is — serves no purpose, since such divine prerogatives 
are the reward of the chosen one. . . . France is so far ahead of 
other peoples that, no matter who they be, they should feel honored 
at being allowed to eat crumbs destined for her dogs. 



The German World Peril Bugaboo i8i 

We ourselves are not free from this kind of talk. We 
do not need to go beyond President Wilson himself to find 
out that we are extraordinarily endowed, strangely unself- 
ish, singularly righteous, that our history is peculiarly pure 
and white, that we are especially chosen to carry the torch 
of civilization and democracy to the world, even on the 
point of the sword. It may be worth while to set down 
half a dozen quotations of this sort: 

We are Trustees of World's Morality. 

I need not tell my fellow-citizens that we have not held off from 
this struggle from motives of self-interest, unless it be considered 
self-interest to maintain our position as trustees of the moral judg- 
ments of the world. (Speech at Chicago, Jan. 31, 19 16.) 

JVe Fiffht the First Unselfish War in History. 

The glory of this war, my fellow-citizens, so far as we are con- 
cerned, is that it is, perhaps for the first time in history, an unselfish 
war. (Speech at New York, May 18, 191 8.) 

Our Fine Example has Thrilled Two Continents. 

Do you never stop to reflect what it is that America stands for? 
. . . It is for the sovereignty of self-governing peoples, and her ex- 
ample, her assistance, her encouragement, have thrilled two conti- 
nents in this western world. (Speech at Pittsburgh, Jan. 29, 19 16.) 

Just Think of Cuba! 

The world sneered when we set out for the liberation of Cuba, 
but the world does not sneer any longer. The world knows now 
what it was then loth to believe, that a nation can sacrifice its own 
interests and its own blood for the sake of the liberty and happiness 
of another people. (Speech at New York, Jan. 27, 19 16.) 

We are the Flower of Mankind. 

We are the flower of mankind, so far as civilization is concerned. 
(Speech at Billings, Sept. 11, 1919.) 

"Me und Gott:' 

We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that lib- 



i82 Shall It Be Again? 

erty is made secure for mankind. (Speech at Confederate veter- 
ans' reunion, June 5, 191 7.) 

Our aggressions have invariably been for the good of 
the victims. In this we are not different from our powerful 
neighbors — if you take the word of their statesmen for it. 

But it is not true either that two continents have been 
thrilled by our disinterested example, or that the world has 
stopped sneering about our Cuban pretensions. The truth 
is that the menacing picture of Pan-Germanism, as painted 
by Wilson In his Flag Day address, is a counterpart of the 
menacing picture of Pan-Americanism, as It appears to a 
great many Latin Americans. 

Why? Partly because of American boasts of superior- 
ity and declarations of purpose to bend the weaker Ameri- 
can countries to our will. The propaganda for German 
Imperial expansion, at Its worst, is not one whit more cold- 
blooded and subversive of the principles for which we pre- 
tended to fight Germany than, for example, the propaganda 
that has been carried on for some years for American 
domination of Mexico. 

Is there a valid basis for the German-peril theory, then, 
in the acts of the Kaiser's government? 



XXII 

OUR MYTH OF THE WAR's BEGINNING 

In President Wilson^s message to the Pope occurs the fol- 
lowing passage: 

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world 
from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establish- 
ment controlled by an irresponsible government, which, having se- 
cretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan 
out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty, or the 
long-established practices and long-cherished principles of interna- 
tional action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; de- 
livered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either 
of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of 
blood — not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent 
women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands 
balked, but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. 
This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master 
of the German people. 

This is as complete an endorsement of the German-peril 
theory as can well be expressed in a few words. It even 
lends color to the proposition so sedulously disseminated by 
the Allied war propagandists and our own, that Germany's 
"attack" of August, 19 14, was timed at a chosen moment 
and delivered upon unprepared, unsuspecting, and lamb- 
like neighbors. 

That Unsuspected and Premeditated Attack. 

But every one knows that a war between the Triple Al- 
liance and the Triple Entente, or between members thereof, 

183 



i84 Shall It Be Again? 

had been expected for years, and prepared for for years; 
that such a war had been expected, talked about, and pre- 
pared for no less In France, England, and Russia, than In 
Germany and Austria; that several times, within a period 
of ten years, Europe had trembled on the verge of a gen- 
eral war. 

During the forty years In which Germany was accused 
of preparing for a war of aggression upon "heroic France," 
the "revanche" cry — for a war of revenge against Germany 
— was periodically dinned In the ears of the French people. 
In England, from 1905 to 19 14, the respectable press car- 
ried on an almost constant propaganda of hatred against 
Germany. The question of war was repeatedly raised in 
jParllament. Cabinet officers presented exaggerated figures 
as to German naval Increases In order to obtain even 
greater appropriations for the British nav>^ It was admit- 
tedly in contemplation of war with Germany, that such 
leaders of the empire as General Lord Roberts devoted 
themselves to a serious campaign to commit England to 
peace-time conscription. Meanwhile, the Czar was spend- 
ing huge sums in rebuilding his navy, under the direction 
of British experts; In perfecting his army, under the direc- 
tion of French officers; and In constructing a system of 
strategic railways to the German border. 

Nellson has shown ("How Diplomats Make War," p. 
146), that the German appropriations for new naval con- 
struction were lower in 19 12 than in 191 1, lower In 19 13, 
than In 19 12, lower In 19 14 than in 19 13; that the British, 
French, and Russian appropriations for new naval construc- 
tion were all higher in each of those successive years; that 
the 19 14 appropriation of each was higher than that of 
Germany; that for 19 14 the combined appropriations for 
new naval construction of England, France, and Russia 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 185 

were two and one-half times as large as the combined ap- 
propriations of Germany, Austria, and Italy. 

Morel, another Englishman, has shown, ("Truth and 
the War"), that the expenditures for both military and 
naval purposes of the French-Russian combination were 
very much larger than the expenditures of the German-Aus- 
trian combination; that the French-Russian expenditures 
Increased much more rapidly in the decade preceding 19 14 
than the German-Austrian expenditures; that by 19 13 the 
peace strength of the French-Russian armies was nearly 
double that of the German-Austrian armies. 

During the very period in which the terrible Bernhardi 
was informing his readers that, for England ^Uo come to 
terms with Germany, instead of fighting, would he a most 
desirable course for us'\' and that ^^we cannot contemplate 
attacking England, as such an attack would he hopeless,'^ 
("Germany and the Next War," pp. 98 and 155), General 
Lord Roberts himself, the greatest military hero of the 
times, was publicly advocating a surprise attack upon Ger- 
many. Lord Fisher, England's First Sea Lord in those 
days, boasts in his "Memories" that he also had recom- 
mended such an attack as far back as 1908, as a drastic 
means to disposing of a trade rival. 

In 19 12, the secret understanding for French and Brit- 
ish cooperation against Germany, for six years a subject of 
conversation between the general staffs of the two countries, 
was put into writing. In the same year the Franco-Rus- 
sian naval convention was signed, and, as the Bolsheviki 
have revealed to us through the publication of the secret 
treaties, the Czar procured a definite pledge from both M. 
Polncare and Foreign Secretary Grey of French and Brit- 
ish support. In case trouble in the Balkans should involve 
Germany on the side of Austria. 



1 86 Shall It Be Again? 

As the year 19 14 drew on, it became generally known 
that the British fleet was concentrated in the North Sea, the 
French in the Mediterranean. As Neilson points out, if 
there was no understanding that the French coasts were un- 
der the protection of England, and British Mediterranean 
interests under the protection of France, then the general 
staffs of the two countries, under military law, ought to 
have been shot. ("How Diplomats Make War," p. 305.) 
At about this time, our own Admiral Mahan called atten- 
tion to the fact, in an article in the Scientific American, that 
"Eighty-eight per cent, of England's guns are pointed at 
Germany." March 10, 19 14, the British Minister of War 
told the House of Commons: "We stand vv^ell for the pur- 
pose of immediate war on any basis you may consider," 
while the First Lord of the Admiralty announced the arm- 
ing of forty merchant ships. ("How Diplomats Make 
War," p. 228.) In our own White Book (vol. Ill, p. 
169), appears a reference to a notification from the Brit- 
ish Admiralty, dated May 26, 1 9 13, of the arming of British 
merchant vessels at the expense of the British government. 

Pmally, the opening of the diplomatic confab of the last 
week of July, 19 14, found the British fleet completely mo- 
bilized and the German navy all but bottled up. 

Even Belgium was not surprised. Whether the Belgian 
understanding with France and England was — or was not 
— definite enough to vitiate her position as a neutral, Neil- 
son recalls the fact that, In November, 19 12, a month full 
of preparation In the Entente countries, the Belgian Parlia- 
ment, after a secret sitting, increased the war strength of 
its army from 180,000 to 340,000 men — so constructing 
a stupendous military machine for a country the size of 
Belgium, and especially for one which professed to depend 
upon ancient neutrality guarantees. 

The German "attack" was not unsuspected in any quar- 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 187 

ter, not unprepared for In any quarter. The comparative 
tables upon preparedness prove that, in sheer weight of 
arms, the lambs were stronger than the wolves, and were 
relatively in a better position to be "attacked" than they 
had ever been before. They were also better prepared 
.diplomatically; for they had made sure of at least the neu- 
trality of Italy. 

If not unsuspected or unprepared for, was the German 
^'attack," nevertheless, premeditated? Did the German 
government plan and plot beforehand to precipitate the 
long expected war at a given moment, namely, the first days 
of August, 19 14? 

Any such hypothesis would have to show that Germany 
not only had made the same military preparations that 
her enemies had made, but that she had made other far- 
reaching preparations which any country would make with 
war certain in a given period, but which otherwise would be 
impracticable. 

The German lack of such preparations was notorious. 
The crisis of the summer of 19 14 found German shipping 
in all parts of the world, including the harbors of her ene- 
mies. On July 28, the North German Lloyd steamship 
''Kronprinzessin Cecile" sailed from New York with 
$10,000,000 gold on board, consigned one-half to London 
and one-half to Paris. Halted by a wireless in mid-ocean, 
she made a sensational race back to port to avoid capture 
by British cruisers. Had the Kaiser's irresponsible govern- 
ment, even as late as July 28, "chosen its own time for the 
war," had it determined to deliver its "sudden blow" within 
half a week, the great German liner would hardly have 
been permitted to sail out of a safe port. 

The more one examines the circumstances of the German 
"attack" the more clearly it appears that, for the Triple 
Entente, it could not have been better timed had the En- 



i88 Shall It Be Again? 

tente chosen the date Itself. Leading Britons have, on oc- 
casion, gleefully proclaimed this very fact. 

Morel points out — although not, in his case, gleefully 
— that had the Kaiser long plotted to "subjugate Europe," 
and had he bided his time for the most favorable moment to 
do so, he would have chosen any other moment than the 
summer of 19 14: 

How comes it that Germany did not wage war upon her neighbors 
when she could have done so with every guarantee of military suc- 
cess? She could have smashed France easily in 1887, and our offi- 
cial classes, judging from statements in such papers as the Standard 
and the Spectator, would have been rather pleased than otherwise. 
. . . Germany could have smashed France with equal ease when 
Russia, exhausted by the Japanese war, was incapable of stirring 
a finger against her. Germany could have smashed France with 
equal ease when we were engaged in annexing the South African 
republics. . . . Why, if Germany desired to 'subjugate Europe,' did 
she wait until August, 19 14, when her military supremacy, as I 
shall show later on, was less assured than at any period during the 
previous thirty years? ("Truth and the War," p. 64). 

Morel also points out that even before the adoption of 
the Three Years Military Service Law in 19 13, France had 
become more militarized than Germany or any of the other 
great powers. ("Truth and the War," p. 148.) He also 
adduces evidence to prove that the adoption of that law 
forced the French government to make an early choice be- 
tween foreign war and revolution at home. 

In a speech at New York, February 12, 1920, our Ad- 
miral Sims said: 

In December, 1910, I submitted a report to the admiral command- 
ing my division, which stated that, having discussed the subject with 
military men of Great Britain and France, the consensus of opinion 
was that war would come within four years. 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 189 

By whose choice? French jingoistic glee over coming 
events is typified in the following from the Nouvelle Re- 
vue, in 19 1 2, and reproduced in Neilson's book (p. 206) : 

We intend to have war. After forty years of a heavily armed 
peace, we can at last utter this opinion. . . . France is ready to 
strike and to conquer, as she was not ready forty years ago, and as 
she will not be in four or five years, owing to the annual divergent 
numbers of the birth rate in each country. . . . We, the attacking 
party, will have arranged with England that their fleet . . . will 
have followed . . . the remains of the whole German navy into 
German waters. 

Another confession of British Sea Lord Fisher, set down 
in his "Memories," is that as far back as 1905 he also 
prophesied war with Germany, in the very month of Aug- 
ust, igi4. 

Turn to the immediate circumstances of the outbreak. 

"The war was begun by the military masters of Ger- 
many," asserted President Wilson, in his Flag Day address. 
But eight months previously (at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916) 
he had said: 

Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you 
have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has. So far 
as I can gather, nothing in particular started it, but everything in 
general. There had been growing up in Europe a mutual suspicion, 
an interchange of conjectures about what this government or that 
government was going to do, an interlacing of alliances and under- 
standings, a complex web of intrigue and spying, that presently was 
sure to entangle the whole family of mankind in its meshes. 

Some millions of words have been printed to prove that 
the immediate responsibility for the outbreak of 19 14 rests 
in this or that quarter. The arguments seem to resolve 



190 Shall It Be Again? 

themselves largely into two questions: first, the extent to 
which evidence unfavorable to a given government has been 
suppressed or mutilated by it; second, the relative value of 
the professions of a will to peace, for which all the govern- 
ments claimed to be working. 

If you begin by crediting one side with honesty and the 
other with dishonesty, it will be easy enough to prove the 
responsibility as you wish to prove it. But if you begin 
with an equal measure of confidence in all — or an equal 
lack of confidence — then the case assumes a different aspect. 
It is not necessary to grapple with the mass of conflicting 
evidence of the "war guilt" controversialists; for it hap- 
pens that, even among the most violent partisans, there is 
sufficient agreement on questions of fact to make it appear 
quite plain that not one of the great powers immediately 
concerned can escape a share of the responsibility. 

If you date your survey, say, from July 28, you find that 
Austria was determined to chastise Serbia; that Russia was 
determined to interfere with Austria; that Germany was 
determined that Austria should not be interfered with; that 
France stood ready to fight Germany if Germany struck 
Russia; that England, though involved with France and 
Russia, was professing to be free, and was playing the role 
of peaceful, neutral mediator. 

All professed to wish to avoid a general war, but all ex- 
cept England were frankly wilHng to go into such a war 
under certain circumstances. 

For the moment, Austria stood in the position of an 
aggressor toward Serbia; Russia as aggressor toward Aus- 
tria; Germany as aggressor toward Russia; France as ag- 
gressor toward Germany; England as an uncertain quantity. 

Each of these great countries was in a position to pre- 
vent a general war, provided it cared sufficiently to do so. 
Austria could have prevented war by backing down on 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 191 

Serbia, Russia by letting Austria go ahead, Germany by 
abandoning Austria, France by abandoning Russia, Eng- 
land by declaring her solidarity with France and Russia. 

Although any of the four countries, Austria, Germany, 
Russia, or France, could have dispelled the crisis, it would 
have been at the cost of backing down. There was just 
one country that had the power to disperse the war-cloud 
by not backing down — England. A preponderance of 
force was the only thing that would induce any of the others 
to back down — and England was in a position to wield that 
force. One Edward Grey knew where England's force 
was going to be exerted. France and Russia knew. Ger- 
many and Austria did not know. It is universally admitted 
that this was a determining factor in the incidents of the 
summer of 19 14. 

The German government tried hard to find out whether 
England would intervene. The German ambassador 
asked Grey whether, in the event of war between Germany 
and Austria and France and Russia, England would remain 
neutral provided Germany would not violate Belgium. 
Grey's refusal, alone, would be enough to dispose of the 
self-righteous claim the British government proceeded to 
make to its people, that the violation of Belgium was the 
sole cause of British belligerency. 

The German ambassador Inquired whether England 
would remain neutral, provided the integrity of both France 
and her colonies was guaranteed. Grey refused to tell 
him. Grey declined to state the conditions under which 
England would remain neutral; declined to state whether 
or not, in any event, England would remain neutral; at the 
same time declining to say that England would stand with 
France and Russia, but leading Germany on to hope that 
she would not. Meanwhile, the war web was spinning 
fast. The knowledge that England was bound to the xi 



192 Shall It Be Again? 

stiffened the backs of France and Russia; the hope that 
England would stay out stiffened the backs of Germany and 
Austria. When at last Grey did let the German ambassa- 
dor know the truth, the latter's government took the first 
steps toward backing down, forcing Austria to reconsider 
her decision not to negotiate with Russia over the Serbian 
dispute. Too late — the Russian mobilization was already 
under way, and the Czar refused to halt it. Germany then 
sent the twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia. The Czar paid 
no heed; Germany declared war upon Russia and the huge 
armies of Europe began to move. 

The Czar, It is true, assured the Kaiser that mobiliza- 
tion did not necessarily mean war, but the post-war revela- 
tions of the Bolsheviki show this to have been a falsehood. 
Even had Russian mobilization not meant war. It would 
have meant Russian dictation of the matter In hand. For 
Russia had the numbers, and for Germany to have waited 
would have been for Germany to Invite humiliation. Un- 
der the circumstances, the dates of the various declarations 
of war tell nothing. Nor do actual troop movements. 
Since France was bound to fight the Czar's battles, no mat- 
ter on which front the fighting began. It was only a question 
of speed as to whether German armies would first reach 
French soil or French armies would first reach German 
soil. 

If the peruser of white, orange, and yellow books starts 
with July 30, Russia is seen as the original aggressor. But 
if he starts a week earlier he decides that Austria was the 
original aggressor. But were hostility, intrigue, and aggres- 
sion born into the world as late as July 23, 1914? Why 
was Austria determined to chastise Serbia? Was Serbia 
entirely blameless? Why was the Czar determined that 
Serbia should not be chastised? Was it because he felt 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 193 

himself appointed by God to defend democracy throughout 
the world? 

Why, above all, did Foreign Secretary Grey conceal his 
intentions from Germany? Was Germany "lured to at- 
tack," as Bernard Shaw declared? 

Even Britons, who approved of the action of their gov- 
ernment, have cheerfully held, with Shaw, that it was 
Grey — none other — that chose the fatal hour. President 
Wilson repeatedly expressed what is, in effect, the same 
opinion. For example, in his Columbus speech (Sept. 4, 
1 9 19), he said: ^7 did not meet a single public man who did 
not admit these things, that Germany would not have gone 
into this war if she had thought Great Britain was going 
into it/' 

This amounts to an abandonment of the theory that 
Germany "chose its own time" for the war, and is a virtual 
admission that England chose its own time. 

If Grey could have prevented war by letting Germany 
fknow that England would intervene, why did he not let 
Germany knowj? 

What other motive could he have had for leading Ger- 
many on except that he had decided that the summer of 
19 14 was a propitious time to "have it out" with the Cen- 
tral Powers? 

The action of Grey, indeed, was openly excused on the 
theory that the war was bound to come anyhow some day, 
by the choice of the Kaiser, that Britain chose the time 
righteously, since the wicked mad-dog of Europe had run 
amuck long enough, and the hour had struck for the "free 
peoples" of the world to unite and scotch it. 

Why, then, mention the incidents of July and August? 
Why continue to picture Germany leaping upon its adver- 
saries from behind? 



194 Shall It Be Again? 

Where, also, had the Kaiser run amuck? 

If the view expressed at Columbus be correct — and few 
will now dispute it — it is sufficient answer to the millions 
of words that have been printed to prove the ''war guilt" 
of the Central Power's in the diplomatic correspondence 
and incidents of the summer of 19 14. 

Hang the plot theory on the ultimatum to Serbia, if you 
will, and the answer still is that England was always in a 
position to frustrate such a plot by the simple act of 
speaking out. 

The "German plot" of 19 14, so far as it was a reality, 
was simply a determination of Austria, with the knowledge 
and approval of Germany, to chastise Serbia, even at the 
risk of war with Russia and her allies. The motive for 
this determination, far from insane dreams of world con- 
quest, is easily discernible in the previous relations between 
Serbia and Austria. 

The assassination of the Austrian archduke, stated as 
baldly as it usually is, would not seem to excuse a humilia- 
tion of Serbia. But supposing that this assassination, 
whether perpetrated with or without the knowledge of re- 
sponsible Serbian officials, was the logical outcome of an 
agitation, encouraged and assisted by the Serbian govern- 
ment, to acquire new territory for the kingdom of Serbia 
through the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Em- 
pire by means of revolution within that empire? 

We were once informed by President Wilson — just at a 
time when we were all being adjured to stand behind him 
— that it was the duty of every government to see to it 
^^that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant 
to encourage or assist revolution in other states should he 
sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented.^' (Inau- 
gural address, 19 17.) According to this view, Austria 
had a bona fide grievance against Serbia. If you begin 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 195 

looking for the original aggressor of the world war any 
time within a twelve-month before June, I9i4> you are 
as likely to lay your finger upon "poor little Serbia" as any 
other. ^ 

Go back several years, and Serbia and Austria are found 
to be on friendly terms. That situation obtained until the 
Serbian king and queen were murdered In their palace, at 
the instigation — so it was generally believed — of the Rus- 
sian legation at the Serbian capital. Anyhow, the king who 
acquired the Serbian throne, as a result of the murder, 
proved to be pro-Czar and anti-Josef. From that time, the 
friction between Serbia and Austria began. Start with 
the murder of the Serbian king and queen, and perhaps 
you will decide that Russia was the original aggressor. 

Very early, after gaining her independence from Turkey, 
the reactionary little kingdom of Serbia had developed 
"legitimate ambitions" to acquire the territory of her neigh- 
bors. While under the Influence of Austria, she had signed 
a secret treaty agreeing not to plot to acquire Austrian 
territory, or even Bosnia or Herzegovina, nominally Tur- 
iklsh but under the control of Austria since 1878. But 
immediately Serbia fell under the Influence of the Czar, this 
treaty became a "scrap of paper"; the "manifest destiny" 
of Serbia was directed. In a large measure, toward Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. When, In 1908, Francis Josef annexed 
these provinces, to prevent their recovery by Turkey, 
the Serbian king was peeved, but only because he wanted 
them for himself. He appealed to the Czar, and one of 
the periodical European crises resulted. 

Austria succeeded In retaining Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but the "manifest destiny" of Serbia continued to find its 
outlet in the so-called Pan-Serb propaganda, the chief aim 

1 It now appears, according to information published in the London Na- 
tion, June 21, 1919, that the Sarajevo murderers have been acknowledged 
as Serbian officers. 



196 Shall It Be Again? 

of which was to break up the Austrian Empire for the 
benefit of a greater Serbia. Trace the quarrels of Austria 
a^d Serbia through two Balkan wars, down to 19 14, and 
you will have to agree that the July ultimatum, peremptory 
and violent though It be, was only the logical and almost 
certain result of what had gone on in the years before. 

To hold that Austria should not have resisted the Ser- 
bian-Russian conspiracy would be to hold that the United 
States should not resist a conspiracy of Canada to acquire 
New York with the assistance of Japan. The Serbian ex- 
cuse was that the peoples of the territories which It coveted 
were of the same race and spoke a similar language, but 
Serbia went after territory to which this consideration did 
not apply. Moreover, the blood of the Balkan peoples 
is bewilderlngly mixed. To hold it desirable that all peo- 
ples closely akin in race and language should be under a 
single flag Is one thing; to determine under what flag they 
shall be, and how they shall arrive there. Is another thing. 
The principle which Serbia pretended to be guided by, If 
applied equally by Russia, would perhaps have resulted In 
the gobbling up of Serbia by Russia. If applied equally by 
all countries, it would at once set the whole world at war. 
It would do so to-day. 

There was no clear-cut Issue of purity versus depravity 
In the relations between Serbia and Austria, nor any issue 
that would justify America In taking sides. The folly of 
going to war for another country's Irredentism was thrice 
demonstrated by the world war; it was plain enough be- 
fore that. Nor is the verdict different if the Serbian- 
Austrian struggle be viewed as a Russian-German struggle. 
The Czar, for the time being, played the role of protector 
of Serbia, prompted by the same motive that had been the 
motive of Russian czars for generations — to push south- 
ward, and ultimately acquire Constantinople and the Straits, 



Our Myth of the War's Beginning 197 

and to extend their hegemony over the entire Balkan pen- 
insula. Credit Austria and Germany with the same ambi- 
tion. It becomes a conflict between "manifest destinies" 
— Pan-iSlavism versus Pan-Germanism. Which was more 
inimical to the interests of civilization? Until 1907, when 
the British bread was buttered on the Pan-Slav side, there 
{was no doubt about the answer among our British cousins. 
"Before the Entente of 1907," says BuUard, "the British 
newspapers were horrified at the Russian Intrigues in the 
Balkans. Since that date they have denounced the activity 
of the Austrlans." ("Diplomacy of the Great War," p. 
138.) 

If you are still looking for the original responsibility for 
the great war in or near the Balkan peninsula, you will find 
it, not In any one country, but in the general situation in the 
Balkans. If you would name as the original aggressor the 
government most responsible for the general situation in 
the Balkans, you would perhaps again lay your finger upon 
England. For generations, the keynote of British foreign 
policy was to protect the Turk from Russia. For this pur- 
pose England fought the Crimean War, and for this pur- 
pose England, backed by Austria, intervened In the Russo- 
Turkish war of '77, and through the Congress of Berlin, es- 
tablished that general situation In the Balkans; that status 
quo, which all swore to uphold; which not one, probably, in- 
tended to uphold; which, in fact, took so scantily into con- 
sideration any principle of international equity that it was 
not worthy of upholding; which nearly all proceeded to try 
to change in their favor; which carried the seeds of a great 
war — out of which grew the particular dispute which oc- 
casioned the firing of the first gun of 1914- 

It happens that there is no clear-cut issue of purity ver- 
sus depravity anywhere in that quarter of the world. It is 
clear that our allies and our enemies were equally engaged 



198 Shall It Be Again? 

in a despicable, cowardly, selfish business; that the official 
Allied and American version of the origin of the world 
war is a myth; that whoever goes to the official white, yel- 
low, and orange books, expecting there to find the real re- 
sponsibility, knows nothing of what was going on in the 
world previously to 19 14; that these government books 
merely tell the story of the feinting before the final grapple; 
that if one government or group is more responsible than 
another, the fact is to be found, not in the perpetration of 
any one act, but in many acts perpetrated in pursuance of 
a policy; that if the German world peril was a reality, its 
reality will have to be established by a general record of 
conduct, policy, and motive, on the part of the Kaiser's 
government, distinctly and radically different from the rec- 
ord of the governments which took up the sword against 
Germany. 

So we pass to the question of relative depravity as re- 
vealed by such international outlawry as treaty-breaking, 
atrocities, aggressions upon weaker peoples, and general 
imperialistic activities. 



XXIII 

THE NOBLE DEMOCRACIES SCRAPS OF PAPER; ATROCITIES 

The German violation of Belgium was from the first the 
leading topic in the fear-propaganda of ourselves and our 
allies. The lesson sought to be drawn from it was that 
the Kaiser's government was particularly untrustworthy and 
dishonorable, and that the Germans — either the German 
people, the German government, or the German military 
clique — were particularly savage, ruthless, and inhuman. 
By its breach of the Treaty of 1839, the Kaiser's govern- 
ment had proved that its word could never be trusted. By 
the atrocities incident to the military occupation, the Ger- 
man had proved himself a Hun. Therefore, those govern- 
ments that were incapable of profaning their pledged word, 
those nations whose military forces were incapable of out- 
rage upon civil populations, those great powers which were 
incapable of transgressing the sovereignty of their weaker 
neighbors, must, for their own ultimate safety — but especi- 
ally for the sake of humanity — ^band themselves into a 
League of Honor to crush the offending government and 
to humiliate, punish, and reform the offending people. 

But where is the nation that has proven itself morally fit 
to reform the Hun? Where is the League of Honor? 
Where is the material for any such league? Where is the 
government so without sin that it can claim the right to 
cast the first stone? 

To some it may seem superfluous to discuss the point 
farther. But the peace settlement is based upon the purity- 
versus-depravity theory, and is defensible only under it. 

199 



200 Shall It Be Again? 

Moreover, notwithstanding admissions as to the imperfec- 
tions of the peace settlement, every effort has been put 
forth to perpetuate the purity-versus-depravity theory in 
the popular mind as an axiom, never to be questioned or 
reexamined. So intensive was the work of the fear-prop- 
agandists that, after every other excuse for America's war 
has lost its force, there is danger that millions of Amer- 
icans may still remain under the misapprehension that we 
saved America and humanity from a power of singular 
wickedness, which actually entertained a scheme of world 
conquest and stood in a fair way to realize it. 

England, Prussia, and other countries united in a treaty 
guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Prussia violated 
the treaty and England declared war, claiming to do so 
purely on principle, in defense of the sacredness of treaties 
and the rights of weak nations. But England, France, 
Russia, and Japan united in treaties guaranteeing the neu- 
trality of Korea. Japan invaded Korea, as Germany in- 
vaded Belgium, compelled Korea to declare war on Russia, 
and afterwards made Korea a permanent dependency of 
Japan. The king of Korea objected, appealed to both 
England and France — and, for that matter, to one Theo- 
dore Roosevelt, then President of the United States — to 
intervene to preserve the integrity of Korea. Not one of 
the three gave any help to Korea. The principle was 
exactly the same as in the case of Belgium. Why, then, 
did England not go to war on principle against Japan? 

England, France, and other countries united in a treaty 
guaranteeing the integrity and independence of the Turkish 
Empire. But England invaded Egypt, an integral part of 
the Turkish Empire, against the wishes of the Turkish gov- 
ernment, conquered Egypt, and ultimately annexed it, brib- 
ing France with Morocco to keep still about the matter. 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 201 

During the Boer War, the British government insisted 
on violating the neutrality of Portugal, by marching troops 
across Portuguese East Africa, over the protest of the Port- 
uguese government, in precisely the same way that Ger- 
many violated the neutrality of Belgium in 19 14. 

England, France, America, Germany, and other coun- 
tries united in a treaty, in 1906, known as the Act of AI- 
geciras, guaranteeing the neutrality and integrity of the 
empire of Morocco. Meanwhile, England, France, and 
Spain, had entered into secret agreements for the partition 
of Morocco between France and Spain. In 1907, France 
sent an army into Morocco, which was never withdrawn. 
France destroyed the neutrality and integrity of Morocco 
by armed force, ultimately dividing the country with Spain. 
Instead of declaring war on France and Spain, England 
gave them her support and protection. Nor did America 
protest against the tearing up of the Moroccan scrap 
of paper. The only government to protest was the govern- 
ment of the Kaiser, whose word. President Wilson solemnly 
informed us, 'Ve cannot take as ... a guarantee of any- 
thing that is to endure," because, forsooth, ^'They observe 
no covenants!" 

England and Russia, in the Entente of 1907, united to 
guarantee the integrity and independence of Persia. At the 
same time, they secretly bargained to divide Persia between 
them. With the consent and support of England, Russia 
sent an army into Persia, overturned the existing govern- 
ment, destroyed the integrity and independence of Persia, 
and was still In control of Persia by means of an army of 
occupation when noble England declared war upon Germany 
for violating the neutrality of Belgium. 

America and England, in 1850, united in a treaty — the 
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty — agreeing never, either of them, 
to ^^ assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa 



202 Shall It Be Again? 

Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America'^ 
But England violated this treaty at the beginning, by refus- 
ing to give up her protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. 
This was also in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Two 
years later, England again violated both the treaty and the 
Monroe Doctrine, as well as the sovereignty of the republic 
of Honduras, by declaring the Bay Islands a British colony, 
after a military occupation of those Islands. Later, Eng- 
land again violated both the treaty and the Monroe Doc- 
trine by asserting sovereignty over British Honduras, which 
was formally made a British colony in 1862. In 1859, 
England relinquished control over the Mosquito Coast 
and the Bay Islands, but the retention of British Honduras 
remains a permanent violation both of the Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty and of the Monroe Doctrine. In due course, 
America also violated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, by the as- 
sumption and exercise of dominion over Panama, the per- 
manent occupation of Nicaragua, the control of its govern- 
ment, and the acquisition from Nicaragua of the Corn Is- 
lands. 

Even Belgium — irony of history ! — has a scrap of paper 
in Its closet. In 1885, England, France, Germany, and 
other countries, united in a treaty, known as the Berlin Act, 
guaranteeing the neutrality and integrity of the Congo Free 
State. The kingdom of Belgium also promised to observe 
this treaty. But in 1908, Belgium formally annexed the 
Congo Free State, without the consent of any of the signa- 
tory powers, and over the protest of some of them. Why 
did not the British government declare war upon Belgium In 
defense of the sacredness of treaties? 

The same righteous government which. In 19 14, told the 
world It declared war against Germany "solely" on princi- 
ple, because Germany tore up the Treaty of 1839, was In 
power In England In 1908, when Belgium tore up the Treaty 






Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 203 

of 1885 — the same party, the same cabinet, largely, the 
same Foreign Secretary. It was also in power in England 
when France tore up the Treaty of 1906, when England and 
Russia together tore up the Treaty of 1907, and when the 
British government completed the mutilation of the Treaty 
of 1878 by the formal annexation of Egypt. 

Every powerful government which, at one time or 
another, virtuously proclaimed its duty to assist In crushing 
Germany because of the German scrap of paper, had its 
own scraps of paper, not one, but many, and at least one 
scrap of paper paralleling in all essentials the German scrap 
of paper. Every one, even, acquired scraps of paper during 
the very war whose purpose, in part, was asserted to be to 
mete out punishment for the German scrap of paper. 

International law, as It was known at the beginning of 
1 9 14, had, in toto, either been fabricated In treaties or ac- 
knowledged in treaties. In large part, these treaties were 
thrown overboard by the belligerents, not merely as they 
applied to enemies but as they applied to neutrals. Be- 
tween 19 14 and 19 1 8, every belligerent assisted In tearing 
up International law and the treaties acknowledging Inter- 
national law. The accumulation of this great collection of 
paper scraps did not In every case Involve, as in Belgium, 
violation of the territorial integrity of a neutral. But In at 
least three notable cases it did, those of China, Greece and 
Russia. 

The territory of every country on earth, strong or weak, 
is guaranteed by some treaty, convention, or paper, to which 
every great government associated in the war against Ger- 
many has put Its signature. An article that was generally 
adopted at the second Hague Conference, for example, 
reads: "The territory of neutral powers Is inviolable.'' 
Another reads: ''Belligerents are forbidden to move troops 
or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across 



204 Shall It Be Again? 

the territory of a neutral power." These had already be- 
come commonplaces of international law. Every nation on 
earth not at war with China, Greece and Russia was, there- 
fore, under precisely the same obligation to respect the terri- 
tory of China, Greece, and Russia as Germany was, to re- 
spect the territory of Belgium. 

But Japan violated the territory of China, over the pro- 
test of the Chinese government, marching its forces through 
China in order to get at the German dependency of Kiao- 
Chau, exactly as Germany violated the territory of Belgium 
in order to get at France. England, France, Russia and 
Italy violated the territory of Greece, over the protest of 
the Greek government, and by a series of military and naval 
aggressions, overturned the Greek government, and in- 
stalled a new government, forcing Greece to declare war 
against Germany. And, after Russia became a neutral, 
England, France, Japan and the United States violated the 
territory of Russia, over the protest of the Russian govern- 
ment, made war on the Russian government, and attempted 
to assist to power In Russia a political aggregation more 
favorable to the Allied cause. 

Much was made of the fact that the German govern- 
ment, when about to violate Belgium, admitted to the world 
that it was about to commit a wrong. We commit exactly 
the same wrong, but pretend that we are doing right. Wc 
double our own crime by hypocrisy. 

Atrocities. 

By the very nature of things, nothing Is more certain of 
embellishment, from their source to their final appearance in 
the form of hate-propaganda, than stories of war atrocities. 
The high state of excitement of the victims, their passion, 
fear, and resentment, render exaggeration inevitable, even 
though it may be unconscious. Passion and self-interest, 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 205 

with the certainty that disproof is next to impossible, furnish 
the most powerful conceivable incentive to outright fabrica- 
tion. 

I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that there 
were no atrocities whatever in Belgium. I do wish to be 
understood as holding that nothing occurred revealing singu- 
lar depravity on the part of the Germans. The history of 
our allies, recent and remote, is burdened with atrocities. 

British historians frequently refer to the practice of bind- 
ing Sepoys to the mouths of cannon and blowing them to 
fragments, indulged in by British officers in the early days 
of the subjugation of India. Mass murder, wholesale hang- 
ings, extermination of entire communities, starvation on a 
large scale — these were but commonplaces in the conquest 
of India, which is not yet completed. 

Much of the same can be said of Egypt. The bombard- 
ment of Alexandria, in 1882, like the bombardment of 
Canton, China, in 1885, was a cold-blooded atrocity perpe- 
trated upon an unoffending and practically defenseless peo- 
ple. The British control is studded with British atrocities, 
which continue to this writing. 

In Bloemfontein, South Africa, the subjugated Boers 
erected a monument in memory of 26,663 women and chil- 
dren who died in British concentration camps in the two 
years of the Boer War — murdered by deliberate starvation 
and neglect. The British in South Africa could not urge 
the extenuating circumstances which existed in the occupied 
zone of France, where non-combatants were underfed by 
the Germans; they were not themselves subject to a starva- 
tion blockade. 

In 1907, in the sovereign state of Morocco, the population 
of the town of Casablanca resisted the efforts of a French- 
Spanish syndicate to build a railroad line through the local 
cemetery. A collision occurred between the population and 



2o6 Shall It Be Again? 

the workmen, and the latter were driven away. Whereupon 
French troops bombarded the defenseless town with artil- 
lery, killing thousands of men, women, and children. This 
outrage served the French purpose to penetrate farther and 
farther into Morocco, under the pretense of "protecting 
French lives and property," with the ultimate view of annex- 
ing the country. 

Even Belgium had its own particular and special Belgium. 
Under the Belgian rule in the Congo Free State, according 
to a report published in 1904 by the British Foreign Office, 
in one district the population was reduced in six years from 
live thousand to six hundred. "In six months on the Mom- 
boya River the lowest estimate of people killed or mutilated 
by having their right hand cut off was six thousand, and 
this did not include the women and children, whom the sol- 
diers were instructed to kill with the butt of their rifles so 
as not to waste cartridges." ("The New Map of Africa," 
by Herbert Adams Gibbons, p. 152.) 

Interested Belgians, at the time, held that the various 
investigations of the Congo atrocities were either conducted 
or inspired by the British government, as a means to pre- 
paring the way for taking over the Congo Free State, and 
its rich rubber resources, for the benefit of British gentle- 
men. The aforementioned official British report was pub- 
lished with an air of great sanctity. Eight years later the 
world learned, from other and equally reliable reports, that 
Britons were employing similar methods in the rubber har- 
vests of Putamayo, Peru. 

Concurrently, similar atrocities were being perpetrated by 
Frenchmen in the French Congo. The same author re- 
counts an incident related by a French investigation com- 
mission: 

At Bangui, the commission found that the foremen of the com- 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 207 

panics exercised pressure upon the blacks to bring in rubber by seiz- 
ing their women and children, and holding them as hostages until 
the allotted quota was brought to the company's compound. In 
1904, at Bangui, one concessions company, which made a practice of 
this barbarous hostage system, shut up in a small hut sixty-eight 
women and children, without air and water and food enough to 
keep them alive. The crime happened to be discovered by a young 
French physician. He demanded their release. Forty-five women 
and two children were found dead. Only thirteen women and eight 
children w^re still alive. Some of them died in spite of all the 
exertions of their liberator. The case could not have been unique. It 
was discovered only because it happened to be on the path of travelers. 

In none of these cases did the government of the "noble 
democracy" concerned take action against the perpetrators 
of these deeds. 

We also have our black pages of atrocity. How many 
Americans remember that Sherman's march to the sea was 
for the avowed purpose of starving the Confederacy, includ- 
ing the civil population? In the Philippines we at times 
wiped out whole villages, without regard to age or sex. As 
late as 19 13, it was reported that, in the campaign against 
the Moros, General Pershing's soldiers killed 196 women 
and 340 children in one day's fighting. In 1920 we learned 
from official sources that, in Haiti, our marines had killed 
3,250 natives, while losing only thirteen of their number. 
The figures justify the term "indiscriminate killings," em- 
ployed by an American major general. This is not war, 
but massacre. 

Not only were opponents of the American occupation 
hunted down and killed, but scores were murdered after 
being taken prisoner. Scores of Haitians who had not re- 
sisted the occupation in a military way were killed by our 
marines for trying to escape from enforced labor upon the 
public roads. Gatherings of Haitians were bombed from 



2o8 Shall It Be Again? 

airplanes, and Haitian and Santo Domingan prisoners were 
subjected to tortures of the most savage and revolting na- 
ture, according to testimony given to a Senate committee 
in the fall of 1921. 

As for Nicaragua, the "Confidential Hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Sen- 
ate, 63rd Congress, Second Session," reveals a number of 
atrocities which, if generally known, ought to shame into 
whispers any mention we may need to make of unpleasant 
events In Belgium. 

October 3, 19 12, Colonel J. H. Pendleton, U. S. N., 
in command of 2,000 marines, stormed the heights of 
Coyotepe, killing fifty NIcaraguan Liberals under command 
of General Benjamin F. Zeledon. Having reduced by this 
assault the defenses of the city of Masaya, Colonel Pendle- 
ton stood by while the Diaz contingent, for whom he was 
fighting, proceeded to execute Zeledon and then to stage a 
massacre In the undefended city. This massacre of un- 
armed men, women and children, which Pendleton per- 
mitted and for which the great government of the United 
States must forever stand responsible, is described by an 
eye-witness, page 420, of the secret government document, 
as follows: 

I took a photograph of Colonel Pendleton standing on top of the 
hill with his men. When this happened the Nicaraguan soldiers, 
who had been standing by . . . sailed into the town of Masaya, 
which lies under the brow of the hill. They massacred everybody 
they could lay their hands on, and the women and children of the 
town fled into the church of Masaya, and these Nicaraguans, or 
government soldiers, brought up a field piece, and they fired the 
door of the church down, and they brought up two machine guns 
and fired into these people. There must have been 300 or 400 peo- 
ple all crowded into that church. . . . They killed about 250 peo- 
ple right there in the church. They simply mowed them down 
with the machine gun. Then they fell upon the rest of the inhabi- 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 209 

tants. They looted everything there, and they simply tore that 
town to pieces. It was the worst looking horrible wreck I ever 
saw, and the dead were littered all over it. 

The Belgians, at least, had formal warning of the Ger- 
man invasion. But the population of Vera Cruz, Mexico, 
had no warning whatever. The government of the United 
States had not declared war on Mexico, nor upon the city 
of Vera Cruz. In Europe a desperate struggle of nations 
was going on. But on April 21, 19 14, the United States 
was in no danger of attack. The life of no American was 
at stake. Nevertheless, we made an aggressive war upon a 
practically defenseless city, and entirely without warning to 
the population thereof. Not a civilian in Vera Cruz had 
any idea that the Americans were going to attack. When 
the booming of the guns began, the children were let out of 
school, and ran panic-stricken for their homes. By that 
time the invaders were running amuck through the city. At 
least ten children and six women were shot to death in the 
streets by our gallant lads. 

The Mexicans consider our attack upon, and occupation 
of, Vera Cruz an American "Lusitania" and an American 
Belgium rolled into one. Our punitive expedition they re- 
member with little less horror. During that expedition, 
according to our own official reports and our own news- 
paper correspondents, our heroic soldiers, on one occasion, 
''surprised," and massacred sixty Mexicans, without giving 
them an opportunity to surrender. On another occasion 
they surprised, and massacred, forty unarmed Mexicans, 
some of whom were asleep and some of whom were naked, 
swimming in a pool. On a third occasion, they fired into 
a civilian mob, killing forty. 

Meanwhile, on the American side of the line, unolTending 
and defenseless Mexicans were murdered by border rang- 
ers, local police officers, or others intent upon "making the 



210 Shall It Be Again? 

Mexicans pay for Villa's raid," or "making this a white 
man's country." According to a report ^ of an investigator 
appointed by Colonel H. J. Slocum, U. S. A., rendered Feb- 
ruary 12, 19 1 8, *^the number of victifns thus sacrificed in 
southwest Texas by such peace officers assuming the powers 
of a court of justice will probably never be known, though I 
understand that attorney F. C. Pierce holds a list of names 
of nearly three hundred.*^ 

Coming down to the great war, the absence of Allied 
atrocities upon a civiHan population upon the western front 
is explained by the fact that the Allies had no enemy popu- 
lation to deal with. Atrocities upon enemy combatants 
were perpetrated on both sides. On returning from Eu- 
rope, Herbert L. Pratt, vice-president of the Standard Oil 
Company and a Y. M. C. A. worker, declared in a pub- 
lished interview (June 2, 191 8) that: "The Americans no 
longer are bringing in prisoners in small groups. They 
I, re shooting the Germans down like rats." 

Atrocities of this kind were defended on the ground that 
the Germans had committed atrocities quite as bad. The 
hate-propaganda was necessary not only at home, but on 
the battle front also. We had to sermonize our soldiers 
on hatred before they entered the trenches, for fear they 
might consider the Germans fellow creatures — for fear 
they might not take sufficient pleasure in mutilating the Ger- 
mans. We had to put our own brave boys in the savage 
state that we told them the Germans were in. We had to 
repeat to them the old lie that is told in all wars, that the 
enemy take no prisoners. 

Upon the battlefield, stories of mutilation and outrage 
were readily believed and held to justify any outrage. We 
excused our poisoned gas and our air raids on open towns 

1 This report is printed in full in the April, 1918, Mexican Revieiv, 
published at Washington, D. C. 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 211 

only on the ground that our enemies had employed such 
means of warfare first. But British aviators bombed non- 
combatants both of India and Afghanistan, where no pre- 
tense of retaliation could be offered, and this after German 
''savagery" had been crushed.^ 

For Germans to rejoice over the sinking of the "Lusl- 
tania," of greater value to Britain than any warship, was 
savagery, but for Britons to rejoice at the stunting of Ger- 
man babies, of no use whatever In that particular war, was 
patriotism. In an interview published In the Chicago Trib- 
une, February 14, 19 17, Sir Gilbert Parker was reported 
as saying: "German boys and girls of to-day, who are to y 
be the future manhood and womanhood of Germany, are 
being deprived of those foods necessary to proper growth 
and sustenance. And I am glad of It." 

In speaking to the House of Commons, December 20, 
19 1 7, Lloyd George exulted thus: 

We must not imagine that the enemy has not had his difficulties. 
We had proof of that the other day, when facts were given to us 
as to the deteriorated physical quality of the German workers as a 
result of the blockade imposed by the British navy. The German 
workers have so deteriorated that the output of Germany per man 
has gone down by something like thirty-three per cent., compared 
with the first year of the war. 

In an Interview with the Associated Press, May i, 19 19, 
Professor Abderhalden, a noted physiologist who had been 
making an investigation of German health conditions, as- 
serted that to date a million persons, chiefly children, were 
dead as a result of the Allied hunger blockade, and that 
the survivors averaged a loss of twenty per cent. In weight. 

Our hunger blockade, even while the war went on, was 

2 The Glasgow Forivard seems to have proven that the Entente Allies were 
first both in the use of poison gas and in bombing civilian populations 
from the sky. 



212 Shall It Be Again? 

an atrocity against our enemies beside which the "sub- 
marine atrocity" is not to be mentioned. How much 
greater an atrocity it was after our enemies were no longer 
resisting us! And how much greater an atrocity against 
neutrals, who never wished to fight us. First, our noble al- 
lies starved Greece — the entire population, civil and mili- 
tary, old and young, male and female — as a means to com- 
pelling that country to abandon neutrality and assist them 
in the war. Afterwards we starved Russia and Hungary. 

We starved hundreds of thousands of Russians, especially 
women and children, and for no other reason than that 
our government did not approve of the Soviet Government. 
We had expressed horror at the enforced labor of Belgians 
behind the Allied lines, but at Archangel we forced unwill- 
ing Russians to labor behind the Allied lines. More than 
that, we conscripted them for service against their own 
people, and, on occasion, murdered them in cold blood when 
they refused to fight. 

The effect of our starvation blockade was even more 
disastrous upon the population of Hungary. Testifying 
before the House Ways and Means Committee, January 
15, 1920, Secretary of War Baker presented a summary of 
infantile death rates per thousand in the city of Budapest, 
for the first six months of 19 19, as follows: January, 812; 
February, 966; March, 784; April, 577; May, 567; June, 
635. For this mass murder of babies we share responsi- 
bility with our allies. 

Whatever may be said of military heroism, war also 
brings out the worst in human nature, which is everywhere 
approximately the same. But even in peace times, atroci- 
ties are constantly occurring in every large community. 
America lynched 67 persons in 19 18, of whom four were 
white men and five colored women, and in 19 19 this record 
was surpassed. If all the brutal assaults, arsons, murders, 



Scraps of Paper; Atrocities 213 

rapes, unlawful Imprisonments, and tortures, perpetrated 
upon defenseless persons in the United States of America, 
by men In the uniform of the United States, by State militia- 
men, by the police, and others wearing the badge of author- 
ity, by private detectives, by corporation gunmen, and by 
individuals, during the same period in which Germany oc- 
cupied Belgium — If all these were brought together and set 
forth In their most revolting details. It may be that they 
would fill a book upon American atrocities In peace time, 
not so vastly different from our books upon German atroci- 
ties in war time. 

The only atrocity alleged against the Germans that is 
not equalled or surpassed by the atrocities of ourselves and 
our allies Is found in the "rape squad" stories, which depict 
the violation of womanhood as an official part of the Ger- 
man warfare. But Sir Philip GIbbs, the celebrated British 
correspondent ("Now It Can Be Told," p. 456), says: 

On the whole it seemed that they [the Germans] had not mis- 
used the women. I heard no tales of actual atrocity, though some 
of brutal passion. But many women shrugged their shoulders when 
I questioned them about this and said: *They [the Germans] had no 
need to use violence in their way of love-making. There were many 
volunteers.* 

With many Americans the "rape squad" stories have no 
doubt long since gone into the same class as our official 
"expose" of Lenin as an agent of the German autocracy, 
and our yarn about the nationalization of women by the 
Soviet Government. To those who are still Inclined to 
credit them there is just one thing to say: // our official prop- 
agandists, beginning with the President and the Secretary 
of State, had the effrontery to put forward deliberate, mali- 
cious, monstrous, and easily provable distortions — such as 
the story of Germany's ^'broken submarine promises/^ the 



214 Shall It Be Again? 

tale of a ^^German-Mexican plot to attack America, ^^ the al- 
legation of ^'our right under international law'^ to confiscate 
the Dutch ships — to what extent can we credit the dictum 
of these gentlemen upon matters which are largely inca- 
pable of proof or disproof? 

When the armistice was signed, a good many Americans 
expressed disappointment. Several miUion Germans had 
been killed, but that was not enough to satisfy them. 
Rather than give immediate peace to a people that was 
seeking peace on our terms, they were willing to sacrifice a 
few thousand more Americans, for the sake of a final mas- 
sacre of Germans. The lesson of the war's atrocities is 
that war makes savages of men of whatever blood or na- 
tion, and of whatever degree of culture. The lesson is 
that war atrocities cannot be banished from the earth by 
exterminating or punishing Germans, but only by banishing 
war itself. 



XXIV 

THE NOBLE DEMOCRACIES AND SMALL NATIONS 

Belgium was the most vulnerable spot in Germany's moral 
armor, and the enemies of Germany were quick to take 
full advantage of it. In Belgium the British government 
found the casus belli that it was bound to find somewhere, 
and around Belgium was built its entire scheme of war prop- 
aganda. The scrap of paper incident involved not only 
the principle of the sacredness of treaties, but the more 
fundamental principle of the equal and absolute sovereignty 
of all nations. So England, in entering the arena profes- 
sedly in defense of the sacredness of treaties, also pro- 
claimed itself the world's heavyweight champion of weak 
nations. The psychological step to the issue of democracy 
versus autocracy was short. Soon, every government as- 
sociated in the war against Germany, with the possible ex- 
ception of that of the Czar — even Rumania, the most 
feudal country in Europe; even Japan — was informing 
the world in thunderous tones that it had unsheathed the 
sword in defense of world democracy, and the rights of 
weak nations. 

In due course, our own government, as soon as it had 
succeeded in bringing us to the certainty of war on the sub- 
marine issue, raised the cry quite as loudly as any of its 
aUies. In the war message, the President announced that 
we would fight ^'for the privilege of men everywhere to 
choose their own way of life and obedience . . . for democ- 
racy . . . for the rights and liberties of small nations.^' 
And thereafter a large share of our own propaganda was 

215 



2i6. Shall It Be Again? 

devoted to Inculcating the notion that the only way to do 
this was to destroy the existing government of Germany; 
that we had thrown In our lot with England, France, Italy, 
and Japan, because they, like ourselves, were protectors of 
small nations; that our "League of Honor" actually repre- 
sented "the privilege of men everywhere to choose their 
own way of life and obedience," while Germany repre- 
sented aggression, conquest, and exploitation in the world's 
affairs. 

"By their works ye shall know them." In works our 
League of Honor was a distinctly greater offender against 
the principles which It professed to champion than was the 
government that it destroyed, even during the war Itself, as 
has been pointed out, while before the war the preponder- 
ance of its offenses against world democracy is overwhelm- 
ing. 

The supremacy of our most powerful ally in the world's 
affairs la based upon supremacy in sea power. That suprem- 
acy was attained only after a long series of aggressive 
wars extending over a century and a half, in which the 
Spanish, Dutch, and French navies were swept from the 
seas. To these, In 1807, the Danish navy was added in a 
single stroke. On a mere suspicion that Denmark intended 
to join with France and Russia against England and Swe- 
den, the British fleet was sent into the Baltic Sea, under 
specific assurance that it was not intended as a menace to 
Denmark. Once there, the British government suddenly 
demanded the surrender of the entire Danish fleet. On re- 
ceipt of a refusal, a British force was landed, Copenhagen 
was bombarded and burned, and the Danish fleet became 
by conquest the property of Great Britain. 

The boast that the sun never sets on the British flag Is 
ts true as the other boast that Britannia rules the waves. 
The British Empire, even before its latest vast acquisitions, 



Noble Democracies and Small Nations 217 

embraced nearly one-fourth of the land surface of the earth, 
fully one-fourth of its productive surface, the best harbors 
overseas, and the most commanding positions, commer- 
cially and strategically. Nearly all of this vast empire was 
acquired by war, either upon England's European neigh- 
bors, or upon the native peoples, or upon both. 

The Portuguese and the Dutch were the first Europeans 
in India. England acquired India by war, first upon the 
Dutch, second upon the French, third upon the native 
peoples. 

The Dutch were first in South Africa. England took 
Cape Colony in war from Holland, abolished by force the 
republic of Natal, and completed the conquest in the twen- 
tieth century by cutting down those two small nations, the 
republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 

France colonized Canada. Holland colonized New 
York. Both fell to England as spoils of war. Later, 
France sold its Louisiana territory to the young republic 
of the United States to prevent it from being taken in war 
by Britain. The large island of Malta was taken from 
the French. Gibraltar, Spain, was taken and kept simply 
because the British liked its commanding position. Ja- 
maica was wrested from Spain. Other British possessions 
in the western hemisphere were either taken, by conquest, 
from Spain or held in defiance of the claims of the Ameri- 
can republics. 

The foundations of British world empire were laid, in 
other centuries, upon aggression. But in the enlightened 
twentieth century, "democratic" England has been quite as 
ready to increase her dominion by war as in what we are 
wont to pretend was a more immoral age. 

In building up the myth that England represents the 
principle of democracy, great emphasis was laid upon the 
degree of self-government existing in certain British colo- 



2i8 Shall It Be Again? 

nies, such as Canada and Australia. But this sort of self- 
government is enjoyed by less than five per cent, of the peo- 
ple living under the British flag outside of the British Isles. 
The other ninety-five per cent, are governed by an official 
bureaucracy that imposes its will everywhere by force. 
More than 300,000,000 British subjects enjoy no self- 
government worthy of the name, and are kept under the 
British flag only by the constant exercise of military power. 

The British ruling class has as little regard for democ- 
racy, self-determination, the rights of small nations, the 
sovereignty of weak peoples, without the British Empire 
as within. Where England has appeared to champion a 
small nation against a larger, a selfish British purpose has 
almost invariably been evident, usually the purpose to save 
the victim for ultimate British consumption, or to be par- 
celed out among other consumers of small nations at some 
later date for favors rendered. 

This is exemplified in England's dealings with Turkey and 
Russia. The British imagination created the German peril. 
The British have always had a bugaboo. When the 
French bugaboo was laid, early in the nineteenth century, 
Russia became the British bugaboo. As the main feature 
of British foreign policy in the twentieth century was to 
isolate Germany, so the main feature of British foreign 
policy throughout most of the nineteenth century was to 
curb Russia. Any enlargement of Russian power was an 
affront to England. Any Russian ambition for expansion 
was an ambition of autocracy to conquer the world. Brit- 
ish opposition to Russian expansion was unselfish champion- 
ship of world democracy and the rights of small nations. 
It was Britain's duty, as the world's trustee of liberty, to 
thwart the Russian desire for a warm seaport, even to re- 
sist Russian expansion in the direction of such a seaport. 



Noble Democracies and Small Nations 219 

If war resulted, very well, the Czar would be the aggressor; 
England would be fighting in self-defense. 

So immaculate England became the protector of the 
Turk. In relation to Russia, Turkey was a small nation; 
England was championing a small nation. But in relation 
to Turkey, Bulgaria, Armenia, and the other Christian peo- 
ples, struggling for independence from Moslem rule, were 
small nations. In championing Turkey, England effectively 
stood between these subject peoples and independence. 
^'Democratic" England became a cooppressor with the Turk 
of the most oppressed peoples in Europe, a responsible 
party to the periodical massacres in Turkey's Christian 
provinces. At the Congress of Berlin, it was the British 
government that insisted that two-thirds of "bleeding Bul- 
garia" be handed back to Moslem oppression. 

As the price of protecting the Turk, England took the 
island of Cyprus. Had racial demands been considered, 
Cyprus would have gone to Greece. England was now 
ready to begin the acquisition of Egypt also. In the 30's 
Egypt had won its independence from the Sultan and estab- 
lished sovereignty over Syria besides. But in accordance 
with its policy of protecting the Turk, England had driven 
the Egyptian forces out of Syria and compelled Egypt to 
acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sultan and pay the lat- 
ter an annual tribute. In 1875, by a species of treachery, 
we find England nosing France out of control of the Suez 
Canal. After this, England shouldered France out of the 
way and into Egypt. 

British control over both entrances to the Mediterranean 
being doubly secured by the occupation of Egypt, "democ- 
racy" no longer so pressingly required either that the Turk 
be protected or that the Czar be curbed. England's ally 
in the east, Japan, beat Russia in a quarrel over Manchuria, 



220 Shall It Be Again? 

and the Czar turned about to face a revolution at home. It 
was a promising day for democracy. The world's greatest 
autocracy was tottering. The Russian world peril, so far 
as it was a reality, was about to be laid in the only way that 
perils of the sort can be permanently laid — by fundamental 
reforms brought about from within. 

But, unfortunately, England had meanv/hile forgotten 
the Russian peril and discovered the German peril. So, 
over the frantic appeals of the revolutionary leaders, Eng- 
land and France loaned the Czar the cash which alone ena- 
bled him to stamp out the revolution. Thus was the Rus- 
sian autocracy kept alive long enough to assist England and 
France in the great war that was even then preparing — the 
war ^'for the privilege of men everywhere to choose their 
own way of life and obedience F' 

While protecting the Turk, England had also stood forth 
as protector of the small nation, Persia. But suddenly 
(In 1907), world democracy of the British flavor no longer 
required that Persia have rights or even existence. The 
time had arrived for another good British bargain. So 
Persia went upon the block, and with Persia another small 
nation which England had been protecting against Russia, 
Afghanistan. Foreign Secretary Grey divided Persia with 
his good friend, the Czar, giving the Czar the larger por- 
tion, while the latter acknowledged England's "right" to 
''choose the way of life and obedience" of the inhabitants 
of Afghanistan. 

When the Czar was trying to v/ork his way south in the 
70's, England and Austria had stood together against him. 
England and Austria were comrades in the ^ood cause of 
democracy. Even as late as October 8, 19 12, in spite of 
waning friendship for the Turk, and warming friendship for 
the Czar, the integrity of the Turkish Empire was of more 
importance to England than self-determination of Turkey's 



Noble Democracies and Small Nations 221 

subject peoples. On that date a note, signed by all the 
powers, but emanating from the British Foreign Office, was 
delivered to the various members of the Balkan alliance, 
warning them against a war with Turkey, declaring that: 

If, in spite of this note, war does break out between the Balkan 
states and the Ottoman Empire, the powers will not admit, at the 
end of the conflict, any modification of the territorial status quo in 
European Turkey. 

But, by 19 14, the rights of the small nation, Serbia, 
had suddenly become of vast Importance to "democracy." 
British treachery had driven Turkey into the arms of Ger- 
many. Wherefore, "democracy" not only no longer re- 
quired the protection of the Turk, but was ready to look 
on complacently while the Czar proceeded on his way to 
Constantinople. So it happened that, while virtuous Eng- 
land found her casus belli in the scrapping of the Treaty 
of 1839, she agreed to the final pulverization of the Treaty 
of 1878; Constantinople was promised the Russian autoc- 
racy as its share of the spoils In the great world struggle 
for the rights of weak nations and the sacredness of treaties ! 

Africa, the second largest continent, has been divided up 
like a great English plum pudding, most of It since the 
beginning of the twentieth century. The division was ac- 
complished by the tearing up of treaties, by the profana- 
tion of official pledges, by deliberate deception of home 
electorates, by mass murder, and by assassination of small 
nations upon their own doorsteps. 

By the year 19 14, but two small nations had survived 
the cannibal invasion from Europe; insignificant Liberia, 
greatly shrunken, not really independent, but an unacknowl- 
edged protectorate of the United States; Abyssinia, which 
had successfully resisted Italy, and whose continued exist- 



222 Shall It Be Again? 

ence was due to mutual jealousies among her would-be- 
butcherers. Between them Liberia and Abyssinia held less 
than three and one-half per cent, of the area and but two 
and one-half per cent, of the population of the great conti- 
nent of Africa. 

England, France, Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree, 
Germany, had all engaged in wars of conquest, sometimes 
very bloody and prolonged, upon the weak nations of Af- 
rica. Among these European aggressors there had been 
disputes innumerable. Italy had fought another European 
power, Turkey. There had been bad blood all around. 
At least once, England and France were on the verge of 
war with one another. At least twice, a crisis between 
England and France, on one side, and Germany on the 
other, brought all Europe to the verge of war. 

In the division of the African plum pudding, England 
received one-third, France one-fourth. England got the 
best and juiciest plums, France the second best. Italy was 
blessed with the third best portion. Spain got a plum or 
two. Germany was served some underdone portions, with 
the plums carefully removed. In the spilling of human 
blood, democratic France divided honors with England. 
Italy was third, Spain fourth. "The Hun" killed least of 
all. 

Over a longer period, a similar division to that of Africa 
has been going on in the largest continent, Asia, although 
it is not yet as nearly completed. Here, as in Africa, Eng- 
land acquired the choicest plums. Not far behind England 
are Russia and Japan, though "democratic" France is not 
without her Asiatic tidbits. The partition of Asia has 
been going on more rapidly in the twentieth century than 
ever before. At China, the great powers have been pick- 
ing like vultures. The year 19 14 found England dominant 
in Asia, as in Africa — supreme in the middle east, joining 



Noble Democracies and Small Nations '223 

control with Japan in the far east, partner with the Czar in 
the near east, disputing German entrance into affairs in 
that quarter. 

The garroting of small nations by large ones has pro- 
ceeded more rapidly during the past quarter of a century 
than at any previous period in the world's history. Within 
a single generation, England, France, Russia, Italy, Ger- 
many, and Japan acquired new territory aggregating more 
than both the North and South American continents. Ac- 
cording to Rear-Admiral French E. Chadwick, U. S. N., 
retired, (Speech before Lawyers' Club of New York, 
February, 19 17), in that period Great Britain expanded to 
the extent of 6,750,000 miles; France, 3,500,000; Russia, 
2,000,000; Germany, 1,000,000. Every mile of this 
13,250,000 was acquired by some form of aggression. 

In the forty-four years previous to 19 14 — throughout 
the entire period of the activity and influence of the men 
who, we were told, plotted world conquest by war — Ger- 
many engaged in war less than any of the other countries 
named, including our own. 

Do, then, the German aggressions reveal a more de- 
praved purpose than the aggressions of her enemies? 
What is the purpose of aggression in modern times? 



XXV 

WHAT REALLY STARTED IT 

In 1 840-1, England fought what has since become known 
as the Opium War, to break down the barriers of China 
against the importation of opium from British India. 
China, defeated, was compelled not only to open five har- 
bors to the British trade, but to pay $22,500,000 to cover 
the cost of the war, $6,250,000 for opium seized and 
burned on Chinese soil, and to hand over Hong Kong to 
England for good measure. 

England's Opium War is a classic in its clear simplicity 
as a war for business. But every war fought by England 
within the present generation, as well as by every other 
great power, although not always as plainly so on the 
surface, was also a war for business. 

Most modern wars for business, however, unlike the 
Opium War, are not motived upon a desire to crowd trade 
down the throat of an unwilling people. The mere ex- 
change of goods is a secondary consideration. Nor is con- 
quest in the present day carried on for so legitimate a pur- 
pose as that of providing homes for surplus populations. 
European powers make no serious effort to colonize their 
African and Asiatic possessions, as a rule. France, the 
world's second greatest grabber of new territory, has a 
stationary population. 

What is sought is access to the natural resources of the 
weak nation in question, opportunity to exploit these re- 
sources with cheap labor and without any adequate return 
for the privilege, and favorable concessions for railroads 

224 



What Really Started It 225 

with which to get away with the loot. The usual process 
Is to get a "stake" in the country, concessions for mines, 
lumber, or oil, often through bribery, and then to begin 
coercion, leading usually to armed intervention, on behalf 
of the particular interest involved. 

This process has been termed "the new imperialism." It 
was first enunciated as a policy in the year 1850 by the 
British government, and the first example of its practice on 
a large scale is furnished by Egypt. Intervention on be- 
half of investments is a denial of the equality of nations, 
and the grossest possible violation of international law. 
Nevertheless, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, and Japan, 
followed the example of England, and intervention on be- 
half of investments became the most serviceable maneuver 
in the partition of Africa and Asia. It is not always neces- 
sary to resort to actual war to accomplish the end sought, or 
even to hoist the flag over the coveted spoils. Threats, 
more or less veiled, often accomplish the desired result. 
China furnishes one example. Spheres of influence fly the 
flag of the exploited, not the exploiter, though control by 
the latter is no less effective for his purpose. 

Where the business motive of a given war is not evident 
at the beginning, it invariably appears later, in the condi- 
tions imposed upon the beaten nation. Having persuaded 
the Boers by cannon-shot to yield to British mine-owners 
what they wanted, England conceded to South Africa a 
measure of self-government approaching that of Canada 
and Australia. Because the spirit of the Boers could not 
be completely broken, it happened to be good business to 
do so. But nowhere else in the British dominion in Africa 
or Asia is Home Rule in operation. Throughout these 
vast dominions, government is by and for British bondhold- 
ers, British concessionaires, and British officeholders. 

A result of British imperialism is that the inhabitants 



226 Shall It Be Again? 

of the richest spots of the earth live and die in the most 
abject poverty. The famines of India have been shown to 
be due, not so much to overpopulation or failures of crops, 
as to appropriation of crops by British gentlemen. The 
voracious demands of British bondholders and concession- 
aires, made good by British bayonets, are responsible for 
wholesale starvation of Egyptians in past decades, and for 
the present misery of the Egyptian population. - 

Such is the result, on the one hand, of British imperialism. 
The result, on the other, is that England has a leisure class 
larger in proportion to population than any other country 
— and at the bottom of the social scale a most pronounced 
destitution. By virtue of her "glorious" empire, England 
lives more largely upon forced tribute from "weak nations" 
than any other power. By virtue of aggression, treaty- 
breaking, atrocity, and conquest, London became the finan- 
cial centre of the world, England the "world's banker." 

No fact is more significant than that the British nation 
does not share, in any degree, in British imperial pros- 
perity. The standard of living of the masses in England 
is no higher than that in neighboring countries that possess 
no empire. The wage of the British trade unionist de- 
pends, not one iota upon the bursting banks of London, the 
expanse of the empire, or the supremacy of the fleet, but 
solely upon the strength of his union. The British common 
laborer is no better paid than the Dutch, the Belgian, the 
Norwegian, or the Dane. The British slums are the most 
notorious in the world. This could not be true were "dem- 
ocratic" England a real democracy. It is true because 
the empire, and all it means, is for the upper classes. 

More space is devoted here to British imperialism than 
to French, German, Italian, Russian, or Japanese imperial- 
ism, only because Britain led the way, set the styles, has 
profited most — and is supreme. France is the world's sec- 



What Really Started It 227 

ond greatest Imperial power. We have heard much of 
French democracy, but French "democracy" Is of little 
value to the world so long as democracy does not extend 
to France's foreign relations. The bankers of Paris wield 
the same measure of control over the French Foreign 
Office as the London bankers enjoy over theirs, while the 
control of the French press by the Paris bankers Is reputed 
to be even more complete than similar control exercised In 
England. While the French army was gradually extend- 
ing dominion over Morocco, the Chamber of Deputies re- 
peatedly adopted resolutions reaffirming the adherence of 
France to the Act of Algeclras, promising that the army 
would be withdrawn. These resolutions were probably 
sincere. But the French bankers had their way. As the 
great war drew on, the desire of the French people w^as 
unquestionably pacific, as was the desire of the peoples of 
all countries. Nevertheless, the same factors were domi- 
nant in France as in Germany, Russia, Austria, and Eng- 
land, and they worked the same way. 

German mlhtarism existed for several decades before it 
was discovered by British gentlemen. German militarism 
and the German peril were discovered only when Germany 
began to compete for foreign trade, to look for colonies, 
and to build a navy. Imperial Germany's crime against 
democracy was to Imitate Imperial England, and to do it 
with disturbing energy and efficiency. 

Britons informed us that the Kaiser's speech at the begin- 
ning of the war, to the effect that Germany would now have 
her place In the sun, meant that Germany would now pro- 
ceed to conquer the world. There is no ground whatever 
for such an Interpretation. The term, "places In the sun,'' 
had long been employed to mean rich tropical colonies. 
What the Kaiser literally meant was that he Intended to 



228 Shall It Be Again? 

acquire some new colonies in the war. This is a brazen 
confession of depravity — until one remembers that all the 
great governments that took up the sword against the 
Kaiser, had been doing the very thing the Kaiser confessed 
he intended to do. 

All had been acquiring colonies by war. Not by a 
world war; but they were not far behind the Kaiser in 
letting it be known that they, also, intended to acquire new 
territory in the world war itself. 

The world war, indeed, was the logical and almost in- 
evitable outcome of the rivalries and enmities of the pre- 
ceding years, which were kept alive, sharpened, and ren- 
dered malignant by the competition for "places in the sun." 
While contributing causes can be found which run back to 
the very beginnings of some of the nations involved, the 
preponderating and decisive cause was the clash of rival 
imperialisms within the previous ten years. 

While, for example, the German acquisition of Alsace- 
Lorraine was a persistent factor in French enmity against 
Germany, it would never of itself have caused another war. 
French and British enmity had been more bitter and of 
longer standing, British humiliation of France more recent. 
Britain was the "traditional enemy." Yet for imperialistic 
reasons, France joined forces with Britain, who in former 
decades had scarcely known a dispute with Germany, and 
the latter became the common foe. 

Partly because the Kaiser had come late into the field of 
spoliation, and partly because when he came the other de- 
spoilers united and bargained to keep him out, the German 
acquisitions of "places in the sun" were meagre. They 
not only bargained and divided among themselves, and 
conspired to keep out the Kaiser, but on occasion they made 
it plain that they were determined to keep him out, even 
at the cost of war. 



What Really Started It 229 

The threat of armed force was a constant and decisive 
factor in the competition of the great powers for "places 
in the sun." England, possessing the greatest force, every- 
where took the lion's share. But England's force was 
never great enough to take all. To make sure of the lion's 
share, England not only had to threaten, but to bargain, to 
divide, to throw sops. By occasional exercise of force, and, 
more frequently, displays of force, England brought Rus- 
sia, France, and the greater part of the world to accept the 
fact of British supremacy, to be content with the crumbs 
that fell from the British table. Germany remained the one 
likely challenge to British supremacy. So Germany became 
the world peril. 

Says H. N. Brailsford, an Englishman (*'War of Steel 
and Gold," pp. 42-3) : 

The difficulty between Britain and Germany was not so much 
Bagdad or even Morocco, as the general sense that a powerful dip- 
lomatic combination and a naval preponderance were being used to 
frustrate German purposes and to exclude her from 'places in the 
sun'. . . . First, we excluded Germany from Morocco, and then 
we constructed a general league which hemmed her in on all sides. 
We 'debauched' her ally, Italy, we brought Spain into our 'or- 
bit'. . . . The 'balance of power' had been violently adjusted in 
our favor, and in Prince von Buelow's phrase, Germany felt herself 
'penned in'. ... It can hardly be doubted that, for some years at 
least, the Triple Entente was really inspired by the aims which Ger- 
man alarm ascribed to it. Its real architects were M. Delcasse and 
King Edward, and the former, at least, made no secret of his ambitions. 

Look at a political map of Africa in 19 14, and you find 
seven-tenths of this great continent in the hands of British 
and French — the best and most productive seven-tenths. 
Germany is credited with several colonies, mostly jungle. 
Where this jungle abuts upon the sea, we discover the har- 
bor to be in the hands of some other power, usually Eng- 



230 Shall It Be Again? 

land. In Togoland, points out Herbert Adams Gibbons, 
an American ("New Map of Africa," p. 276), "as else- 
where In Africa, the Germans are shut off from a logical 
and natural portion of their coast line by a projection of 
British territory." Also (p. 232) : 

Zanzibar stands to German East Africa as Walfish Bay to Ger- 
man Southwest Africa, the mouth of the Volta and Cape St. Paul 
to Togoland, and the Niger Delta to Kamerun, an everlasting com- 
mand — Thou shah not! 

Says Frederic C. Howe, an American ("Why War?", 
p. 240-1) : 

The Mediterranean is, in effect, a British sea. This is secured 
through the command of the western and eastern entrances at 
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. The fortresses at Gibraltar are im- 
pregnable. The great guns command the narrow straits through 
which all commerce to and from the Atlantic must pass, as com- 
pletely as the entrance to a harbor. This, with the Suez Canal, 
gives Great Britain control of the Mediterranean, which is the 
Igreatest trade route of the world. It enables her to menace the 
commerce of all European countries and to close the door at will 
upon all ships passing through it to the outside world. By reason 
of this fact, all the Mediterranean states are under the potential con- 
trol of Great Britain. This is one of Germany's complaints, for 
so long as Great Britain controls the gateways and trade routes to 
the Orient, the commerce of other nations is not really free. 

Neutral, American, and even British writers agree that 
German imperialism turned Its eyes toward Turkey be- 
cause of the success of the policy of Isolation elsewhere. In 
time, no doubt, the sword would have been employed to 
Insure German control and exploitation of the Turks. It 
happens that German Imperialism in Turkey never progres- 
sed beyond the stage of persuasion and peaceful bargain- 
ing. Germany's best argument with the Turks was the 



What Really Started It 231 

record of her competitors. To Turkey, the British peril 
was a reality. To Germany, the Bagdad Railway was a 
means for extending power and Influence without war with 
her powerful neighbors. 

The German scheme happened, however, to conflict with 
British ambitions to acquire control of the same territory. 
A much talked of British plan was to colonize southern 
Mesopotamia with Egyptian peasants, then grab it as Egypt 
was grabbed, penetrate into southern Arabia as the Sudan 
was penetrated, connect Persia with Egypt, and so complete 
the encirclement of Germany. 

In pursuance of this purpose, the British press was in- 
spired to raise the cry of a German peril to India and 
Egypt. German peaceful penetration of Turkey must be 
halted at all costs. The Bagdad Railway as a German pro- 
ject must be smashed; by diplomacy, if possible; by war, if 
diplom.acy would not do the trick. 

In the end It was smashed. Throughout, it Is a story 
of sordid intrigue. The governments of France and Eng- 
land disputed every mile of the road In some way. The 
knockout was finally delivered by England. The Sheik of 
Kowelt was persuaded to disavow the rule of the Sultan and 
accept the protection of the King of England. So the Gulf 
of Kowelt, the sea terminus of the road, fell Into British 
hands. So, to complete the Bagdad Railway as a German 
project, it would have been necessary for Germany to back 
the Sultan In subduing the Sheik of Kowelt. That would 
have meant war with England. As the German govern- 
ment had backed down in Morocco, so again it backed 
down In Turkey. In "agreements" signed with England, 
France, and Russia, German imperialism yielded up control 
of the Bagdad Railway to Entente imperialism. When the 
Germans were slow to back down still again — in the Serbian 
crisis — the world war began. 



232 Shall It Be Again? 

President Wilson boldly held up the German activities 
in Turkey as a cause for war by the United States upon the 
Imperial German Government. "Government after gov- 
ernment," said he (to Russia, May 26, 19 17), had "with- 
out open conquest of territory, been linked together in a net 
of intrigue." The governments were those of Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. There was none 
other. 

This horrible net of intrigue, spread by four governments 
which had voluntarily associated themselves together, was 
directed "against nothing less than the peace and liberty 
of the world," said Wilson. But when he begins to go into 
details, we discover that the intrigue is, rather, against 
a collection of states which happened to have been linked 
together with "open conquest of territory," and at the time 
were held together only by iron links of force. The star- 
tled phrases of Wilson name India, Egypt, and Persia, as 
objects of German ambition! 

Supposing there we7'e lurking ambitions ultimately to 
free these states from British rule — even to impose upon 
them German rule — of what concern was that to America? 
Supposing there were an immediate possibility of the success 
of such designs, what difference could it make to democracy? 

The President, for that matter, admitted that the imme- 
diate hopes of German imperialism did not fly as far as 
Egypt, India, or Persia. To Russia he asserted that Ger- 
many was suing for peace "only to preserve^^ the very ques- 
tionable advantages already gained (May 26, 19 17). 
It was after this that the American sacrifices were made! 

A year later he declared the German purpose to be 
merely to erect "an empire that will ultimately master Per- 
sia, India, and the peoples of the Far East." (Apr. 6, 
1918.) 



What Really Started It 233 

Ultimately ! 

A stronger Germany, the President told us, indulging 
in prophecy (same speech) would "overawe" Europe, and 
— after a while — America would somehow be threatened. 

Supposing Germany zvere placed in a position to "over- 
awe" Europe, what then? 

We have to go back only a few years to find the "Hun" in 
the very position so darkly painted. Brailsford tells us 
("War of Steel and Gold," p. 34) : 

Europe had a long experience of German ^hegemony' during the 
quarter of a century which elapsed between the fall of the French 
Empire and the creation of the Franco-Russian alliance. Nothing 
disastrous happened. No little states were overrun, no neighbors' 
landmarks removed, no thrones overturned, no national or religious 
liberties menaced. Not even If the Kaiser wielded a military power 
as great as that of Louis XIV can we conceive of his acting as the 
Grand Monarch acted. 

This from an Englishman. 

Why spend one hundred thousand American lives and 
fifty billion American dollars to place France and England 
in a position to "overawe Europe," instead of leaving them 
to fight it out with Germany? Where is the special Ger- 
man depravity that called for the American sacrifice? 

Is it to be found in the blood of the Germans? But 
racially the English are nearer the Germans than the 
French, the Italians, or the Japanese; and as for the Kaiser, 
that gentleman was blessed with a British mother. 

Supposing we permit the peril theory to stand or fall on 
the sole test of capacity. No country could imperil the 
world, much less conquer it, without first conquering the 
seas. In dominant sea power alone resides the possibility 
of world aggression. If Germany ever exhibited the remot- 
est capacity to wrest the control of the seas from England, 



234 Shall It Be Again? 

then the naval experts of the Entente lied and lied again. 
Here is a typical declaration of a British statesman: 

If Germany had never built a dreadnought, or if all the German 
dreadnoughts had been sunk, the control and authority of the Brit- 
ish navy could not have been more effective [than now]. (Winston 
Spencer Churchill, Colliers Weekly, Sept. 30, 19 16.) 

And here is a typical statement from one of England's 
foremost naval writers : 

Great Britain's seas command has not been less, but infinitely 
greater, than in any previous human experience. And the result is 
that a German victory has been made impossible. (Arthur Pollen, 
in Metropolitian Magazine, May 19 17.) 

"Look at the picture," said Wilson himself (at New- 
York, May 18, 1918); "in the centre of the picture four 
nations, . . . and against them twenty-three governments, 
representing the greater part of the population of the 
world." Isn't it a bit ridiculous — not to say cowardly — 
to draw this picture, and then, in the next breath, to pre- 
tend that the twenty-three are actually in danger of being 
conquered and governed by the four? 

What supermen the seventy million Germans would have 
to be, if they were reasonably to be feared by two billion 
others ! And how fired would each and every one of them 
have to be with the worst ambitions imputed to their former 
rulers ! 

Of course, the enemies of the Germans will be the last 
to contend that they are supermen, while no one will seri- 
ously claim that the German people were entirely passive 
tools of the Kaiser. In the war message, the President 
himself absolved the German masses from complicity in the 
schemes of German imperialism. This view he reiterated 
from time to time during the period of the fighting, and 
even after his treaty had been signed. In spite of the 



What Really Started It 235 

execrations heaped upon the German socialists, they were a 
constant embarrassment to the Kaiser, and in July, 19 17, 
they were strong enough to pledge the Reichstag against 
"forced acquisitions of territory, and political, economic, 
and financial violations"; against "economic blockades and 
the stirring up of enmity of the peoples after the war"; for 
the freedom of the seas; for "international juridical organi- 
zations"; for "an economic peace," for "mutual understand- 
ing and lasting reconciliation among the nations." 

No pronouncement from the British government, or any 
branch of it, or from any branch of any of the Allied gov- 
ernments, so nearly endorsed in the concrete the very prin- 
ciples for which Wilson professed to be fighting. 

So far as threatening the nationality of others is con- 
cerned, the Kaiser never went as far as his enemies, even 
at the height of his successes. No responsible spokesman 
of the German government ever announced that Lloyd 
George, or the House of Lords, or the King, or President 
Wilson, must be overthrown as a condition of peace, as 
Wilson announced that the Kaiser and his Junkers must be 
overthrown. The determination to conquer was far more 
evident on our side than on the side of our enemies. 

Even had the Kaiser by some means succeeded in wrest- 
ing control of the seas from England, or even in capturing 
the entire British fleet, there is no tenable ground for the 
belief that he would have abused the power any more than 
the British government has abused its power. The Wilson 
exposition of the German peril is nothing more nor less 
than a paraphrase of the nursery tale that the British press 
and the French press had been telling the British and 
French people for the past decade — for a purpose. 

The German peril to the other great powers, so far as 
it was a reality, was simply a threat to rival imperialisms, 
exactly as the rival imperialisms were a threat to German 



236 Shall It Be Again? 

imperialism. The German "threat to the world" was noth- 
ing more nor less than a danger that Germany might suc- 
ceed in compelling England and France to make a re-divi- 
sion, on more equal terms, of "places in the sun." Impe- 
riahsm is the only real peril, but it is not a peril to great 
states except insofar as they themselves choose to play the 
game. It is a real peril, however, to weak states that hap- 
pen to be rich in undeveloped resources. 

World conquest for any nation has so far been an impos- 
sibility and is likely to remain so. Wars of conquest are 
never profitable to a nation as a whole. When undertaken 
on a gigantic scale, the cost is so severe that domestic un- 
rest invariably undermines the strength of the offending 
government. The impulse of all peoples is toward peace. 
The British Empire has traveled farther toward world con- 
quest, probably, than any other country can ever go again. 

There was nothing in the history of the Central Powers, 
in their form of government, in their political leadership, 
or in their people, that justified our striking at them rather 
than at their enemies. There was no reason to believe that 
a victory of Germany over England, if that had been pos- 
sible, would have been worse for America or the world than 
a victory of England over Germany. There was no defen- 
sible reason why we should not have continued as good 
friends of the Imperial German Government as of the 
French bourgeois republic or King George. 

On the other hand, the interest of the American people 
called for a peace without victory. The safety of the 
weak nations would have been best subserved by an indeci- 
sive contest. Dem.ocracy within what President Wilson 
termed "the great fighting nations" would have had a bet- 
ter chance if none of them had been victor. American 
participation in the European war was a crime against de- 
mocracy and permanent peace. 



XXVI 

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 

If there remained any doubt of the soundness of the con- 
clusions of the previous chapters, it would be dissipated by 
a cold review of the "peace" that was actually framed and 
sought to be Imposed. 

First, a peace without victory was In sight in 19 17. 
Wilson frustrated it by dragging America Into the war. 

The notion that America saved the Entente from deci- 
sive defeat has been carefully fostered in this country. But 
before America entered the war, Allied statesmen and 
publicists had, a thousand times, proved to their own satis- 
faction that an ultimate German victory was impossible. 
At no time did there exist a reasonable probability of the 
submarine blockade's becoming su^clently effective to score 
a knockout. Germany might have gained effective land 
victories, but that would have placed her in a position only 
to negotiate, not to dictate. 

The best evidence on this point is found in the German 
peace overtures themselves. No one will accuse the Kaiser 
of preferring an indecisive peace to a victorious peace. 
Why, then, did he seek an indecisive peace before the end 
of 19 16? It could only have been because he shared the 
judgment of his enemies as to his own incapacity for victory. 

It will be remembered that the German overtures were 
invariably denounced as wicked Insincerities, "peace of- 
fensives," war maneuvers; that all peace talk was decried 
in America and In the Allied countries, on the ground that 
immediate peace would mean a "German peace," which 



238 Shall It Be Again? 

implied German victory and conquest. The fact remains 
that the German proposals were taken by Allied statesmen 
as an offer to return to the status quo ante, and they were 
so taken by Wilson himself. In his reply to the Pope ap- 
pear the following words: 

Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it 
is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that 
the war will end in the restoration of the status quo ante. 

The Allied statesmen, of course, did not want a peace 
without victory. They rejected the German overtures. 
But, by the middle of 19 17, they were virtually confessing 
to us that they would have been constrained to look favor- 
ably upon such a peace, had America not come to their as- 
sistance. 

Which means that America, at the beginning of 19 17, 
stood in a position seldom vouchsafed to a neutral nation in 
any war. It stood in a position to bring about an imme- 
diate peace, not by going to war, not by abandoning neutral- 
ity, but by withholding its hand, by smoothing the way. 

It is too much to say that America stood in a position to 
impose in full the peace programme which it had just an- 
nounced as its own. But it stood in a position to see the 
acceptance of the primary principle of that programme, and 
in an infinitely better position to urge the remainder of the 
programme than it could possibly stand by taking sides. 

The opportunity to compel the acceptance of the details 
of the peace-without-victory formula — through the opera- 
tion, if necessary, of justifiable economic pressure, and en- 
couragement to the democratic forces working in all coun- 
tries for the overthrow of imperialism — probably will 
never again he paralleled in the world's history. 

But, having pronounced for a peace without victory in 



Promise and Performance 239 

January, Wilson went to war In April, to destroy the oppor- 
tunity for such a peace, and to postpone for two years 
the realization of a peace of any kind. 

Although America did not save the Entente from defeat. 
It did determine the Entente victory. Upon America must 
fall the weight of the responsibility for the continuation of 
the world travail after 19 17, as well as a large share of the 
responsibility for the character of the "peace" that was ulti- 
mately Imposed. 

A favorite theory of apologists for Wilson is that the 
President hoped and expected to procure a democratic 
peace by going to war, and that his failure to realize the 
promised formula was because he was deceived and finally 
"beaten" at Paris by the Entente statesmen. 

But Wilson had the past records of the Entente govern- 
ments before him. His arguments for neutrality in 19 16, 
19 1 5, and 19 14 Indicate that he was fully aware that de- 
mocracy could not be served by America's joining what he 
termed "this chaos of hostile and competing ambitions." 

And If the previous record of the Entente governments 
was not enough, Wilson had before him, also, ample evi- 
dence of the aims of the very Entente statesmen with whom 
he was about to ally himself. 

Although the secret treaties had not yet been published, 
the concrete aims of the Entente had been sufficiently ac- 
knowledged to make It quite clear that they were as far as 
possible from the peace-wlthout-vlctory formula. The 
British Colonial Secretary and the Japanese Foreign Minis- 
ter had both announced that the German colonies would 
not be returned. The Entente reply to the German over- 
tures, dated December 30, 19 16, had declared for general 
reparation. At the Paris Economic Conference, the En- 
tente governments had agreed to prosecute a relentless 
trade war after the war was ended. In his speech reply- 



240 i Shall It Be Again? 

ing to Wilson's December peace note, Lloyd George had 
told Parliament: "We have to exact damages." Finally, 
in the joint Allied notes replying to the Wilson note, the 
Entente had acknowledged a purpose not only to exact 
damages from the enemy countries, but to dismember them 
— to wrest territory from Germany, from Austria and from 
Turkey. 

Wilson could not have been deceived. He must have 
known, furthermore, that once he threw in his lot with the 
Entente Allies, he placed himself in a less strategic position 
effectively to persuade or compel them to adopt the pro- 
gramme to which he had proclaimed allegiance. 

Did Wilson, indeed, ever attempt to persuade or compel 
his allies to adopt that programme? On the contrary, the 
"Wilson principles," in the hands of Wilson, became a 
strikingly serviceable instrument for assisting the Entente 
to realize to the full its programme of conquest and spolia- 
tion through a dictated and crushing peace — and the more 
closely we examine the Wilsofi maneuverSj the more we are 
forced to conclude that this was their sole purpose. 

They served to deceive the American pubHc, and, to a 
considerable extent, the democratic elements in the Allied 
countries, as to the character of the peace that was intended, 
and so contributed vitally to the ability of our coalition to 
carry forward the war to a victorious conclusion. They 
served also to deceive the public of the enemy countries, 
and to some extent, the enemy statesmen, and so persuaded 
them ultimately to place themselves in our hands. 

What caused the Germans to sue for an immediate peace 
in October, 191 8? Military reverses, in part, but only in 
part. The immediately decisive factor was the German 
revolution. And a decisive cause of the German revolu- 
tion unquestionably was a faith of the German people that 



Promise and Performance 241 

the expulsion of the Kaiser and his party would open the 
way for an immediate peace on a tolerable basis. 

The Germans did not appeal to any of the Allied govern- 
ments for peace. Nor did the Austrians. And they made 
clear the reason why — that the Entente terms, so far as 
they were revealed, were unacceptable. They appealed to 
Wilson, in the name of the "Wilson principles," as voiced 
not merely in the peace-without-victory address, but in the 
war message, and on numerous occasions, down to only 
eight days before the German offer. They specified the 
Wilson terms laid down on January 8, and in subsequent 
addresses, offering to conclude an immediate peace on those 
terms and no others. They quit fighting only when Wilson 
and the Allied governments had expressly accepted the offer 
to conclude peace on the specified terms, subject only to two 
amendments; first, a reservation upon the point of the free- 
dom of the seas; second, a qualification that Germany should 
make compensation for damage done to the civilian popula- 
tion of the Allies. 

We have seen how Wilson, in laying down the general 
armistice terms, violated his promises to the Germans, of 
equality in the field and at the peace table, provided only 
they would reform their government. Under the most 
solemn assurances, however, that the actual settlement 
would be as agreed upon, the Germans accepted the armis- 
tice conditions, surrendered their fleet, gave up their rolling 
stock, and bowed to other conditions which placed them 
in a position where they had to depend upon our good faith 
and our plighted word. 

Can any circumstances be imagined that would carry 
a weightier moral obligation to hold to a stipulated bar- 
gain? 

Under these circumstances, every departure from the 



242 Shall It Be Again? 

Fourteen Points, or the principles laid down in the subse- 
quent addresses — subject only to the amendments referred 
to — would seem to constitute a breach of international 
faith at least as obliquitous as the German violation of the 
Treaty of 1839. 

Indeed, the Belgian scrap of paper would appear in- 
significant in comparision, inasmuch as in the present case 
was involved not merely a compact with a given nation, but 
a pledge to all the world, including the peoples of the En- 
tente countries, including ourselves — a pledge to apply cer- 
tain principles to the conclusion of a certain peace, not 
merely as a matter of justice to an enemy nation, but pri- 
ftiarily in order that the peace of all peoples might be made 
secure, and a lasting service rendered to the cause of democ- 
racy. 

It may be that the two amendments, and especially the 
second one, were inserted intentionally to provide a loop- 
hole for repudiating the entire "Wilson programme," but 
nothing of the sort was suggested at the time. 

On the other hand, Wilson himself, on a number of 
occasions, expressly held that they did not vitiate it. In 
announcing the armistice terms to Congress, he said: "The 
Allied governments have accepted the bases of peace which 
I outlined to Congress on the 8th of January last, as the 
Central Empires also have." And in his Christmas speech 
to the American expeditionary forces: "It happened that it 
was the privilege of America to present the chart for peace, 
and now the process of settlement has been rendered com- 
paratively simple by the fact that all nations concerned have 
accepted that chart." 

Under these circumstances, was not Wilson obligated, by 
every consideration of personal and national honor, to hold 
to the specified "chart," even if his allies went back on it, 
to make a separate peace, if need be; and if he were tricked, 



Promise and Performance 243 

deceived, or beaten, by the Entente statesmen, not to make a 
secret of it, but to proclaim the fact to all the world? 
Could he do less and keep the faith? 

No one, having read the secret treaties, will maintain 
that the Entente governments ever intended to carry out 
their agreement to make peace on the "Wilson terms." It 
happens that there is no evidence that Wilson had any more 
intention of keeping the faith in this matter than did they. 
A number of the secret treaties were published a year be- 
fore the armistice was signed. Though he continued his 
pledges of a peace of equality, Wilson did not require their 
repudiation. The salient fact of the whole matter is that, 
haVing lured the Germans into the net with the "Wilson 
terms," Wilson promptly threw the "Wilson terms" into 
the wastebasket, forgot every promise he had made of 
equality to the German people provided they should reform 
their government, agreed to a peace based on the secret 
treaties, placed his hand and seal upon almost the entire 
Entente programme of murder and robbery, and in the end 
defended this course to his own people as an act of justice 
and of honor. (See Chapter XXXVI.) 

No one else could have done the thing except Wilson, 
for no one else had so wormed his way into the confidence 
of the peoples of the earth. Wilson's work at Paris and 
Versailles must go down in history as a gigantic treachery, 
not only to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and 
Turkish governments, and the peoples under them, but to 
all the rest of us; treachery to all the subject peoples under 
the heel of the Entente, to whom he had promised self-de- 
termination; treachery to all the independent small states of 
the world, to whom he had promised freedom from fears of 
aggression; treachery to the American people and the peo- 
ple of the Entente countries, to whom he had promised de- 
liverance from future wars and preparations for war. 



244 Shall It Be Again? 

How vast the betrayal can be realized only by glancing 
again at the "Wilson terms" and comparing them with the 
terms written into the treaty. 

As has been seen, the Fourteen Points do not harmon- 
ize in every respect with the original Wilson formula as 
to the terms of a democratic and permanent peace. 
(Chapter XX.) There are several variations in concrete 
detail, in the direction of a peace of conquest. Yet if 
honestly applied, in the light of the principles laid down in 
the subsequent addresses, they would have realized, at least, 
a share of the Wilson promises. They would have given 
Germany and the other enemy countries a tolerable peace. 
They would have gone a long way toward finding the per- 
manent and democratic peace which all the peoples of the 
world had been led to hope for from the Messiah, Wilson, 
and which all governments of the world professed to 
desire. 

Of the Fourteen Points, only two were genuinely embod- 
ied in the peace arrangements, the one providing for the 
restoration of Belgium, the other for an independent Po- 
land. If the reference to Alsace-Lorraine be taken as re- 
quiring unconditional cession of this territory to France, 
then it can be said that three of the Fourteen Points were 
embodied in the settlement. 

The first point, providing for the abolition of secret di- 
plomacy, was made a huge mockery throughout the confer- 
ence, and continues so. The second point, providing for 
the freedom of the seas, was abandoned before Wilson's 
ship touched a European port. The third point, provid- 
ing for the removal of all economic barriers and the estab- 
lishment of an equality of trade conditions, was reversed. 
Trade handicaps were placed upon Germany, and elaborate 
provisions were made to hold that country in economic 
subjection to the governments dictating the peace. 



Promise and Performance 245 

The fourth point, promising a reduction of armaments, 
v/as flouted. The defeated governments were compelled 
to agree to arbitrary reduction of armaments, while the vic- 
tors were left free. Article 8 of the so-called covenant, 
which purports to cover this point, does not provide for 
compulsory reduction of armaments, or limitations thereon, 
either immediately or at any time. 

The fifth point, relating to the adjustment of colonial 
claims, would require all colonies, by whomever claimed, 
to be disposed of either by plebiscites or restoration to 
their former "owners." No action of any kind was taken 
on behalf of the colonies "owned" by the enemies of Ger- 
many, while the German colonies were parceled out, more 
or less unequally, among the governments dictating the 
peace. 

The sixth point, providing for the evacuation of all Rus- 
sian territory and "the independent determination of her 
own political development and national policy," and "a sin- 
cere welcome into the society of free nations under institu- 
tions of her own choosing" was not adopted on paper, and 
was reversed in action. The governments dictating the 
peace invaded Russian territory in larger numbers and made 
war on the existing Russian government, seeking to set up 
another government not of the choosing of the Russian 
people. They did not invite Russia to join their league. 
They parceled out bits of Russian territory among their 
proteges. 

The ninth point, providing for a readjustment of the 
frontiers of Italy "along clearly recognizable lines of na- 
tionality" was violated insofar as Italy's new frontiers took 
in Germans, Slavs, or other nationalities. 

The tenth point, promising to safeguard the place of 
Austria-Hungary among the nations, was abandoned. 
Austria-Hungary was dismembered, in accordance with the 



246 Shall It Be Again? 

secret treaties, and to the advantage of the governments 
dictating the peace and their smaller proteges. 

The eleventh point, promising that the relations of the 
several Balkan states to one another should be "deter- 
mined by friendly counsel along historically established lines 
of allegiance and nationality," was not complied with. 
The relations between these states were determined, in- 
stead, by the selfish interests of the governments dictating 
the peace, and the bribes secretly promised to Greece and 
Rumania for participation on the side of the Entente. 

The twelfth point, providing that "the Turkish portions 
of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty," was reversed. The' victors proceeded to 
launch one new war after another in an effort to conquer 
and divide the Turkish provinces. 

The fourteenth point, holding out a promise of a genuine 
league of nations, was not fulfilled. No "general associa- 
tion of nations" was formed, and no effort was made to 
form one. Article lo, of the so-called covenant of the 
League of Nations purporting to guarantee members 
thereof against aggression, does not meet the implied prom- 
ise for a mutual guarantee for all states against aggression. 

That the Fourteen Points were not to be interpreted a.« 
justifying, in any respect, a departure from the pledge to 
Germany of justice through equality, provided only that 
country should be brought under the control of a parlia- 
mentary government, Is seen In these words from the ad- 
dress of the Fourteen Points: 

We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing 
in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement 
or distinction of learning, or of pacific enterprise such as have made 
her record very bright and enviable. We do not wish to injure 
her or to block in any way her legitimate Influence or power. We 
4o not wish to fight her, either with arms or with hostile arrange- 



Promise and Performance 247 

ments of trade, if she is willing to associate herself with us and the 
other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and 
law and fair dealing. 

We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peo- 
ples of the world — the new world in which we now live, instead of 
a place of mastery. 

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modifi- 
cation of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, 
and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealing with her on 
our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when 
they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the 
military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination. 

In the message to Congress the previous December, after 
the most sweeping promises of a peace without victory 
to our enemies, provided only they should effect internal 
reforms, the President declared that the very "worst thing 
that can happen to the detriment of the German people," 
provided they should not effect internal reforms, was exclu- 
sion from the League of Nations, and a peaceful boycott. 
In the speech of the Fourteen Points, referring to the prin- 
ciple of equality, he declared that ^'unless this principle be 
made its foundation, [the foundation of the peace] no part 
of the structure of international justice can stand.'^ To 
the vindication of this principle, said he, the people of the 
United States, ^'are ready to devote their lives, their honor, 
and everything they possess/^ Finally, in the speech of 
September 27, he assured us that, 'Wo peace shall be ob- 
tained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the 
principles we have avowed as the principles for which we 
are fighting ^ 

Yet the settlement the world was asked to approve, 
instead of being "to the exclusion of selfish advantage even 
on the part of the victors," turned out to be to the exclusion 
of everything except the selfish advantage of the victors. 



248 



Shall It Be Again? 



The victors realized every item of material gain that their 
might made possible. The vanquished were condemned to 
pay "to the full limit of their capacity." 

What other "peace" in the history of civilization was so 
contemptuously and imperiously dictated? Where before 
was a nation commanded to agree to pay indefinite sums, 
and to abide by treaties, arrangements, and territorial 
changes, to be determined by the victors in the future? 
Where was a great people in modern times compelled to 
agree to a protracted supervision of its affairs so broad as 
practically to amount to an abolition of sovereignty? How 
could the terms have been made harsher without reacting 
to the financial disadvantage of the victors? 

On the contrary, the terms were found so to react upon 
the victors that they were impelled almost immediately to 
begin revising them. The victors were placed in the ridicu- 
lous position of having spent the blood and the treasure of 
their people in order to prostrate a business rival, only to 
find that, for selfish reasons purely, they had to set him up 
in business again, loan him money, and start him once more 
toward the position that he had held before.^ 

In the face of the immediate scrapping of all prescribed 
conditions of a permanent and democratic peace, the so- 
called League of Nations was brought forward as promis- 
ing to realize such conditions at some future time. 

But the Wilson league failed as signally to meet the Wil- 
son specifications of a genuine peace league as his actual 
terms fell below his promised terms. 

Any bona fide peace league, the President made it plain 

1 Years ago Norman Angell informed us, in "The Great Illusion," that 
this is what would happen. The minority in each country who were respon- 
sible for the war were well aware that the masses, even of the victor na- 
tions, could never profit by it. The point that Angell did not bring out in 
**The Great Illusion" is that war is profitable to a powerful few, and it is 
to serve this few, regardless of the many, that modern governments go to 
war. 



Promise and Performance 249 

at every turn, must be a league of all nations from the start; 
a league of equals, a pure democracy. Since inner circles 
are a contradiction of equality, inner circles are expressly 
barred. As a guarantee against clandestine inner circles, 
all secrecy is barred. For America, a pledge is offered in 
advance that it shall be a party to no inner circle, whether 
open or secret. As to the obligations, one stands out above 
all others: "Mutual guarantees of political independence 
and territorial integrity"; not for some states, but for all. 
There is to be an absence of special privilege upon the seas, 
and no trade hostilities. Finally, as a guarantee against 
the violent upset of our genuine peace league, or any of its 
fundamentals, by a minority, every state, however virtuous, 
must render itself physically incapable of aggression. 

But the association which Wilson actually offered us ex- 
cludes all former enemies and many neutrals. Even within 
itself, it is a league of unequals. It has an inner circle, 
the Council; an inner circle within the Council, the Big 
Five; an inner circle within the Big Five, England-France- 
America; probably other inner circles. No outside state 
is guaranteed against aggression. Economic hostilities are 
a part of its bone and sinew. Not one of the fundamental 
requirements is complied with. 

Time, we were told, would correct all shortcomings. 
But the ^Yt old gentlemen who framed the League in 
secret, and who determined upon the charter members, took 
every precaution against time's correcting anything. The 
covenant cannot be amended without the unanimous con- 
sent of the Council. The Assembly can never overrule the 
Council. New members are to be received, not on general 
terms open to all applicants, but on special terms laid down 
to a given applicant. It turns out that nobody may have 
anything to say in the affairs of any of the Big Five. They 
even protect themselves from one another. For this rea- 



250 Shall It Be Again? 

son, the "safeguards," of which we heard so much from 
Wilson's political opponents, are not of as great importance 
as asserted. It turns out that practically nothing can be 
done without unanimous consent of the Council. Which 
means that any contemplated undertaking can be blocked 
forever by a single member. Which also means that the 
League will be forever at the mercy of the most reactionary 
member. The covenant of the Wilson League of Nations 
would make it safe from democracy. 

For the Wilson peace of victory and his league of victors 
there is only one conceivable defense, the official defense 
— purity versus depravity. Nothing is defensible except 
on the theory of the utter righteousness of the Big Five, the 
utter depravity of the Central Powers, and the inferiority 
of the other governments and peoples of the world. 
Everything that the Big Five did or could do is defensible 
under this theory. It is a convenient theory. Purity can 
do no wrong — no wrong can be done to depravity. 

*'The object of the war is attained," Wilson told Con- 
gress, November ii, 191 8, "and attained with a sweeping 
completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed 
imperialism . . . is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed 
in black disaster. . . . The arbitrary power of the military 
caste of Germany is discredited and destroyed." 

Yet in a speech before the French Senate, January 20, 
19 19, he mentioned the German peril as still existent, say- 
ing: "It [the awakened world] knows that not only France 
must organize against this peril, but that the world must or- 
ganize against it/' 

Did our President profess to beheve still in the German 
peril only because he was even then planning a settlement 
defensible under no other theory? 



Promise and Performance 251 

The practical value of the German-peril theory can be 
appreciated only when it is seen how it is applied to the 
details of the great settlement. 

The victor wishes to strip the vanquished naked, appro- 
priate his possessions, and chain him to a rock-pile. But 
sentence to fine and hard labor is defensible only if imposed 
upon the guilty by and for the righteous. So the Kaiser 
must be tried by an impartial jury of his virtuous enemies, 
who have already determined upon a settlement indefensi- 
ble except on the theory of his utter guilt! 

But the Kaiser is no longer in a position to pay. The 
German people can pay. So the distinction between the 
German people and the Kaiser is set aside. The delegates 
of the reformed German government, recalling the Wilson 
pledges, protest against being forced to pay for offenses 
formerly imputed only to the Kaiser. Clemenceau replies 
that the German people must be regarded as the accompli- 
ces of the German government. Wilson acquiesces. The 
victors must have their pay ! 

Even the German people are unable to satisfy the vic- 
tors' lust for pay. So the other defeated states, for whose 
emancipation from the German power we professed to 
fight, must pay also. Even the oppressed peoples whom 
we liberated from these states, and who are now to form 
small states under our tutelage, must pay — all to the limit 
of their capacity. 

The victors want pay, not in money alone, in goods, and 
in ships, but in land and its resources. Where self-deter- 
mination or nationality can be pleaded as an excuse for 
taking this kind of pay, self-determination or nationality is 
duly pleaded. Where these principles are notoriously vio- 
lated, some other principle is invoked. Where all prin- 
ciples are violated, there is always the peril theory to fall 



252 Shall It Be Again? 

back upon. "Precautions" must be taken against the beast, 
even though he has already submitted to the removal of 
his claws. 

The victors want the German colonies. Purity adminis- 
ters colonies for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Ger- 
mans, having exploited their colonies, have abused a sacred 
trust of civilization. The victors unselfishly assume the 
burden — haggling a good deal about the matter. In order 
to make it doubly clear that there is nothing sordid in the 
transaction, the burdens are assumed under the name of 
"mandatories." The "mandatory" theory serves another 
purpose still; it saves the value of the colonies from being 
charged on the credit side of the indemnity. Self-determi- 
nation is a sacred principle, but it is not for "inferior" peo- 
ples. Dictatorships of the pure must be imposed upon the 
weak to "assist" them "until such a time as they shall be 
able to stand alone." 

Was it an oversight that certain neutral nations were 
not invited to join the Wilson league — that universal self- 
determination was nowhere mentioned — that the freedom 
of the seas was forgotten — and all other essentials of a 
genuine peace league were lacking? 

The answer is found in another line of questions: Would 
Lloyd George have been willing for his League of Nations 
to guarantee Persia against aggression by England? — 
Orlando for his league to guarantee Abyssinia against ag- 
gression by Italy? — Makino for his league to guarantee 
Siberia against aggression by Japan? Would Wilson 
himself have been willing for his league to guarantee Mex- 
ico against aggression by the United States? 

Who is simple enough to imagine that Wilson ever ex- 
pected to persuade England to grant self-determination to 
India, or Egypt; Japan to Korea; France to Morocco; 



Promise and Performance 253 

Italy to Tripoli? Or that Wilson himself intended 
to grant self-determination to Santo Domingo or Nicara- 
gua? At a time when the largest number of subject peo- 
ples were actually in revolution to realize the freedom 
which Wilson had promised them, at a time when a greater 
number of subject peoples under one flag, the British flag, 
were fighting for self-determination than ever before in the 
world's history, Wilson not only turned a deaf ear to these 
subject peoples, but he approved of a "peace" handing over 
a large number of new subject populations to England, her 
allies and proteges. 

As late as February 3, 19 19, Wilson announced: 

The nations of the world are about to consummate a brotherhood 
which will make it unnecessary in the future to maintain those 
crushing armaments which make the peoples suffer almost as much 
in peace as they suffered in war. (Speech before French Chamber 
of Deputies.) 

Yet, just before sailing for France, Wilson had urged 
upon Congress ^^the uninterrupted pursuit'^ of the policy 
of ^'adhering to a definite method of development for the 

It is plain enough why Wilson did not insist that the 
"Wilson terms" be put into practice. They were never in- 
tended for anything except propaganda. 

The original Wilson theory, that victory could not bring 
peace out of the European mess, is supported not only by 
past realities, but by the immediate results of the victory 
that was gained. Seven months after the signing of the 
armistice, a British cabinet member informed us that twenty- 
three separate and distinct wars were then raging in Europe. 
We won victory, but not peace nor the probability of peace. 
It is because we fought not for peace but for the spoils of 



254 Shall It Be Again? 

war. We continued fighting only in order to collect the 
spoils of war. 

After they were under our heel, we heard a great deal 
about the unrepentance of our enemies. Nothing could 
more emphatically demonstrate the unrepentance of our 
allies than our settlement and the secret treaties upon which 
it was based. These treaties reveal the considerations that 
caused our allies to bind themselves to fight on to victory, 
to fight until the enemy was crushed, no matter how repen- 
tant he might become, no matter what the cost to their own 
people. 

By the beginning of 19 17 our enemies had repented, suf- 
ficiently, at least, to sue for a peace of equality. But our 
allies did not repent; they fought on for purely business 
considerations. 

It is no accident that our peace settlement realizes for the 
bankers of London and Paris the ambitions with which they 
approached vv^ar, and upon which their patriotism rested, 
that it realizes the wildest dreams of Entente imperialists 
during the past decade. An efficient business competitor is 
now eliminated. The encirclement of Germany is now com- 
plete. The victors now divide the "places in the sun" that 
had been held by Germany, and the other "places in the 
sun" which the balance of power had saved from them. 
Wilson himself let the cat out of the bag in his speech at 
Helena (Sept. 11, 19 19) when he said: 

The merchants and manufacturers and bankers of Germany were 
making conquest of the world. All they had to do was to wait a 
little while longer, and long German fingers would have been 
stretched all through that country which never could have been with- 
drawn. The war spoiled the game. 

But one game of this sort only leads to another. 
Hence, all of us begin to prepare for a new conflict. 



Promise and Performance 255 

The final reason why wars for democracy are imprac- 
ticable In the present day is that no existing government of 
the first class is pure enough to serve democracy in any 
war. Not one is as much a democracy as an autocracy. 
Not one is capable of fighting for democracy. Armed im- 
perialism is not at an end. In the victorious treaties, it 
registered Its greatest triumph. 

The severity of the Treaty of Versailles has been de- 
fended on the ground that Germany, If able, would have 
imposed conditions quite as severe. That Is no doubt true. 
But we professed to go to war to prevent that kind of a 
peace from being Imposed by anybody; while, as a matter of 
fact, our Intervention was the one thing that made such a 
peace possible. 

Assertions of his distinguished apologists to the contrary 
notwithstanding, no part of "Wilson Idealism" went Into 
the League covenant or any other part of the settlement. 
The only Impression that Wilson gave to that settlement 
was Its stamp of Pharisaism. To the scheme of Imperial 
England, Imperial Japan, and imperialistic France was at- 
tached the phraseology of Pharisee Wilson. The Ideal of 
a world peace league. In the hands of Wilson, became a 
blind for an alliance of victors for the purpose of guarantee- 
ing the material fruits of victory and asserting a world 
supremacy for themselves. The WIlsonTClemenceau-Lloyd 
George league turned out to be an Imperialistic trust, mas- 
querading as a company of angels; a modern Holy Alliance 
for the suppression of democracy at home and abroad, and 
the prosecution of more wars for business. 

For our own autocrat In the White House, American 
lives were not a consideration; international law was not a 
consideration; democracy was not a consideration; Ameri- 
can honor was not a consideration. All were sacrificed. 
Why, then, did we fight ? 



OUR WAR AND BUSINESS 
XXVII 

PATRIOTISM OF THE PROFIT-MAKERS 

To what extent was America's war a war for business? 

Did Woodrow Wilson lead America into war in order 
to serve the selfish interests of the few? 

The answer is determined by looking into the essential 
facts. In the first place, Wall Street wanted war. 

Not a single recognized spokesman of our greatest finan- 
cial and industrial interests, anywhere in public life, expres- 
sed opposition to war during the critical weeks of February 
and March, 1917. On the contrary, our leading financiers 
themselves, who up to that period had seldom been quoted 
on political questions, personally endorsed the proposition 
of belligerency. 

April 4, the New York Times said: "Not since Woodrow 
Wilson became President has any utterance of his met with 
such instant and hearty approval by leaders in the financial 
district as his war address to Congress." This conclusion 
was backed by a column of quotations. "It [the war mes- 
sage] was . . . exactly right," said Judge Gary, head of 
the U. S. Steel Corporation. "It was 100 per cent. 
American," said Frank Vanderlip, moving genius of the 
American International Corporation and head of the Na- 
tional City Bank. "The President's address was magnifi- 
cent," said James Wallace, head of the Guaranty Trust 
Company. "It was well worth waiting for," said A. Bar- 
ton Hepburn, another of our leading bankers. "The 
speech breathes the true spirit of the American people," 

256 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers ^57 

said Martin Carey, of the Standard Oil Company. These 
opinions of the President's address, said the Times, "were 
echoed in one form or another by bankers, brokers, and 
executives In large number." 

Nor can this attitude on the eve of war be taken as an 
eleventh-hour move to "get on the right side"; for the 
spokesmen of our large business interests openly favored 
war at a time when to "stand behind the President," was 
supposed to mean not belligerency, but pacifism. During 
the "armed neutrality" period, the Wall Street correspond- 
ent of the Philadelphia Public Ledger diagnosed financial 
sentiment (Mar. 22) as follows: 

Briefly stated, Wall Street believes that war is just one move 
ahead. And Wall Street is glad that it is so. The financial district 
here is unqualifiedly for war as soon as it can be declared. *It is a 
good thing for the country,' one trust president declared. . . . This 
is the way Wall Street feels about the prospects of war. Only a 
few of the men thus interviewed were willing to have their names 
mentioned; their enthusiasm for war, however, was too real to be 
misunderstood. 

Going back to the breaking of diplomatic relations, 
within five minutes after the news reached the financial dis- 
trict, according to the Times: "Wall Street was bright with 
the Stars and Stripes floating from banks and brokerage of- 
fices. Figuratively, the street gave a concerted sigh of re- 
lief J^ On the Produce Exchange, 300 brokers sang "The 
Star Spangled Banner." 

February 20, the New York Merchants'Associatlon held 
what the Herald declared was "the greatest demonstration 
In the history of that organization." The organization 
drank to the President. During this period, the State and 
local Councils of Defense, upon which business leaders 
everywhere shone, were constituted. Business organiza- 
tions besieged the President and Congress with petitions 



258 Shall It Be Again? 

for vigorous action. The directors of the National Safety 
Council, claiming to represent 2,814 American corporations 
employing 3,000,000 workmen, adopted resolutions *'pledg- 
Ing to the President of the United States the loyal support 
of this organization In whatever measures may be neces- 
sary to defend the national honor and to protect the lives 
and property of Americans." 

As early as December, Mr. Schwab had offered his vast 
plants to the government. In case of war, "at the govern- 
ment's price." This example was followed In February 
and March by many great corporations. 

March 26, at the solicitation of the Chamber of Com- 
merce of the United States, J. P. Morgan & Co. loaned 
the government $1,000,000 without interest and without 
security, for the purchase of supplies Immediately desired 
In anticipation of war. 

During March, J. P. Morgan, Mrs. E. H. Harriman, 
George Baker, Jr., Vincent Astor, and others of their class 
offered their private yachts for service as submarine chasers 
In the event of war. At the same time. Wall Street was 
giving the President the fullest assurances that It was ready 
to cooperate also in the matter of loans. March 23, we 
find Thomas W. Lamont delivering a patriotic address en- 
titled "America Financially Prepared," In which he prom- 
ised: "If the Treasurer should decide to issue a govern- 
ment obligation to-morrow for a billion dollars, the whole 
sum would be waiting for It." 

One of the most effective things that big business did, In 
those critical weeks. In working Its will for war, was to 
demand naval guns and crews for Its ships and to tie up 
transportation and commerce until that demand was satis- 
fied. 

Immediately after the breaking of diplomatic relations, 
the International Mercantile Marine Company — a Brit- 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 259 

ish-controlled corporation, in which, however, America's 
mpst powerful financiers are interested — began holding its 
ships in port. February 12, its president made formal ap- 
plication for naval guns and crews. At the same time the 
railroads, which are under the control of the same Ameri- 
can financiers who are interested in the International Mer- 
cantile Marine Company, began to refuse shipments be- 
cause of alleged congestion due to the ships' being held in 
port. This tying up of American domestic commerce "by 
Germany" was played upon with great effect by the 
press. When, on February 26, President Wilson appeared 
before Congress asking for authority to arm merchant 
ships, he was able to offer the argument that "our own 
commerce has suffered, is suffering . . . rather because so 
many of our ships are timidly keeping to their home ports 
than because American ships have been sunk." 

Had there been any good reason to believe that the 
means of "protection," which the International Mercantile 
Marine demanded, would in fact protect, its demand for 
such means might be taken as sincere. But for many 
months, ships flying the British flag had been trying pre- 
cisely the same means of "protection," and it had been 
proven that these means did not protect. Five weeks later, 
the President himself admitted that such protective meas- 
ures were futile, although meanwhile no new incidents had 
happened to render that truth any clearer than before. 
(See Chapter VI.) 

We may well take the President's word for this, espe- 
cially as no one — much less the ofllicials of the International 
Mercantile Marine — disputed it. Since this truth was as 
clear on February 26 as on April 2, the tying up of Ameri- 
can shipping by big business in February and March can- 
not be explained in any other way except as a conspiracy 
to promote war sentiment. 



26o Shall It Be Again? 

Not only was Wall Street enthusiastically for war be- 
tween February 3 and the declaration, but big business was 
a most powerful influence within the country working to- 
ward war previously to that period. The organs of public- 
ity that were loudest in their calls to "stand behind the 
President" after February 3 were the same that previously 
had been most insistent on an unyielding policy toward Ger- 
many, and most tolerant of concessions to the Entente. 
The National Security League, and the Navy League, 
which carried on the intensive preparedness agitation 
throughout 19 16, enjoyed the financial support of our rich- 
est millionaires. In that year, the United States Chamber 
of Commerce held a referendum of the 750 Chambers of 
Commerce throughout the country on the question of pre- 
paredness; ninety-five per cent, of them voted in favor of 
preparedness. The staging of the great preparedness pa- 
rades, also in 19 16, involved the expenditure of huge sums 
of money. Aside from any consideration of mere ex- 
penses, however, those parades would have been impossible 
without the hearty cooperation of the largest employers of 
labor and the most outstanding business leaders. 

In February, 19 17, Representative Calloway, on the 
floor of Congress, charged the Morgan interests with hav- 
ing, in March, 19 15, organized and financed a huge prop- 
aganda machine embracing twelve influential publishers 
and 179 selected newspapers, for the purpose of manufac- 
turing sentiment favorable to American participation in the 
war. These charges were renewed in May, 192 1, by Rep- 
resentative Michelson of Illinois. The latter called at- 
tention to the fact that, in his history of the war, Gabriel 
Hanotaux tells of a conference with the late Robert Bacon, 
then a member of the Morgan firm, in 19 14? in which he 
and Bacon drew up plans and specifications for a great scare 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 261 

campaign in this country. Hanotaux also suggests that 
France was ready to make peace in 19 14, but was dissuaded 
by Bacon and other American politicians, who gave assur- 
ances that they could ultimately bring America into the 
war on the side of France. 

These charges are worth recording, but they are impor- 
tant only when taken in connection with other evidence. 
As a means to establishing the wish of our great financial 
interests for war, at least for some time before it was de- 
clared, they do not need to be proven. For, aside from the 
circumstantial evidence here given, any one who has read 
the Pujo Committee report on the Money Trust, showing 
the concentration of credit in the hands of three great 
banks, and the control of small banks by the big ones — and 
any one who appreciates the dependence of the more pow- 
erful organs of the press upon the dominant business inter- 
ests of the communities which they serve, and especially 
upon the banks — will understand that the propaganda 
storm of the months preceding our entrance into the war 
would have been impossible without the approval and in- 
stigation of Wall Street. 

As Wall Street wanted war before it came, so, after it 
came. Wall Street promoted the war. 

"The first vigorous and effectual response to the call to 
arms came precisely from Wall Street," said the Saturday 
Evening Post editorially, July 7. This journal then pro- 
ceeded to prove the proposition in a series of articles. 

It cannot be denied. While the Conscription Bill was 
pending, great industrial corporations, milling firms, and 
banks, spent huge sums of their own money in the campaign 
for recruits. Merchant princes offered their stores for 
recruiting depots, and their employees for any capacity in 



262 Shall It Be Again? 

which the government might wish to use them. Financiers 
went about the country making speeches on democracy. In 
opposing the Conscription Bill in Congress, Representa- 
tive Huddleston offered a formidable list of multimillion- 
aires who favored conscription. Among them was John 
D. Rockefeller, Jr., who came out for conscription as the 
one means of "substituting real democracy for existing 
class distinctions" in America. 

Mr. Harding, governor of the Federal Reserve Board, 
predicted, in an address, May 7, that the European war 
would be won by American bankers. By the middle of 
May, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and Daniel Guggenheim had 
their feet under the table with Sam Gompers, arranging 
for brotherly cooperation between capital and labor for 
the period of the war. No American corporations had 
been more violent or successful foes of organized labor 
than the corporations under the tutelage of these gentlemen. 

Five days after war was declared, America's great rail- 
roads voluntarily combined under one board for the pur- 
pose of cooperating with the government. The first de- 
tachments of Americans to go to France included the best 
engineering talent of these roads, cheerfully loaned by the 
management to the government. "Never in the history 
of the world," said Carl Vrooman, Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture, May 11, "have business men shown as much 
patriotism and unselfishness as have been manifested, since 
the war began, by the business men of America." Said 
Samuel G. Blythe in the Saturday Evening Post (Jan. 12, 
1918): 

It is the mere truth to say that we could not fight this war a min- 
ute, if the men with money in the United States refused to loan 
that money to the government. We never could have begun it, to 
say nothing of continuing it as far as we have continued it. . . . No 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 263 

system of taxation that could be devised would have secured enough 
money for the w^ar, or a tenth of enough money for the war. No 
system of levy that could have been put in operation, save confisca- 
tion, could do this. 

Very true. Our men with money not only loaned that 
money in huge sums, but they procured the money of their 
customers, their employees, and the general public. To 
this end they devoted their perspnal time and energy, with- 
out limit, loaned their clerks and salesmen, donated their 
office facilities, and expended millions of dollars of their 
own money in advertising. 

A list of America's most conspicuous boosters for the 
Liberty Loans would coincide with a list of America's 
most prominent financiers. Just to get the first loan well 
started, aside from the far larger subscriptions made by 
their corporations, about fifty of America's richest men 
were reported as making personal subscriptions of from 
one to twenty million dollars each. 

The war work of the Red Cross began with Henry P. 
Davison, of the Morgan firm, as its head, with the title of 
Chairman of the War Council. Robert S. Lovett, one of 
the world's greatest railroad directors, became Chairman 
of the Red Cross Coordinating Committee. When the 
iPresident reorganized the Red Cross on a military basis, he 
honored Davison with the title of Major General, while 
five other Red Cross officials from the banking world were 
commissioned Brigadier Generals. 

In the early days of the war, several of our first families, 
(led by the W. K. Vanderbilts, offered their country villas 
for use as Red Cross hospitals. When New York, like 
other cities, was divided into districts for solicitation, the 
soliciting teams were led by members of America's richest 
families. Special dividends were declared by our largest 



264 Shall It Be Again? 

corporations, to be paid, not to the stockholders, but on 
behalf of the stockholders to the Red Cross. Contribu- 
tions to the Red Cross, either direct or in the form of div- 
idends, from such corporations or their heads, ranged 
from half a million to two million dollars, during 19 17 
alone. In the first ten months of the war the personal 
contributions of John D. Rockefeller to all war activities 
were reported as totaling $70,000,000. 

In September it was announced that Frank A. Vanderlip 
had turned over his great affairs to subordinates, to devote 
his entire time, as chairman of the War Savings Certificate 
Commission, to floating the two billion dollar War Savings 
Certificate Issue authorized by Congress. 

Of inestimable importance in the promotion of the war 
were the many unofficial patriotic organizations, to which 
the leading business men of every community gave their 
support, and particularly the work of the great newspapers, 
news associations, and magazines. From the declaration 
of war until the Germans quit, not one of the great vehicles 
of publicity breathed a suggestion that our war was a mis- 
take, or that the official war propaganda was unsound, or 
that the government should attempt to arrange its differ- 
ences with the enemy by agreement. In the demand for 
victory and a dictated peace, there was not a dissenting 
voice. Unlimited news space was devoted to the official 
propaganda. Millions of dollars' worth of advertising 
space was donated outright. It is almost literally true to 
say that, as a whole, the American press gave as loyal serv- 
ice as if it had been founded for the sole purpose of war 
promotion and had been edited by Mr. Creel himself. 
Anything like this would have been unthinkable, without 
an almost absolute unanimity for the war on the part of 
big business. 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 265 

Not only did Wall Street promote the war, but Wall 
Street directed the war, in nearly all its phases outside the 
purely military and naval operations. 

The President, of course, was supreme in every realm. 
But the details were attended to by officials of America's 
banks, railroads, manufacturing, mining, and shipping cor- 
porations, who, while acting for the government, were paid 
by these corporations. 

Never in the history of America, probably never in the 
history of any country, had there been such open and direct 
control of governmental activities by the very rich. Theo- 
retically and legally, the ultimate control rested in Congress. 
In practice, the power of a Senator or Representative was 
less than that of a doorkeeper in the office of any of the 
money kings whom the President appointed to direct the 
course of America, domestically, in the war "to make the 
world safe for democracy." 

Two of the most important organizations to function as 
special war bodies were provided for by law, and even 
constituted before war was declared; indeed, at a time when 
the President was still promising to "keep us out of war." 
They were the Shipping Board and the Council of National 
Defense. 

As originally constituted, the Shipping Board consisted 
of an attorney for large Pacific Coast lumber interests, a 
multimillionaire lumberman and exporter, a railroad mana- 
ger, and two shipping magnates. 

At the beginning of the war, the Council of National 
Defense, with its numerous subsidiary committees, emerged 
as the general clearing house of war activities, not only of 
those activities having to do with the "education" and 
repression of the public, but of those concerned with indus- 
try. The Council of National Defense, proper, is com- 



266 Shall It Be Again? 

posed of six members of the President's cabinet. The real 
working body of the Council turned out to be the Advisory 
Commission. The Advisory Commission, as originally ap- 
pointed by the President, consisted of seven members, four 
of them conspicuous business men. The chairman was 
Daniel Willard, president of a great railroad. The other 
three business members were Bernard M. Baruch, a noted 
Wall Street speculator; Julius Rosenwald, president of 
America's greatest mail-order house and closely identi- 
fied with large industrial corporations; and Howard E. 
Coffin, vice-president of the Hudson Motor Corporation. 
The minority consisted of a labor leader, a president of a 
college, and a medical man. It was these seven men who, 
secretly and illegally, according to Representative Graham, 
chairman of the Select Committee on Expenditures in the 
War Department (Report of July 7, 19 19) worked out the 
details of the President's war programme months before 
the declaration of war. 

So far as matters of business were concerned, the func- 
tion of the Advisory Commission was to advise the Council 
proper what to buy for the war, where to buy, how much 
to pay, how to "encourage production," how, in a word, to 
deal with the business interests. In practice this gave the 
decision, in nearly every instance, to the Advisory Commis- 
sion. 

In practice it gave the decision, not to the Advisory Com- 
mission as a whole, but because of the allotment of work 
within that body, to the four business members thereof. 
They divided the field among them, and each in turn di- 
vided his special field into smaller fields to be handled by 
sub-committees under his control. A month before the dec- 
laration of war, the functionless nature of the Council 
proper was made more clear by the appointment of a direc- 
tor, to whom was turned over the details of such work as 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 267 

the Council proper was supposed to do. This director was 
another official of a great corporation, W. S. Gilford, of 
the American Telephone & Telegraph Company. Mr. 
Gifford later became comptroller of the telephone monopoly 
when it was taken over by the government. 

As the sub-committees of the four business members of 
the Advisory Commission were composed of men selected 
from corporations dominating the particular field in which 
it was appointed to function, we have the remarkable sit- 
uation of the government's handing over to the corporations 
of the country the decision as to what the government 
should pay them for their products and how in general it 
should deal with them. 

The Steel and Steel Products Committee was headed by 
Elbert H. Gary, chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation; 
James A. Farrell, president of the same concern; and 
Charles M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Com- 
pany. The function of these gentlemen as government of- 
ficials was to meet with the representatives of the steel 
industry — meaning their own immediate subordinates in 
their own private business — to make provision for "co- 
operation" in the procurement of supplies, and to arrange 
prices "by voluntary agreement" ! 

The Copper Committee was headed by John D. Ryan, 
president of the Anaconda Copper Company — the succes- 
sor of the Amalgamated, of Thomas Lawson fame — and 
the presidents of the Calumet & Hecla and the Utah Cop- 
per companies. 

The Locomotives Committee was headed by the vice- 
presidents of the Baldwin Locomotive Company and the 
American Locomotive Company. The Express Committee 
was composed of the vice-presidents of the four great ex- 
press companies. A. C. Bedford, president of the Stand- 
ard Oil Company, headed the Oil Committee. P. A. S. 



268 Shall It Be Again? 

Franklin, president of the International Mercantile Ma- 
rine Company, headed the Shipping Committee. 

The Brass Committee was headed by the president of 
the American Brass Company, the Nickel Committee by 
the president of the International Nickel Company, the 
Sulphur Committee by the president of the Union Sulphur 
Company, the Lumber Committee by the president of the 
National Lumbermen's Association, etc., etc., etc. — all gov- 
ernment officials. 

The function of these gentlemen was to divide up the 
government's business — among themselves; to recommend, 
practically to fix, a price to be paid by the government — 
to themselves. 

As the months went by, this scheme underwent various 
alterations, usually with a view to concentrating vast deci- 
sions into fewer hands. On the whole, the alterations did 
not lessen the directing power of Wall Street, but only 
vested such power in the hands of fewer and more con- 
spicuous personages. 

The War Industries Board, at the beginning, v/as headed 
by a manufacturer of munitions, Frank A. Scott, who was 
also chairman of the General Munitions Board. The Cen- 
tral Purchasing Commission consisted of four millionaire 
business men: Mr. Baruch, of Wall Street; Judge Lovett, 
the railroad magnate; Robert S. Brookings, and Herbert 
Hoover. Later Daniel Willard, the railroad president, 
served as chairman of the War Industries Board,, to be 
succeeded a little later by Mr. Baruch. 

Meanwhile, the Food Administration was in the hands 
of the great corporations most conspicuous in the manu- 
facture and distribution of foods. The headquarters of 
the Food Administration in New York were the offices of 
the American Sugar Refining Company, known as the Sugar 
Trust. 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 269 

The president of thf American Sugar Refining Company 
acted as chairman of the International Sugar Committee, 
while the manager of the California-Hawaii Sugar Refin- 
ing Company acted as head of the sugar division of the 
Food Administration. The sugar division, almost through- 
out, was officered by men taken directly from the offices of 
the Sugar Trust, which paid their salaries, following the 
system in general practice elsewhere. 

We find a similar situation in the meat and livestock, and 
other divisions, of the Food Administration. Joseph Cot- 
ton, an attorney for Wilson & Co., one of the Big Five 
packing firms, acted as head of the meat and Hvestock divi- 
sion. Other important positions in this division were held 
by employees of Swift & Co. and the other packers. Ed- 
ward Chambers, vice-president of the Santa Fe Railroad, 
acted as head of the transportation division. F. S. Brooks, 
of Swift & Co. acted as Chambers' chief assistant. A. C. 
Loring, head of the great Minneapolis milling firm, the 
Pillsbury Flour Mills Company, acted as northwestern rep- 
resentative of the Food Administration in regard to flour 
and feed prices. To head the government's Grain Corpo- 
ration the President selected a well-known speculator from 
the Chicago wheat pit. 

In the Fuel Administration v/e find the same scheme as 
elsewhere. A coal operator in private life acted as the 
government's director of bituminous coal distribution. 
An oil operator in private life acted as the government's 
oil administrator. The subordinates of these and other 
Fuel Administration officials were selected from the large 
coal and oil corporations. 

When the government formally took over the railroads, 
the details of administration were dictated and carried out 
by a group of railroad presidents headed by A. H. Smith, 
president of the New York Central, and Judge Lovett, head 



270 Shall It Be Again? 

of the Harriman lines. When Director General McAdoo 
resigned, he was succeeded by a railroad official, Walker 
D. HInes, chairman, general counsel, and director of the 
Santa Fe Company. 

Eleven months after the declaration of war, the country 
was divided Into ten munitions districts. Over each dis- 
trict was placed a district chief of the production division 
of the Ordnance Department, a government official. In 
every instance the district chief was a captain of Industry. 
Overseeing the district chiefs generally, as head of the 
procurement division of the Ordnance Department, was 
Samuel MicRoberts, vice-president of the National City 
Bank. Guy E. Tripp, president of the Westinghouse 
Electric Company, was chief of the production division of 
the same department. Mr. McRoberts and Mr. Tripp, 
like numerous others holding similar positions, were given 
military titles by the President. 

Charles M'. Schwab, the greatest steel maker In the 
world — and incidentally, at the same time, the greatest ship- 
builder — became director general of the Emergency Fleet 
Corporation. The position of general manager of the Fleet 
Corporation was abolished in order to give Schwab "com- 
plete supervision and direction of the work of shipbuilding" 
— including that going on In his own yards. Edward N. 
Hurley, a millionaire captain of industry, remained chair- 
man of the Shipping Board and president of the Fleet Cor- 
poration. 

P. A. S. Franklin, president of the International Mercan- 
tile Marine Company, was given direct control of the rout- 
ing of all merchant and passenger vessels leaving Ameri- 
can ports. John D. Ryan, president of the Anaconda Cop- 
per Company, the world's greatest copper producer, owner 
of other copper-producing corporations, became director 



Patriotism of the Profit-Makers 271 

of aircraft production, exercising powers analogous to 
those of Schwab in the field of ocean ships. 

D. C. Jackling, another large copper producer, was placed 
in charge of the production of T. N. T., as well as of con- 
struction of government plants to increase the output of 
this explosive. 

Edward R. Stettinius, one of the twelve Morgan part- 
ners, became director of purchases and supplies for the 
War Department, superseding the War Industries Board 
In the purchase of billions of dollars' worth of merchandise. 
Mr. Stettinius also became a member of the War Council, 
and when this body was abolished, he was named an As- 
sistant Secretary of War, with the same functions as be- 
fore. 

Meanwhile, in Paris, Paul Cravath, chief counsel of 
Schwab's private steel company, was sitting upon the Inter- 
^lied War Council, representative of the American democ- 
racy. A little later we find Thomas W. Lamont, one of 
the Morgan partners, acting as official representative of 
the Treasury Department in the peace conferences. 

When the British Foreign Mission arrived in America 
in April, 19 17, Mr. Balfour, its leader, received President 
Wilson, held a conference with J. P. Morgan, and dined 
with Mr. Stettinius, all in the same day. The incident is 
symbolic of the merging of Wall Street and the government 
for war purposes. 

If unanimity for war, both before and after, and active 
voluntary service, without direct compensation, be the meas- 
ure of patriotism, then the enthusiastic declaration of a 
Liberty Loan orator, that Wall Street is not only the cen- 
tre of American finance, but is also the fount of American 
patriotism, will have to go down in history as gospel truth. 



XXVIII 

THE PROFITS OF PATRIOTISM 

Why the patriotism of Wall Street? 

Can Wall Street, which had never before pretended to 
be the home of altruism, which had always acknowledged 
that its beginning and end was profit, be readily accepted 
in its war-time role of unselfish and resplendent champion 
of the common good? 

If it appears that Wall Street expected to profit by our 
war, did profit, and stands to profit still more, what be- 
comes of its professions of patriotism? 

It is easy to understand how any one expecting to make 
money out of war, with all its horrors, would incline to 
caution in admitting the fact. The opponents of war, all 
along, had been charging that Wall Street wanted war be- 
cause there would be money in it for Wall Street. Never- 
theless, evidence of gleeful anticipation is not lacking. 

An article by B. C. Forbes, printed in the May number 
of Hearst's Magazine (1917), and evidently written in 
March, was based on the question put to business leaders: 
"What will war do to America|?" There were no pessi- 
mistic answers. C. A. Stone, of the firm of Stone & Web- 
ster, president of the American International Corporation, 
and head of the Water Power Trust, said that "on the 
whole, the new turn of events can be accepted with fortitude 
from the strictly business point of view." George M. Rey- 
nolds, president of the Continental and Commercial Na- 
tional Bank, pointed out that "it must be remembered that 
a rich nation at war, or preparing for war, spends cnor- 

272 



The Profits of Patriotism 273 

mous sums of money, and sets all forms of industry in mo- 



tion;' 



Reporting the receipt in Wall Street of the news of the 
breaking of diplomatic relations, the New York Times said, 
February 4: 

In many brokerage offices, the assembled customers stayed long 
after the half day's work was done, discussing market and banking 
prospects in a more optimistic frame of mind than in many weeks. 

The financial columns of the American, referring to the 
same incident (Feb. 19), said that it had "converted some 
of the most obstinate pessimists to the view that better 
times are coming in the stock market." Looking forward 
to war, the National City Bank said, in its statement of 
March i, that "there is no reason to anticipate that a 
declaration of war would have any effect upon the imme- 
diate business situation other than that resulting from added 
stimulus." One month later, this bank was able to say 
that its prophecy was already beginning to be fulfilled: 
"The whole industrial situation has tightened up, for be- 
sides the capacity taken up by government orders, the im- 
minence of government orders has given a spur to other 
business." 

Once war had been safely declared, we find Frank A. 
Vanderlip, president of the same great financial institu- 
tion, in a patriotic speech, May 17, enthusiastically proph- 
esying that, as a result of the war, ^'a million new springs 
of wealth will he developed/^ 

In registering pleasant anticipation, as each new step was 
taken toward war, the voice of the Stock Exchange, which 
expresses the composite sentiment of the financial world, 
was less cautious than the voices of individual financiers. 

Said the Times, February 4: 



274 Shall It Be Again? 

Stocks rebounded sharply yesterday on receipt of definite news 
from Washington that the break with Germany had occurred. . . . 
Bethlehem Steel rose 30 points, and the new Bethlehem B. shares 
gained 10% ... So eager were buyers for certain steel and cop- 
per stocks that 2 points or more frequently existed between a pur- 
chase price and the next bid price. 

Said the Tribune, March 6 : 

On Saturday it was generally believed that the bill providing for 
the arming of merchant ships would be passed, and stocks gained 
considerably as a result. 

For the next period we quote the American, March 12: 

Wall Street has accepted the arming of ships and the special ses- 
sion of Congress as the second step along the road that leads to war 
with Germany, and on that theory has bought stocks. . . . Stocks 
have been purchased on the theory that war means a boom for a 
time . . . Wall Street is proceeding on the assumption that war is 
inevitable. 

Finally, the war message sent stocks soaring. "United 
States Steel was up 2>^ points on first sales. . . . Beth- 
lehem jumped up to 142, up ij4. Marine preferred 
opened at 86, up ij^," etc. 

Were these rosy anticipations fulfilled? They were. 

To appreciate how much American intervention meant 
to the Wall Street pocketbook, one must first realize the 
unprecedented state of prosperity at the beginning of 19 17, 
as well as the shaky conditions upon which it rested and 
the imminence of its decline. 

The year 19 16 had been by far the most prosperous in 
the history of American industry and finance. This pros- 
perity was directly due to the European war. Between Au- 
gust, 1914, and February, 1917, more than 10,500,000,000 



The Profits of Patriotism 275 

dollars' worth of goods were shipped out of America, an 
excess over imports of five and one-half billion dollars. 
In exchange for food, munitions, and other supplies, sold 
to the Entente countries, American capitalists had increased 
their stocks of gold by nearly a billion dollars, had bought 
back two biUion dollars' worth of securities in American 
railways and other corporations owned in Europe, and had 
loaned something like two billion dollars to the Entente 
governments besides. They had also inherited a large 
share of the neutral trade of the belligerents, and out of 
the war gains had loaned several hundred millions to neu- 
tral countries in Latin America and elsewhere. 

But the profits represented by such huge transactions were 
only a minor fraction of the immediate war profits. The 
greatest harvest was gathered in at home. The demand 
for supplies abroad made it possible to run up domestic 
prices to unprecedented levels. With all the inflation of 
foreign trade, for every dollar's worth of food and other 
supplies sold abroad, twenty-five dollars' worth was sold at 
home. The increase in domestic prices was only partially 
offset by increases in returns to the farmer and in wages. 
The American public in peace was paying greater war prof- 
its to Wall Street than were the warring nations them- 
selves. 

The total winnings in that hectic period, of the few men 
who control the banking, the shipping, the manufacturing, 
the mining, and the transportation of the country will prob- 
ably never be revealed. It was frequently stated that the 
young J. P. Morgan made more money in two years than 
the senior Morgan had made in all the days of his life. 
There is evidence a-plenty that, whatever the ultimate fig- 
ures, the war profits were such as to drive their possessors 
quite mad with the reality, and even more with the possibil- 
ity of future winnings. 



276 Shall It Be Again? 

But there were certain flaws in this happy situation. In 
the first place, it could not go on indefinitely. In the sec- 
ond place, a part of what had been gained was not yet 
wholly secure. 

The war profits could not go on indefinitely, first, be- 
cause the war could not go on indefinitely. And by the 
beginning of 19 17, it was evident that the war profits could 
not go on even if the war went on — in the same way in 
which the war was then going; also that a great part of 
what had been gained might be lost. 

When the war trade was in its first phases, Wall Street 
was afraid of nothing more terrible than the cessation of 
the conflict. When the German government first began 
making peace overtures, before the end of 19 15, American 
munitions shares fell from 5 to 40 per cent. This was 
simply an expression of a fear that peace would put an 
end to the boom. Later, the periodical German overtures 
depressed the stock market in each case in proportion to 
the probability that such overtures would bring results. 
As late as December, 19 16, the peace parleys sent Ameri- 
can stocks down 15 to 20 per cent. But by the beginning 
of 19 1 7, Wall Street had come to fear, even more than 
the cessation of the conflict, the continuation of the war to 
an indecisive end. 

Wall Street would have been still more afraid of a Ger- 
man victory, had a decisive German victory been at any 
time within the realm of probability. But Wall Street was 
really never afraid of a German victory.^ Nevertheless, 
the beginning of 19 17 found Wall Street facing a crisis. 

That crisis was due to the approaching exhaustion of 
Entente credit in America, coupled with the inability of the 

1 We have the word of Alexander Dana Noyes, financial editor of the 
New York Times, in "Financial Chapters of the War," that Wall Street 
picked the Entente Allies to win at the beginning, and never wavered from 
tiiis judgment during those early years. 



The Profits of Patriotism 277 

Entente to deliver the knockout blow. The war trade was 
based on gold imports, security purchases, and credits. As 
the supply of gold and securities was drawn upon, the trade 
came to depend more and more upon credit. Some of the 
vast loans which Wall Street made to the Entente, to keep 
up the war trade, were secured, in part, by collateral which 
might not be greatly affected by the outcpme of the war, 
such as American securities. But a fraction of the collat- 
eral, such as British securities, depended for its value upon 
the future stability of the British Empire. Some of the 
loans, indeed, were wholly unsecured, and the repayment 
rested solely upon the continued solvency of the Entente 
governments. Of this class were the original loan of 
$500,000,000, known as the Anglo-French loan, and the 
loans to French municipalities. 

When Henry P. Davison returned from abroad about the 
first of November, 19 16, he had announced that the next 
Allied loan would have to be unsecured. But American 
bankers were already so overloaded with Allied loans, un- 
secured or inadequately secured, that they were loth to 
take more. 

In December, a marked decline in actual Entente pur- 
chases was reported. In the same month, England an- 
nounced its decision to manufacture all its own shells as 
soon as existing tontracts in America should expire. This 
would hit all the great steel and munitions companies. The 
decision was declared to be due to enlargement of Entente 
manufacturing facilities, but it is probable that the ability of 
England and France to fill their own munitions needs was 
purposely exaggerated, as a maneuver to persuade America 
to go on accepting their depreciated credit. In January, a 
British manufacturer spectacularly entered the American 
field and secured a contract to furnish shells for the Ameri- 
can navy. This was no doubt another maneuver. 



278 Shall It Be Again? 

That future war orders depended, not upon enlarged En- 
tente facilities but upon further extensions of credit, indeed, 
was admitted by Mr. Davison in a published interview, 
November 3 : "For a time Europe was forced to place their 
orders in America, but now, unless they make favorable 
ferms, France and England will make their own munitions." 
"Favorable terms" meant nothing more nor less than inade- 
quately secured credits, which Mr. Davison and Mr. Mor- 
gan were finding more and more trouble in placing among 
their associates in America. 

So, at the beginning of 19 17, Wall Street was faced with 
tv/o contingencies: first, the end of the war boom — due to 
the exhaustion of Allied credit; second, the possible loss of 
a large part of $2,000,000,000 in loans, principal and in- 
terest — due to the inability of the Entente to score a deci- 
: ive victory. 

While a German victory was out of the question — at 
least so far as England was concerned — no one could fore- 
see the internal political results of an indecisive war, espe- 
cially if the struggle went on for years to economic as well 
as military exhaustion. No one could guarantee that there 
would not be far-reaching social upheavals. Repudiation 
of debts was always possible. Repudiation aside, British 
and French bonds would be worth much less in the event of 
a compromise peace than in the event of victory. Each 
changing aspect of the military situation already affected 
the price of these bonds. 

In a word, not only future war profits stood in jeopardy, 
but past war profits also. Wall Street had bet its money 
on the Entente horse. Wall Street had backed Its choice so 
heavily that the interests of the Entente governments had 
become the Interests of Wall Street. To the Wall Street 
pocketbook, a peace without victory was unthinkable. And 
it was becoming more and more apparent that a decisive 



The Profits of Patriotism 279 

victory was possible only by means of American interven- 
tion on the side of the Entente. 

At the beginning of 19 17, war on the side of the Entente 
was the one thing that would solve all problems. First, 
it would insure another long period of war orders. Sec- 
ond, it would insure Allied credit. Third, it might be 
so manipulated as to serve in the attainment of certain other 
advantages of a permanent nature, toward which Wall 
Street had been hungrily looking. (See Chapter XXXI.) 
Considering any of these three advantages, American par- 
ticipation' in the war against Germany would constitute the 
most tremendous and profitable coup in the history of 
American finance. 

So it came to pass. The harvest upon American belliger- 
ency began to be gathered, even before the declaration of 
war, in what may be termed the profits of expectation. 
The crisis found our "big men" loaded heavily with stocks 
and profiting by the rise. Said the New York Sun's finan- 
cial column, April 9: 

Sentiment among bankers is patriotic and it is bullish . . . To 
many persons, long on stocks, war apparently merely spells another 
long period of abnormal profits for our corporations . . . The big 
men hold stocks. 

The declaration of war found the "big men" long on 
commodities, as well as stocks, and the profits of expecta- 
tion include the returns from soaring prices of food and 
other articles. In May, wheat reached $3.25 a bushel. 
No farmer profited by this. The American farmer had 
long since parted with the last of his crop at around $1.30. 
In August, cotton touched its highest mark for 45 years. 
It meant nothing to the grower; the middleman had long 
since acquired his product. The same is true of other staples. 



28o Shall It Be Again? 

The food profiteers of the spring of 19 17 were de- 
nounced as "food hogs," "sharks," "traitors." An effort 
was made to create the Impression that only a few irre- 
sponsible, low persons had brought about the situation. 
We were told that representative American business men 
were too patriotic to boost prices in the face of war. But 
such a general rise in prices could result only from 
the concerted action of the rich and powerful combina- 
tions which control the distribution and price of American 
commodities. Although wholesalers and retailers took 
profits where they could, if the word "traitor" applies to 
the parties responsible for the food riots of 19 17, it must 
fall first upon men who were so soon to become conspicuous 
government officials at one dollar a year, or who paid the 
salaries of employees who acted as government officials. 

After the profits of expectation, followed the profits of 
realization. Allied credit was not only insured; it was 
guaranteed. Allied trade, which, in the words of a finan- 
cial circular, had come to be looked upon as a "pinchbeck," 
again became "the genuine article." The boom was pro- 
longed. It became possible to advance wholesale prices in 
April on an average of two per cent, over March, making 
the total since the beginning of the European war 57 per 
cent. This was only a beginning. By the middle of May, 
the Times was able to say: "Business is still feeling the mo- 
mentum Imparted by the vast buying demand opened up 
when the United States declared war." This momentum 
rose. Instead of falling — rose steadily for eighteen months, 
until the German collapse. 

Of the profits of realization, the statements of the great 
corporations themselves tell the least of the story. In its 
efforts to dispel suspicion that Wall Street provoked the 
war for business reasons, the daily, weekly and monthly 
press sought to lead the public to believe that profits were 



The Profits of Patriotism 281 

less in 19 17 than in 19 16. The approved method was to 
flash the figures of one or two corporations, and to make all 
deductions from them. For reasons that have been made 
clear, even were all immediate profits of all American cor- 
porations less in 19 17 than in 19 16, that would not change 
the fact that Wall Street greatly profited from American 
belligerency. 

But the profits of a very large number of the richest cor- 
porations show an increase, even by their own statements. 
In other cases, where net gains are reported as less, it is 
often evident that the reported decrease is not real. In its 
report on profiteering, and in other reports, the Federal 
Trade Commission exposed many tricks of bookkeeping 
resorted to by the great corporations to conceal the extent 
of their gains from war contracts. Costs were fictitiously 
enhanced by account juggling. Officers^ salaries were in- 
creased. The item of depreciation was padded. Inter- 
est on investment was included in cost. Fictitious valuation 
of raw material was resorted to. Inventories were manip- 
ulated. 

Such practices are not flattering to the patriotism of our 
great financiers, but they were general. Indeed, minimiza- 
tion of profits is often evident to the eye of the casual 
reader, in the abbreviated reports of corporation state- 
ments as printed in the newspapers. 

The earnings of the U. S. Steel Corporation for 19 17 
exceeded, by many millions, the face value of its common 
stock, a greater part of which is water. The figures were 
$528,757,615, as against $333,574,17^ for 1916. They 
exceeded by $70,000,000 the combined earnings of the three 
years 191 1, 19 12 and 19 13. After the deduction of in- 
come and excess profits taxes, depreciation, etc., the sum set 
aside for dividends was smaller than in 19 16 by about 
twenty per cent. But the capital outlay for new plants, 



282 Shall It Be Again?, 

etc., was more than double, while the total cash in bank, in 
demaiid loans, Liberty Bonds, Treasury certificates, etc., 
was $446,369,597, or more than twice as great as at the 
end of 1916. 

The Bethlehem Steel Corporation likewise reported a 
smaller total, after income and excess profit taxes, inter- 
est charges, and greatly increased sums for depreciation 
were set aside. But, as acknowledged, the final net in- 
come was equal to $44.20 per share on the liberally watered 
common stock, after providing for the preferred share div- 
idends. Net earnings in 19 16 had been almost three times 
as great as in 19 15, and at the beginning of 19 17 the com- 
pany had indulged in a "melon cutting," in the form of a 
stock dividend of 200 per cent. 

Midvale Steel and Ordnance Co., and Republic Iron and 
Steel both acknowledged net profits, after all tax and other 
deductions, as higher than in 19 16. In its report on profit- 
eering, the Federal Trade Commission gave a list of ten 
other steel companies whose 19 17 profits ranged from 52 
to 109 per cent, on the investment. 

Some of the big copper companies reported smaller net 
earnings in 19 17 than in 19 16. But the U. S. Geological 
Survey reported that the 19 17 production, although 
38,000,000 less in pounds, sold for $35,0001,000 more. 
Profits of 1 9 16 had greatly exceeded all previous records. 
The Anaconda, Mr. Ryan's company, made three times as 
much in 19 16 as in any previous year. In 19 17, after all 
juggling was completed, the balance set aside for dividends 
by the American Smelting and Refining, Daniel Guggen- 
heim's company, amounted to twenty-two and one-half per 
cent, of the common stock. After setting aside large sums 
for alterations, replacements, taxes, and other items, Utah 
Copper, Mr. Jackling's company, reported a balance for 
dividends of $28,695,495. 



The Profits of Patriotism 283 

The American Sugar Refining Company reported 19 17 as 
the best year in its history. The Big Five packing com- 
panies confessed to greater returns in 19 17 than ever be- 
fore. In 19 1 6 they netted $60,759,000, more than three 
times as much as in 1913. But in 1917, after all tax de- 
ductions, they netted $95,639,000, or nearly 60 per cent. 
more than in 19 16. Morris & Co.'s net profits were 267.7 
per cent, of capital stock. Armour's would have been 
'^3S'S P^^ cent., were it not for a 400 per cent, stock divi- 
dend declared that year. 

The Federal Trade Commission found that 48 leading 
lumber companies in the southern states netted more than 
three times as much in 19 17 as in 19 16. 

In six years ending May, 19 17, Standard Oil firms distrib- 
uted dividends in excess of six times the par value of their 
capital stock, or $629,000,000. But Standard Oil profits 
continued to increase through 19 17. 

After war tax deductions, the Baldwin Locomotive Com- 
pany reported net profits 500 per cent, greater than in 
19 16; the American Locomotive Company, 30 per cent, 
greater; the American Woolen Company 30 per cent, 
greater; the Railway Steel Spring Company, 175 per cent, 
greater; the American Can Company, 70 per cent, greater; 
Lackawanna Steel, 30 per cent, greater; U. S. Industrial 
Alcohol, 150 per cent, greater. The Corn Products Re- 
fining Company, another Standard Oil subsidiary, which 
had been running along happily on about $3,400,060 a year 
net, gathered in $16,852,793 in 1917, about 250 per cent, 
more than the previous year. 

Between May i and June 20, 19 17, the resources of the 
fifty National Banks in New York City increased 
$98,341,499. Between February 28 and June 20, of the 
same year, the resources of the trust companies of New 
York State increased more than three billion dollars. The 



284 Shall It Be Again? 

earnings of the National Banks of the country for the fiscal 
year were reported as $667,406,000, the greatest in their 
history, and 13^^ per cent, greater than in the previous 
year. Net earnings on capital stock figured out as 18 per 
cent. 

In 19 1 5, a new high record in foreign trade had been 
established. In 19 16 another high record had been estab- 
lished. But the figures of 19 17 exceeded those of 19 16 by 
$1,225,000,000. 

These few figures will hardly convey an adequate con- 
ception of the immediate advantages accruing to Wall 
Street from American participation in the European war. 
They are set down only that there may be no doubt that 
there were great gains. Either the reports of the Federal 
Trade Commission or of the corporations themselves are 
sufficient proof of this, though they tell only a part of the 
story. Finally, the profits from financial transactions, as 
distinct from industrial, were greatest of all, and these were 
most successfully hidden. Even the figures of the U. S. 
Treasury Department (given to the public Apr. 18, 1920) 
show, in spite of all concealments and evasions, that the 
war created 21,000 new American millionaires, and that, 
during the war period, 69,000 men made more than three 
billion dollars over and above their normal income. 



XXIX 

PROFIT-SEEKER AND PROFIT-SERVER 

It was universally assumed during the fighting, and count- 
less times asserted, that it was the policy of the War Ad- 
ministration not merely that big business should not be per- 
mitted to make money out of the tragedy of war, but that 
it should be required to feel the burden equally with the 
common people. This idea no doubt received its impetus 
from a pronouncement on the incompatibility of war prof- 
its and patriotism found in President Wilson's "Appeal 
to the Business Interests," July ii, 19 17: 

Patriotism leaves profits out of the question. In these days . . . 
when we are sending hundreds of thousands of our young men across 
the seas ... no true patriot will permit himself to take toll of their 
heroism in money or seek to grow rich by the shedding of their blood. 

How, then, did it come about that Wall Street profits 
walked so pleasantly hand in hand with Wall Street patriot- 
ism? 

In the appeal of July 11, the President also set forth the 
actual course he intended to pursue, in the following words: 

A just price must, of course, be paid for everything the government 
buys. By a just price I mean a price which will sustain the indus- 
tries concerned in a high state of efficiency, provide a living for those 
who conduct them, enable them to pay good wages, and make possible 
the expansion of their enterprises. 

This statement of policy is, on its face, open to several 
interpretations. It might be interpreted as licensing our 
financial patriots to indulge in a profit orgy unparalleled in 

28s 



286 Shall It Be Again? 

the annals of civilization. Whether or not it was so inter- 
preted by our War Administration and our financiers must 
be determined by the actual application of the policy. As 
has already been seen, the system of cooperation between 
government and business was one perfectly calculated to 
produce the highest possible profits consistent with safety 
and success. 

Our great financiers, having advised, urged, and pro- 
moted the war, now advised as to its policies, directed, exe- 
cuted. The government accepted their advice, commis- 
sioned them to act, backed them with its authority — and 
footed the bills. Is it a coincidence that the result was 
extremely pleasing from a strictly financial point of view? 

On the first of April, 19 17, nothing could have been 
more financially delightful to our international bankers 
than that America not only should declare war against Ger- 
many, and so greatly strengthen Allied credit, but that the 
government should absolutely guarantee that credit with its 
own treasure. 

We find the President emphasizing this very proposal in 
the war message. 

The Bond Issue Bill, rushed from the White House to 
the Capitol, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to 
purchase from the Entente governments three billion dol- 
lars' worth of paper promises to pay. It was brought out 
in the Congressional debates that this alone meant an item 
of $60,000,000 in commissions to one banking firm — owing 
to a contract under which the Entente governments agreed 
to pay, as a commission, two per cent, of all loans floated in 
America, whether negotiated through that firm or not. 

Second, a condition of the loan was that the govern- 
ment of the United States should purchase the Allied paper, 
not at its market value, but at par. This was several per 
cent, more than Wall Street had ever paid for the best se- 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 287 

cured Allied paper. It not only made Wall Street paper 
good, but It Immediately gave that paper a higher value 
than It had ever had before. 

The difference between v/hat the United States govern- 
ment paid for Allied government bonds and the market 
rate previously prevailing, represented a clear gift, total- 
ing many millions. This gift went to the Allied govern- 
ments, 071 future purchases only. On all outstanding obli- 
gations, it was a direct gift to the holders of Allied credit 
paper — meaning our great banking and munitions firms. 

The day following the war message, Anglo-French bonds, 
which had been rising in anticipation of war, jumped two 
points on the Stock Exchange, which meant a gain of 
$10,000,000 in a single day to the holders of these bonds. 
All other Allied paper registered advances. On the floor 
of Congress, April 13, 19 17, it was brought out that the 
market value of one thousand ruble Russian bonds was 
$273, and that In paying $510, the par value, the govern- 
ment would make a donation of $237, giving almost two 
dollars for one. 

Still another condition of the Allied loans was that the 
money should be expended in America, which simply meant 
that it should be used to liquidate the debts owed our inter- 
national bankers and our captains of Industry, and to trans- 
act future business with them. 

As a result of the President's proposal to guarantee Al- 
lied credit, the Bank of England was able Immediately to 
reduce Its discount rate, which had become an obstacle to 
business In this country. The three billion dollar fund It- 
self — like the billions later appropriated for the same pur- 
pose — was not shipped to Europe, any part of It, but was 
deposited in installments in the Federal Reserve Bank to the 
credit of the Allied governments, red-tape being cut to get 
the first installments there In a hurry. Allied agents then 



288, Shall It Be Again? 

drew checks upon it, and turned the checks directly over to 
the corporations of Mr. Schwab, Mr. Ryan, Judge Gary, 
Mr. Davison, Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Farrell, Mr. Vanderlip, 
Mr. Morgan, and other multimillionaires who were so 
soon to figure as shining patriots, all of whom were inter- 
ested in Allied trade and involved in Allied credit opera- 
tions. 

In order to loan billions of dollars to the Entente govern- 
ments, it was necessary to procure the money from the 
American public, and this was done through the so-called 
Liberty Loans, which were also the source of the major 
share of the money that the government itself spent with 
Morgan and his associates. 

While acting as England's financial and munitions repre- 
sentative in America, J. P. Morgan also sat upon the advi- 
sory council of our Federal Reserve banking system. At 
the same time he was playing a third role of private busi- 
ness man, banker, munitions maker, railroad director, coal 
baron, etc. etc. The reader may conjecture for himself 
in which of these capacities it was, that America's leading 
financier advised the Liberty Loan issues and the conditions 
thereof. 

Three days after the declaration of war, following a con- 
ference with Secretary McAdoo in Washington, we were 
told that "Mr. Morgan expressed satisfaction with the plan 
to issue $5,000,000,000 in bonds, with the understanding 
that $3,000,000,000 of the amount thus raised should be 
employed to buy war bonds of the ally countries." (New 
York Times.) 

As business men purely, our international bankers had 
cause for satisfaction not only in the features of the Bond 
Issue Law relating to AUied credit, but in many others. 
They had cause for several kinds of purely financial satis- 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server ^89 

faction In every Liberty Loan dollar raised by the govern- 
ment. This satisfaction was not always concealed. 
Charles H. Sabin, president of the Guaranty Trust Com- 
pany, the biggest institution of its class in America, exulted 
as follows: 

The proceeds from the sale of Liberty Bonds will be expended in 
this country by our government and by the Allied governments. . . . 
The money will remain in this country and will not involve any loss 
of gold or any loss of values. It is obvious that the more money 
that is spent in this country, the greater will be our prosperity. (New 
York Times, Sept. 25, 19 17.) 

Speaking the same kind of satisfaction for Wall Street 
in general, L. L. Winkleman & Co., specialists In Standard 
Oil, copper and steel stocks, and closely connected with 
some of the biggest mining and munitions firms, uttered 
the following shriek of ghoulish glee on the day war was 
declared : 

The Secretary of the Treasury, at the instigation of the President, 
has asked for an appropriation for the army and navy alone of $3,- 
400,000,000, while simultaneously, members of the National Council 
of Defense, the Federal Reserve Banks, and Treasury officials, give 
assurance that $2,000,000,000 at an interest rate not to exceed three 
and one-half per cent, will be almost immediately available. This 
and many multiples more of wealth will find its way continuously 
and unsparingly into all the units of the country's many-sided indus- 
tries. Any one viewing this formidable array of strength would be 
a pitiable pessimist indeed if he looked to the future with any feeling 
of trepidation or foreboding. 

If the record of the country's coming achievements carries a 
tinge of scarlet, the golden lustre will be undimmed. (Financial 
Circular.) 

The New York Times, a first class barometer of big 
business sentiment, remarked editorially: "The loan Is a 
means of making patriotism profitable." (May 4, 19 17.) 



290 Shall It Be Again? 

And again: **The Liberty Loan is not only a means of mak- 
ing democracy safe. It is a means of benefiting the money 
market." (May 17) 

In the early days of the first bond drive, Mr. McAdoo 
announced that "to avoid any disturbance of the money 
market," the government would not take away from the 
banks the sums subscribed by them or obtained from their 
customers, but would place such sums on deposit in the re- 
spective banks to the credit of the United States. 

Still another source of Wall Street satisfaction in the 
Bond Issue Law was the tax exemption feature. Said the 
New York Times financial editor : 

The war-financing bill to authorize a total issue of $5,000,000,000 
of bonds and $2,000,000,000 of Treasury certificates met with instant 
approval throughout the financial district. . . . Lawyers familiar with 
such matters were of the opinion that the conditions of issue and 
redemption were not such as to attract men of small means. They 
were termed rich men's bonds, because the bonds would be exempt 
from the income tax and the amount invested in them need not be 
reported. (Apr. 12) 

Our multimillionaires went about the country telling 
what a sound and profitable investment the bonds were for 
anyone. The fact was not always hidden that the terms 
were especially calculated to please these particular patriots. 
Daniel Guggenheim confessed: "For miUionaires they 
[Liberty Bonds] are an exceptional opportunity." (New 
York Times, Jan. 7, 19 18.) 

Comparing the advantages to rich and poor, the financial 
writer, Albert W. Atwood, explained : 

The first Liberty Loan paid only three and one-half per cent, in- 
terest, but it was made free from all taxes, including the enormous 
super-toll on large incomes. Thus it would come about that a very 
rich man . . . would be receiving the equivalent of perhaps ten per 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 291 

cent, on an investment that pays the poor hardly more than one third 
as much. {Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 13, 1917.) 

The expenditure of the proceeds of the Liberty Loans 
gave cause for even deeper thrills of satisfaction to our 
business leaders. We have already had a glimpse of the 
methods of disbursing these billions, and an inkling of the 
profit-taking that resulted. A correct appreciation of both 
the generosity of the War Administration and the patrio- 
tism of Wall Street requires that we have another glimpse. 

Glance again at steel. 

It is unnecessary to recall the frenzied profit-taking of 
1 9 15 and 19 1 6. From pre-war values Bethlehem stock 
mounted more than twelve hundred per cent, in a little 
over a year. Nevertheless, America's appearance in the 
role of champion of world democracy was a signal for a 
higher boost in prices. By June, iron prices were above 
those of Civil War times. There was no expectation of 
placing large contracts at the highest figures reached on 
paper, but these paper prices served a wonderful purpose; 
when reduced slightly, patriotism could be claimed as the 
motive. Government and operators promptly and conven- 
iently forgot the promises of the latter to forego war prof- 
its. The prices, when fixed by the government, evoked nu- 
merous expressions of pleasure. The Iron & Steel Insti- 
tute met at Pittsburgh. After expressing satisfaction with 
the price of steel, the assemblage sang "The Star Spangled 
Banner." Judge Gary, chairman, made a speech: 

We have no reason to complain of the action and attitude of the 
government. To win the war the government must have steel and 
more steel. There is no room for disloyalty in America. (New 
York Times, Oct. 27.) 

Notwithstanding the satisfaction of the steel operators, 



292 Shall It Be Again? 

the government raised the price of steel from time to time. 
In due course we find Judge Gary expressing further satis- 
faction. Here is an excerpt from his report at the annual 
meeting of the U. S. Steel Corporation: 

It is fortunate that the government has fixed prices which permit 
us to make fair profits and pay large dividends. We feel that we are 
living up to the policy outlined by the President of the United States, 
when he said that prices should be large enough to pay living wages 
to the workers, fair salaries to officials, and provide for necessary 
plant additions for war work. (Apr. i8, 19 18.) 

Two days after the armistice was signed, the War In- 
dustries Board met with the general committee of the 
Iron & Steel Institute. Among those representing the lat- 
ter, were Judge Gary, Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Grace, act- 
ing head of the Schwab corporations. Among those repre- 
senting the former, were associates and underlings of Gary, 
Farrell, and Grace in the steel industry. Mr. Gary, Mr. 
Farrell, and Mr. Grace were so satisfied with the "govern- 
mental supervision" of their business that they urged its 
continuation "for the present" as "highly desirable." (Of- 
ficial Report of Mr. Baruch, Nov. 14.) 

Glance again at copper. 

In March, 19 17, the big producers, represented by Mr. 
Ryan and Mr. Guggenheim, agreed to furnish 45,510,000 
pounds of copper during the next twelve months to the gov- 
ernment for 16% cents a pound. This figure, they said, 
was the average selling price of their product during the 
previous ten years, although elsewhere it was asserted that 
the figure was nearer twelve cents. But, however this may 
be, some of America's largest fortunes were built upon cop- 
per. In a report to its stockholders, quoted by Champ 
Clark {Congressional Record, May 24, 1917), the Utah 
Copper Company, of which Daniel C. Jackling was manag- 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 293 

ing director, had recently declared that it could put copper 
free on board cars for 5% cents per pound. 

But Mr. Baruch, on behalf of the government, chose to 
heap fulsome praise on the copper magnates for their pa- 
triotism. Ryan, Jackling, Guggenheim, et al., also received 
unlimited press notices from the newspapers. The fact 
was overlooked that the government could have fixed the 
price at 16% cents in spite of these gentlemen, and that if 
it had wished to follow a policy of taking the profit out of 
war, it would have seen that the price was far below that 
figure. 

We were told that copper had ''gone up" to thirty 
cents. The truth is that the copper operators had not been 
selling copper at thirty cents. They simply put the price 
up on paper, then to pose as shining patriots for "agree- 
ing" to a reduction. 

Furthermore, the copper magnates did not fulfill their 
contract to furnish the government at the "patriotic price" 
— nor did the government attempt to hold them to it. 
Thirty thousand pounds, not forty-five million, were re- 
ported as having been actually delivered at i6% cents. 
Then, "by agreement," the price was fixed at 23^^ cents. 

On receipt of the news, copper stocks soared. Mr. Ryan 
announced : 

All the producers are satisfied. The price is fair and should be 
good both for the producers and the country. (New York Times, 
Sept. 25, 1917.) 

How good it was for the producers was pointed out by 
the Times, in its review of the effects of the government 
policy upon business for the year 1917 : 

The past year was prosperous for the copper miners [producers]. 
They kept their mines operating to capacity and enjoyed the highest 
prices for the metal which have ruled for 50 years. . . . The United 



294 Shall It Be Again? 

States and Great Britain fixed the price of copper at 23^ cents a 
pound, in order to prevent a runaway market. This measure has 
greatly benefited copper miners. Had the price not been fixed, there 
would have been price fluctuations, which would have led to irreg- 
ular demands for the metal. The average production cost before 
the war was around eight cents a pound. Some mines produced at 
around si cents. The cost now is about ten cents, with many of 
the larger mines producing at 7 J cents. (Jan. 6, 1918.) 

From which It appears that the government was giving 
to Mr. Ryan, Mr. Jackling, Mr. Guggenheim, Mr. Rocke- 
feller, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Bedford, Mr. Dodge, and others 
interested in copper, three perfectly good Liberty Loan 
dollars for every dollar's worth of goods passed over the 
counter. 

Nevertheless, in the middle of 19 18, the government 
price for copper was raised to 26 cents a pound. 

Glance again at railroads. 

When war was declared, the physical condition of the 
railroads was at its worst. The service both in freight and 
passenger traffic had become a national scandal. Unable 
decently to meet the requirements of peace, the great trans- 
portation systems practically collapsed In the face of the 
war emergency. The coal famine, at the end of 19 17, 
which caused the loss of so many millions in wages and re- 
turns to capital, as well as so much actual suftering, was due 
chiefly to the railroad breakdown. High prices of stock 
feed, resulting in great losses to farmers, high living costs, 
and many other unfortunate circumstances, were attributed, 
in part, to the same cause. 

For their delinquency the companies pleaded lack of 
money, and attempted to lay the blame upon the nation, 
for not having responded to their frantic appeals for higher 
rates. As a matter of record, the rates had been several 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 295 

times raised under the Wilson regime, and, according to 
their own figures, in 19 15 and 19 16 the companies had col- 
lected higher earnings and netted greater profits than ever 
before. From the income of 19 16, the railroads had dis- 
bursed more in dividends than in any previous year, besides 
financing the most expensive campaign of "public educa- 
tion" ever undertaken by a business coalition in American 
history. At the same time, their poverty was so terrible 
that they could afford hardly a dollar for repairs and im- 
provements I 

The explanation of the railroad spokesmen themselves 
was that dividends had to be paid, improvements or no im- 
provements, that improvements could only be financed with 
new stock and bond issues, and that, owing to the gorgeous 
returns from munitions making, "investors" were unwill- 
ing to put their money in railroad issues, and would remain 
unwilling until such a time as railroading became as profita- 
ble as catering to the war monster. 

So, in effect, the public was asked to pay a fine of a bil- 
lion or more a year to the railroads because the munitions 
business was making money. This wonderful scheme had 
already been put into operation in other lines in which it 
was not necessary to ask government permission before 
boosting prices. 

The "problem" of the railroads could have been solved 
by a government policy that would have taken excessive 
profits out of the war trade. But nobody thought of that. 
In any event, the problem was not one that had to be solved 
by higher rates. For the men who owned the controlling 
interest in the great transportation systems were the same 
men who owned the munitions business. These men had 
been making more money than ever before in their lives. 
They were at that very time conducting a vigorous campaign 
for preparedness, pressing upon the government for a more 



296 Shall It Be Again? 

uncompromising attitude toward Germany. They were 
aware that, with their approval and at their instigation, 
America was moving toward war. They knew that their 
railroads would be a vital factor in the prompt and efficient 
prosecution of the war when it came. But instead of put- 
ting their properties in a condition to meet the emergency, 
they brought them to the verge of collapse in a deliberate 
effort to coerce the country into consenting to a raise in 
rates. 

Very well, the situation in 19 17 had to be met by govern- 
ment control. But, instead of conscripting a part of the 
bloated fortunes of the railroad magnates, or taking divi- 
dends to pay for improvements that had to be made, the 
War Administration gave to the corporations everything 
that they had ever had the temerity to ask for — and a great 
deal more. 

The President's announcement of policy in taking over 
the railroads is a reaffirmation and amplification of the 
original announcement of his war policy toward business. 
After a few well chosen words expressing solicitude for rail- 
road earnings, declaring that the roads should not be re- 
quired to suffer from war conditions, even acknowledging 
that a primary object in taking over the roads was to pro- 
vide them with more money, the President uttered the fol- 
lowing definite assurances: 

Investors in railway securities may rest assured that their rights 
and interests will be as scrupulously looked after by the government 
as they could be by the directors of the several railway systems. 

Immediately upon the reassembling of Congress, I shall recommend 
that these definite guarantees be given: 

First, of course, that the railway properties will be maintained 
during the period of Federal control in as good repair and as complete 
equipment as when taken over by the government, and 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 297 

Second, that the roads shall receive a net operating income equal 
in each case to the average net income of the three years preceding 
June 30, 1917. 

The President specified the three years ending June 30, 
instead of the three years ending December 31. Earnings 
had declined since June 30. The three years selected were 
the most prosperous thirty-six consecutive months in rail- 
road history. 

Ten days later the President pleaded the cause of the 
railroad kings to Congress, declaring: 

One of the strong arguments for assuming control of the railroads 
at this time is the financial argument. ... It is an obligation of 
public conscience and of public honor, that the private interests we 
disturb should be kept safe from unjust injury. 

The President's recommendations, as more fully set 
forth in the Administration Railroad Bill, turned out to be 
even more generous than were the President's promises. 
The guaranteed net income figured out to be about 
$945,000,000. The law even permitted larger compensa- 
tion in "abnormal cases," at the discretion of the President. 
Another favor was the payment to the railroads concur- 
rently of their own estimates of depreciation of equipment, 
the sums to be charged off to operating expenses. The 
President was authorized to raise rates at his own discre- 
tion. He was also authorized; to permit the companies 
to issue securities, and then to purchase the same from them 
with the people's money. Half a billion dollars were im- 
mediately provided as a "revolving fund" out of which to 
make improvements. Another provision obliged the gov- 
ernment to return the roads to private hands within a def- 
inite period after the end of the war. 

How did the railroad presidents take all this? They 
took it — patriotically. The interviews which appeared in 



298 Shall It Be Again? 

the newspapers the day following the President's proclama- 
tion show that they took it as a Christmas present. The 
present had, in fact, been solicited. 

As to the Httle matter of financial satisfaction, the im- 
mediate effect upon the stock market was set forth as fol- 
lows: 

The net recovery [of railroad securities] after this momentous 
event [the taking over of the roads] ran from seven to more than 
twenty points among the major railroad stocks. . . . The forward 
leap of many railroad bonds, along with the stocks, made manifest 
the relief which investors in railroad securities felt over the govern- 
ment's action. (New York Times financial review of 191 7, Jan. 
6, 1918.) 

When the year was done the report was: 

After an auspicious beginning, with the railroad issues reflecting 
the relief occasioned at the end of 191 7 by the government's assump- 
tion of transportation control, the price trend was consistently up- 
ward through the year, with the railroad shares providing a strength 
and a backbone of sufficient rigidity for the majority of the industrial 
issues to move higher on a restricted volume of business. (New 
York Times, Jan. 5, 19 19.) 

Glance again at shipbuilding. 

Space does not permit mention of the many scandals, of 
great and small degree, that marked the Administration 
shipbuilding programme. For the financial compensations 
of shipbuilding for patriotic purposes. Hog Island alone 
furnishes sufficient illumination. 

The Hog Island contract was obtained by the American 
International Corporation. A majority of the stock of 
this concern is owned by stockholders of the National City 
Bank, who, by stock ownership or control, or affiliation with 
other banks, exert a dominating influence upon every great 
field of, business enterprise in America. Our richest and 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 299 

most conspicuous ''super-patriots" are discovered to be the 
very same who divided the Hog Island proceeds among 
themselves. 

The whole truth of the Hog Island steal will probably 
never be known. The most astonishing stories have been 
told by apparently reputable persons. A public Inquiry, 
begun In February, 191 8, by the Senate Committee on Com- 
merce, was opposed and finally throttled by the President, 
who substituted a private Investigation by the Attorney- 
General. The statements herein are based upon the abor- 
tive Senate hearing, and to a lesser degree, upon the 
brief "whitewashing" report of the Attorney-General to 
the President. 

The Hog Island contract was let by the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation, September 13, 19 17. It required the 
government to furnish every dollar of expense. Including 
salaries, office expenses, and every other outlay appertain- 
ing to the job — and every risk — except that required to 
purchase the land, which was to be used at an annual rental 
of six per cent, of the alleged cost, with the privilege of 
subsequent purchase by the government. The company 
was to build shipyards and ships with the people's money. 
Estimates of costs, figured by Stone & Webster, America's 
greatest engineering firm, and Interlocked with the Ameri- 
can International Corporation, were made and entered in 
the contracts, but no limit to costs was set. Compensa- 
tion nominated in the bond was not patriotism, but a per- 
centage of the money expended. Compensation was fixed 
at five per cent, of cost. 

Stone & Webster's original estimate of the cost of 
the yard was $19,000,000. This was soon raised to 
$21,000,000. A little later it was $27,000,000. By March, 
191 8, it was between $35,000,000 and $40,000,000. In 
December, the yard was not yet completed. Fifty-eight 



300 Shall It Be Again? 

million dollars of the people's money had been spent on 
it, and (Dec. i8) general-manager Piez of the Fleet Cor- 
poration estimated that the cost would reach $63,500,000. 
It went far higher than that. 

Contracts were let for 180 ships. The original estimate 
of the cost of these ships was $256,000,000. In December, 
191 8, Mr. Piez admitted that the cost would be as much 
as $225 a ton. By the time the armistice was signed, the 
contractors had contrived to involve the government in ex- 
penses on the Hog Island job to an amount exceeding the 
cost of the Panama Canal. 

"Lieutenant-Colonel" Charles N. Black, one of the rich 
gentlemen whom the President honored with military titles, 
described as "a volunteer worker In the Ordnance 
Department," had been part owner of the 846 acres which 
the American International Terminal Corporation, a sub- 
sidiary, had ''bought" for $2,000 an acre, and was renting 
to the government for $102,360 a year. Black appeared 
before the Senate committee in defense of the corpora- 
tion. 

"I sold the land because it was represented to me as a 
duty," testified "Colonel" Black. 

But it was proven that the land had been a stretch of 
Inaccessible swamp, assessed by the State at $100 an acre, 
and that the highest price ever paid anywhere for land in 
the vicinity was $500 an acre. 

Dwight P. Robinson, president of the American Inter- 
national Shipbuilding Corporation, the subsidiary in direct 
charge of the work, testified: "We have undertaken the 
work as a patriotic duty." 

But it was shown that the salary of Mr. Robinson's gen- 
eral manager of construction was more than doubled as 
soon as he went from the corporation payroll to the gov- 
ernment payroll, and that salaries of the corporation ex- 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 301 

perts and officials generally were more than doubled; even 
that more than one salary, thus bloated, was paid to one 
person, in some instances. The government not only paid 
these bloated salaries, but the corporation collected five per 
cent, of the amounts from the government as profit — in ac- 
cordance with the contract. 

George D. Baldwin, chairman of the American Inter- 
national Corporation, and a member of the firm of Stone 
& Webster, assured the committee : 

We are loyal American citizens, who cannot afford to have our 
loyalty questioned. . . . We have the incentive of patriotism. We 
are not in this for money. 

But when Baldwin was asked why, then, he and his as- 
sociates were accepting such large sums of money, he re- 
plied: 

A corporation cannot live on patriotism. . . . Our stockholders 
must have their dividends. 

The "normal fee" for ship construction alone, based 
on the original estimates of cost, was $11,675,000. The 
chief official excuse for that item was the participation of 
the firm of Stone & Webster, which ^^knew how'' to do the 
thing that was wanted. But it was brought out that, while 
the American International Corporation was being paid 
"know how" profits, Stone & Webster were being paid 
"sub-know how" profits — as were other corporations af- 
filiated or subsidiary to the American International Cor- 
poration. 

In other words, a group of patriotic financiers contracted 
to collect eleven million simply for passing contracts along 
to themselves — dividing them among themselves. The 
same men then collected a second fee based on costs. This 
pyramiding of contracts — and fees — was carried even 
farther. 



302 Shall It Be Again? 

The "sub-know how" fee was also five per cent. — on pa- 
per. Profits in hard cash were higher. It was shown that 
Stone & Webster cleared one-third of a million on one sub- 
contract of less than a million. 

H. D. Connick, vice-president of the corporation, was 
another who swore to the patriotic nature of the venture. 

"You didn't propose to invest one penny of your own 
money, though," taunted a Senator. 

"We were going to invest our reputations," answered 
Connick. 

It developed that the precious reputations, once "in- 
vested," were handsomely defended with the people's 
money. One press agent was paid a salary of $20,000 a 
year. Press agents' salaries and other publicity costs — 
outlays to convince the public that Hog Island was what it 
was not — were charged to the government, which also paid 
an added charge of five per cent., as profit to the Ameri- 
can International Corporation. 

Throughout the Senate hearing, officials of the Fleet 
Corporation, and other government officials, shielded the 
grafters. Both government officials and officers of the 
American International Corporation were forced to admit 
extravagance, waste, and exorbitant costs. These things 
were defended on the ground of speed. But the only speed 
visible at Hog Island was the speed with which the con- 
tractors made away with the people's money. America 
had been at war sixteen months before the first ship was 
launched, and no Hog Island ship got into commission in 
time to be of service against Germany. 

The Corporation's general defense, when investigated by 
the Department of Justice, was that officials of the Fleet 
Corporation knew and approved everything it did. It 
happens that the officials of the Fleet Corporation, in pri- 
vate life, were associates or employees of the men who 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 303 

were profiting by the job. These officials did not satisfac- 
torily explain why they permitted the contractors to adopt 
a system of bookkeeping perfectly calculated to conceal 
thievery; nor how it was that bills for material to the ex- 
tent of over ten million dollars in value had been prepaid 
and no effort made to discover (in the words of the De- 
partment of Justice report) "whether the prepaid bills were 
in fact followed by the actual receipt of the material paid 
for." 

On a number of occasions after the fighting was over, 
Mr. Schwab publicly declared that ^'at least two billion of 
the three billion dollar cost'' of government shipbuilding 
*'ought to he charged of as war cost/' In other words, 
the two billion, or most of it, was stolen or wasted under 
cover of the war emergency. Albert D. Lasker, who be- 
came chairman of the Shipping Board under President 
Harding, went even farther. July i6, 192 1, Lasker de- 
clared that the government's "loss" on the building, opera- 
tion, and leasing of ships would total $4,000,000,000, 

After a peep at Hog Island patriotism, one may perhaps 
appreciate, slightly, Mr. Vanderlip's enthusiastic predic- 
tion, made in an address to business men: ^^A million new 
springs of wealth will be developed." 

Hog Island patriotism is not different from any other 
Wall Street patriotism, so soon as the latter is subject to 
scrutiny. Nor is the War Administration elsewhere less 
generous with its profits, less willing to satisfy, to the full, 
financial appetites already gorged with money. Every- 
where we find captains of industry pleased with large re- 
turns — avidly seeking them. Everywhere we find the gov- 
ernment seeking to satisfy them — satisfying them. 

The average price for bituminous coal at the mine, for 
the entire United States, in 19 15, was $1.13 a ton. Large 



304 Shall It Be Again? 

deliveries were made in 1916 at $1.25 a ton. The Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor reported that labor costs had in- 
creased but 13 cents a ton in three years. Yet in August, 
19 17, the President fixed prices from $2 upward at the 
mine. Under this arrangement, according to the Federal 
Trade Commission, margins of profit were much higher 
than in previous years. Nevertheless, before the end of 
19 17 the President granted the coal corporations another 
increase of 45 cents a ton. Under this arrangement, coal 
profits ran as high as 7)856 per cent. (Senate Document, 
No. 259.) 

Numerous official investigations established the fact that 
the unprecedented profits of the Big Five packers were due 
to the special care and protection of Hoover — that it was 
the policy of the Food Administration that such corpora- 
tions should profit enormously at the expense of both the 
farmer and the public. The public was officially informed 
that packer profits were limited to five per cent. But 
Hoover gave his approval to an additional four per cent. 
profit, which was kept secret. On borrowed money — 
money ^'borrowed" from their own banks — the packers 
were allowed to collect an income not only to cover inter- 
est, but a profit also. When the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion recommended to the President that this additional 
profit be abolished. Hoover opposed the plan, and through 
his influence the report of the Federal Trade Commission 
was withheld for nearly a year after the armistice. 

The segregation of nearly a billion dollars' worth of 
stocks and bonds, industrial plants, and other business hold- 
ings, owned by Germans, might be defended as a war meas- 
ure. But the sale of such properties, privately, as a rule, 
and at prices far below their real value, is difficult to under- 
stand except as a means of bearing gifts to Wall Street. 

The government put an excess profits tax in the revenue 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 305 

bill at the beginning. This is not an evidence that Wall 
Street did not make money out of the war, but only official 
acknowledgement that it did. Private profits from the 
blood of our young men and the privation of our people 
were an integral part of the war policy, acknowledged and 
defined in the war revenue bills. 

In preparing the schedules, the government estimate of 
visible war profits to be harvested by American corpora- 
tions in 19 17 — collectable net gains over and above esti- 
mated gains of peace times — ^was four billion. 

In subjecting these billions to taxation, the Administra- 
tion pretended that it was compelling big business to as- 
sume its proportionate share of the war burdens. But 
while the war taxes weighed heavily upon the middle clas- 
ses, the tax laws were so framed, and their application so 
manipulated, that our money kings and our captains of 
industry went scot free. 

Their influence caused the striking out of the retroactive 
tax, intended to take a part of the 1916 profits. In 1916 
there had been a special tax on the manufacture of muni- 
tions; it was removed. Tariff schedules were revised up- 
ward, throwing a great weight upon the poor. Evasion 
was made easy by the Administration's policy of keeping 
tax statements secret, and its policy of combining profits 
taxes and income taxes in a single item. Corporations were 
permitted to make arbitrary deductions for war taxes to be 
subsequently paid, a procedure not contemplated by the law. 
They were even permitted to deduct stock dividends from 
statements of profit, and by this maneuver to wipe the item 
of war taxes completely from their books. 

The Administration even adopted the policy of paying 
the war taxes of favored corporations, either by taking the 
taxes into consideration in figuring prices on government 
contracts, or by engaging to pay such taxes itself, whatever 



3o6 Shall It Be Again? 

they might come to. The government agreed, in writing, 
to pay all increases of taxation appertaining to the Hog 
Island job. The nine hundred million odd a year "rental" 
paid by the government to the Transportation Trust, was 
not subject to a dollar of war tax. 

The upshot of the Administration's war policy toward 
business was that every dollar of taxes that seemed to be 
laid upon steel, copper, coal, and the other great industries 
of Morgan, Schwab, Vanderlip, Ryan, Lovett, et al., was 
passed along finally to the general public. 

In his appeal to business interests (July ii, 19 17), the 
President spoke of the contribution of our business men to 
the winning of the war as ^'a contribution that costs you 
neither a drop of blood nor a tear.^* He might have added : 
'^Nor a dollar^ For if the great corporations were given 
greater net profits, after all war tax payments, than they 
could have realized had the country remained at peace, it 
is obvious that they were permitted to escape absolutely any 
share whatever of the war burden. 

When it was over, the Administration was not above 
boasting that big business had been protected, aided, and 
strengthened by the war policies. (19^18 reports of Secre- 
tary of the Treasury and the Controller of the Currency.) 
The picture is well drawn in Lafrobe^s Weekly Market Re- 
view ^ May 16, 191 8 : 

The most remarkable situation that has ever existed in the United 
States since the prosperous days of President McKinley has developed 
as a result of the war. . . . The leaders of industry and finance are 
working hand in hand with the government, the steel companies 
are becoming partners of the government, and the railroads are ob- 
taining favors of which they never dreamed, with guaranteed earn- 
ings and very high rates for transportation. The War Finance 
Corporation is attending to finance requirements. . . . There is every 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 307 

indication that the shipbuilding plans of the government will be 
expanded and rushed at a great pace under Mr. Charles M. Schwab 
of Bethlehem Steel, and one of the first moves he made was to cancel 
the original Submarine Boat contract and arrange for a new one for 
160 ships on terms which admit of much larger profits. 

Finally, the Administration served as protector and press 
agent for the super-patriots while they got away with the 
people's money. 

It was the policy of the President to prevent public in- 
vestigations of profits, profiteering, and graft, by Congress, 
and, when the pressure for investigation was especially 
strong, to substitute therefor secret inquiries by the execu- 
tive departments. Such inquiries never passed beyond the 
control of the President. The evidence was never pub- 
lished; reports could be framed to suit the policy of the 
President, and publication even of reports was delayed at 
the will of the President. The President opposed all in- 
vestigations of the sort begun by either House, declared 
that "nothing helpful" was likely to come out of them, 
charged them with causing "delay and confusion," and in 
the end succeeded in suppressing all of them. 

Yet had it not been for these abortive hearings, the pub- 
lic might never have heard of the Hog Island steal, the 
shoe and clothing grafts, or sugar profiteering. It would 
have heard less of packer thievery, still less of the aircraft 
scandal, and perhaps nothing at all of a hundred other 
things reflecting upon the patriotism and the common hon- 
esty not only of business patriots, but of army and navy 
officers, and even of members of the President's cabinet. 

The policy of hush illustrates one of the uses of autocracy 
in war. The policy could not have been carried out suc- 
cessfully without far-reaching usurpations on the part of 
the Executive. The looting of the Treasury mentioned 
herein is only a hint of what actually occurred. Unless the 



3o8 Shall It Be Again? 

government should continue as completely under the con- 
trol of high finance as during the war, we may expect to be 
regaled with scandals for years to come.^ 

As a part of the policy of hush, criminal prosecution of 
our financial leaders was taboo. The entire system of han- 
dling government contracts was in gross violation of the 
common law and of the statutes. Honest enforcement of 
the law would probably have required wholesale prosecu- 
tions not only of dollar-a-year men, but also of government 
officials who gave the system their sanction. When the 
criminal nature of these transactions was mentioned to the 
Attorney-General, he placed his stamp of approval upon 
them, declaring them "matters of national policy rather 
than a legal question." (Report of Chairman Graham, of 
the House Committee on War Department Expenditures, 
July 7,1919.) 

Federal police protection of captains of industry was 
carried so far as to require the postponement of prosecu- 
tions pending when war was declared. Newspapers of 

1 Although the Harding Administration attempted no general expose of 
war-time thievery, the veil was lifted slightly, now and then, in response to 
political expediency. For example, in a letter boasting of the accomplish- 
ments of Republican rule, August 29, 1921, President Harding said in part: 
"Our government . . . expended between five and six billion dollars for the 
manufacture of aircraft, artillery and artillery ammunition. To show for 
this expenditure, it has been officially testified that less than 200 American- 
made airplanes or 200 American-made cannon ever went into action on 
the fighting front of the war, while not more than one per cent, of the am- 
munition expended by American artillery was, according to the same testi- 
mony, of American manufacture. Approximately $3,500,000,000 has been 
poured out under the direction of the Shipping Board, yet I have from the 
War Department the curious bit of information that only one vessel built by 
the Shipping Board ever carried any American troops to fight in Europe. 
This was a cargo boat, the 'Liberty,' which, according to War Depart- 
ment records, in October, 1917, carried approximately fifty soldiers to Eu- 
rope. These were the only soldiers, according to the record, that were 
transported to Europe before the armistice in a vessel built by the Ship- 
ping Board. According to the most conservative estimate which has come 
to me, the Railroad Administration has cost the government between one 
and a quarter and one and a half billion dollars, and the end is not 
yet." 



Profit-Seeker and Profit-Server 309 

January 3, 19 18, carried a dispatch from Washington read- 
ing, in part: 

Attorney-General Gregory to-day asked the Supreme Court to de- 
fer argument on the seven large anti-trust suits pending. This action, 
Solicitor-General Davis explained, was taken because the government 
wants cooperation from the business interests of the country. The 
suits postponed are those against the United Shoe Machinery Com- 
pany, the American Can Company, the International Harvester 
Company, the U. S. Steel Corporation, the Eastman Kodak Com- 
pany, the Quaker Oats Company, and the Corn Products Refining 
Company. 

To this dispatch the Tunes appended a local news note 
saying that, upon the information's reaching Wall Street, 
U. S. Steel Common shot upward, closing the day with a 
net advance of five points, while industrial stocks generally 
were in increased demand. 

Meanwhile, to the government press agency, embellish- 
ing the fame of the "super-patriots" as model citizens, 
were frequently added the voices of members of the Presi- 
dent's official family, and at times the voice of the Presi- 
dent. But this was not enough. Hand in hand with the 
policy of praise went the policy of repression. Mr. Burle- 
son laid down, as a condition for the enjoyment of second- 
class mailing privileges, that "Papers must not say that the 
government is controlled by Wall Street." (Oct. 9, 
19 1 7.) At the same time, the Attorney-General was plead- 
ing for more repressive legislation, hinting that it was not 
sufficiently easy to imprison persons for calling attention to 
the peculiar relations between big business and the govern- 
ment. 

It was the President's policy that It should be illegal to 
impugn the motives of the men among whom the govern- 
ment was distributing our billions. It was the President's 
policy that it should be illegal to say that ours was a busi- 



310 Shall It Be Again? 

ness man's war, provided you were against the war. At 
the same time it was the President's policy that it should 
be perfectly legal to make exactly the same statement, pro- 
vided you favored the war. "The business plea to business 
men" was an approved and respectable part of the patriotic 
propaganda. It was voiced, at times, even by the Presi- 
dent himself: ^'And every man in every business must know 
by this time that his whole future fortune lies in the bal- 
anced' (Urbana, Jan. 31, 19 18.) 



XXX 

SECRET OF THE WAR PROFITS 

Although the announcement of President Wilson's war 
policy toward business was in practice construed as per- 
mitting the greatest profits in the history of the country, 
it was capable of being construed as permitting no profits 
at all. Had the generosity of the War Administration 
been, in fact, confined strictly to satisfying the four consid- 
erations mentioned, — wages, upkeep, management, and 
necessary expansions for war purposes — then its war policy 
toward business might not be open to criticism. But a 
very large share of the money abstracted from the Treas- 
ury was not devoted to any of these specified purposes, but 
was diverted into an entirely different channel. 

Not one dollar of the nine hundred million odd net, 
which the government guaranteed the railroad corpora- 
tions, was devoted, or intended to be devoted, either to sus- 
taining the efficiency of the railroad industry, providing a 
living for those who conducted the railroads, paying wages, 
or expanding the railroad properties. Salaries and wages 
were paid out of the operating income, and were covered 
by rate increases to the public. Maintenance and expan- 
sion were attended to with the half billion dollar "revolv- 
ing fund," and the funds of the War Finance Corporation, 
both appropriated by Congress. The $945,000,000 was 
an entirely different item, for an entirely different purpose. 
It was net profit. The part of this guaranteed net income 
over and above the sum that would have been available for 
dividends had America remained at peace — several hun- 

311 



312 Shall It Be Again? 

dred million dollars — must be set down as riches coined by 
the shedding of America's young blood upon European bat- 
tlefields. 

What is said of the railroad industry applies with equal 
force to steel, copper, coal, oil, shipping, and every other 
like enterprise. In each instance, the War Administra- 
tion provided the money not only for four items, sala- 
ries, wages, maintenance, and expansion, but for a fifth 
item, profit. 

The necessity of satisfying the first four items, as a con- 
dition for the successful conduct of the military operations, 
may be cheerfully conceded — provided the fourth item, ex- 
pansion, were satisfied by loans exclusively. But what is 
the secret of the fifth item? 

"They are giving their lives; will you not give your 
money?" This famous appeal was shouted at us by the 
"super-patriots" themselves. But it is obvious that no 
American who possessed more money at the end of the war 
than at the beginning can be said to have contributed one 
penny to it. The fact cannot be evaded that our leaders 
of industry and finance were richer at the end of the war 
than at the beginning, and that they became so through the 
operation of a policy unswervingly followed by the War 
Administration — the policy of paying them prices that per- 
mitted them, after every war exigency was met, to add bil- 
lions of dollars to their permanent fortunes. 

Why was it the policy of President Wilson that Wall 
Street should make a lot of money out of the war? Huge 
profits in war time have apparently been accepted by a 
great many persons as a normal, necessary, and Innocent 
phenomenon. But it would seem that if American finance 
and industry had been mobilized and utilized with a view to 
its most effective use in war no dividends whatever would 
have been allowed, no p>Hng up of great fortunes, no in- 



Secret of the War Profits 313 

crease in anybody's wealth, least of all the wealth of those 
who already possessed the most. 

It is true that the influence of our captains of industry- 
was continually exerted in favor of higher prices — and of 
other special favors to themselves — and that the copper 
and coal producers particularly were accused of conspiring 
to limit production as a means to gouging more money out 
of the government. 

But evidence of the power of these gentlemen to compel 
the Administration to meet their wishes is lacking. If the 
War Administration was physically powerful enough to 
conscript an army for the trenches, surely it was physically 
powerful enough to conscript industry and finance, includ- 
ing the personal services of managers and directors, and to 
pay to industry and finance — as to the men in the trenches — 
the money necessary to make them most efficient for war 
purposes, and no more. 

The most plausible excuse for exorbitant profits paid 
to the large mining and industrial corporations was that, 
in order to attain the maximum production possible, it was 
necessary to bring every available plant into operation, high- 
cost plants as well as low-cost plants, and that prices paid 
by the government had, therefore, to be based on costs in 
the highest-cost plants. Thus the owners of the low-cost 
plants — who were none other than our richest citizens — 
came into huge profits as if by accident. 

But why was this pretty scheme adopted? Would it 
not have been possible to put into effect, instead, a system. 
Discing all plants, whether of high or low cost, on a basis 
of all efficiency and no profit? 

If every man conscripted for the trenches had been paid 
twenty dollars per day net for his services, he would still 
not have been treated relatively so well as the possessors 
of America's largest fortunes. 



314 Shall It Be Again? 

The secret of our magnificent generosity to Wall Street 
during the war — and the secret of the war itself — is to be 
found, not in any special war conditions, but in a govern- 
mental policy pursued from the beginning. It had always 
been the policy of President Wilson to serve the special 
interests of Wall Street, regardless of the general welfare. 

No American President ever more frankly confessed him- 
self a servant of business than Wilson. No American Pres- 
ident ever more completely met the wishes of big business 
than Wilson. 

Although Wilson went to the White House in the role of 
a radical, solemnly pledged to a great programme of re- 
form and attack upon special privilege, he did not carry out 
that programme in any important particular. A part of 
the programme intended to protect the public against the 
extortions of monopoly, he repudiated; another part he put 
through in such form that it turned out to be a service to 
monopoly, instead of a check upon it. 

Although the Baltimore platform, upon which Woodrow 
Wilson became President of the United States, pronounced 
for ''the vigorous enforcement of the criminal as well as 
the civil law against trusts and trust officials," and "the 
enactment of such additional legislation as may be neces- 
sary to make it impossible for a private monopoly to ex- 
ist"; and although Wilson endorsed this proposition both 
before and after election; neither his new "anti-trust" legis- 
lation nor his "enforcement" of the old, put an end to any 
monopoly. On the other hand. President Wilson, after 
prolonged efforts, procured the passage of laws, exempting 
corporations engaged in foreign commerce from all re- 
strictions provided by the anti-trust laws. 

Although the transportation monopoly was especially 
singled out for discipline by the Democratic party and its 
candidate, and although candidate Wilson pronounced in 



Secret of the War Profits 315 

favor of lower rates, from one year after taking office 
President Wilson was almost constantly working for, and 
openly urging, higher rates. After having been responsi- 
ble for one rate Increase, the President twice urged upon 
Congress "explicit approval, by the Congress, of the con- 
sideration of the Interstate Commerce Commission of an 
increase In freight rates." (Words of the message of Dec. 
19 16.) As early as November, 19 14, the Wall Street 
Journal acknowledged: "So far as he properly could, he 
[President Wilson] has assisted the railroads." 

Although, In the programme of reform upon which 
Wilson rode Into office, the high Republican tariff was de- 
nounced as "the principal cause of the unequal distribu- 
tion of wealth," and as "a system of taxation which makes 
the rich richer and the poor poorer" ; and although an Im- 
mediate revision downward, such as would reduce the cost 
of living, was promised; under Wilson the revision was ac- 
complished in such a way as to reduce neither the cost of 
living nor the profits of protected industries. Moreover, 
guided by Wilson, the Democratic party enacted an "anti- 
dumping law," which, In effect, built a barbed wire fence 
around the top of the tariff wall; and under cover of the 
war emergency, it 'enacted, to employ the words of Con- 
gressman Kitchin, "the highest tariff ever written on the 
books." 

Although the Baltimore platform carried a promise of 
currency reform guaranteeing "absolute security to the pub- 
lic" and "complete protection" from "the misuse of the 
power that wealth gives to those who possess it," the Wil- 
son Federal Reserve Act only made more secure the monop- 
olistic control of the country's credit that is so well de- 
scribed in the Pujo Committee report on the Money Trust. 
Currency inflation, made easy by the Federal Reserve 
scheme, greatly facilitated the war-time looting of the coun- 



3i6 Shall It Be Again? 

try, and became one of the causes of famine prices. The 
first claim for this law was that it would give us an "elastic 
currency." The Federal Reserve currency proved elastic 
enough in the stretching, but when the day arrived for 
deflation, the "unstretching" was not so easy a process. 

Although the Baltimore platform pledged candidate 
Wilson to conservation, promising "such additional legis- 
lation as may be necessary" to prevent the country's natural 
resources from "being wasted or absorbed by special or 
privileged interests," under Wilson no bona fide conserva- 
tion laws were enacted. On the other hand. President 
Wilson conducted a long fight for the so-called Shields and 
Water Power bills, and the oil and mineral lands-leasing 
bills, designed to open up the last of such resources to a 
raid of the great exploiting concerns, on terms violating 
every accepted principle of conservation. 

It is not the purpose here to go far into President Wil- 
son's peace-time record, nor even to enumerate all the 
pledges of the Baltimore platform that became "scraps of 
paper" in his hands. Passed over is the pledge not to 
stand for a second term, the pledge not to encroach upon 
either of the other two branches of government, the Pan- 
ama Canal tolls reversal, the pledge to suppress gambling 
in agricultural products, the pledge for an adequate system 
of rural credits. Only enough of this record is recalled 
to make it quite clear that the war-time favors to Wall 
Street embodied no new policy. 

Wilson's own testimony on this point may be of interest. 

As early as January 20, 19 14, President Wilson an- 
nounced to his Congress: "The antagonism between busi- 
ness and government is over." On signing the Federal 
Reserve Act, he said: 

I myself have always felt, when the Democratic party was criti- 
cized, as not knowing how to serve the business interests of the 



Secret of the War Profits 317 

country, that there was no use in replying to that in words. The 
only satisfactory reply was in action. We have written the first 
chapter of that reply. 

June 25, 19 14, in a speech before the Virginia Editorial 
Association, the President sketched his entire legislative 
programme as one of "beneficence" to business, carried out 
"under the advice" of business men. "When the pro- 
gramme is finished," he promised, "there will be a boom 
in business in this country such as we have never witnessed 
in the United States. . . . Business can get and will get 
what it can get in no other way." 

On the December 8 following, the President informed his 
Congress that the above promises had been fulfilled. 
"The road at last lies clear before business," said he. "It 
is the road to ungrudged, unclouded success." 

Again, January 29, 19 15, the President was voicing the 
following happy assurances: "Nobody is going to be afraid 
of or suspicious of any business merely because it is big." 
Accordingly, in the St. Louis platform appeared a number 
of strange paragraphs, the like of which had never before 
been seen in a Democratic platform. One such paragraph 
reads : 

We must now remove, so far as possible, every remaining element 
of unrest and uncertainty from the path of the business men of 
America, and secure for them a continued period of quiet, assured, 
and confident prosperity. 

Promises of this character notwithstanding, Democratic 
spellbinders followed their time-worn practice of telling 
the people that Wall Street was lined up against their can- 
didate. Evidence of this is lacking. Wall Street looked 
on with singular complacence. The reason was disclosed 
by the Wall Street Investment and Mining News^ in its 
June issue: 



31 8 Shall It Be Again? 

The Presidential nominations are most satisfactory from a financial 
standpoint. No matter what a man's political preference may be, he 
should be satisfied with the choice as far as business is concerned. 
Wall Street responded nobly. 

In the campaign, indeed, President Wilson repeatedly 
pointed to his record as an argument that the business vote 
should fall to him. In his speech of acceptance, for exam- 
ple: 

The tariff has been revised, not on the principle of repelling foreign 
trade, but upon the principle of encouraging it. . . . The laws 
against trusts have been clarified by definition, with a view to mak- 
ing it plain that they were not directed against big business, . . . and 
a Trade Commission has been created with powers of guidance and 
accommodation, which have relieved business men of unfounded fears 
and set them upon the road of hopeful and confident enterprise. . . . 
Effective measures have been taken for the recreation of an American 
merchant marine. ... So much have we done for business. What 
other party has understood the task so well or executed it so intelli- 
gently and energetically? 



XXXI 

WILSON IMPERIALISM 

Just as it Is necessary, In seeking the true causes of the 
European quarrel, to go back a space in the history of the 
contending countries, so, in order to determine the real 
motives for our own participation, we must devote some 
attention to the nature of American governmental policies 
even before the European war began. 

Attention has been drawn to governmental service to 
domestic business. We now turn to foreign business. All 
foreign business of American citizens has come to be spoken 
of as "foreign trade," especially by persons Interested In 
promoting it — perhaps because the term has an innocent 
sound. 

What has Wall Street wanted most of America, on be- 
half of its foreign "trade?" 

First, a great merchant marine; second, a greater navy 
and army; third, legislation especially framed to "encour- 
age" and "protect" foreign business; fourth, an Executive 
committed to aggressive support of foreign business; fifth, 
a "disciplined" nation. 

These are what may well be termed the permanent, as 
distinct from the immediate, advantages accruing from 
American belligerency. They are the instrumentalities of 
imperialistic exploitation. 

Agitation for government subsidies, as a means to creat- 
ing a large merchant marine under the American flag, had 
been carried on for several decades without results. The 
Japanese peril had been raised annually. In an effort to 

319 



320 Shall It Be Again? 

bring about substantial increases in the army and navy. In 
the year 1902, the Navy League was founded by a group 
of millionaires interested in contracts for armor plate, pow- 
der, munitions, and foreign financing. It carried on an un- 
ceasing propaganda for a huge navy and for a govern- 
ment policy of employing the navy to back up the under- 
takings of American financiers abroad. In the year of the 
European outbreak, the National Foreign Trades Council 
was organized by the heads of large banks and industrial cor- 
porations, many of whom were already prominent as foun- 
ders of, directors of, or contributors to, the Navy League. 

The ^'publicity" of such organizations found its way into 
the news and editorial columns of the newspapers, into the 
speeches of Senators and Congressmen, into university 
classrooms, into the pulpit, into the popular magazines, 
into the book world. Due to such influence, the Monroe 
Doctrine was given a more and more aggressive interpreta- 
tion, inimical to the sovereignty of our Latin American 
neighbors. 

The circumstances of the European war rendered these 
purposes a hundred times more desirable — as well as ap- 
parently capable of realization in the fullest measure. By 
the end of 19 15, Wall Street had seized a goodly share of 
the foreign trade of belligerents, particularly of Germany. 
How was that trade to be retained and extended? New 
York was in a fair way to supplant London as the world's 
financial centre. How was that position to be secured and 
made permanent? The billions of war profits, dazzling 
in themselves, also opened up a dazzling future. To-day 
they were bursting American banks. What should be done 
with them to-morrow? 

The answer came from the Navy League, from the For- 
eign Trade Council, from the American Manufacturers' 
Export Association, and the other organizations formed to 



Wilson Imperialism 321 

take advantage of the situation. The answer was that 
there are no profits equal to the profits of imperialism; that 
to-morrow American dollars must be competing abroad 
with sovereigns and francs ; that to-morrow America would 
be sharing "places in the sun" with the great imperial pow- 
ers — provided political America would do its part. 

In announcing the launching of the American Interna- 
tional Corporation, Chairman Vanderlip urged upon his as- 
sociates the necessity of "arousing the Interest and securing 
the cooperation of the entire country." It was necessary, 
explained Vanderlip, "to make it [the business of interna- 
tional finance] a national undertaking, and to appeal to the 
confidence, the enterprise, and the patriotism of the Ameri- 
can people." President Farrell of the U. S. Steel Corpor- 
ation seconded the motion. The public must be taught, he 
said, "that foreign trade is a vital element in domestic pros- 
perity." 

The European war, which brought inconceivable suf- 
fering to so many millions of human beings, presented it- 
self to Wall Street as a financial opportunity^ infinitely be- 
yond its wildest dreams of former days. Said Mr. Vander- 
lip to a Chicago audience of bankers (Dec. i6, 191 6) 

Never since the beginning of time was there such an opportunity. 
Never did a people have before them a choice of two roads that led 
to such different destinations. Never did a nation have flung at it 
so many gifts of opportunity — a flood tide of wealth, of opportunity, 
which, added to our resources, puts upon the people of this country 
a responsibility of trusteeship of the world. . . . We have 
suddenly by a world tragedy been made heir to the greatest estate of 
opportunity that imagination ever pictured. The last twenty years 
have seen a fivefold development. I would hesitate to suggest what 
the next twenty years may see, if we rightly manage this heritage. 

"Our future for many years to come," said Vanderlip, 
in the same speech, "will be governed by the soundness of 



322 Shall It Be Again? 

the public mind and governmental actions in the next score 
of months." 

This sort of propaganda raged throughout the year 
19 16, and reached its climax in the final weeks before 
America declared war. Following the Paris Economic 
Conference in June, 19 16, the press was filled with horri- 
ble forebodings lest our rosy destiny might not be realized. 
The "war after the war" was presented as a peril hardly less 
sinister than the German invasion peril paraded before us 
a year later. Oh woe! What should be done? 

Wall Street told us what should be done, not too impetu- 
ously at first, but feehng its way. Even the National Se- 
curity League did not at once tell us that the solution was 
to declare war on Germany. At the luncheon discussions 
of the war after the war, held by bankers, manufacturers, 
and merchants, daily throughout the country, exhortations 
to prepare for our great opportunities overseas, advocacy 
of compulsory military training, the beauties of a merchant 
marine under the American flag, demands for sterner meas- 
ures in Mexico, rhetorical flights upon American destiny, 
and praise of the Monroe Doctrine, were inextricably 
mixed — and equally applauded. 

Finally, military alliance with the Entente came to be 
mentioned in the same breath with financial alliance. Evi- 
dence that our allies-to-be intended to wage commercial war 
on us, after the war, was used, more or less openly, as an 
argument to ally ourselves with them in order to get on the 
band-wagon. The last step was to bellow for the vindica- 
tion of American honor, hoist the German peril, and call 
for war. 

After war was safely declared, the purpose to obtain, 
through the circumstances of the war, the imperialistic ad- 
vantages long sought by Wall Street, was frequently ac- 
knowledged. We find W. S. Kies, vice-president of the 



Wilson Imperialism 323 

National City Bank, and one of Vanderllp's right-hand pro- 
pagandists, assuring friends (The Jmericas, Apr., igij) : 

The entry of the United States into the war, and our definite align- 
ment with the Alhes will undoubtedly be of Influence in obtaining for 
us preferential treatment [in the economic struggle after the war]. 

We find such men as James A. Farrell, president of the 
U. S. Steel Corporation, saying: 

As we have willingly devoted our lives and our fortunes to the 
cause of the Allies ... it would be a natural corollary to this joint 
enterprise that there should evolve at the end of the war a definite 
plan of international cooperation in the financing of foreign enter- 
prises. (Foreign Trades Council Convention, Apr., 191 8.) 

Also, same speech; 

The gigantic task confronting the United States means not only 
that the Allies must be protected against defeat, . . . but that . . . 
our great resources should be fully utilized for the restoration of the 
decadent industry of shipbuilding. 

Our war "for the right of nations, great and small, to 
choose their own way of life and obedience," did not see 
the end of the plot to choose Mexico's way of life and 
obedience for her, but only brought that plot nearer to ma- 
turity. 

Now glance at the government's share in this business. 

From the beginning President Wilson was a propagan- 
dist for foreign trade. In his first Inaugural address, we 
find the words: "Our domestic markets no longer suffice. 
We need foreign markets." And In his first message to 
Congress: "We must build up trade, especially foreign 
trade." His public advocacy of government aid, in the 
building of a huge merchant marine, dates from the first 
months of his tenure. His first shipping bill having failed, 



324 Shall It Be Again? 

we find him, the following year, urging a similar pro- 
gramme upon Congress. (Dec. 7, 19 15.) Here is the 
plan and argument, in part: 

The task of building up an adequate merchant marine for America, 
private capital must ultimately undertake . . . and it seems to me 
a manifest dictate of wisdom that we should promptly remove every 
legal obstacle that may stand in the way. . . . But . . . something 
must be done at once . . . and it is evident that only the govern- 
ment can undertake such beginnings and assume the initial risks. 
When the risk has passed ... the government may v^dthdraw. But 
it cannot omit to begin. It should take the first steps, and take them 
at once. . . . With a view to meeting these present necessities of 
our commerce, and availing ourselves at the earliest possible mo- 
ment of the present unparalleled opportunity of linking the two 
Americas together in bonds of mutual interest and service — an op- 
portunity which may never return if we miss it now — proposals will 
be made to the present Congress, for the purchase or construction of 
ships to be owned and directed by the government, similar to those 
made to the last Congress. 

The President's bill, introduced forthwith, embodied the 
policy ultimately carried out, that the government should 
pay for the shipc and afterwards turn them over to private 
enterprise, either through lease or sale. 

The President succeeded finally in putting through his 
shipping legislation, but only as a part of the preparedness 
programme of 19 16. The policy itself was realized only as 
a part of the war programme, when, in the words of Far- 
rell, "our great resources" were, in fact, "fully utilized for 
the restoration of the decadent industry of shipbuilding." 

In a speech before the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 
February 3, 19 15, President Wilson said: 

The anti-trust laws of the United States apparently make it il- 
legal for merchants in the United States to form combinations for 



Wilson Imperialism 325 

the purpose of strengthening themselves in taking advantage of the 
opportunities of foreign competition. That is a very serious matter. 
... I want to know how these cooperative methods can be adopted 
for the benefit of everybody who wants to use them, and I say 
frankly, if I can be shown that, I am for them. 

The Webb Bill — exempting combinations engaged in 
foreign trade from the operation of the anti-trust laws — 
was accordingly Introduced, and In every subsequent session 
of Congress it was personally urged by the President in 
messages or public statements. It failed repeatedly, due 
to opposition to It as class legislation for the very rich. 
The President was finally able to put It through only under 
cover of the war. Meanwhile, so Impatient was the Execu- 
tive In this matter that he put the provisions of the bill 
Into operation by flat, more than a year before It passed 
Congress. 

Many other bits of legislation designed to promote for- 
eign trade were enacted at the Instigation of President 
Wilson, as we approached war, and during the fighting It- 
self. In urging the Water Power Bill, one of the Adminis- 
tration's arguments, signed by Secretaries Baker, Lane, 
and Houston (Mar. 3, 1918), ran thus: "There Is also 
need of legislation. In order that time may be given to pre- 
pare for the developments that must take place after the 
close of the war, If the United States Is to maintain its 
proper place In world trade." 

Under the guidance of Wilson, the Democratic party, 
In the 19 1 6 platform, pledged Itself to the essential prin- 
ciple of Imperialism In the following words: 

We favor ... a fixed policy for the continuous development of 
a navy worthy to support the great naval traditions of the United 
States, and fully equal to the international tasks which the United 
States hopes and expects to take part in performing. . . . The cir- 
cumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities for inter- 



326 Shall It Be Again? 

national action which no former generation can have foreseen. We 
hold it to be the duty of the United States to use its power, not only 
to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests 
throughout the world. . . . The American government should pro- 
tect American citizens in their rights not only at home, but abroad, 
and any country having a government should be held to strict ac- 
countability for any wrongs done them, either to person or property. 

In spite of this, during the campaign, President Wilson 
charged his opponents with desiring to get in control of the 
government in order ^^to put the army and navy of the Uni- 
ted States back of their financial enterprises in Mexico and 
throughout the world.'' (Oct. i6, 191 6.) During his 
preparedness-tour addresses, as has been seen, the Presi- 
dent had made it a question of national honor to put the 
army and navy back of the business enterprises of Ameri- 
can citizens abroad. 

Said Wilson at Shadow Lawn, on the eve of the election 
(Nov. 4) : 

The United States will never again be what it has been. The 
United States was once in the enjoyment of what we used to call 
'splendid isolation.' . . . Now . . . we have become not the debt- 
ors but the creditors of the world, and in what other nations used to 
play in promoting industries which extended as wide as the world 
itself, we are playing the leading part. We can determine to a 
large extent who is to be financed and who is not to be financed. 
... So it does not suffice to look back, as some gentlemen are look- 
ing, back over their shoulders . . . for now we are in the great 
drift of humanity which is to determine the politics of every coun- 
try in the world. With this outlook, is it worth while to stop to 
think of party advantage? 

Such quotations help to explain why our international 
bankers were not in the least alarmed, in 1916, when our 
pacifists and Liberals united to reelect Wilson because "he 
kept us out of war." 



Wilson Imperialism 327 

Further explanation Is found In the course which the 
President was then actually pursuing, not merely In the 
diplomatic disputes with belligerent countries, and In the 
matter of preparation for war, but In his dealings with our 
neighbors, near and far. The antl-Imperlallst can find a 
complete vindication of his position, In the speeches and 
state papers of Wilson, but the Imperialist finds equal com- 
fort for his views In the same quarter. The record of 
action win determine the real nature of his foreign policy. 
Imperialism Is not Imperialism unless It has teeth — the 
teeth of armed public forces behind the smille of diplomacy. 
Did Wilson's policy In action differ In any essential from 
the policy of Imperial England, Imperial Germany, and 
Imperialistic France? 

It differed on but two occasions, and In each of the two 
Instances the action was later reversed. 

The second of these two Instances, relating to Wall 
Street loans to belligerent governments, has already been 
mentioned. (Chapter VII.) The first had to do with a 
loan to China. Soon after coming to power. President 
Wilson refused diplomatic support to the Wall Street end 
of a proposed "consortium" loan to the Chinese govern- 
ment, in which financiers of England, France, Germany, 
Russia, Japan, and the United States had arranged to par- 
ticipate. As a result of Wilson's declaration that the 
scheme "touches very nearly the sovereignty of China,'* 
the American bankers withdrew, and Wilson's name was 
hailed throughout the world as that of a genuine antl- 
ImperlaHst. But In 19 19, under the aegis of Wilson, the 
American bankers went Into a reorganized China consor- 
tium, paralleling In every principle and purpose the old one. 

The President, Indeed, had reversed himself as early as 
19 16 on this particular question. November 16 of that 
year, a State Department letter pledging diplomatic sup- 



328 Shall It Be Again? 

port to a loan by American bankers, and the enterprises 
behind it, was given to the press. It read: 

Gentlemen : 

I have read the contract between yourselves and the republic 
of China with reference to a loan of $5,000,000 for a period 
of three years, and I have to say in reply to your oral request for a 
statement of the policy of this department, respecting such loans, that 
the Department of State is always gratified to see the republic of 
China receive financial assistance from citizens of the United States, 
and that it is the policy of this department, now as in the past, to 
give all proper support and protection to the legitimate enterprises 
abroad of American citizens. 

I am, gentlemen, your obedient servant, 

Robert Lansing. 

That these words were not a mere polite "bon voyage'' 
to the adventuring American dollars was soon made mani- 
fest. The particular loan, to which the published state- 
ment of the Secretary of State referred, was secured by a 
mortgage upon wine and tobacco taxes. Another loan, 
floated at about the same time, involved a contract for the 
construction of a railroad and the improvement of a canal 
by the Siems-Carey Railway & Canal Company, a subsid- 
iary of the American International Corporation; in other 
words, it was tied to a government concession promising 
large profits. 

In pursuance of its policy of establishing a modernized 
Monroe Doctrine for the benefit of Japanese capitalists in 
the Far East, the Japanese government promptly made rep- 
resentations to the Wilson Government, objecting to the 
first loan on the ground that it was political in its nature, 
and to the second on the ground that the enterprise came 
into conflict with concessions held by Japanese citizens. 

The French, Russian, and British governments, at the 
instance of French, Russian, and British financiers, regis- 



Wilson Imperialism 329 

tered similar protests, but the sharpest issue was made by 
the Japanese. The diplomatic correspondence is still a se- 
cret, but the attitude of our government was sufficiently re- 
vealed to make it quite certain that Lansing's term, "all 
proper diplomatic support and protection," meant conven- 
tional support and protection, nothing less. 

The crisis brought Viscount Ishii to America on his 
"special mission." How near the two governments came 
to an open break over a profiteering contract gouged out 
of the weak and needy Chinese, the American public may 
never know. The signed statement of Lansing, published 
colncldently with the so-called Lanslng-Ishii Agreement 
(Nov. 7, 19 17), suggests that actual hostilities were nearer 
than any one not on the Inside could have suspected. The 
agreement dissipated that particular crisis, and the repre- 
sentatives of both governments expressed themselves as 
delighted. What the real understanding was remained a 
matter of speculation; for the published version, to any 
one familiar with the processes of secret diplomacy, is ob- 
viously a blind. 

The published version appears, on its face, however, to 
record a victory for Japan, as it registers a recognition by 
the United States of Japanese special interests in China. 
It is self-evidently hypocritical; for, while professing to 
guarantee the Integrity and sovereignty of China, It vio- 
lates It, and was protested against for this reason by the 
Chinese government. 

The Lanslng-Ishli Agreement is a conventionally impe- 
rialistic document, arrived at by conventionally Imperialistic 
paths. The character of the new consortium Is the same. 
These things begin to show how far America has gone 
afield to exploit weaker countries and to risk future war 
through competition in such business with the Old World 
predatory powers. 



XXXII 

MEXICO 

For the completed picture of our recent imperialism, it is 
necessary to look nearer home. In words we find Presi- 
dent Wilson playing two roles here, as elsewhere. 

Before we Injected ourselves Into European affairs, Pres- 
ident Wilson had promised equality to Latin America: 
"All the governments of America stand, so far as we are 
concerned, upon a footing of genuine equality and unques- 
tioned independence." (Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 
19 1 5.) Yet the following month (Jan. 27, 19 16), he was 
telling us: "What America has to fear, if she has anything 
to fear, are Indirect, roundabout, flank movements upon her 
regnant position in the western hemisphere" — and sugges- 
ted a willingness to fight to maintain such position. But 
how can a government claiming a "regnant position" among 
a group of nations also profess to stand for "genuine equal- 
ity?" 

In his Mobile speech (Oct. 27, 19 13), President Wilson 
revealed a clear understanding of the conventional imperial- 
istic devices through which weak countries nowadays are 
drawn under the dominion of the strong, and even promised 
the Latin American countries emancipation from such sub- 
jection: 

There is one peculiarity about the hlstor}^ of the Latin American 
states which I am sure they are keenly aware of. You hear of 'con- 
cessions' to foreign capitalists in Latin America. You do not hear 
of concessions to foreign capitalists in the United States, . . . and 
states that are obliged, because their territory does not lie within 

330 



Mexico 331 

the main field of modern enterprise and action, to grant concessions, 
are in this condition, that foreign interests are apt to dominate their 
domestic affairs, a condition of affairs always dangerous and apt to be- 
come intolerable. What these states are going to see, therefore, is 
an emancipation from the subordination, which has been inevitable, 
to foreign enterprise. . . . They have had harder bargains driven with 
them in the matter of loans than any other peoples in the world. 
Interest has been exacted of them that has not been exacted of any- 
body else, because the risk was said to be greater ; and then securities 
were taken that destroyed that risk — an admirable arrangement for 
those who were forcing the terms! I rejoice in nothing so much 
as the prospect that they will now be emancipated from these con- 
ditions. 

Pledges of this character were repeated periodically 
through the next five years. Yet when, in July, 19 16, Sen- 
ator LaFollette offered an amendment to the Naval Ap- 
propriation Bill providing that none of the ships authorized 
therein should be used ^'in any manner to coerce or compel 
the collection of any pecuniary claim of any kind, class 
or nature^ or to enforce any claim of right to any grant or 
concession for or on behalf of any private citizen, copart- 
nership, or corporation, of the United States,^' the amend- 
ment did not meet with Presidential approval, and it was 
lost. Moreover, in opposing it, Senator Lewis, the Demo- 
cratic "whip," told his colleagues that if they voted for it 
they voted ^'to iinpeach the Administration of President 
Wilson/' 

Where did the Senator get that? 

From Wilson's record in Latin America, particularly in 
Santo Domingo, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico. 

Americans know. In a hazy way, that under "antl-Imperla- 
llst" Wilson we undertook a military occupation of Santo 
Domingo and Haiti, maintained American forces perma- 
nently In Nicaragua, and perpetrated two notable invasions 



332 Shall It Be Again? 

of Mexico. Have they duly reflected that each of these 
four countries won its Independence by means similar to 
those by which the American repubhc won its independence ; 
that they were recognized as sovereign and independent 
powers by the United States; that war was not declared 
against any of them; that an act of invasion constitutes an 
act of war; that, In sending armed public forces Into these 
countries, the President not only violated the letter and 
spirit of international law, and the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution of the United States, but that he made a mock- 
cry of every pretense of adherence to the principle of the 
equalit}'' of nations? 

What was the nature and purpose of President Wilson's 
Mexican policy? The President himself gave answers ir- 
reconcilable one with another. 

On the same day that he was giving to Congress the most 
solemn pledge of "scrupulous regard to the sovereignty and 
Independence of Mexico," he was wiring our consuls to 
threaten the Mexicans with intervention. While assuring 
Mexico and the world that he was concerned solely for the 
Interests of Mexico, he was telling Congress that the for- 
tunes of Americans in that country would be well looked 
after. Although at one time he repudiated the big brother 
role for America, at other times he urged it as an excuse 
for his Mexican meddling. Time after time he told his 
audiences that Mexico had a right to take as long as she 
liked In settling her affairs; meanwhile he was telling Mex- 
ico she would better hurry or he would step In and do the 
settling. While pledging himself before the American 
people never to coerce Mexico, he was employing all forms 
of coercion, including verbal threats which contradicted his 
pledges. While promising the American people not to 
overwhelm Mexico with force, he was threatening to over- 



Mexico 333 

whelm the strongest and most popular Mexican party with 
force. When, while professing to oppose Huerta, he 
placed an embargo on arms, causing greater embarrassment 
to Huerta's enemies than to Huerta, he defended the action 
as in accordance with "the best practice of nations in the 
matter of neutrality," but, when he raised the same em- 
bargo, he characterized it as "a departure from the ac- 
cepted practices of neutrality." To the American people 
he pledged himself "eventually" to fight American conces- 
sionaires in Mexico; eventually he Informed the Mexican 
government that he was willing to fight for American con- 
cessionaires, although over so insignificant a question as 
taxes. When he sent an army Into Mexico "after Villa," 
he promised that it would not be used "in the Interest of 
American owners of Mexican properties"; long after the 
Villa chase was ended, he virtually admitted, through a 
member of his cabinet, that the troops were still held In 
Mexico in the interest of American owners of Mexican 
properties.^ 

The varying points of view cannot be separated chrono- 
logically; the contradictions are not explainable on any 
theory of a change of policy. The conclusion Is Inevitable 
that President Wilson played the role of anti-imperialist in 
order to mask a course of imperialistic purpose. 

True, our Chief Executive stopped short of a war of 
conquest upon Mexico. Did he refrain because of any 
question of principle? What principle could hold him back 
from war upon Mexico, while permitting him to make war 
upon Haiti and Santo Domingo? 

It must have been a question of expediency. There were 
arresting circumstances in the case of Mexico that did not 
exist in the case of her weaker neighbors — circumstances 
which any other President, equally with Wilson, would have 

1 For quotations see Appendix, pp. 438-443. 



334 Shall It Be Again? 

had to consider. The theory that Mexico owed her safety, 
at any time, to the fact that one Woodrow Wilson hap- 
pened to be President of the United States, is unsound. 

An arresting circumstance of a most decisive nature was 
nothing more nor less than relative power. The Executive 
was in a position to make war on Haiti and Santo Domingo 
almost in secret, without even calling the matter to the at- 
tention of Congress, without asking for special appropria- 
tions for the purpose, without selling Liberty Bonds, with- 
out conscription, without a vast machine of "education" 
and terror to keep the American people under control. 
But Mexico he could not conquer personally and pri- 
vately. 

Does this mean that the efforts of our President to serve 
Wall Street in Mexico were a failure? 

Not at all. The aim of imperialism is not conquest pri- 
marily, but control. Conquest is resorted to only as a 
means to the measure of political control essential to the 
"proper protection" of property "rights." If the desired 
political control can be procured without the expense and 
risk of war, so much the better. 

Especially in countries having capacity for stubborn re- 
sistance, imperialism proceeds more or less cautiously, re- 
sorting to a series of well-tried tricks and maneuvers. Al- 
though Wilson did not see his way tow^ards making an open 
effort at the conquest of Mexico, his efforts to control were 
unceasing, and the friction and agitation accompanying such 
efforts tended to prepare the way to conquer when the 
time is ripe. Intervention is intervention, even though it 
does not go beyond the field of diplomacy — and it is suc- 
cessful intervention exactly to the extent to which it suc- 
ceeds, through threats or otherwise, in imposing the will 
of the stronger government upon the weaker. The threat 
to use an army, veiled as it may be in diplomatic language, 



Mexico 



335 



is hardly less grave an offense than the use of the army it- 
self. 

Almost from the day Woodrow Wilson took office, the 
threat of armed force was held over Mexico, with intent to 
mold Mexico's domestic affairs in accordance with the 
wishes of Wall Street. The Wilson threats cover every 
question remotely affecting the financial interests of foreign- 
ers. They touch every important item of the revolution- 
ary programme, and have proven the greatest obstacle to 
Mexican reform since the time of Huerta. 

Representations were almost invariably accompanied by 
some form of coercion. The refusal to recognize Huerta 
in the beginning was a form of coercion. Wilson's refusal 
to recognize Huerta was approved by anti-imperialists 
everywhere; it contributed greatly to his reputation as an 
enemy of imperialism; by this very fact it placed him in a 
position to serve imperialism more effectively than he 
would have been able to serve it otherwise. 

But why did Wilson refuse to recognize Huerta? He 
sought to lead the world to believe it was because, as a 
democrat, he could not approve of any government ^'stained 
by blood or supported by anything but the consent of the 
governed." But what becomes of such pretensions when 
Wilson himself set up blood-stained governments in Haiti 
and Santo Domingo, and employed our armed forces to 
protect a blood-stained government set up by the previous 
administration in ^^icaragua? 

Wilson was in the beginning not unalterably opposed to 
the recognition of Huerta. I take the following Washing- 
ton dispatch from the New York World, April ii, 19 13: 

When asked about it this afternoon, President Wilson said the de 
facto government of Mexico would be recognized as the new provi- 
sional government when it had worked out the problem now before 
it — the establishment of peace. 



336 Shall It Be Again? 

In a speech, November, 19 13, defending England's rec- 
ognition of Huerta, Prime Minister Asquith told Parlia- 
ment: 

We were informed by the government of the United States that, 
as regarded the recognition of Huerta, no definite answer could be 
given, except that they would wait some time longer before recogniz- 
ing him. 

It was evidently with ultimate recognition in view that 
Wilson retained, as ambassador to the court of Huerta, 
Henry Lane Wilson, who had assisted in setting up the 
Hudrta regime and who, so long as he remained, was 
Hucrta's most conspicuous apologist and support. 

It was evidently with ultimate recognition in view, also, 
that for 176 days after his inauguration, Wilson permitted 
agents of Huerta to purchase arms in the United States and 
ship them without interference; while at the same time the 
enemies of Huerta, when caught trying to export arms, 
were thrown into jail and their shipments confiscated. 

Wilson did turn definitely against Huerta in August. 
Why? The mission of John Lind is still shrouded In mys- 
tery, and it is impossible to state the full conditions de- 
manded at that time by Wilson. Subsequent events make 
it quite certain that what Wilson sought was, literally, to 
"maintain the dignity and authority of the United States," 
as he told Congress when he took Vera Cruz — particularly 
to impose the authority of the United States upon Mexico; 
to procure from Mexico, if possible, an admission of the 
right of the United States to dictate in Mexican affairs, 
which would mark the end of Mexican sovereignty. 

Wilson pretended to Congress that he had to employ 
the armed forces of the United States to compel Huerta 
to salute the flag. It was a matter of principle. Huerta 
had offered to salute the flag if Wilson would at the same 
time salute the Mexican flag. That did not satisfy Wil- 



Mexico 337 

son. It looked too much like equality. The regnant posi- 
tion of America must be maintained. At Tampico some 
sailors had landed at a dock at which they had been warned 
not to land, the city being under siege by the Constitution- 
alist forces. These sailors were arrested, taken part way 
uptown, brought back, and an apology offered. There 
had been no violence. For this offense Huerta was com- 
manded to salute the flag. In April, 19 19, Japanese sol- 
diers arrested an American officer who was leaving a theatre 
In China, handled him roughly and threatened him with the 
bayonet. Nobody asked the Japanese government to salute 
the American flag. There happened to be no occasion, at 
that time, to require Japan to bow to "the dignity and 
authority of the United States." 

When Wilson occupied Vera Cruz, he sent a friendly 
note to Carranza, omitting to mention the dignity and au- 
thority of the United States, but hinting that the action 
was taken to serve the cause of Carranza. Had Carranza 
not protested against the invasion, he would have fallen 
into a trap evidently designed to catch him. Tacitly, at 
least, he would have recognized the dignity and authority 
of the United States — Its authority to invade Mexico at 
pleasure. 

It was not Wilson's first effort to trap Carranza. In 
November, 19 13, the President dispatched a personal 
agent, one William Bayard Hale, to Carranza to lay down 
the conditions under which Carranza would be recognized 
by Wilson. Secret diplomacy also shrouds the Hale pro- 
posals. Their nature may be guessed from a statement 
Issued by Carranza on breaking off the Hale Interviews: 
^^We will accept no transactions, nor the interference of 
any nation to regulate Mexico^ s interior conditions.^' 

All that Carranza asked of the United States was equal 
rights with Huerta in the purchase and export of arms. 



338 Shall It Be Again? 

This right was not accorded him until Wilson had been 
President of the United States for eleven months. Recog- 
nition was withheld for nearly two years after the Hale 
interviews. 

Once American forces were ensconced in Vera Cruz, 
Wilson forgot to renew his demand that Huerta salute the 
flag. Nor did he capture Huerta's shipload of arms — 
supposed to have been the immediate occasion of the inva- 
sion. 

Wilson is credited with having caused the downfall of 
Huerta, but when the Vera Cruz assault occurred, the Con- 
stitutionalist armies had already won the series of victories 
which decided the assassin's end. 

At least, the fall of Huerta is supposed to have been 
Wilson's purpose in occupying Vera Cruz, and incidentally 
killing some two hundred residents thereof. Why, then, 
did he forthwith renew the arms embargo against the Con- 
stitutionalists, who were also fighting to down Huerta? 
Why, then, did he stay in Vera Cruz four months after 
Huerta had fled? 

Is it conceivable that Wilson did not go down to Vera 
Cruz either to get the flag saluted, to help the Constitution- 
alists, or even to hurry the fall of Huerta, but that the 
occupation was one maneuver in a scheme to dictate who 
should succeed Huerta — and under what conditions? 

The facts that support this view seem to have been gener- 
ally overlooked. Wilson accepted the mediation of the 
A-B-C governments on the condition that the internal af- 
fairs of Mexico and the selection of a new provisional pres- 
ident should come into the discussion. Wilson was as 
anxious, to eliminate Carranza as Huerta. But Carranza 
declined mediation on such terms, and triumphed in spite 
of the opposition of Wilson. Our forces remained in 
Vera Cruz for four months after Huerta fled, and were 



Mexico 339 

withdrawn only after the announcement had been blazoned 
in Washington that the early triumph of Villa was assured. 

After the faikire of his effort to arrive at the political 
control of Mexico through the mediation conference, Wil- 
son simply decided to assert the dignity and authority of 
the United States through the medium of Pancho Villa. 
A Wilson consular agent became Villa's closest adviser. 
An American general carried to Villa Wilson's pledge that 
he would never, under any circumstances, recognize Car- 
ranza. The State Department was turned into a Villa 
press agency. American oil and mining interests looked 
with favor upon Villa. Villa gave to Wilson pledges of 
'^proper protection" to Wall Street investments, and Wil- 
son diplomacy assisted Villa and hindered Carranza in al- 
most countless ways. 

When Villa succeeded in capturing Mexico City, Wilson 
demanded that the city and the routes to it from Vera 
Cruz be "neutralized" — which would have made it impos- 
sible ever to oust Villa. 

When the hemp kings gained the ascendency temporarily 
over the Carranza garrison in Yucatan, Wilson prohibited 
Carranza from blockading the port of Progreso, as a 
means to recovering the state, and dispatched a warship 
to make sure that there should be no blockade. 

Even after Villa had been decisively beaten, Wilson con- 
tinued to maintain an arms embargo against Carranza, ren- 
dering operations of the latter more difficult, and opening 
the way for the Columbus raid. Even after the Columbus 
raid, Wilson maintained his arms embargo, rendering it 
impossible for Carranza effectively to police the border^ — 
at the same time justifying his "punitive expedition" by the 
conditions for which the embargo was responsible. 

During his; entire administration, down to Carranza's 
downfall, Wilson employed his authority to embargo arms 



340 Shall It Be Again? 

as a powerful means of coercion to persuade the latter to 
come to the Wall Street-Wilson view as to the "dignity and 
authority of the United States." 

When the Mexican- American joint commission met to 
arrange for the withdrawal of American troops, the Mexi- 
can delegates came prepared to enter into any reciprocal 
arrangements suggested, and to concur in any plan intended 
to prevent future raids. They discovered to their surprise, 
that the American delegates did not come to talk about 
protecting the border against raids, but to talk about oil 
taxes, mining decrees, and — in the words of Chairman Lane 
— other 'Wights that are vested.^* 

Although Villa was not caught, the American forces had 
killed several hundred Mexicans, and in April, General 
Scott, representing the government of the United States, 
had signed a memorandum to the effect that the dispersion 
of the Villa bands had been completed and that, therefore, 
no reason remained why the troops should not be with- 
drawn. 

Nevertheless, for nine long months after the Scott state- 
ment, the American army was held on Mexican soil while 
Woodrow Wilson, through Franklin K. Lane, and others, 
fvas attempting to browbeat Carranza into yielding to 
American capital in Mexico the guarantees desired by the 
Rockefellers, and Guggenheims, the Dodges and the Do- 
henys. 

Wilson finally recognized Carranza, only after being 
urged to do so by Argentine, Brazil, and Chili, and after 
repeated maneuvers to oust him in favor of reactionary ele- 
ments had failed. 

Wilson finally withdrew the American army from Mex- 
ico in February, 19 17, only to prepare it for action against 
Germany. 

The result of the Wilson policy is that the aims which 



Mexico 341 

iWilson set out to realize have been partially realized, and 
stand in a fair way to be realized in full. 

While all the Wilson maneuvers and aggressions did not 
succeed — due to the astuteness and patience of Carranza — 
in procuring from the latter an express recognition of the 
''dignity and authority of the United States'^ — an accept- 
ance of the principle of inequality — a concession of the 
authority of the government of the United States to dic- 
tate in the affairs of Mexico — they tended to defeat every 
purpose that Wilson ever professed to serve — Mexican 
reform, pacification of the country, security for American 
lives, except the one purpose of protecting vested interests. 

It is obvious that sweeping reforms cannot be applied 
to the portion of any given industry controlled by natives, 
without at the same time applying them to the portion of 
the industry controlled by foreigners. 

It is easily understood how a government, say, in the 
United States, which essayed to lay war taxes upon corpora- 
tions owned entirely by Americans, while remitting the 
taxes upon similar corporations having foreign stockhold- 
ers, could not last. 

Americans can figure out for themselves how long an 
American President would last who negotiated, say, over 
Japanese "rights" In California, while a Japanese army 
was encamped on American soil. 

Although, in the end, the Carranza regime was a failure 
— although Carranza in the end succumbed to the forcjss 
against him — the greatest force against him v/as the big 
stick of "anti-imperialist" Wilson. Wilson made It im- 
possible for Carranza to "deliver the goods" to the Mexi- 
can people. Wilson helped to m.ake the Obregon revolu- 
tion not only possible, but necessary. But towards Obre- 
gon Wilson pursued the same policy, in principle, as to- 
wards Carranza. As the condition for the recognition of 



342 Shall It Be Again? 

Obregon, he accepted the terms of Albert B. Fall, which 
were also the termsi of the great financial and industrial 
interests. When Obregon rejected these terms, Wilson 
turned the new Mexican president over to the tender mer- 
cies of his Republican successors. 

The Wilson policy in action was a consistent policy oi 
intervention, the aim being to control Mexico politically for 
the benefit of American capital; a policy looking toward 
war should it become impossible to impose the desired con- 
trol by less expensive means; meanwhile, to prepare the 
way for easy conquest when the time is ripe. This is pre- 
cisely the Wall Street policy. 



XXXIII 

VIRGIN ISLANDS, HAITI, SANTO DOMINGO, AND NICARAGUA 

There is not a foot of territory belonging to any nation which 
this nation covets or desires. (Woodrow Wilson, Jan. 29, 19 16.) 

Although the American public apparently swallowed the 
misleading reports of the press as to our acquisition of the 
Virgin Islands, the Danish pubHc was not so gullible, and 
the Danish government was forced to reveal a little of its 
true inwardness. The Danish foreign minister had to ad- 
mit that he favored the "sale" only because "retention of 
the islands might possibly involve Denmark in interna- 
tional complications." Edward Brandes, the finance minis- 
ter, informed the Lower House (Aug. 10, 19 16), that the 
Danish government '^had no alternative but to accede to 
the desire of the United States.^' Brandes revealed the 
fact that Denmark had rejected an offer to purchase in 
19 13, as it "had no desire to lower the Danish flag without 
cogent reasons." 

What can this mean except that little Denmark simply 
bowed to a threat of force by the great American "democ- 
racy?" 

The one thing that we learned from our own govern- 
ment was that, in consideration of the yielding of Denmark, 
the United States would ^'not object to the Danish govern- 
ment extending its political and economic interests to the 
whole of Greenland/' 

Who gave us the right to say what should become of 
Greenland? 

Finally, the Danish foreign minister disclosed the fact 

343 



344 Shall It Be Again? 

that he had suggested leaving the question of the transfer 
to a referendum of the population of the islands, in ac- 
cordance With the principle of self-determination, but that 
'*the United States refused to sanction itJ^ 

More than one hundred years ago, after desperate fight- 
ing, now against France and now against England, the 
inhabitants of Haiti, like those of the American colonies, 
won their independence from European domination. Un- 
til the regime of Woodrow Wilson, the sovereign republic 
of the United States recognized the smaller republic of 
Haiti as equally sovereign. 

Here are the salient facts of the Haitian conquest, as 
gleaned from the meagre news dispatches of that period: 

1. That American forces invaded Haiti July 27, 1915, 
following a revolution in which President Guillame Sam 
was killed by a "mob." 

2. That, previously to the revolution, the American 
State Department had been pressing upon Sam a *'convcn- 
tion" signing away the sovereignty of Haiti; that Sam was 
on the point of yielding; that the revolution grew out of 
patriotic opposition to the treaty; that, therefore, our own 
government caused the very revolution which occasioned 
the intervention. 

3. That, July 30, it was announced from Washington 
that "the armed forces of the United States would remain 
on Haitian soil pending negotiations of an arrangement 
whereby the United States would assume control over 
Haiti's financial affairs" — a confession that intervention 
was not to "restore order," but to cram the convention 
down the throat of Haiti, regardless of order or disorder. 

4. That Admiral Caperton at once began to impose a 
military dictatorship over Haiti. August 4, he dispersed 
♦he government army, compelling its commander to resign. 



Haiti 345 

He dissolved the Committee of Public Safety named by the 
opposition leader, Bobo, and attacked Bobo's forces, both 
in the capital and at Cape Haltien. August 6, he seized 
the government gunboat the "Paclfique," and disarmed the 
forces In charge of it. 

5. That, August 24, the Haitian National Assembly was 
called together in the National Palace, surrounded by 
American bayonets, presented with a draft of a conven- 
tion prepared by the American State Department, and was 
ordered to ratify the convention without discussion and 
within 24 hours; that the National Assembly was over- 
whelmingly opposed to the convention, and permission to 
discuss it was given, and the time extended, only after the 
members had threatened to resign in a body. 

6. That the Wilson Government did not await the rati- 
fication of the convention, either by the Haitian National 
Assembly or by the United States Senate, but began at 
once putting Its provisions into effect. August 27, Caper- 
ton began seizing customhouses, collecting the customs and 
disarming all Haitians. September 4, because of general 
opposition to the American Invasion, Caperton proclaimed 
martial law in the entire territory occupied by his forces. 
Before the end of September, 2,000 American marines were 
operating against Haitian nationalists, thereafter termed 
"bandits." 

7. That resistance to the American dictatorship, which 
began with the landing of American marines, did not cease 
with the enforced ratification of the convention; that the 
armed forces of the United States engaged in a prolonged 
war of conquest. In which thousands of patriotic Haitians 
and a few Americans lost their lives. 

The Haitian National Assembly signed the convention 
under duress, September 16, 19 15. Its text was secret. 
January 11, 19 16, the President sent it secretly to the 



346 Shall It Be Again? 

Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The Com- 
mittee ordered it printed in confidence for the use of the 
Senate only. Between January ii and February 28, the 
Committee conducted secret hearings. Not a line of the 
hearings was ever printed, even for the confidential use of 
Senators. Finally, February 28, meeting in executive ses- 
sion, the Senate ratified the convention, after which the 
bare instrument was printed. 

The brief convention itself reveals a few things. 

Article 2 puts the financial affairs of the republic in the 
hands of the United States, through a general receiver and 
a financial adviser named by the President. 

Article 10 puts the police power in the hands of the 
Unite3 States, through a constabulary, urban and rural, 
organized and officered by Americans named by the Presi- 
dent. 

Article 13 puts "the development of the natural resour- 
ces" in the hands of the United States, through Americans 
named by the President. 

Finance — police powers — public works. What re- 
mained of the sovereign republic of Haiti? 

Even the foreign affairs were taken over by Americans, 
and in due course the '^republic' ' of Haiti declared war 
upon Germany under the direction of the United States. 

The independence of Santo Domingo was first impaired 
by an American receivership of customs, forced upon it 
by Theodore Roosevelt. Soon after Wilson became Presi- 
dent, a Senatorial investigation revealed a scandalous situa- 
tion in which American politicians, in league with American 
bankers and concessionaires, were preying upon Santo Do- 
mingo finances by virtue of political control exerted under 
the terms of the customs convention. 

But the Sullivan scandal brought no change of policy. 



Santo Domingo 347 

Instead, "anti-imperialist" Wilson was soon pressing for 
greater control than had been attempted either by imperial- 
ist Roosevelt or imperialist Taft. The war of conquest be- 
gan in May, 19 16, following an ultimatum from President 
Wilson to President Jimenez, giving the latter seventy-two 
hours in which to resign. 

Jimenez claims to have yielded, only on the understand- 
ing that his resignation would prevent intervention. How- 
ever that may be, six days afterwards, 500 marines took 
possession of the capital, and a fortnight later Puerta 
Plata was occupied, after two hours' fighting. 

We struck at the enemies of Jimenez as well as at Jime- 
nez. In June, Admiral Capcrton issued a proclamation 
stating that there was no intention of infringing on the sov- 
ereignty of Santo Domingo or subjugating its territory. 
At the same time he was seizing every vestige of the civil 
power wherever his forces went. There were many bat- 
tles and some massacres. By November, 1800 marines 
were reported engaged in the pacification of Santo Do- 
mingo. On the twenty-ninth day of that month. Captain 
Knapp, on behalf of Wilson, issued a proclamation estab- 
lishing martial law throughout the republic. All natives 
were prohibited from bearing or possessing arms, and a 
censorship of the press was instituted, prohibiting any crit- 
icism whatsoever of the government of the conquerors. 

The proclamation of martial law assured the natives that 
'*there is no intention on the part of the United States to 
destroy the independence of the republic," and that the 
only purpose of the occupation was "to assist the country 
to establish internal order and to enable it to comply with 
the provisions of its convention and to fulfill its obligations 
as a member of the family of nations." 

Meanwhile, at Washington, had been drawn up a con- 
vention modeled after that applied to Haiti, placing Santo 



348 Shall It Be Again? 

Domingo under a civil dictatorship under the President of 
the United States. 

By January, 19 17, an American captain of marines was 
discovered to be holding the post of Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the sovereign repubHc of Santo Domingo, order- 
ing native diplomatic and consular officials abroad to hand 
in their resignations. February 11, 1919, Washington dis- 
patches informed us that Rear Admiral Snowden had been 
"detailed for duty as military governor of Santo Domingo 
and the additional duty as representative of the United 
States in Haiti.' ^ In May, 192 1, Snowden was superseded 
by Admiral Robinson, the military dictatorship continuing. ^ 

Nicaragua completes the picture, because it gives the 
why of all such extraordinary happenings in the sworn tes- 
timony of the persons who furnished the why. 

Among all of President Wilson's voluble speeches, there 
appears not a single word of explanation of our adventures 
in Nicaragua — or, for that matter, in Haiti or Santo Do- 
mingo. The fact that a portion of our naval force was 
enacting the role of an alien army of occupation in a Cen- 
tral American republic was briefly mentioned at long in- 
tervals in the press. At such times a phrase or two, such 
as "protecting American lives and property," or "a lega- 
tion guard," was all the explanation deemed necessary. 
During Wilson's eight years in the Presidential chair, no 
serious criticism of our occupation of Nicaragua was seen 
in any of our leading newspapers or magazines. Nor did 
the national law-making body make any demand upon the 
Executive for an accounting of his acts. Of the so-called 
Canal Convention Senator Borah remarked: "If the Amer- 

iThe "withdrawal" from Santo Domingo promised by the Harding Ad- 
ministration in 1921 did not mean the removal of American control from 
Santo Domingo affairs, financial or political, but only a partial withdrawal 
of American forces similar to our "withdrawal" from Nicaragua after we 
had completed the "pacification" of that little country. 



Nicaragua 349 

ican people had known all the circumstances of its making 
it would never have been made." That was about all. 
Evidently the press as a whole, and the leaders of both 
great political parties, approved of the Wilson policy in 
Nicaragua. When Wilson's successor continued it, no pro- 
test was heard. The policy had, in fact, been initiated by 
Wilson's predecessor in office. 

For authentic details we may turn to the hearings on 
the NIcaraguan convention, conducted by the Senate For- 
eign Relations Committee early in 19 16. These hearings 
were printed "In confidence," for the use of the committee 
only, one copy going to each member under an Injunction 
of secrecy. The writer has had access to one of these com- 
mittee copies. 

An examination of this secret government document 
shows the hearings to have been In the nature of a "frame- 
up." That is to say, neither NIcaraguans nor Americans 
who opposed the convention were given an opportunity to 
testify. Only one witness was heard who was not either in- 
terested In putting the convention through, or In some way 
connected with the interested parties. In spite of the sup- 
pression of illuminating details inevitable from such an ar- 
rangement, the document discloses the following essential 
facts : 

1. That the permanent occupation of Nicaragua was 
undertaken by the Taft Administration for the purpose of 
sustaining in power a "president'' opposed by an over- 
whelming majority of the voters of the country. 

2. That said president, Adolfo Diaz, was raised to 
power neither by the votes of NIcaraguans, nor the arms of 
NIcaraguans, but by the armed forces of the United States 
under the direction of the President of the United States. 

3. That, as a means to raising Adolfo Diaz to the presi- 
dency and maintaining him there, we conducted a series of 



350 Shall It Be Again? 

unlawful military campaigns, killed scores of Nicaraguans, 
overturned three successive governments, seized public 
and private property, and prosecuted an actual war of con- 
quest until in complete possession of the country. 

4. That Adolfo Diaz, on becoming president, found that 
he could do nothing of his own volition, but was required 
to take orders like a butler. 

5. That American domination of Nicaragua did not 
bring a single "American benefit" to the Nicaraguan peo- 
ple; that what liberties Nicaraguan citizens had were per- 
manently taken away; that a free press, free speech and 
free suffrage are unknown; that the government of Nicara- 
gua under the American protectorate is a pure autocracy, 
administered by aliens, which is forced to hold the Nicara- 
guan people under a reign of terror in order to perpetuate 
itself in power. 

6. That the sole purpose of the American war on that 
little republic was to compel Nicaragua to submit to a gen- 
eral looting of her rich resources by American financiers. 

7. That Woodrow Wilson carried out in every essential 
the purpose of the conquest begun under Taft; that the 
looting of Nicaragua under American guns was given a 
color of legality only under the Wilson regime, by the rati- 
fication of the Nicaraguan convention on the recommenda- 
tion of Wilson. 

8. That the feature of this convention, relating to the 
"purchase" of a canal concession and the "lease" of naval 
bases, was an after-thought, conceived and put through pri- 
marily as a blind, to hide the purely financial features of 
the protectorate. 

9. That the actual arbiter of Nicaraguan destinies under 
the protectorate is none other than the local representative 
of the syndicate of New York bankers for whose benefit 



Nicaragua 351 

the conquest was undertaken and the convention put 
through. 

Our NIcaraguan adventure began in 1909. The first 
step was an effort to remove President Zelaya from power, 
through a revolution financed by Adolfo Diaz. Before the 
launching of this revolution, Diaz was a bookkeeper on a 
salary of about $1000 a year, in the employ of an American 
mining company owned in Pittsburgh. Diaz "loaned" the 
revolution $600,000 gold, the origin of which he was never 
able to explain. The hand of Washington began to be 
seen only when the anti-Zelaya movement, as a privately 
financed undertaking, was on the point of failure. De- 
cember I, 1909, Secretary of State Knox, in a singularly in- 
temperate note, broke off relations with Zelaya and de- 
clared in favor of the revolution. His pretext was the 
execution of two American filibusters, Roy Cannon and 
Leonard Groce, who had been caught trying to dynamite 
a vessel loaded with Zelaya's troops. As these men had 
enlisted in the forces opposed to Zelaya, they had, of 
course, forfeited whatever rights they may have had to the 
good offices of their home government. 

The action of Knox caused the resignation and flight of 
Zelaya. As his successor, the Nicaraguan Congress elected 
Dr. Jose Madriz, by all accounts a person of high char- 
acter. Whatever domestic reasons there existed for a rev- 
olution disappeared with the passing of Zelaya, and the rev- 
olution would have been quickly dissipated had it not been 
saved by American Intervention. Madriz's forces took 
possession of the entire country with the exception of Blue- 
fields, and bottled up the remnant of the insurgents in that 
seaport. But our marines were landed, and the Madriz 
commander was prohibited from entering the city. Fill- 



352 Shall It Be Again? 

busters were Imported from the United States, the revolu- 
tion was reorganized and revictualed, and in time was able 
to take the offensive. Protected by our navy, and due 
wholly to our assistance, the Diaz movement finally came 
into possession of the Nicaraguan capital. 

Immediately, there came from New York one Thomas C. 
Dawson, who was named by the banking syndicate and ap- 
pointed by the Secretary of State. Dawson had previously 
acted in the same capacity for our bankers in Santo 
Domingo, and later performed a similar service for them 
in Honduras. A meeting with the revolutionary chiefs was 
held on board an American warship, and a bargain entered 
into, known as the Dawson Pact. Diaz was named vice- 
president, and Estrada, the military head of the revolution, 
was named president. In pursuance of the Dawson Pact, 
a farcical election was staged under the direction of Ameri- 
can marines, the purpose being to frame a new constitution 
that would facilitate the bankers' programme. But the 
scandal became so great that the packed Congress refused 
to carry out its full share of the scheme. Whereupon Es- 
trada dissolved it and ruled as a dictator, taking his orders, 
however, from the American minister. Estrada was soon 
given the command to leave — and he left. So Adolfo 
Diaz, late bookkeeper for an American corporation, be- 
came president of the sovereign state of Nicaragua. 

Naturally, the people of Nicaragua were hardly pleased 
by the turn of affairs, and it was to be expected that we 
who had placed Adolfo Diaz in power should be called upon 
to defend him. The Taft Administration poured some 
2,350 marines and bluejackets into the country and a gen- 
eral war of pacification was prosecuted. The "battle of 
Coyotepe" and the "battle of Leon" — both in October, 



Nicaragua 353 

19 1 2 — ended the organized resistance on the part of Nica- 
raguan patriots. 

All this was done without a shadow of legality. It was 
murder in the first degree, for which the then President 
of the United States ought to have been impeached and in- 
dicted. Had Woodrow Wilson, on becoming President, 
entertained any real regard for any of the democratic prin- 
ciples by which he professed to be guided In the European 
war, or even for his own oath of office, he would at once 
have recalled our forces from Nicaragua, and denounced 
and repudiated the purposes for which they were sent there. 
Instead, he kept our marines in that "sister republic," and 
proceeded to carry out the purposes for which they were 
sent there by Taft. 

The "Canal" Convention ratified by the Senate, February 
18, 19 1 6, cedes to the United States the following things: 

1. Exclusive proprietary rights to construct, operate, 
and maintain, forever free from all taxation and public 
charges, an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua. 

2. Lease of the Corn Islands on the Atlantic side, 99 
years, with option of renewal, for the purpose of a naval 
base. 

3. Lease of territory on the Gulf of Fonseca, Pacific side, 
99 years with option of renewal, for the purpose of a naval 
base. 

In consideration whereof, Nicaragua purports to receive 
$3,000,000. Actually, the money gets no nearer Nicara- 
gua than a bank In New Yprk. The convention provides 
that It cannot be drawn out without authority from the 
American Secretary of State. In the working out of the 
scheme, the money remains In the hands of a New York 
banking syndicate, which never renders any adequate re- 



354 Shall It Be Again? 

turn for it, either to the United States, which paid it out, 
or to Nicaragua, which is supposed to receive the benefit of 
it. 

On its face the "Canal" Convention looks like a simple 
purchase and lease. In the unpubHshed features lies its 
secret. The canal "purchase" and the "leases" of terri- 
tory were not urged by the Naval Board, but by our "pa- 
triotic" bankers. Their real motive may be judged by the 
things that Nicaragua lost besides her canal route and the 
territory set aside for naval bases. 

When Knox deposed Zelaya, Nicaragua was solvent; the 
bona fide foreign debt was only about $2,500,000; the 
railroads were owned by the government; the customs were 
collected and disbursed by native officials; the government 
administered its own funds; the laws were framed and 
put through by citizens of that republic. But when the 
conquest was completed, Nicaragua was permanently in the 
hands of a receiver, with a debt in the neighborhood of 
$15,000,000; the railroads were in the possession of Ameri- 
can bankers; the same bankers collected and disbursed the 
customs, owned the National Bank and administered the 
public finances; legislation for the government of Nicara- 
guan citizens was framed in Wall Street, enacted at the 
direction of agents of Wall Street, and administered by 
Americans under control of an American banking syndi- 
cate. 

The "Canal" Convention, ratified at the instance of 
President Wilson, established Nicaragua as a private finan- 
cial preserve of a group of American bankers, and that was 
its primary purpose. 

It may be supposed that our financiers got possession of 
the Nicaraguan railroads, the banks, the customs, etc., by 
loaning to Nicaragua large sums of money, which the latter 



Nicaragua 355 

was unable to pay; that intervention was undertaken to en- 
force payment of such debts. 

Nothing as innocent as that. Previously to the Diaz- 
Estrada plot, according to their own testimony, the bankers 
did not have a penny invested in Nicaragua. Their en- 
tire interest was based upon the speculative opportunity 
furnished by the defenseless condition of the little republic. 

Wall Street went in for revolution, intervention, and po- 
litical control in Nicaragua as a business proposition purely 
— prompted by the same motives which later caused it to go 
in for intervention in Europe. The scheme had been tried 
in Santo Domingo — and it worked. It had been tried in 
Honduras — and it worked. Later it was to be tried in 
Haiti. The ambition is ultimately to put the same system 
in operation in Mexico. 

Very well, as soon as Adolfo Diaz was well on his way 
to the palace, we find our bankers acquiring bogus claims 
upon Nicaragua, and, at the same time, drafting, in their 
offices, a convention legalizing such claims, to be presented 
at Washington for solemn approval and ratification. 

The first big claim acquired was known as "the Emery 
claim." For twenty years the George D. Emery Company 
had exploited a concession which had netted it $186,000 a 
year. Zelaya finally revoked the concession on the ground 
of gross violation of its terms. Emery then put in a claim 
based, not upon the investment, but upon the profits ex- 
pected during a period of years to come. The claim was 
so preposterous that any honest court would have denied it 
forthwith. The bankers bought the Emery claim cheap — 
for less than $100,000, it was said. The bankers then 
tagged the claim with a valuation of $500,000, and at that 
price it was saddled upon Nicaragua, with the consent of 
both the Taft and the Wilson Administrations. 



356 Shall It Be Again? 

As originally written (in 191 1), the Nicaraguan conven- 
tion, known as the Knox-Castrillo Convention, purported to 
provide a loan of $15,000,000 to Nicaragua. But an exam- 
ination of the document discloses the fact that Nicara- 
gua was not to receive the money, that the bankers were to 
''expend" it. We discover, indeed, that the bankers were 
never to pay out any such sums as $15,000,000; that such 
sums as they paid out were to be paid chiefly to themselves; 
first, to liquidate the Emery and other claims, and, sec- 
ond, to "develop the country" — to establish a bank, which 
they themselves should own, and to improve the National 
Railway, which they themselves should control, operate, 
and later own. The bankers were also to receive a conces- 
sion to build a new railroad, upon their own terms, at the 
expense of Nicaragua, the property to be controlled, opera- 
ted, and owned by themselves. 

Finally, the $15,000,000 was to be paid out, but — by 
Nicaragua. The bankers were to collect the customs, and 
disburse therefrom the sums needed to meet their "claims" 
and "improvements," after which they were to pay out of 
this national revenue $15,000,000 and interest to them- 
selves — to liquidate a loan that they had never made ex- 
cept on paper. 

But, by the election of 19 10, Congress went Democratic. 
The Knox-Castrillo Convention was defeated by the Demo- 
crats, and there was some denunciation of it as dollar diplo- 
macy. Nevertheless, its worst features went into opera- 
tion under a protectorate formally entered into by the Wil- 
son Administration. 

Mr. Taft's honorable Secretary of State, and the bank- 
ing syndicate, did not, indeed, permit their scheme to be 
greatly hampered by the Senate. Following the example 
of Roosevelt in the case of Santo Domingo, they proceeded 
to put the terms of their convention into operation without 



Nicaragua 357 

indulging In the motions of legality. For the paper loan of 
$15,000,000, however, was substituted a "temporary loan" 
of $1,500,000, which, again, was not to be paid to Nic- 
aragua, but expended by the bankers, who agreed to "reor- 
ganize" the National Bank, 51 per cent, of the stock to be 
oy/ned by the bankers, 49 per cent, by the Nicaraguan 
government. 

In "consideration" of this "loan," the bankers were given 
a mortgage on the government's share of the bank, a mort- 
gage on the government's railway, a lease for the opera- 
tion of the government's railway, a lien upon the customs, 
authority to negotiate a settlement of the Ethelburga 
"debt," a contract for the "reform" of the currency, and 
various other little things of solid financial value. 

But first of all, the bankers were placed In possession of 
the customhouses, where they remained, protected In their 
private business by the public armed forces of the United 
States — collecting the customs, paying out the customs re- 
ceipts to run their Nicaraguan enterprises, paying out the 
customs money to liquidate principal and Interest on the 
"loans" that Nicaragua never received. 

The settlement of the Ethelburga "debt" is worth a 
word. The bona fide foreign debt of Nicaragua was only 
$2,500,000. Two and a quarter million of this sum had 
been taken up In a refunding scheme, negotiated in England 
just before the expulsion of Zelaya, known as the Ethel- 
burga Syndicate Bonds. Had this scheme gone through 
it would have made the foreign debt amount to $6,472,689. 
But Nicaragua had never received any money on this deal. 
Moreover, there were Irregularities which placed the Ethel- 
burga bonds In the fraudulent class. At least this was the 
contention of the bankers, who offered to submit the matter 
to the British courts. The Ethelburga Syndicate did not 
wish to fight, and a settlement was arranged, not between 



358 Shall It Be Again? 

the syndicate and the bankers acting for Nicaragua, but 
between the syndicate and the bankers acting for them- 
selves. 

In other words, the bankers acquired control of the 
Ethelburga business — cheap. The charge was made by 
Senator Smith of Michigan that they acquired the bonds 
for twenty-five cents on the dollar. These bonds were 
grafted upon the public debt of Nicaragua at par, 
$6,250,000, with the approval of both Taft and Wilson. 
The bankers proceeded to pay principal and interest to 
themselves out of the customs receipts of the repubHc. 

Another item of interest is "our" "reform" of the Nic- 
araguan currency. The bankers drew upon their $1,500,000 
"loan" to buy up for themselves, as private business men, 
the national paper at the existing market value, between 
15 to one, and 20 to one. Then, as "fiscal agents of the 
Nicaraguan government," they put into effect an arbitrary 
exchange rate of I2j4 to one, unloaded at this figure, 
and so turned over a cool profit of from 25 to 75 per cent, 
on every "reformed" Nicaraguan peso. 

While the reforming was going on, the bankers "loaned" 
Nicaragua an additional half million dollars for sixty days, 
to facilitate the job. On this half million they collected 
a profit of $60,000, above interest, based upon the differ- 
ence in the "value" of the Nicaraguan peso at the time that 
they "loaned" themselves the money and the time they "re- 
paid" it. 

In due course the bankers exercised their option to "pur- 
chase" a majority of the stock of the National Railway. 
Although it had been a paying investment, and al- 
though Zelaya had refused $4,000,000 for it, the bankers 
acquired control of the Nicaraguan National Railway for 
$1,000,000. Again, Nicaragua did not receive a cent. 



Nicaragua 359 

The syndicate simply made a paper payment to one of its 
New York banks, announcing that the "money" would be 
held against the "debts" it was rolling up against Nicaragua. 

The press informed us, from time to time, that the chief 
purpose of the intervention and the financial deals connected 
with it, including the canal "purchase," was a part of a 
big brotherly scheme to "assist Nicaragua to get on its 
feet financially." It is apparent, instead, that the deliber- 
ate purpose, from the start, was to bankrupt Nicaragua 
for the benefit of our international bankers. 

Had President Wilson actually cared to "put Nicara- 
gua on its feet" — and wanted the Canal route besides 
— he would have recommended that Nicaragua be paid in 
cash what the Canal route was worth, with the stipulation 
that Wall Street get its blood money and be kicked out of 
the country. But "business Presidents" do not do that 
sort of thing. 

Instead, in October, 191 6, Wilson permitted the bankers 
to take over the internal revenues, completing their con- 
trol of Nicaragua's income and finances. 

Finally, the terms of the Canal "purchase" and naval 
base "leases" were found to conflict with rights which Nic- 
aragua's immediate neighbors shared with her on the Gulf 
of Fonseca, and the convention was ratified over the pro- 
tests of Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras. Immedi- 
ately afterwards, Costa Rica and Salvador brought suit 
against Nicaragua In the Central American Court of Justice, 
which had been set up In 1907 at the instance of the United 
States government to obviate future wars among the Cen- 
tral American republics. The decision was against Nicara- 
gua, and required the latter to repudiate the convention. 
This Wilson would not permit Nicaragua to do. Thus 
our own government was the first to flout the judgments of 
an international peace court which it had assisted to set up, 



36o Shall It Be Again? 

and whose decisions, inferentially, at least, it had bound it- 
self to respect. 

In such circumstances lies the secret of the "necessity^' of 
keeping an army of occupation permanently on the soil of 
a "sister republic." On page 511 of the Secret Senate 
Committee hearings appears the following colloquy: 

Senator Smith of Michigan: Could the present government down 
there be maintained at all without the aid or presence of American 
marines ? 

Mr. Cole: I think the present government would last until the 
last coach of marines left Managua station, and I think President 
Diaz would be on that last coach. 

This brief statement of Walter Bundy Cole, personal rep- 
resentative in Nicaragua of our bankers, explains the ac- 
ceptance of the bankers' regime by the people of Nicaragua. 
Also, it partially explains the bankers' sure and perfect 
mastership over the native "government." Should the 
dummy in the palace become restive, he is quickly brought 
to terms by a simple threat to withdraw the protecting 
fence of foreign bayonets and leave him to the vengeance 
of his countrymen. 

Another form of discipline applied by the bankers is to 
withhold salaries until their commands are fully complied 
with. The president of the sovereign republic of Nicara- 
gua was at times found humbly begging his wages of Ameri- 
can financiers. When the "sale" of the National Railway 
was being put through, the members of the hand-picked 
National Assembly were afraid to approve the deal — so 
violent was public opposition to it. It is recorded that one 
means of pressure brought to bear upon them by Bundy 
Cole was to withhold their salaries until the contracts were 
duly ratified. 



Nicaragua 361 

In such Incidents Is revealed the Importance of the bank- 
ers' possession of the customhouses. Once there, their grip 
is forever fixed upon the throat of Nicaragua. They set 
their own terms upon all future transactions. They keep 
the books. Nicaragua can never become solvent. Nicara- 
gua can never choose another master. Nicaragua is in the 
position of a Mexican peon In the days of Diaz. The pur- 
pose of the convention, acknowledged in the contracts, is 
to furnish security to the bankers. That security is ex- 
tended In the shape of young men, in the uniform of ma- 
rines, carrying rifles paid for in taxes by the American peo- 
ple. We protect not only the bankers, their customhouses, 
their banks, their railroads, but also their dummy president 
who sits In the palace. So we grind the faces of the Nicara- 
guan people. For this the American people pay, In cash 
alone, more than the bankers receive — although cash is the 
least of what we pay. 

The story of Nicaragua Is Pan-Americanism as Pan- 
Americanism is. This is the Monroe Doctrine, not as It 
is v/rltten, but as it Is applied. This Is "protecting Amer- 
ican lives and property." This is "encouraging American 
trade." 

This is Wilson imperialism In action. It is American 
imperialism, as approved by the controlling element in both 
the Democratic and Republican parties. It Is not different, 
in any respect, from the imperialism of England, France, 
Germany, Japan, or Italy, at their worst. 

There Is no reason to debate the question as to whether 
Wilson called America into the European war In the hope 
of putting an end to Imperialism. It Is enough to point 
out that Wilson himself was a conventional Imperialist be- 
fore the European war began. 



XXXIV 

STRICTLY BUSINESS 

The changing phases of the Wilson diplomacy — and of 
the Wilson domestic policy, as it bore upon the conflict 
overseas — unerringly followed the changing interests of 
Wall Street. When the war trade could be expanded only 
if the war-traders would undertake loans to the Entente 
governments, Wilson reversed himself on the propriety of 
such loans. When, due to the piling up of their loans, the 
integrity of Entente credit became of overshadowing im- 
portance to our international bankers, Wilson reversed him- 
self on the law of the submarine, the law of the armed 
merchantman, and the question of equal treatment as an 
attribute to neutrality, swinging America into a position of 
hostility toward the Central Powers and benevolence to- 
ward their enemies. Looking ahead to a possible war on 
behalf of the dominant Wall Street interest, Wilson re- 
versed himself on the question of preparedness, and put 
through the great preparedness programme of 191 6. 
Casting about for a casus belli with Germany, Wilson 
made of his preparedness tour a popular educational course 
in the identification of the national honor with the private 
business of certain exporters and shippers. 

Said Robert N. Page, North Carolina Congressman, in 
explaining his opposition to the President on the question 
of warning Americans against traveling as passengers upon 
armed beUigerent ships, February, 191 6: 

Jesus Christ never uttered a more profound truth than when He 
declared, 'where your treasure is, there will be your heart also.' The 
loan of $500,000,000 to England by American capitalists, to say 

362 



Strictly Business 363 

nothing of the profits of munitions manufacturers, has destroyed the . 
semblance even of neutrality in the United States, and will probably j 
lead us into war. . . . I will not stultify my conscience nor stain my 
hands with the blood of my countrymen. 

Wall Street's heart was with the Entente. And Wil- 
son's heart was with Wall Street. A day came when it 
was evident that the Entente could never score a decisive 
victory without the full assistance of America as a bellig- 
erent. The tightening of the submarine blockade fur- 
nished the pretext. So, guided by Wilson, America rushed 
into the war in a blaze of super-patriotism and profit- 
taking. 

Coming down to the end of hostilities, both in reference 
to "reconstruction" at home, and in arranging the conditions 
of peace with our allies, it was our government's policy that 
Wall Street should retain every profit and advantage that 
it had already gained, as well as reap every available fu- 
ture benefit. 

As soon as the armistice was signed, Secretary Baker and 
other department heads announced that the government's 
surplus supplies would be disposed of in such a way as "not 
to break the market" — meaning that the government would 
cooperate with the profit-makers to keep up the cost of 
living. Six months after the fighting was ended. It was 
discovered that government and packers were acting to- 
gether to hoard vast quantities of food. In order to pro- 
tect the Interests of the latter. 

The same policy was followed In steel, copper, and other 
industries. After the armistice was signed, the govern- 
ment generously continued taking all the copper output at 
the guaranteed figure, 26 cents a pound, until It had ac- 
cumulated a surplus of 140,000,000 pounds. When cop- 
per had dropped to fifteen cents, It was announced that the 
government would dispose of its surplus, "In cooperation 



364 Shall It Be Again? 

with the producers," at the existing market price. The 
government sold its surplus back to the copper producers at 
from fifty to seventy-five per cent, of the rate they had 
received for it; the latter then immediately boosted the 
figure again above 20 cents a pound. 

The armistice found the job of giving new railroads for 
Did, with the people's money, far from finished. In resign- 
ing as Director General, McAdoo recommended an exten- 
jion of government control as a part of the programme of 
rehabilitation. Hines, a private railroad executive, who 
succeeded McAdoo, seconded the scheme, while Wilson 
urged it upon Congress in his Railroad Bill, which was 
heavily weighted with new appropriations from the public 
treasury. When the President's Railroad Bill failed, the 
Stock Exchange registered a severe set-back in railroad se- 
curities. The President lost his temper, and in a public 
statement (Mar. 4, 1919) denounced the "group of men in 
the Senate" who had "chosen to imperil the financial inter- 
ests of the railway system of the country." Pending fur- 
ther legislation, the coffers of the War Finance Corpora- 
tion were opened to the roads. ^ 

One reason acknowledged for the extension of govern- 
ment control was to give time for the enactment of "some 

1 In a report submitted May 9, 1921, James C. Davis, Director General of 
the Railroad Administration under President Harding, estimated that the 
net "loss" to the government, in operating the railroads during Federal con- 
trol, would come to $1,200,000,000. In other words, not only do we yield 
enormous increases in freight and passenger rates, but we pay one and one- 
fifth billion dollars of cold cash out of the Treasury besides. By the politi- 
cal and journalistic henchmen of the railroads, this vast "loss" is attributed 
to the "failure" of Federal control. But if there was really a failure of 
Federal control, this, in turn, is attributable to the failure of the railroad 
executives themselves to function honestly as public servants. For, in gen- 
eral, these gentlemen retained, throughout the period of Federal control, 
the same positions of trust and of power which they had held when the 
railroads were running without a government guarantee. From 1918 on, 
the Railway Brotherhoods, or experts connected with them, made repeated 
charges tending to bear out this view. 



Strictly Business 365 

new element of policy," which, the President urged, was 
"necessary for the protection of their security-holders." 
(Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 19 18.) The "new element 
of policy," ultimately enacted, and approved by Wilson, 
was a definite guarantee of profits, the last word in govern- 
ment gifts to business, a benefaction to private persons un- 
paralleled in the history of the world, an act of generosity 
to special privilege, so bounteous that the mere suggestion 
of it would not have been tolerated in former days. ^ 

Government benevolence was again shown in the gener- 
ous payments made for the cancellation of war contracts, 
and the losses cheerfully pocketed on the sale of war stocks. 

After the Kaiser was gone and the German people were 
under our heel, the government loans to our allies did not 
cease. Taxes could have been reduced by stopping these 
huge loans. It was urged that our allies had to be sus- 
tained. Did the obligation to sustain the imperialistic gov- 
ernments of England, France, and Italy, with money taxed 
from the American public, have anything to do with the 
fact that the money was used in financial and commercial 
operations in which our international bankers were inter- 

2 Wfien the Republican party came into power, it was as anxious to 
serve big business as any collection of politicians had ever been in the 
history of the world. It did not find the sailing easy, as the Wilson Ad- 
ministration had so satisfied the greed of capital that little more could be 
done without choking to death the goose that laid the golden egg. Rail- 
road freight rates were higher than the traffic would bear, and the great 
railroads found it expedient, in certain instances, to effect voluntary re- 
ductions. Although the Republitan party was willing enough to boost the 
protective tariff even higher, warning voices were heard from the seats 
of the mighty themselves that there was danger of the tariff's becoming a 
boomerang to the injury even of the "protected" interests. The new Ad- 
ministration was able to do little more than stand pat on the business poli- 
cies of the old. One of the potent causes of the depression of 1921 was the 
margin that had prevailed during the years 1917-20 between the earnings of 
the working population and the prices of the necessaries of life. The pub- 
lic was unable to buy back the goods that it had produced and needed, and 
the business classes were slow to let go of those goods except on the basis 
of the profiteering war prices. 



366 Shall It Be Again? 

ested, and that every dollar of it represented a profit to 
these gentlemen? We even waived immediate payment 
of the huge sums, due as interest on these loans, making it 
easier for our allies to continue their traffic with our financ- 
ing and exporting firms. 

MiUions of innocent persons had been led to believe 
that the merchant marine, built at such infamous cost with 
the people's money, was to belong to the people. But we 
soon find the Shipping Board offering the ships for sale, 
and on scandalous terms. Immediately after the armistice, 
the shipping interests had formed an association whose 
avowed purpose was to see that the government ships should 
be handed over to "private enterprise." The failure of 
the Shipping Board, during the Wilson regime, to sell more 
vessels than it did sell, was apparently due to an agreement 
of the shipping companies to hold out for lower prices 
than the government dared, for the time being, to accept. 
Meanwhile, many of the most extravagant hopes of the 
shipping interests were realized in the Jones Merchant 
Marine Act, enacted by a Republican Congress with the 
approval of a Democratic President. 

Not only did we proceed to part with the government 
ships, but the funds of the War Finance Corporation were 
opened to the hastily formed export trusts. The acknowl- 
edged purpose was to "stimulate exports," and this was 
done regardless of the needs of the people at home. The 
government's tom-tom chase of the small profiteer was 
staged in such a way as only to protect and benefit the large. 
While feigning a campaign to reduce the cost of living, 
the Administration was doing everything possible to assist 
in getting the products of the country out of the country and 
away from the people. The sugar shortage and the oil 
shortage of 1920, the shortage of many other commodities, 
and the continued rise in the prices of common necessities, 



Strictly Business 367 

tvere in part due to this policy. Had the Administration 
deliberately conspired with Wall Street to keep up the cost 
of living, for the benefit of a few at the expense of the 
many, it could not have chosen a better course. Notwith- 
standing the defeat of the Versailles Treaty, the 66th Con- 
gress, at the instigation of Wilson, both Republicans and 
Democrats concurring, enacted the most remarkable col- 
lection of special-privilege laws in American history. 

Our illegal war in Russia was pleasing not only to Paris 
and London bankers, but to New York bankers as well. 
The price of the Czar's bonds rose and fell on the Stock 
Exchange, depending on the news of the military reverses 
or successes of the Bolsheviki. American financiers held jl 
some 50,000,000 rubles of the Czar's bonds. When it ap- ^ 
peared that we would be unable to overthrow the Soviet 
Government, even with the sacrifice of American lives, 
money from the public treasury was used to pay the inter- 
est on these bonds, as well as to liquidate the accounts of 
the defunct Kerensky Government, and to promote the \ 
Kolchak revolution. More than fifty million dollars \ 
were paid out for such purposes. (Hearings of House 
Committee on Expenditures in the State Department, / 
1919.) 

At Paris, two American financiers were closer in the con- 
fidence of the President, and had more to do in shaping 
the treaties, than the Senate, or any part or member of it. 
Senator Knox disclosed the fact (Mar. 3, 1920) that on 
file, in the office of a firm of New York lawyers, was the 
complete data of the Peace Conference, access to which the 
President had steadfastly refused the treaty-advising, 
treaty-ratifying body. Mr. Lamont, a partner of Morgan 
and at the same time a Peace Conference official, was 
permitted to send an advance copy of the peace con- 
ditions to his Wall Street associates. While acting 



368 Shall It Be Again? 

for the American people at Paris, Lamont participated 
in the organization of the China Consortium and the Inter- 
national Committee of Bankers on Mexico. So, along with 
the peace arrangements, we find the beginnings of the "def- 
inite plan of international cooperation in the financing of 
foreign enterprises," advocated by President Farrell of the 
U. S. Steel Corporation, a year before. 

President Wilson procured from our allies an express 
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine, which means that 
"we" were promised a freer hand in the western hemisphere 
in "the protection of American lives and property." As 
a part of the Monroe Doctrine plan, it was reported that 
arrangements were under way for the United States to 
take over the British and French loans to Latin American 
republics. A characteristic Latin American interpretation 
of this action was voiced by a Brazilian journalist, Madeiros 
de Albuquerque, as follows: 

Brazil is considered by the United States only as a possible fu- 
ture colony. . . . The United States wants to obtain, as part of the 
payment of the debt of France and England, a bond for Brazil's 
debts to those powers. On the day this is realized, Brazil will be 
sold to the United States, which, on the first occasion, will do to us 
as she has done to Central American nations. . . . The United 
States is incontestably the Prussia of to-morrow. (New York 
Times, May 13, 1919.) 

The statement was frequently made, sometimes self- 
righteously, sometimes complainingly, that "America gets 
nothing out of the peace." But in a speech in the Senate, 
September 3, 19 19, Senator Hitchcock, the Administra- 
tion's spokesman in the treaty debates, urged ratification, 
on the ground of the '^enormous benefits and advantages 
which the United States derives from this treaty, wrung 
from Germany at the cannon's mouth." The Democratic 



Strictly Business 369 

minority of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, In 
submitting Its report, said: 

To adopt an amendment or to reject the treaty means that the 
United States will sacrifice all the concessions secured from Germany 
by a dictated peace. While these concessions are not as large ass 
those which other nations associated with us secure in reparations, 
they are nevertheless of tremendous importance and could only be 
secured under a dictated peace. 

The report then goes Into detail, the American advan- 
tages from the treaty being arranged under twelve heads. 
Upon the twelfth point, which sets forth the financial and 
commercial advantages to be derived from our membership 
on the Reparations Commission, President Wilson him- 
self enlarged somewhat In his speech at St. Louis (Sept. 
S): 

Some of you gentlemen know we used to have trade 
with Germany. All of that trade is going to be in the hands and 
under the control of the Reparations Commission. I humbly begged 
leave to appoint a member to look after our interests, and I was 
rebuked for it. I am looking after the industrial Interests of the 
United States. I would like to see the other men who are. They 
are forgetting the industrial interests of the United States, and they 
are doing things that will cut us off, and our trade off, from the 
normal channels, because the Reparations Commission can determine 
where Germany buys, what Germany buys, how much Germany 
buys. ... It is going to stand at the centre of the financial opera- 
tions of the world. . . . Under the League plan, the financial lead- 
ership will be ours, the industrial supremacy will be ours, the com- 
mercial advantage will be ours. 

Although, in the beginning, the autocrat of our war 
policies had said: ^'JVe look for no profit. We look for no 
advantage. We will accept no advantage out of this 
war*' (May 12, 19 17), yet here we have a direct confes- 
sion that he was moved by the same solicitude for business 



370 Shall It Be Again? 

after the war as during the war, before the war, and when 
getting into war; that at Paris he was a patron saint of the 
privileged class, just as were Lloyd George and Clemenceau. 
The theories of a war of defense, a war for international 
law, a war for democraqr, a war for permanent peace, all 
break down before examination. The theory of a war for 
business alone harmonizes with the facts. 



XXXV 



"the enemy at home" 



In serving business, and acknowledging himself a servant 
of business, President Wilson never, of course, acknowl- 
edged serving big business at the expense of small busi- 
ness, or of the general public; but invariably held that his 
service to business was service to the nation. Said Wilson 
on one occasion: 

Nothing can be for the interest of capital that is not for the inter- 
est of labor; and nothing can be in the interest of labor that is 
not in the interest of capital. (Indianapolis, Oct. 12, 1916.) 

This brilliant pronouncement, if true, would perhaps 
justify any course that any politician might wish to follow at 
any time. It is almost equal to saying that what is good 
for any given group of us is good for all the rest of us. 

The proposition that the interests of business — meaning 
very big business — are identical with the interests of the 
nation, did not, of course, originate with Woodrow Wilson. 
It is upon this assumption that an important share of past 
governmental pohcies has been based. Our time-honored 
protective tariff is indefensible under any other theory — 
also our various currency systems — also a major share of 
the activities of our Departments of State and of Commerce. 
All agitation for government subsidy, or other aid to a pri- 
vately owned merchant marine, has been based upon this 
theory. The doctrine of the protection of private enter- 
prises abroad, with the public armed forces, necessarily 
rests upon the assumption that such enterprises are in some 
way bound up in the general welfare. 

371 



372 Shall It Be Again? 

If the position can be maintained, that what is for the 
interest of big business Is for the interest of the country, 
then the Wilson poHcIes, in peace and In war, are possibly 
vindicated. But can It be maintained? The question is 
doubly important — and timely — because this Is the posi- 
tion now taken by the dominant element in both the Demo- 
cratic and Republican parties. It is, in the main, the posi- 
tion of Wilson's successor in office. The leaders of both 
the big political parties heartily approve of the general 
policy which Wilson pursued toward American business, in 
getting into war, In the conduct of w^ar, in negotiating peace, 
and in "reconstruction." The Administration which suc- 
ceeded Wilson's did not abate a single American business 
"benefit" which Wilson arranged for at Paris or elsewhere, 
no matter how questionable the means, and it did not wish 
to do so. It has to be said that any "business President" 
would have been willing to follow about the course that 
Wilson followed between 19 15 and 192 1 — and if, as has 
been suggested, American history might have been dif- 
ferent had Wilson's opponent been elected in 19 16, it 
would have been due altogether to the circumstances men- 
tioned.^ Wilson as a statesman was singular only in his 
unusual ability to mislead the public as to his motives and 
intentions. 

Very well, our captains of industry have long tried to 
convince their workmen that "nothing can be for the inter- 
est of capital that is not for the Interest of labor," while 
our professional labor leaders have long tried to convince 
our captains of industry that "nothing can be in the inter- 
est of labor that is not in the Interest of capital." Unhap- 
pily, employers have seldom succeeded In persuading em- 
ployees that low wages are good for employees; while 

1 Mentioned in Chapter VII. 



'The Enemy at Home" 373 

employees have seldom succeeded In convincing employers 
that high wages are good for employers. 

True, it Is In the interest of workmen that they shall have 
employment, but it is not in the interest of workmen that 
the employers shall take any more of the product than is 
economically necessary to maintain operations — although It 
is In the interest of the latter to do so. 

Likewise, it is in the Interest of the farmer that there 
shall be a market for his product, but it Is not in the Interest 
of the farmer that he should be forced to sell to a monopoly 
which skims the cream of the profit, nor that he should pay 
exorbitant rent for his land, or usurious interest on bor- 
rowed money, or excessive prices for supplies. Yet it is 
in the interest of some other social group that the farmer 
should be exploited In each of these various ways. 

It is in the interest of the public that there shall be rail- 
roads, but It Is not in the Interest of the public that charges 
should be assessed to cover dividends on watered stock, or 
that rates should be higher than economically necessary to 
provide the desired service. ^ 

It is in the Interest of the public that food supplies should 
be well distributed and easy to obtain, but It Is not In the 
Interest of the public that the supply and distribution of 
food should rest In the hands of a monopoly which exacts 
prices In excess of those economically necessary. 

It Is In the interest of the public that manufactured goods 
should be obtainable, but it is not in the interest of the pub- 
lic that manufacturers should be protected by a tariff wall, 

2 In defense of government benevolence to the Transportation Trust, great 
stress has been laid upon the large number of small security-holders. But, 
unless a major share of the latter's income is from railroad profits, his in- 
i terest is rather that of the public than that of the trust; he loses more by 
high rates than he gains. As the history of railroad financing is one long 
story of the robbery of the small investor by the big insider, the railroad 
kings' pretense of consideration for the small security-holder cannot be 
acjcepted as genuine. 



374 Shall It Be Again? 

enabling them to charge higher prices at home than those 
for which they can profitably sell abroad. 

The proposition that "nothing can be for the interest 
of capital that is not for the interest of labor," or that 
what is good for any given group of us is good for all the 
rest of us, might possibly be true if taken in some far- 
fetched spiritual sense, but in no practical sense is it true. 
Dollars constitute the only accepted measure of interest in 
this material world, and the dollar interests of individuals 
and groups everywhere conflict. 

Buyer and seller, employer and employee, farmer and 
middleman, carrier and consumer, packer and public, may 
have interests in common, but they have opposing interests 
also. It is the function of democratic government to serve 
only the common interests of the majority. The prosperity 
of the majority alone represents the prosperity of the coun- 
try. 

Officially, the country's prosperity is measured by corpo- 
ration profits, the prices of commodities, banking statistics, 
and trade statistics. Such figures do not measure the pros- 
perity of the majority. It has long since been proven that 
the profits of a corporation tell nothing of the standard of 
living of its employees; that industries protected by the 
tariff and yielding the greatest profits frequently pay the 
lowest wages. High prices usually mean that somebody 
is making a lot of money; they do not mean that everybody 
is making a lot of money. High food prices do not always 
mean, even, that the farmer is making a lot of money, but 
often the opposite. 

On the other hand, large profits in any quarter signify 
a one-sided transaction, in which somebody suffers, usually 
a numerically large ^roup. Wherever one party to a 
transaction becomes inordinately rich, it means that some 



"The Enemy at Home" 375 

other party to the transaction is getting the worst of the 
deal. An economic structure, or a governmental policy, 
that makes millionaires of a few of us, necessarily sacri- 
fices the interests of most of us. Prosperity of any numeri- 
cally small group represents, not national prosperity, but 
national exploitation. In general, what is for the inter- 
est of big business, is against the interest of the country. 
Is It possible that the Interest of big business in the war 
furnishes an exception to the rule ? 

We have seen how, while the war was being fought. 
Wall Street gathered in enormous profits, while the lot 
of the majority was unrelieved sacrifice. We have seen 
how the "American" commerce which Wilson essayed to 
protect. In approaching war, while a source of gain to 
Wall Street, was an Injury to the public. We have seen 
how the President's reconstruction policy, while immedi- 
ately protecting the Wall Street pocketbook, did so at the 
expense of the masses. The last possible justification for 
our war and our war policies, therefore, would have to 
lie in the proposition that what has herein been termed 
the permanent advantages accruing to Wall Street, from 
American belligerency, will ultimately enhance the well- 
being of the nation as a whole; that, as Mr. Vanderlip, 
Mr. Farrell, and Mr. Wilson maintained, the interest of 
Wall Street and the public In foreign trade. In a large mer- 
chant marine under the American flag. In foreign enterprise 
and government protection thereof, Is identical — that^ in 
a wordy imperialism is a wise, democratic, and nationally 
profitable policy. 

After the lessons that have been spread before the world 
in the past half-dozen years, it seems almost an Insult to 
the intelligence of the reader to set aside any space, how- 
ever brief, for an examination of this question. Yet, as 



376 Shall It Be Again? 

these lines are written, big business and the government are 
cooperating in a strenuous and intensive propaganda to 
convince the public that the answer should be affirmative. 

Begin with the question of simple trade. The primary 
interest of the majority in foreign trade is in imports ^ and 
arises from a desire, first, for goods not produced in this 
country, and, second, for goods produced here, but obtain- 
able only at prices higher than the cost of purchasing and 
importing similar goods from other countries. But the 
interest of the big business minority in the first class of 
imports is secondary, while it is not interested at all in 
the second class, but only desires its complete strangula- 
tion, by means of protective tariffs and "anti-dumping" 
laws. 

The primary interest of the big business minority in 
foreign trade is in exports. But the interest of the major- 
ity in exports is limited to exporting sufficient goods to 
balance the desired imports. Nothing pleases Wall Street 
more than "a balance of trade in our favor" — meaning an 
excess of exports over imports. But the majority has no 
interest whatever in a "balance of trade in our favor." On 
the other hand, every dollar of such a balance represents 
an economic loss to the country as a whole. Where is 
the benefit in always giving a greater value than is received? 

There is a benefit to the minority — collected chiefly at 
the expense of the majority. Why is the minority so 
pleased by a large "balance of trade in our favor?" One 
important reason is that it tends to limit the home supply of 
goods, and so facilitates the boosting of home prices. The 
profit on foreign sales themselves is small in comparison 
with the enhanced profit on domestic sales, which a large 
volume of export makes possible. 



"The Enemy at Home" 377 

In his report to the Mayor of New York on the food 
situation, In the spring of 19 17, Health Commissioner 
Emerson declared that '^the first cause of the rise in food 
prices is the increase in the exportation of staple articles.^* 
The war trade was employed as a lever to boost domestic 
prices, with the result that, even before America became a 
belligerent, the American public was paying a larger cash 
tax to the war monster than some of the belligerent coun- 
tries themselves. 

Mr. Hoover himself told the Senate Committee on Agri- 
culture that ^^in the last five months, $2^0,000,000 has been 
extracted from the American consumer in excess of normal 
profits of manufacturers and distributors, '' and that the 
average prices to consumers of our own food in the fighting 
countries of Europe ''are lower than those prevailing in 
the United States. In England the price of bread is even 
2^ per cent, lower than the price we payT (June 18, 
1917.) 

In the year preceding our declaration of war, according 
to Department of Labor reports, average food prices ad- 
vanced 32 per cent. The operation Is the same, whether 
in war or peace, In any period of Inflated exports. After 
the armistice had been signed, the cost of living did not 
fall, as had been predicted and promised, but continued to 
Increase. Exports continued to increase. In a statement 
on the economic situation (Sept. 9, 19 19), in which it 
urged speeding up in the factories and a reduced standard 
of living In the home, the Federal Reserve Board admitted: 

Looking at the matter from the point of view of the ordinary 
American consumer, however, the effect of such a 'favorable' bal- 
ance of trade is far from favorable to him. . . . The immediate pres- 
ent effect of it ... is to curtail the supplies available for the 
American consumer, and thereby to become a factor of considerable 



378 Shall It Be Again? 

importance in our price level. . . . Buying in competition with ex- 
port demand undoubtedly has been a major cause of rising prices 
in the post-war period of the United States. 

Which means that the government policy of promoting 
"our" foreign trade simply tends to establish high living 
costs on a permanent basis. 

Of course, the foreign trade propagandists put forward a 
series of propositions intended to convince the majority 
that it shares in the benefits. Otherwise the minority 
would be unable to put through its programme. 

The wage -worker is informed that a large volume of ex- 
ports means that home industry will travel along at full 
blast, and so jobs ^vill be available for all. This stock 
argument, lifted bodily from the propaganda of the pro- 
tective tariff, may appear good and sufficient to anyone 
who holds, with the minority, that the interest of labor is 
adequately served so long as the working population is per- 
mitted to exist and work at any price. 

So, also, might industry travel along at full blast if the 
goods representing the "balance of trade in our favor" 
were offered for sale at home, and the workers of the coun- 
try were paid enough more for their labor to enable them 
to purchase these goods for themselves. The interests of 
labor would really be served by such an arrangement. But 
of course that would mean restricted profits to our captains 
of industry; the real incentive of business patriots would 
disappear; they would sabotage their beloved country by 
shutting down their plants, and panic would stalk through 
the land. 

The bland assertion that labor is bound to benefit by a 
large export trade may, or may not, convince the employee 
working at a fixed salary which he is unable to raise, who 
only knows that the rising living cost is a terrible reality. 



"The Enemy at Home" 379 

There Is a suggestion, of course, that wages will be raised. 
Who win raise wages? Did any Important fraction of 
the employing class ever consent to wage Increases except 
In case of necessity, due to strikes, threats of strikes, or 
scarcity of labor arising frora some unusual condition? 

The wage Increases In 19 15 and 19 16 were not due to 
war-trade prosperity, or the benevolence of employers, or 
even to higher living costs. They were due to a restricted 
labor market, arising from the stoppage of Immigration, 
which made It possible for workmen to demand and get 
more money for their labor. After America entered the 
war, the draft was a prime factor In wage Increases. But 
neither In 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, nor 1920, did 
wage Increases equal — on the average — Increases In living 
costs. In February, 1920, the Department of Labor In- 
formed us that food prices had Increased 105 per cent. In 
seven years. This estimate, based upon figures furnished 
by retail dealers on certain staple commodities, told only a 
part of the story. 

As In April, 19 17, the Department of Labor had In- 
formed us that the effect of the European war upon 
America had been to "force up prices faster than wages," 
so, again. In May 1920, another government agency, the 
Federal Reserve Board, admitted: "Wages have apparently 
fallen behind the advance In prices and cost of living," 

Do our foreign trade propagandists mean to assert that 
the employing class will voluntarily share the proceeds with 
the workers? How can any workman be foolish enough 
to expect anything of the kind, especially when he hears 
the voices of millionaires warning the country that wages 
must be kept down, and strikes prevented as a part of the 
foreign trade programme itself — Indeed, that the produc- 
ing classes In general must work harder and consume less 
— "if we are to meet the competition of other countries?" 



38o Shall It Be Again? 

Again, the farmer is told in glowing terms of the ex- 
panded market for his products, and is told he can com- 
mand higher prices. But how can he command higher 
prices as long as he remains subject to extortion by the 
middlemen's trusts? 

Said Mr. Hoover, in a statement to the Associated Press, 
May 10, 1917: 

I am assured that the American farmer did not realize $1.30 per 
bushel for the 19 16 wheat harvest. Yet the price of wheat in N. Y. 
to-day is $3.25 per bushel, and flour is $14 per barrel, with all its 
attendant hardships and dislocation of social and industrial life. 

Of what value to the farmer is a government subsidized 
merchant marine, so long as grain exchange gamblers, 
packer monopolies, and other rings of middlemen deter- 
mine the price he shall receive, without reference to the 
selling price abroad or the conditions of ocean carriage? 

What evidence, indeed, is there that ships flying the 
American flag, operated for the private profit of a few 
men in Wall Street, backed by a government pecuHarly de- 
voted to the interests of big business, will charge lower 
rates than ships flying any other flag — or that a large num- 
ber of ships under the American flag will tend to break 
either the private shipping monopoly, the transportation 
monopoly on land, or the middlemen's monopolies? 

On the other hand, one of the first moves of the Ship- 
ping Board under the Jones Merchant Marine Act was 
taken with a deliberate purpose of producing the opposite 
effect. Early in August, 1920, it was disclosed that the 
Shipping Board was holding conferences with foreign ship- 
ping interests, in an effort to reach an understanding, and 
through the operation of a world monopoly, to establish 
as a permanent evil, the scandalous carriage charges 
reached during the war. 



*The Enemy at Home" 381 

As to the small business man, he is assured that the pro- 
ceeds of the export trade will find their way into all the 
channels of the country's business, and so, in some manner, 
he is certain to share in the benefits. But what becomes of 
this argument when our rich fellow-citizens are going in 
for the export trade, frankly with a view to reinvesting the 
proceeds not in America, but in foreign countries? 

For another important reason why Wall Street is pleased 
with a "balance of trade in our favor" is that it makes 
practicable the export of capital. During the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 19 19, the "balance of trade in our favor" 
was $4,129,200,000. The nation gave away a four bil- 
lion greater value of goods than it received in return. 

Wall Street invests its foreign trade profits in Mexico, 
Cuba, Central America, China, and other countries, not 
only in anticipation of greater profits from the exported 
money, hut also in order to enable the money remaining be- 
hind to collect greater profits here. 

Hand in hand with the export of goods, goes the export 
of capital. As the export of goods tends to increase the 
price of home goods, so the export of capital tends to in- 
crease the price of home capital — and, in the last analysis, 
of home goods also. So the majority pays — and pays. 
Financiers and captains of industry are enabled to demand 
a higher return on the investment. They refuse, for exam- 
ple, to reinvest in their own railroads any part of the prof- 
its, until the investment is made more attractive. So the 
public is forced to pay higher rates for poorer service. 
The small business man, whose enterprises require frequent 
borrowing, must pay more for borrowed money. The 
farmer does the same. Domestic enterprise, instead of 
being expanded, is restricted. The capital that was prom- 
ised to give jobs to American workmen is found in for- 
eign countries employing foreigners. The development of 



382 Shall It Be Again? 

constructive projects, recognized as essential to material 
progress at home, is pushed aside for the exploitation of 
China. The undeveloped western States, which have been 
begging for more capital for decades, are told to wait a 
while longer. 

All this begins from an artificially stimulated export 
trade, and an artificially restricted import trade. Another 
result of an artificially stimulated export trade is the impov- 
erishment of the natural resources of the country. An 
Associated Press dispatch from Washington, dated March 
20, 1919, reads: 

Original supplies of pine in the south will be exhausted in ten 
years, and at least 3,000 mills will go out of existence within five 
years, according to Henry S. Graves, chief of the United States 
Forest Service. . . . 'Our country is progressively destroying its 
forests,' declared Colonel Graves. 'The consequences are very far- 
reaching. The exhaustion of the forest is followed by the closing 
of industries, the steady increase of waste lands, the abandonment 
of farms that depended for their market on the lumber communities, 
and the impoverishment of many regions. 

'No section of the country can afford to have a large part of its 
land an unproductive waste, with the loss of taxation value, of indus- 
tries, and of population, that would be supported if tjiese lands were 
productive. No section can afford to be dependent for its supply of 
wood products on another section from 1,000 to 3,000 miles away.' 

More or less the same story is told of oil, coal, and other 
natural resources. Viscount Cowdray, the British oil 
king, in a letter to the Westminster Gazette ^ (in 19 17) 
remarked : 

According to American scientific estimates, there is only oil in 
sight in that great continent for another twenty-nine years. This 
situation is causing serious disquietude to the government of the 
United States. 



"The Enemy at Home" 383 

Yet at the very time that Cowdray was uttering these 
words, the American government was using the money and 
authority of the American people to stimulate the export 
of such resources, and so hasten their exhaustion. 

If the government policy of serving the minority's for- 
eign business by building ships for it, loaning it money to 
stimulate exports, subsidizing trade routes, negotiating 
monopolistic rate agreements with foreign shippers, raising 
tariff walls, enacting anti-dumping laws, Webb laws, Edge 
laws, Jones laws, promoting the establishment of foreign 
banks, trade-spying, and other peaceful activities — all at 
the expense of the public — is of questionable value, what 
can be said of that policy when it is carried so far as to 
jeopardize the peace of the nation and the lives of its young 
men? 

For, government assistance in the expansion of "our" 
merchant marine has its corollary in the building of a great 
navy to protect "our" ships "in their peaceful pursuits upon 
the high seas." Government encouragement of "our" for- 
eign investments has its corollary in the protection of such 
investments against "confiscation" by the country in which 
the investment is made, as well as against the machinations 
of other powerful governments, committed to the protec- 
tion of the Investments of their nationals. 

No part of the foreign trade programme Is Innocent. 
Business groups strong enough to command peaceful gov- 
ernment service are also strong enough to command public 
diplomacy and public arms. Public officials who are won 
to the advocacy of reaching out for "our proper place in 
world trade" are also won to the advocacy of compelling 
countries like Mexico to "observe their international obHga- 
tions," as well as compelling countries like Japan to respect 
the Morganlzed Monroe Doctrine — In other words, our 



384 Shall It Be Again? 

"right" to coerce Mexico as "we" see fit, and for "our" 
interests. 

The United States is not in danger of invasion, and has 
not been for generations. It is not in danger of war ex- 
cept as it chooses to perpetrate aggressions upon the weak, 
or except as it arouses the animosity of other business 
governments by its aggressive pursuit of imperialistic 
spoils. 

As government service to Wall Street's foreign business 
carried America into the war against Germany, so a con- 
tinuation of that policy is certain to carry it into future 
wars. There is no course to imperialistic greatness except 
through seas of blood, and the American people have no 
interest whatever in imperialistic greatness, or in any part 
of the programme of imperialism. 

During the decades when America was without a mer- 
chant marine or foreign investments, the American people 
were as prosperous as the people of the countries boasting 
the largest merchant marines and the most valuable for- 
eign investments. Foreign ships have always been glad 
to carry American cargoes, and to charge no more for the 
service than American ships. Foreign trade, within cer- 
tain limits, is desirable, and there is no objection to Ameri- 
can ships as such. 

The point is that subsidized trade and ships are not 
worth the price, and that the trade of the vessel that re- 
quires a warship to protect it is a national calamity. Had 
there not been a handful of ships flying the American flag 
between 19 15 and 19 17, it would have been more difficult 
to find a pretext for involving America in the world war 
on the side of the Entente governments. So long as the 
imperialistic madness lasts, America would be safer and 



*The Enemy at Home" 385 

more prosperous without merchant ships than with them. * 
As to foreign Investments, every adventuring dollar that 
calls back to the United States government to protect It 
Is a traitor dollar. It would be a saner economic policy 
for the nation to buy out the foreign investments of Its 
citizens, paying them dollar for dollar, and paying them 
expected profits besides, to the end of time, than to continue 
in the policy of aiding, encouraging, and protecting such 
investments. 

One stroke of government service to the minority leads 
on to another and bolder stroke. At each stroke the minor- 
ity collects another profit, while the majority pays — the 
protective tariff — Inflated export of goods — the export of 
capital — the building and operation of a merchant marine 
— army and navy contracts — war. 

The "foreign trade" propaganda, like our "war for 
democracy," is a national swindle whose success can be 
explained only by the almost complete control by the mi- 
nority of all the great opinion-forming agencies of the coun- 
try, and especially of the press. Had this control been 
any less complete, the simple fact that the rich favored the 
war v/ould have been sufficient In the beginning to make the 
public quite certain that it was not for democracy. For 
our millionaire class was created by the desecration of de- 
mocracy, and can be perpetuated only by Its continued dese- 
cration. 

3 Of the "American" ships for whose protection we quarreled with Ger- 
many, many — as those of the International Mercantile Marine — belonged 
to British-controlled corporations. An overwhelming number of the others 
became legally American only after the European war began. Previously, 
a majority of them had flown the British flag and had been built in England. 
Their owners changed them from British registry as a means to procuring 
the "protection" of the American government. The British government 
permitted these vessels to be changed to the Ameritan flag in order to 
furnish the American government a convenient excuse for getting into a 
quarrel with Germany. 



386 Shall It Be Again? 

The Congressional Library at Washington, and the ar- 
chives of the Department of Justice, the records of courts 
and official bodies everywhere, are packed with sworn tes- 
timony proving that the accumulation of America's great 
private fortunes was accomplished by the corruption of 
government, national, State, and local, and the habitual 
commission of crimes of almost every known character; 
that these fortunes are to-day maintained and expanded by 
similar practices; that the lives of our rich super-patriots, 
and the corporations which they represent, are a standing 
offense against every democratic principle; even that many 
of these gentlemen were In the past personally Involved In 
operations peculiarly unpatriotic. 

There Is nothing either about the recent war or any pre- 
vious one to Indicate that Wall Street has ever had any 
more concern for the national welfare In war time than 
in peace time. Our richest fellow-citizens have made 
money out of the blood of their countrymen In all our wars. 
Big business supported the recent war because the war was 
In support of big business, and only for that reason. The 
great financiers and their banks gave the same support to 
the Liberty Loans as they were in the habit of giving to a 
bond issue of a railroad owned by themselves; it meant 
the same kind of satisfaction to them; the proceeds were 
intended to go into their pockets. During the war. It was 
treason to denounce the great profit-makers. That was 
logical, for the war was for their sake. It would have 
been quite impossible for President Wilson to have begun 
a war really Intended to "make the world safe for democ- 
racy" without facing the united opposition of Wall Street. 

The real enemy of America is not autocracy abroad. It 
i^ not kings or kaisers or czars. The real enemy of 
America is our rich fellow-citizen who is willing to plunge 
our country Into war for his own selfish purposes — his 



'The Enemy at Home" 387 

political servant, without whose voluntary cooperation pub- 
lic war for private profit would be impossible — his intellec- 
tual henchman, of the press, the pulpit, and the college, 
whose function is to identify the national honor with the 
business ambitions of a small but powerful minority. 



XXXVI 

PROOF OF THE PUDDING 

*But what good came of it at last?* 
Quoth little Peterkin. 
*Why, that I cannot tell,' said he; 
'But 'twas a famous victory.' 

Disillusionment must be final when one faces the results. 
One hundred thousand young Americans died on European 
battlefields and in army camps. Nearly as many more are 
permanently insane from the shocks and horrors of war. 
Half a million are mutilated for life. ^ The direct money 
cost, disbursed by the government alone, was in excess of 
thirty billion dollars — and this was only a beginning. 
What have we to show for the price we pay, except our 
soaring living costs, our 21,000 new millionaires, our muti- 
lated Constitution, our European entanglements, our per- 
manently enlarged military and naval establishment, and 
a complete set of war laws ready to clap down upon the 
country, the moment it is decided that the thing shall be 
done again? 

What one fine promise did the "noble democracies" ful- 
fill? What one pernicious institution did they banish from 
the earth? What one thing did they do for democracyi? 

1 "In all, more than 71,000 of our soldiers and sailors have been dis- 
charged as mentally disabled, and more than 38,000 as tubercular." — Ameri- 
can Legion Weekly, January, 1921. In a letter to Senator Ashurst, during 
the same month, Surgeon-General Cummings estimated that the sick and 
insane men, whose afflictions can be charged to service in the war, were 
increasing at the rate of 1000 per month. According to a report of the 
National Disabled Soldiers' League, at the beginning of 1921, the number of 
disabled soldiers was 64.1,900. 

388 



Proof of the Pudding 389 

Has America more or fewer friends abroad than it had in 
1914 or 1916? Are we more "united," as we were in- 
formed that we would be? Is there less mutual fear and 
suspicion among us? Are our personal liberties more or 
less secure than they were? Is it easier for the masses to 
earn a living than before? Are the social poles nearer 
together, or wider apart? What one domestic evil has 
been corrected at home? 

A year after the German autocracy fell, our diplomats 
and our armed forces were meddhng in a dozen foreign 
countries, breaking strikes here, denying the right of free 
assembly there, suppressing newspapers, acting as spies and 
informers for counter-revolutionists, overturning popular 
governments, seeking to return to power the very minions 
of autocracy whom we had proclaimed it our mission to 
overthrow — at times, as at Archangel, driving citizens into 
the trenches to fight against their own people — everywhere 
making war upon every high principle for which we pro- 
fessed to fight. 

At home, the Terror had been defended only as a war 
measure. But month after month passed, and no part of 
the repressive legislation had been repealed; the prisons 
remained crowded with objectors; the Postmaster-General 
continued to exercise his extraordinary powers, i^lthough 
countless assurances had been given that Americans would 
get back their constitutional Hberties, it became more and 
more evident that those who had set up the Terror intended 
to make it permanent. 

The machinery created to make war on "pro-German- 
ism" was kept intact to make war on "Bolshevism." As 
the German peril was played out, a new peril had to be in- 
vented. Bolshevism was any criticism of existing political 
or financial leadership, any dissatisfaction with existing ty- 
ranny, any effort of workmen towards higher wages, any 



390 Shall It Be Again? 

movement among the masses for better conditions, any dis- 
position towards reform, and especially any demand for a 
fulfillment of the war pledges. Bolshevism was painted as 
an even more horrible menace than Kaiserism, and in order 
to strike fear to the hearts of the people, Russian Bolshe- 
vism was lied about as recklessly as we had lied about 
Kaiserism. 

So, unlawful arrests and imprisonments, and unlawful 
raids, did not come to an end. Espionage in the schools, 
colleges, and elsewhere, did not cease. We had our Fed- 
eral, State, and local inquisitions into all forms of radical- 
ism, and a flock of sedition laws for peace times. The 
Federal Secret Service was permanently enlarged. At the 
request of President Wilson, a peace-time Passport Law 
was enacted and, in conjunction with our allies, we estab- 
lished an international espionage system for the persecu- 
tion of "Bolshevists" of every kind. The Attorney-Gen- 
eral, while maneuvering for a Presidential nomination, pro- 
ceeded periodically to "discover" and "frustrate" a series 
of bomb plots, just in time to "save the country from the 
horrors of Bolshevism," and to use the people's money to 
publish abroad his Don Quixote exploits — although he 
never succeeded in constructing a single plausible case, or 
bringing a single political bomb-thrower to justice. Never 
before in our history had the Federal government been so 
openly and militantly an ally of the employing class in 
industrial disputes. Never had it been so easy to procure 
the aid of the military to break a strike. The democracy 
which we enjoyed before the war was of purest ray serene, 
in comparison with the thing that faced us afterwards. 
The American people were given czarism and solemnly 
told it was Americanism. 

To the official peace-time Terror was added an unofficial 
Terror, and the two worked in harmony. The same public 



Proof of the Pudding 391 

leaders who had been most vociferous in the "war for 
democracy" now led the marching hosts In the war on 
"Bolshevism." Patriotic organizations of every kind were 
kept Intact to assist In the new war, and others were created 
for that purpose. The social, commercial, or religious 
organization that did not issue its diatribe against Bol- 
shevism was not in good form. Men holding the highest 
positions in public life habitually gave voice to sentiments 
which could be Interpreted only as an incitement to riot 
against any one dissenting from the blind, reactionary, 
brutal, and dangerous state of mind which the powerful 
were seeking to Impose upon the nation under the name of 
patriotism. 

As a direct consequence, In the year of Its military 
triumph, America saw more civil strife, more domestic vio- 
lence, more lawlessness, more Intolerance of private opin- 
ion, more assaults upon common democracy, than in any 
other year within half a century. "One-hundred-per-cent 
Americans" went on a nation-wide, anti-Bolshevik shadow- 
hunt, conjuring up an enemy where there was none — break- 
ing up peaceful meetings, burning "red literature," destroy- 
ing property, sacking newspaper offices, maltreating defense- 
less and inoffensive persons. They ran no risk; for the 
Federal, State and local authorities gave them license and 
protection. The cowardice brewed in the fear propaganda 
of 1917 and 1918 was utilized in 1919, In the most das- 
tardly series of attacks on civil liberties known in American 
history. 
I The excuse was that somebody wanted to overthrow the 
I government by force. Since somebody wanted to over- 
l throw the government by force, nobody must criticize the 
I government or advocate change. Anybody who criticized 
i the government must be put down by force. The govern- 
ment must put down the Constitution by force. An organ- 



392 Shall It Be Again? 

ization of cx-service men calling itself the American Le- 
gion assumed to set up a super-government in many commu- 
nities, to censor public discussion, to break strikes, to abolish 
"American liberties" in the name of "Americanism," and 
to exert a nation-wide influence in favor of black reaction. 
The only wonder Is that these things did not of themselves 
produce a series of bomb plots having a more tangible basis 
than the imagination of the Attorney-General. 

When before was the American repubHc so steeped In sin 
that it dared not look Itself in the face? While many sin- 
cere though thoughtless persons were drawn into this 
scheme of violence, there Is no question whence the impulse 
for It emanated, nor what Its motive. Its basic motive, 
undoubtedly, was to impose permanent restrictions upon 
expression, and so conceal the war swindles, to hold the 
public mind in subjection and prepare it again to accept 
military service on behalf of Wall Street's foreign ambi- 
tions, in the name of patriotism and the national honor. 

The conservative reaction of 19 19, like the "democratic" 
brain-storm of 19 17, was artificially stimulated — by the 
same Interests and for similar ends. 

But, In spite of the peace-time Terror, the war swindle 
became more and more discernible to the naked eye. 
Abroad, it was Impossible entirely to conceal the dangerous 
friction among our various allies, or the source of that 
friction — the hungry desire of righteous governments to 
"administer" new territories "for the benefit of the inhabi- 
tants." It was impossible to keep from us some knowledge 
of their sanctimonious atrocities, particularly the butcheries 
of England in India, Egypt, and Ireland; of Japan in Ko- 
rea, as well as of our proteges, Rumania, Poland, Greece, 
and Finland, either within or without their own borders. 
It was also impossible to suppress the fresh evidence, 



Proof of the Pudding 393 

brought to light from time to time by the Bolsheviki and 
others, of Allied plotting for vast territorial grabs in a 
general European war, years before Serbian officers mur- 
dered an Austrian prince. It was impossible to hide from 
us the fact that Britons were beginning to mention America 
as the next world peril — according us the same position in 
the British scheme of things that Germany had held during 
the past generation, that Russia held for nearly a century, 
that France held before Russia, that Spain held before 
France. It was impossible to hide the fact that, even 
greater than the discrepancy between the Fourteen Points 
and the various peace treaties, was the discrepancy be- 
tween the best promises written into these documents and 
the performances that we proceeded to stage. 

Weak nations were "liberated," only to be used as pawns 
in the same old game. "Mandatories" were conquered 
with blood and iron, only to be fenced off for economic ex- 
ploitation. Offensive and defensive alliances continued to 
be made. Diplomacy was never more secret nor sinister. 
Aggression was the order of the day. The new govern- 
ments which we set up turned out to be, In notable instances, 
I less restrained In autocracy and in egoistic madness than the 
I great empires of which they had formerly been a part. 
I The folly of championing with the sword the irredentism of 
I any nation became Increasingly evident. All of us pro- 
I ceeded to prepare to make use In the next war of all weap- 
ons, however frightful, developed by Germans as well as 
by our allies and ourselves. Never did the British imperlal- 
i istic machine work at such high pressure, and the same may 
be said of the imperialistic machines of France, Japan, and 
even of ourselves. 

In a twelvemonth we had sowed more seeds of new wars 
than Germany had sowed In all her history. The League 
of Nations was laughed to scorn by the Supreme Council, 



394 Shall It Be Again? 

which dwindled to two premiers, who happened to hold the 
strings of the greatest military establishments in Europe. 
The old international law was made a mockery, and in its 
place was set up the authority of two politicans. The 
"democratic" and "glorious" France, which we had ideal- 
ized during the fighting, was revealed as being in the grip 
of the most aggressive militarism of modern times. 

Not the least damning are the words of the "utter demo- 
crat" himself, in his efforts to "explain" to the Senate and 
the country the settlement which he brought back from the 
European mire. Although the purpose of these explana- 
tions was to assure the nation that the Versailles Treaty 
realized the President's peace pledges, and to reassure it 
of the validity of the entire body of the war propaganda, 
and although, in the effort to carry out this purpose, the 
President's explanations became a mass of misstatements 
as to what was contained in the treaty, yet within these ex- 
planations themselves appear a series of admissions and 
contradictions which are themselves a confession of the 
monumental imposture. 

While assuring his audiences that his settlement provided 
for general disarmament and would end war, he was urg- 
ing upon Congress a bill to create a standing army of 
576,000 men — a standing army only 300,000 smaller than 
that of Germany at the beginning of the war. 

While assuring his audiences that "when the treaty is 
accepted men in khaki will not have to cross the seas again," 
he was awaiting a politically favorable moment in which to 
ask Congress to approve an American mandatory in Tur- 
key, which would require a new army to be sent immediately 
to Europe. 

While solemnly declaring America incapable of violat- 



Proof of the Pudding 395 

ing the political Independence of any other nation, he was 
announcing that American troops would remain Indefinitely 
in Russia. 

While informing the public that "the essential object 
of the treaty is to establish the Independence of, and pro- 
tect, the weak peoples of the world," he was threatening 
Mexico with "a radical change of policy," which could have 
meant nothing less than another invasion of that country. 

While Informing us that "only the free peoples of the 
world can join the League of Nations," he was confessing 
that a certain charter member (France) was under the con- 
trol of Its general staff at the Conference, that "they were 
dominated by the military machine that they had created, 
nominally for their own defense, but really, whether they 
willed it or not, for the provocation of war." 

While protesting that the members of his league were 
drawn together by a common passion for the political inde- 
pendence and the territorial Integrity of weak nations, he 
was admitting that at least one of the most Important of 
the number had to be permitted to transgress the political 
Independence and territorial integrity of a defenseless neigh- 
bor, as a bribe to induce It to enter his league. 

In one speech we find him proclaiming that, "There can 
be cited no instance where these governments [the govern- 
ments of England, France, Japan, etc.] have been dishonor- 
able" ; yet within the week we find him describing their 
aggressions upon China, and characterizing them as "a 
very serious impairment; of the territorial integrity" and 
"a very serious interference with the political Independence 
of that great political kingdom." 

In one speech we find him asserting that the representa- 
tives of France and England had promised him to return 
to China "the exceptional rights" which they had extorted 



396 Shall It Be Again? 

from that country — giving pledges similar to the alleged 
pledge of Japan to return Shantung; three days later we 
find him saying that no such promise had been made. In 
one breath we find him acknowledging that his treaty would 
subject Germany to a punitive indemnity; in the next breath 
we find him denying it. On one day we find him suggest- 
ing that the German commercial classes wanted war for 
commercial reasons; on the following day we find him 
asserting that the German commercial classes wanted to 
avoid war for commercial reasons. To one audience he 
portrayed our proposed after-war union with our allies, as 
a ''moral union"; to another audience he portrayed it as 
eminently a financial union. On one day he averred that 
he consented to participate upon the Reparations Commis- 
sion only to assist our dear allies; on another day he ac- 
knowledged that his purpose was to serve what he termed 
"the industrial interests of the United States." At times 
he proclaimed in the most positive terms that his peace 
pledges had been completely realized at Paris; at other 
times he confessed that they had not been realized, and of- 
fered excuses of various kinds.^ 

While asserting that "the League of Nations makes 
every agreement of every kind invalid," he was confessing 
that one of its primary objects was to validate and enforce 
a peace based upon the multifarious agreements written 
Into the secret treaties. 

In admitting that In making peace he was guided by the 
secret treaties, he defended the action on the ground that 
the war was fought partly to vindicate the sacredness of 
treaties; pretending that his obligation to observe these 
secret robber bargains was greater than his obligation to 
insist upon the conditions of a permanent and democratic 
and just peace, which he had promised his own people and 

2 For more complete quotations see Appendix. 



Proof of the Pudding 397 

the world, and which the makers of the secret treaties had 
solemnly agreed to abide by. 

Although, in his Memorial Day address at Paris (19 19) 
he asserted: "Private counsels of statesmen cannot now 
and cannot hereafter determine the destinies of nations"; 
and although, at Oakland, California (Sept. 18, 19 19) he 
declared: "From this time forth, all the world is going to 
know what all the agreements between nations are. It is 
going to know, not their general character merely, but their 
exact language and contents" ; yet in the intervening period 
he refused the Senate information upon which his Paris de- 
cisions were based; mentioned the "intimacies" of the 
Peace Conference, and the "indiscretion" of talking about 
them, even to the treaty-ratifying body; declared it a mis- 
take "to redebate here [with the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee] the fundamental questions that we debated at 
Paris"; refused data on the ground that it was agreed at 
Paris that they should be "confidential" ; acknowledged pos- 
session of "international secrets" which he declined to share 
even with the Senate; confessed to the view that his Paris 
secrets should never become public property (Conference 
with Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at White House, 
Aug. 19, 1919) ; brought out more and more clearly the 
facts that the treaty itself was but a skeleton of secret 
understandings known only to five old men who whispered 
together at Paris; that he was attempting to bind America 
to courses of action which would be revealed to the coun- 
try only after they had become accomplished facts ; that he 
had entered into far-reaching engagements with foreign 
governments to use the money and the blood of the Ameri- 
can people in secret enterprises over which neither the 
American people nor their representatives in Congress 
would ever exercise choice or dominion; that his projected 
League of Nations was not intended to be under the control 



398 Shall It Be Again? 

of peoples or of national legislatures, but that it was to be 
an instrument of executives, as secret, irresponsible, and 
autocratic as the Peace Conference itself. 

He asserted that he knew nothing of the secret treaties 
until after he arrived at Paris, although they had been pub- 
lished in Europe and in America, debated in the Parlia- 
ments of our allies and acknowledged by Allied statesmen. 
He asserted that he did not know, until we went to war, 
that "Germany was not the only country that maintained 
a secret service," although he himself maintained a secret 
service of precisely the same sort as Germany's. He as- 
serted that Japan had promised to return the sovereignty 
of Shantung, "without qualification," although Japanese 
statesmen had already announced that there would be quali- 
fications. "Japan has kept her engagements," he declared, 
although he could not be ignorant of the history of the 
strangling of Korea. 

In declaring the unwisdom of defining the Monroe Doc- 
trine in the covenant of the League "because I do not know 
how soon we may wish to extend it," he confessed himself 
capable of the trickery which "extending" the Monroe Doc- 
trine would involve. 

In conceding that "America was not directly attacked," 
he acknowledged as fraudulent the proposition upon which 
he had asked Congress to declare war, "that the recent 
course of the Imperial German Government is nothing less 
than war against the government and people of the United 
States." 

In admitting that "America was not immediately in dan- 
ger," he branded as a hoax the entire scare propaganda, for 
which he himself had struck the keynote. In confessing 
that "This was a commercial and industrial war, not a po- 
litical war," he discarded in a word the theory of a German 



Proof of the Pudding 399 

world peril, upon which his own high professions of a war 
against "autocracy" were based. 

In suggesting that he "waited on" the American people 
a long time before he asked Congress to declare war, he 
pleaded guilty to practicing deception upon the American 
people during the critical weeks of February and March, 

1917- 

In reiterating what he told us at the beginning of the war, 

that the German people did not choose war and did not 
want war, he condemned the punishment-for-wrong-done 
theory, upon which his settlement was based, and which else- 
where he sought to justify. In urging ratification on finan- 
cial and commercial grounds, he confessed to charlatanry 
in all his pretenses of an unselfish war. 

Mr. Walsh, do you think that any considerable number of peo- 
ple, when they read my declarations, thought that these settlements 
were to be made at some particular place, automatically, immediately ? 
(President Wilson to Frank P. Walsh, Paris, June ii, 1919, as re- 
ported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Messrs. 
Walsh and Dunne.) 

What is this but an admission that the promises upon 
which 100,000 American youths gave up their lives were 
never intended to be carried out? 

So, Wilson's own explanations of his settlement, as given 
to the Senate and in his treaty tour, become the final word 
against Wilson himself, against Wilson's war propaganda, 
against Wilson's treaties, against Wilson's war. 

The wisest and best men honestly fail to reach their 
highest aims, honestly make mistakes, honestly change their 
minds, honestly reverse themselves. But the inconsisten- 
cies of Woodrow Wilson cannot be explained on any theory 
that includes an assumption of honesty. Apologists for the 



400 Shall It Be Again? 

Individual may still argue that Wilson was "forced" to re- 
verse himself, forced to break his promises, forced against 
his will to ask for a declaration of war, forced to con- 
sent to an imperialistic peace, forced by "the invisible 
government." Were there no other answer it would 
be enough to point to the fact that Wilson always had the 
alternative of resigning his office. The theory, indeed, re- 
veals a woeful misunderstanding of the operations of the 
so-called invisible government. The great force of the 
latter is exerted before election, not afterwards. Had 
Wilson idealism been anything but verbal, he would not 
have been nominated and elected. The great myth of the 
world war was Wilson idealism. Our noble President 
was simply a one hundred per cent. American politician. 
The secret of Wilson is hypocrisy. 

By the close of 19 19, it had become more or less respecta- 
ble to confess disillusionment as to Wilson, and especially 
as to Wilson's peace. We may have become disillusioned 
regarding Wilson, but how about ourselves? Why were we 
so long in finding out that Wilson and perfection are not 
synonymous terms ? ^ 

What happened from 19 17 on would have been impos- 
sible had not the "leaders of the people" generally been of 
much the same character as Wilson, and willing to serve 
the same ends by similar means. Had the convictions of 
the majority of Senators and Representatives gone any 
deeper than regard for their own immediate political for- 
tunes, they would not have yielded the day on so many im- 
portant points, upon which in the beginning they were op- 
posed to the President. Although the President was more 

3 "What matters the error or the incapacity of a single man compared 
with the incapacity and the error of the entire nation which glorified 
him?" I borrow these words from Martin Luis Guzman, who applied them 
not to Woodrow Wilson and the American people, but to Porfirio Diaz and 
Mexico, in a little book, "The Complaint of Mexico." 



Proof of the Pudding 401 

willing to plunge the country into war, readier to go 
against the peace spirit of the country, and bolder in du- 
plicity and contempt for the laws of the land, the members 
of the national law-making body did, in the end — with a 
few honorable exceptions — swallow the Wilson pro- 
gramme, tolerate the Wilson usurpations, and connive at 
the Wilson duplicities. Every Wilson war lie was echoed 
with becoming sanctity by Wilson's leading political op- 
ponents. 

Senatorial opposition to the Wilson settlement, insofar 
as It saved the country from financial, political, and military 
deals to which the President attempted to commit us, and 
insofar as It operated to explode the myth of Allied and 
Presidential perfection, was a real service. The service, 
however, was an incident of party politics. For it was 
almost universally conceded that, had the President's head 
not been turned by adulation, had he continued to employ 
ordinary political sagacity; once the Republican party had 
won the election of 19 18, Instead of piling up slights and 
Insults, had he permitted it to go through the motions of 
participating In the drafting of the treaties, had he been 
willing to share the "honor," his work would have been 
promptly ratified, without the dotting of an "I" or the 
crossing of a "t." 

Notwithstanding the Iniquity, one cannot refrain from 
a passing regret that the Senate did not at once ratify the 
Wilson treaties, thus yielding the final item of his war pro- 
gramme, just as It had yielded every other item of Impor- 
tance from the beginning. For there will always remain 
some simple persons to contend that Senatorial perversity 
was the one thing that prevented the whole of the beautiful 
edifice of world peace and democracy, promised by Wilson, 
from being realized then and there. 

Such persons really have little to complain of. Smart- 



402 Shall It Be Again? 

ing under a thousand indignities, and with an eye upon the 
1920 election, the Republicans blocked ratification, pledged 
themselves to withdraw from European entanglements, 
promised Immediate peace, won the election on such pledges 
— only to project the country again into the European mess 
as deeply as they dared. 

The League of Nations under that name must forever 
remain anathema, but under other forms we join in the 
imperialistic schemes for which the League was set up. 
The Armenian mandate and the French-Brltlsh-Amerlcan 
special alliance are shelved; from that much the Republi- 
can party saved us — for the time being, at least. Other- 
wise, it did not right a single wrong, or, in any important 
particular, attempt to change the course of the country. 
The Wilson policy towards reparations, mandatories, ter- 
ritorial disputes, the China Consortium, Shantung, Russia, 
alien property, railroads, shipping, dye tariffs, the army 
and navy, passports, foreign trade, "anti-dumping," Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Cuba, Mexico, oil. Federal espionage, our Eur- 
opean debtors, we take up where Wilson left off, and carry 
forward from there.* Even in his speeches, Wilson's suc- 
cessor can do little else than feebly echo Wilson. The re- 
sult of "the great and solemn referendum" was that the 
public, while believing it was repudiating the Wilson poli- 
cies, was only putting them into other hands quite as will- 
ing to carry them out. The election of 1920 was a fraud 

* Under the name of a "Conference for the Limitation of Armaments," 
we stage at Washington a parley of governments reminiscent of the con- 
ferences of "the powers" of Europe so frequently held in the years before 
the outbreak of the world war. While China's finish is being duly ar- 
ranged, we are positively assured that, as a result of the conference, 
armaments will be reduced all around. At the same time the still small 
voice of a cabinet member is informing us: "Plans noiv initiated for prep- 
aration for national defense contemplate a more complete state of pre- 
paredness than at any previous period in the peace-time history of our 
country" (Annual report of the Secretary of War, Dec, 1921.) 



Proof of the Pudding 403 

of the same character as that of 19 16, though of lesser 
magnitude. 

By the middle of 1920, it was no longer ''Bolshevism" 
to criticize the Wilson peace; it was still "Bolshevism" to 
question the validity of the Wilson war. So the saviors 
of our country, in the Republican group in the Senate, con- 
tinued to glorify the Wilson war while condemning the Wil- 
son peace, and many of the rest of us, sheep-like, followed 
their example. But had the major premises of the war 
propaganda been valid — the perfection of Wilson and the 
purity of our allies — the settlement could not have been 
other than a pure and perfect one. It is Impossible now 
to offer any criticism of the Wilson settlement, or of Wil- 
son, or of any of the post-war conditions, without tearing 
down some essential part of the theory upon which the war 
was put through. But the invalidity of that theory was as 
demonstrable before the war as afterwards. There was 
no occasion for the experiment that we made. No one who 
joined in the "Stand-Behind-the-PresIdent!" cry, or partici- 
pated In the purity-versus-depravlty nonsense, has a right to 
cast a stone at Wilson. He got what he bargained for. 
The Liberal patriots who raised their hands in holy horror 
at the peace-time Terror got what they bargained for. 
The "now-that-we're-in" patriots got what they bargained 
for. The Labor patriots of the American Federation of 
Labor got what they bargained for. The anti-union drive 
of the Garys and the government, like the lawless war on 
"Bolshevism," was an almost certain aftermath of a war 
for the enrichment of the Garys, although that war would 
hardly have been possible without the voluntary coopera- 
tion of the Gomperses. 

Certain "liberal" editors have sought to excuse our war 
lies on the ground that they were necessary for victory. 



404 Shall It Be Again? 

But had America's cause been just, there would have been 
no need to bolster it up with lies. Even had this argument 
been valid once, it would long ago have lost its force. 
Nevertheless, the movement to keep alive the memory of 
our dead in Europe also became a movement to keep alive 
the war lies, and forever hide the war swindles. Let us 
face the truth. 

The truth is that there was not a particle of democracy 
about our war, either in the way it was achieved, in the 
way it was conducted, in the distribution of its burdens, in 
the fighting organization itself, in its real motives, in the 
manner of making peace, or in its fruits, either at home 
or abroad; that we quarreled with Germany, went to war, 
and negotiated peace, purely in the interest and at the 
direction of high finance, and at all stages to the prejudice 
of the general welfare; that no American died for his 
country in Europe in 1917, 1918, or 1919, since there was 
no occasion for any American to die for his country, either 
in Europe or elsewhere. 

A great truth is that we have lied — ^^ve have indulged in 
an orgy of lying. We have not been honest even with our 
own allies. No American could honestly ask for freedom 
for Ireland on any ground of principle, and put the soft 
pedal on Haiti. No one could consistently criticize the 
Shantung award and keep still about Nicaragua. America 
has nothing to be afraid of except its own conscience, and 
has not had for a long time. The truth is that we have 
given the world a spectacle of white-livered hysteria that 
will require years of self-respecting conduct to live down. 

For the mere money cost of our war, every person who 
works for a living in America, every bread-winner, ev^ery 
propertyless family, could have been provided with a mod- 
ern and comfortable home, free of liability. Instead, we 
have what are called Liberty Bonds. We were informed 



Proof of the Pudding 405 

that they were a good investment, but that was not enough; 
they were forced upon us. We paid our good money for 
them. We were then taxed to pay for them again. Our 
government then proceeded to confiscate a large share ol 
their value, by printing paper money in greatly increased 
quantities. At the end of the war we could sell our bonds 
for something less than half the goods the same money 
would have bought before. But whether we sell our bonds 
or whether we keep them, we shall continue paying for 
them — over and over again; in taxes and in swollen prices. 
By the simple trick of inflation, the government confiscates 
a part of the wages of every workman; and by its financial 
operations turns the money over to the multimillionaire 
owners of our "essential industries." 

Instead of gaining, we have everywhere lost. Our Lib- 
erty Bonds turn out to be a gold brick from every point 
of view. 

The case against the war is also the case against existing 
leaders of the people in every walk of life, against big busi- 
ness patriotism, against Wall Street democracy, against 
the press as it Is, against a trust-in-the-President form of 
government, against a social system that could permit the 
great American swindle of 1916-1919. 

There remains a single chance for America to derive a 
benefit from the war just past. It is to perceive the lesson 
and act upon It. It Is for common folks to recognize the 
real character of past events, and so take measures to pre- 
vent a recurrence with probably more costly results. 



XXXVII 



"reconstruction" 



The programme that would preserve the peace of America, 
promote its prosperity, and serve democracy at home and 
abroad, would have to include an honest application of prin- 
ciples by which President Wilson professed to be guided in 
sending American armies to European battlefields. 

For international application, the cardinal principles are 
self-determination and equality of sovereignty. Before 
there could be any question of fighting to compel the observ- 
ance of these fundamentals by others, we would first have 
to observe them ourselves, as well as to heal, as far as may 
be, the scars that we have cut in trampling upon them in 
the past. In other words, we would have to purge our- 
selves with a course of repudiation, withdrawal, and repara- 
tion. 

I. Repudiation. Formal repudiation of every *'Ameri- 
can" and other policy in foreign affairs that conflicts with 
the principles of self-determination and equality of sov- 
ereignty. 

Repudiation of the policy of employing diplomatic coer- 
cion or armed intervention on behalf of business invest- 
ments in any country, whether under the name of "protect- 
ing American lives and property," "preserving order," or 
any other guise. 

Repudiation of dollar diplomacy in any form. 

Repudiation of the Piatt Amendment, asserting a "right" 
to intervention in Cuba. 

Repeal of the legislation empowering the President 

406 



''Reconstruction" 407 

to proclaim an arms embargo, as a means to assisting or 
hindering one side or another in an internal dispute in 
Latin America, or countries elsewhere. 

Repudiation of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, recogniz- 
ing special interests of Japan in China foil considerations 
kept secret. 

Repudiation of the imperialistic "peace" treaties, and all 
special alliances with Imperialistic governments. 

Renunciation of the Nicaraguan Canal Convention, the 
Haitian and Santo Domingan conventions, and every other 
international "agreement" procured under duress from our 
neighbors. 

Renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, our time-honored 
excuse for a denial of full sovereignty to Latin American 
states. In practice we have not fully enforced observance 
of the Monroe Doctrine upon others. Much less have we 
observed it ourselves. We permitted England to take and 
keep Belize. '^JVith the existing colon.es or dependencies 
of any European power we have not interfered and shall 
not interfere.'' But In 1898, we stripped Spain of all her 
colonies In this part of the world, and In 19 16 we coerced 
Denmark into selling us the Virgin Islands. '^Oiir policy 
with regard to Europe . . . is not to interfere in the in- 
ternal concerns of any of its powers.'' Yet we projected 
America Into the middle of European affairs In 19 17. 

In abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, we would abandon 
a pohcy that long ago outlived whatever usefulness it ever 
had as a protector of the weak, or as a means for our own 
defense; which long ago became a scrap of paper in our 
hands, and whose only present use is as a cloak for aggres- 
sion. 

2. Withdrawal. Immediate and unconditional with- 
drawal of all American military and naval forces from all 
countries not a part of the United States. 



4o8 Shall It Be Again? 

Withdrawal from Nicaragua, Haiti, Santo Domingo, 
and Cuba. 

Immediate withdrawal from all protectorates, official 
and unofficial. Withdrawal of American collectors from 
all foreign customhouses. Withdrawal of all support of 
Latin American dictators whom we have set up, or who 
owe their tenure to our favor. Abandonment of all meas- 
ures inimical to popular movements in neighboring coun- 
tries requiring revolution for their success. 

Withdrawal of all military forces from Europe and Asia. 

Immediate and complete independence to Filipinos, 
Porto Ricans, and Virgin Islanders. 

3. Reparation. Full reparation to all countries, such as 
Nicaragua and Honduras, whom we have assisted into 
bankruptcy by compelling them to acknowledge exorbi- 
tant claims of our bankers, having no just foundation. 

Restoration of Guantanamo to Cuba, and the Corn Is- 
lands and other territory taken from Nicaragua. 

Restoration of full sovereignty to Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Honduras. 

Adequate reparation to Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nic- 
aragua for injuries done to their citizens in our wars of 
conquest. 

Restoration of all indemnities to our late enemies, includ- 
ing merchant ships appropriated in American harbors, and 
property confiscated on land. 

Satisfactory reparation and apologies to all neutral na- 
tions against whom we committed injuries in violation of 
international law during the late war. 

Having freed the subject peoples under our heel, having 
washed our hands of the blood of our weaker brethren, 
having righted every international wrong that we have 
committed, so far as that is possible ; having taken the fear 



"Reconstruction" 409 

from the hearts of our nearest neighbors, we may consider 
ourselves competent then — and only then — to offer pro- 
posals to other nations, looking toward the maintenance 
of the peace of the world, and the safety of democracy. 

Governments which really cared nothing for democracy, 
or international justice, or peace, might not take kindly 
to our proposals; they would know that they were sincere. 
All governments care for peace of a sort; all wish to avoid 
great wars if they can have their way without them. But 
no government devoted to the interests of a minority which 
fattens upon the profits of aggression wishes to see estab- 
lished the bases of permanent world peace. They do not 
wish to be deprived of the "right" to make public war for 
private profit. 

But every government not devoted to imperialism, or 
under the thumb of an imperialistic government, or in im- 
mediate terror of reprisals from imperialistic governments, 
would be interested in our proposals and willing to join a 
genuine peace league. They would have everything to 
gain and nothing to lose. 

Such a league would have a larger charter membership 
than the spurious league which President Wilson brought 
back from Versailles. At the same time it would not at 
once be a league of all nations. For the "noble democra- 
cies," our late comrades at arms, would be conspicuous 
by their absence — unless our magnificent example should 
lead to the downfall of imperialism everywhere. 

It is impossible to exaggerate the probable effect through- 
out the world of such an example. The downfall of Rus- 
sian imperialism caused all imperialistic governments to 
tremble in their shoes. Either the restoration of Russian 
imperialism or the partition of that country among impe- 
rialistic governments was everywhere deemed essential to 
the safety of imperialistic "civilization." Yet the lesson 



410 Shall It Be Again? 

of America's renunciation would be infinitely clearer and 
more inspiring. Russian imperialism crumbled under the 
stress of war, under circumstances in which the issue was 
clouded, at a time when the new regime was subject to 
misinterpretation, hostile prejudice, and attack, from which 
we in America would be comparatively free. 

We have talked much and we have not ^'delivered the 
goods." The world will never again credit our high pre- 
tensions, until they are proven by deeds. It is easy to be- 
lieve that one magnificent act of renunciation would nerve 
a suffering world to dehver the death-blow to the cause of 
its travail. 

And if it did not, what then? Would it mean danger or 
disaster for ourselves? Would we stand in peril of our 
noble allies, the only remaining governments in the world 
either interested in aggression or in a position to perpetrate 
aggressions ? 

These governments will have their hands overfull for 
years — and probably as long as they last — In enforcing the 
conditions of settlement upon their late enemies, in carry- 
ing out other schemes nearer home, and in keeping their 
own people in subjection at the same time. The with- 
drawal of our support would vastly limit their capabilities 
for aggression. If, with our support, a supreme effort 
to subjugate Russia was impracticable, as Entente statesmen 
admitted — Russia, Impoverished by war, weakened by rev- 
olution and counter-revolution, disorganized, blockaded, 
geographically within easy reach, her ports in their posses- 
sion and their armies upon her soil — how much more im- 
practicable would it be for these governments to attempt 
to send any force across the Atlantic in an effort to dictate 
in our affairs! 

Our imperialistic allies will continue to perpetrate ag- 
gressions in Europe, Asia, and Africa, in proportion to the 



"Reconstruction" 41 1 

''practicability" of the undertakings. They are the world 
peril, they and their system, a far greater peril to the world 
than the Kaiser ever succeeded in becoming — only because 
they are stronger than he and his Junkers ever were or had 
a chance to be. 

So long as these governments last, the world cannot be 
made "safe for democracy," especially that part of the 
world "practically" within their reach. Yet I do not advo- 
cate that we attack this peril as we attacked the Kaiser. 
The struggle against autocracy and imperialism is essen- 
tially an internal one. The autocracy, militarism, and im- 
perialism of a given country can best be dealt with by the 
democratic forces within that country. Imperialistic gov- 
ernments may, on occasion, overthrow imperialistic 
governments, as in the present era. But the sum of the 
world's imperialism is not decreased thereby. Autocracy, 
militarism and imperialism thrive on external hostilities. 
So long as the democratic forces within imperialistic coun- 
tries are not strong enough to deal with their own govern- 
ments, the death-blow to imperialism cannot be delivered, 
and a part of the world will remain in danger. 

I would not advocate an effort of America against this 
peril, even to the extent of attempting to save the next 
intended victims of European and Asiatic imperialism in 
Europe, Asia, or Africa. But in the western hemisphere 
something of the kind might wisely be done. 

In the past, the independent states of the western hemi- 
sphere have owed their comparative immunity from Euro- 
pean aggression more to distance and their own strength 
than to the protection of the Monroe Doctrine. They had 
been under European rule, and with their own strength had 
cast it off. The Monroe Doctrine pronounced against 
their reconquest, which was under consideration by the 



412 Shall It Be Again? 

Holy Alliance. Nevertheless, the credit for saving them 
from new wars at that time cannot be claimed for the 
Monroe Doctrine. For the withdrawal of England from 
the Holy AUiance, which happened before the Monroe 
Doctrine appeared, was sufficient to cause the abandonment 
of the scheme as impracticable. 

No one can say that, if the Monroe Doctrine had not 
been promulgated, the whole of the Americas, outside of 
the United States, would have come into the possession 
of European powers. Nor can it be said that, had they 
come into the possession of European powers, such posses- 
sion would now constitute a peril to the independence, the 
territorial integrity, or the institutions of the United 
States. Is Canada a peril to this country? 

Although, in our national pride, we have greatly exag- 
gerated the effect of the Monroe Doctrine upon the rela- 
tions between Europe and the western hemisphere, it has 
not been wholly without influence. What would be the 
effect of its formal renunciation? Would our late allies 
— one or more of them — rush in and seize Mexico and 
other Latin American states? 

Mexico is the issue upon which the policy of imperialism 
may next be tested in the western hemisphere. British 
gentlemen, like American millionaires, have properties, 
claims, and ambitions, which they are anxious shall be made 
good by the strong arm of the United States govern- 
ment. Let us suppose that America should refuse to use 
either its arms or its diplomacy on behalf of British inter- 
ests — should unreservedly recognize the sovereignty of 
Mexico, as it has repeatedly promised to do — should con- 
cede the full right of Mexico to tax, or otherwise control, 
foreign property within her borders. In accordance with 
her own ideas of the public welfare — would Britain then 



^'Reconstruction" 413 

proceed to enforce her ^'rights" in Mexico with British arms? 

I grant that England or any other imperialistic govern- 
ment is capable, morally, of entering upon a war of con- 
quest upon Mexico. Every imperialistic government every- 
w^here stands ready to perpetrate a war of conquest any- 
where, the moment that it appears practicable to do so. 
But would it be practicable for England to invade Mexico? 

Certainly not nearly as practicable for England as for 
the United States. That is a reason why England is quite 
willing for America to "attend to her interests" there. 
Why not wait and see if England would consider it prac- 
ticable to enter upon a war of conquest upon Mexico, before 
entering upon such an enterprise on her behalf ourselves? 

The Mexicans would rather have us do that, feeling that 
they would be safer without the "protection" of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine than with it. Latin Americans generally! 
would be most happy to have us withdraw from them the 
"protection" of our Monroe Doctrine, and only because 
they have reason to consider it more of a menace than a 
protection. They know the history of American aggres- 
sion — and understand its significance — better than do the 
American people themselves. 

Should the United States formally renounce the Monroe 
Doctrine, and recognize, in its stead, what has sometimes 
been called the Carranza Doctrine — which places foreign- 
ers on the same level with citizens, denying to the former 
the "right" to call upon their home governments to inter- 
vene on behalf of their business enterprises — the action 
w^ould be hailed with rejoicing throughout Latin America; 
the fear and hatred felt generally for Americans would 
disappear with the removal of its cause; and it is certain 
that the Carranza Doctrine would be adopted generally by 
Latin American countries. In which case it is probable 



414 Shall It Be Again? 

that the eastern hemisphere would be forced, by circum- 
stances already mentioned, to accept the dictum of the west- 
ern hemisphere, and refrain from pressing any imperialistic 
claims in this part of the world. 

But supposing that it should not? The people of the 
United States would then have to determine how far they 
would go in standing with their near neighbors against 
European aggression. 

There would be several courses open to us. First, we 
could give military assistance of a strictly defensive charac- 
ter, such as the original Monroe Doctrine contemplated, 
and such as was contemplated for all threatened states in 
Wilson's original scheme for a genuine League of Nations. 
If we must have a war over Mexico of some kind, why not 
fight to save Mexico from being grabbed by others, instead 
of grabbing Mexico ourselves? 

Second, if we did not think it wise to fight, we could 
stand aside, selling our neighbors the arms with which to 
protect themselves — our right as a neutral nation — leaving 
the issue to be determined between them and their enemies. 

A third possible course would be to use our good offices, 
and a small portion of our great wealth, if need be, to set- 
tle any immediate claims of a pressing nature that might 
seem to threaten the peace of the western hemisphere. 

We paid out more money for our part in the European 
war than the combined investments of all Europeans in all 
the independent states of Latin America. One of our rea- 
sons for doing this, we said, was to save small states from 
the peril of aggression. We did not save small states 
from such peril. A far wiser poHcy, and a far less expen- 
sive one — at least, so far as the western hemisphere is con- 
cerned — would have been to guarantee, with the Treasury 
of the United States, the foreign debt of all our neighbors 
who happened to be in financial trouble, to adjust all Euro- 



"Reconstruction" 415 

pean claims, and to put every state '*on its feet" financially, 
even if we never received a penny of our money back. 

An objection to this will be that some of these countries 
are In the hands of corrupt and Inefficient governments, 
which would continue to contract European obligations and 
would soon be found again In financial difficulties. An 
answer Is that, once an adjustment were made, coupled 
with the declaration that henceforth no debts were to be 
collected by governmental intervention, future risks would 
not be taken with the expectation of making them good by 
such means. 

Another answer Is that our present policy Is largely 
responsible for the Insolvency of Latin American govern- 
ments, their inefficiency and corruption. In order to be 
in a position always to assert American supremacy for the 
sake of selfish Interests, we have created the fiction that 
Latin Americans are unfit to look after their own affairs, 
and are Incapable of self-government. At the same time 
we ourselves have forced Latin American states Into bank- 
ruptcy. We have set up dictators who betrayed their own 
people. We have furnished Latin America with the for- 
eign peril that everywhere plays Into the hands of autoc- 
racy. We supported the counter-revolutions that have 
kept Mexico In turmoil. Our own citizens and our 
own government are responsible for the very danger 
to life and property that we are asked to end by Interven- 
tion. 

It Is probable that Mexico, If left to herself, would ulti- 
mately pay all just claims of foreigners. But the demands 
of foreign capitalists. Intent on getting away with Mexico's 
natural resources without adequate return to the country, 
ought not to be met. The great oil corporations would 
have the American people war upon the Mexican people in 
order to save the oil deposits from what they term confisca- 



4i6 Shall It Be Again? 

tion by the Mexican government. What an unterrified Mex- 
ican government would do with the remaining oil resources 
it is impossible to say. We will suppose that it would con- 
fiscate them. Then let it confiscate them. The interests 
of the American people are not the interests of the oil cor- 
porations in this matter. They are, rather, the interests 
of the Mexican people. Perhaps some American would 
really suffer. But the Americans who are interested in the 
exploitation of Mexican oil are, for the most part, mil- 
lionaires with great holdings elsewhere. Were they dis- 
possessed in Mexico, without a dollar of compensation, they 
would not forego any luxury, nor would their families 
starve. There may be foreign ''rights" in Mexico, but 
how about the rights of Mexicans? Public undertakings 
on a large scale, serviceable to the Mexican nation, must 
wait until there are funds to prosecute them. Mexico has 
both the legal and the moral right to tax such funds from 
the rich holdings in her natural resources. The vested in- 
terests of a minority, whether native or foreign, cannot 
stand against the needs of the great majority. 

America needs a new patriotism — a patriotism that is 
able to see our neighbor's viewpoint, as well as our own; 
that is willing to accord genuine "equality of rights," re- 
gardless of relative might; that dares to look our own 
faults in the face, in order that they may be rectified. 

But we cannot make democracy safe abroad, not even 
from ourselves, until we have first made democracy safe at 
home. It is not within the scope of this book to offer 
any detailed suggestions for making democracy safe at 
home. When the eyes of the American masses are opened 
to the real motives of their war and the fruits of their 
peace, they will then begin to see what they must do. Cir- 
cumstances will have to determine how rapidly progress 



"Reconstruction" 417 

may be made, as well as what means may be most effectively 
employed to make it. 

It may be suggested, however, that those Americans 
whose professions of love for their Constitution are gen- 
uine cannot do less than to press for its restoration, and 
the righting, so far as possible, of the domestic wrongs 
that have been accomplished by its profanation. They 
will at least insist that every imprisoned victim of any 
war law be set free, also all victims of army courts-martial. 
They will cast about for a means of defending their Consti- 
tution against the President and the Supreme Court. 
Since, in our foreign policy, we remain subject to a Stand- 
behind-the-President-trust-in-the-Presidcnt system — to a 
scheme of things that holds us at the mercy of the secret 
whims, blunders, treacheries, and machinations of one man 
—they will seek to take from the President the power which, 
for that matter, the framers of the Constitution never in- 
tended that he should have, to make war practically at 
will; they will try to accomplish at home the thing that 
Woodrow Wilson declared to be a war aim of the United 
States: '^The destruction of every arbitrary power any- 
where that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, 
disturb the peace of the world/^ 

Again, all Americans, whose professions of love for de- 
mocracy are sincere, will at least clamor for the immediate 
and absolute abolition of secret diplomacy, and of conscrip- 
tion, for the obliteration of existing class distinctions in 
the armed forces, for the abolition of the present barbar- 
ous system of military "justice" — "reformed" though it 
be. They will perhaps press for a prohibition of the use 
of the armed forces outside the territory or territorial 
waters, except after referendum. Certainly they will de- 
mand that the entire cost of the war be collected from the 
interests that profited by it and furnished the motive for it. 



4i8 Shall It Be Again? 

They will even seek to make an end of government service 
to the big business minority, whether in foreign or do- 
mestic affairs. 

The majority will have to gain actual control of the 
public business in every department thereof. But to hope 
to gain such control and keep it will be futile so long as a 
minority retains possession of the means of information, 
and uses it to deceive the others for its own selfish and se- 
cret purposes. A simple observance of the Constitution 
would preclude the imprisonment of persons for expressing 
their views upon public affairs, but real freedom of speech 
and of the press cannot be restored without fundamental 
economic changes. 

So long as a handful of men in Wall Street control the 
credit and industrial processes of the country, they will con- 
tinue to control the press, the government, and, by decep- 
tion, the people. They will not only compel the public to 
work for them in peace, but to fight for them in war. 

Democracy is not a reality in America. America is a 
financial oligarchy, in which the President is the willing, 
though pretendedly reluctant, servant of the great finan- 
cial powers. 

The events of the past half-dozen years have demon- 
strated not only the moral bankruptcy of the political and in- 
tellectual leaders that capitalism has given the world, but 
the inability of capitalism to save the world from periodic 
disaster. Imperialism is simply a phase of capitalism. 
Big business government must go, but big business govern- 
ment will not go until big business goes. Only the institu- 
tion of a new social order, based upon economic equality, 
will save the world from more and more wars for business. 



APPENDIX 

A FEW DEADLY PARALLELS OF WOODROW WILSON 

Explaining the Victory and its Results 

what becomes of the german peril? 

German Peril is Destroyed. 

"The object of the war is attained. . . . Armed imperialism . . . 
is at an end. . . . The arbitrary power of the military caste of 
Germany ... is discredited and destroyed." — Message to Congress 
announcing armistice terms, Nov. ii, 19 18. 

German Peril is not Destroyed. 

"It [the world] knows that not only France must organize against 
this peril [the German peril] but that the world must organize 
against it." — Speech to French Senate, Jan. 20, 1919. 

THE FUTURE OF ARMAMENTS 

Heavy Armaments are no Longer Necessary. 

"The nations of the world are about to consummate a brotherhood 
which will make it unnecessary in the future to maintain those crush- 
ing armaments which make the people suffer almost as much in peace 
as they suffered m war." — Speech to French Chamber of Deputies, 
Feb. 3, 1919. 

But American Armament must he Increased. 

"I take it for granted that Congress will carry out the naval pro- 
gramme. . . . These plans have been prepared . . . with the in- 
tention of adhering to a definite method of development for the 
navy. I earnestly recommend the uninterrupted pursuit of that 
policy." — Message to Congress, Dec. 2, 191 8. 

419 



420 Appendix 

WHAT HAS BECOME OF MILITARISM? 

// is Banished from the Earth. 

"To-day the world stands freed from the threat of militarism." 
— Victory Loan message to American people, Apr. 19, 19 19. 

// is in the Saddle in France. 

"Again and again, my fellow-citizens, in the conference at Paris, 
we were face to face with this situation : that in dealing with a partic- 
ular civil government we found that they would not dare to promise 
what their general staff was not willing that they should promise ; 
and that they were dominated by the military machine that they 
had created, nominally, for their own defense, but really — whether 
they willed it or not — for the provocation of war. And so, as long as 
you have a military class, it does not make any difference what your 
form of government is. If you are determined to be armed to the 
teeth, you must obey the orders and directions of the only men who 
can control the great machinery of war." — Kansas City, Sept. 6, 
1919. 

THE PRIVATE COUNSELS OF STATESMEN 

They cannot Determine Destinies of Nations. 

"Private counsels of statesmen cannot now and cannot fiereafter 
determine the destinies of nations." — Memorial Day address at? 
Paris, 19 1 9. 

They must Determine Americans Destiny without Review by Treaty- 
making Body. 

"No stenographic reports were taken of the debates on the League 
of Nations, and such memoranda as were taken it was agreed 
should be confidential. . . . The various data bearing upon or used 
in connection with the treaty of peace with Germany . . . would 
include many memoranda which it was agreed, on grounds of public 
policy, it would be unwise to make use of outside the conference." — 
Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 8, 19 19, refus- 
ing data upon which Treaty of Versailles was formulated. 



Appendix 421 

ON THE RESPONSIBILITY AND FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE 
GERMAN PEOPLE 

German People had neither Knowledge nor Choice. 

"The German nation had no choice whatever as to whether it was 
to go into that war or not, did not know that it was going into it 
until its men were summoned to the colors." — Speech at Billings, 
Mont., Sept. ii, 1919. 

German People had Knowledge and are Responsible. 

"In the last analysis, my fellow-countrymen, as we in America 
would be the first to claim, a people are responsible for the acts of their 
government. . . . Germany was self-governed. Her rulers had 
not concealed the purposes they had in mind." — Columbus, Sept. 4, 
1919. 

THE QUESTION OF INDEMNITIES 

Explains Indemnity Germany must Pay. 

"In the first place, my fellow-countrymen, it [the treaty] seeks 
to punish one of the greatest wrongs ever done in history, the wrong 
which Germany sought to do to the world and to civilization, and 
there ought to be no weak purpose with regard to the application of 
the punishment. She attempted an intolerable thing, and she must 
be made to pay for the attempt." — Columbus, Sept. 4, 1919. 

Says there is no Indemnity {Same Speech). 

"There was no indemnity — no indemnity of any sort was claimed 
— merely reparation, merely paying for the destruction done, merely 
making good the losses. . . . There is no indemnity in this treaty." 
— Columbus, Sept. 4, 19 19. 

Justifies Collecting Damages as Punishment. 

"My fellow-citizens, Germany tried to commit a crime against 
civilization and this treaty is justified as a memorandum to make 
Germany pay for the crime up to her full capacity for payment." 
— Billings, Sept. 11, 191 9. 



422 Appendix 

Pledge against Collection of such Damages. 

"Punitive damages, ... we deem inexpedient and in the end 
worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of 
all for an enduring peace." — Reply to Pope, Aug. 27, 1917. 

DID GERMAN COMMERCIAL CLASSES WANT WAR ? 

Evidently So. 

"The real reason that the war we have just finished took place 
was that Germany was afraid her commercial rivals were going to 
get the better of her, and the reason why some nations went into the 
war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get 
the commercial advantage of them. The seed of the jealousy, the 
seed of the deep-seated hatred, was hot successful commercial and 
industrial rivalry." — St. Louis, Sept. 5, 19 19. 

Emphatically Not/ 

"The German bankers and the German merchants and the German 
manufacturers did not want this war. They were making con- 
quest of the world without it, and they knew it would spoil their 
plans." — Speech at St. Paul, Sept. 9, 1919. 

NATURE OF THE "UNION" WITH OUR ALLIES 

J Moral Union. 

"There is no way, which we ought to be willing to adopt, which 
separates us in dealing with Germany from those with whom we 
were associated during the war. . . . because I think it is a moral 
union which we are not at liberty to break." — Conference with 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 19, 19 19. 

A Financial Union. 

"Under the League plan, the financial leadership will be ours, the 
industrial supremacy will be ours, the commercial advantage will be 
ours." — Speech at St. Louis, Sept. 5, 19 19. 



Appendix 423 

WHY DO WE WISH TO PARTICIPATE UPON REPARATIONS COMMISSION ? 

To Assist our dear Allies. 

"Why, we were disinclined to join in that [the Reparations Com- 
mission], but yielded to the urgent request of the other nations that 
we should, because they wanted our advice and counsel." — White 
House conference with Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Aug. 
19, 1919. 

To Make Money for Ourselves, 

"Some of you gentlemen know we used to have trade with Ger- 
many. All of that trade is going to be in the hands and under the 
control of the Reparations Commission. I humbly asked leave to ap- 
point a member to look after our interests, and I was rebuked for 
it. I am looking after the industrial interests of the United States. 
I would like to see the other men who are. They are forgetting 
the industrial interests of the United States, and they are doing 
things that will cut us off, and our trade off, from the normal chan- 
nels, because the Reparations Commission can determine where Ger- 
many buys, what Germany buys, how much Germany buys. . . . 
It is going to stand at the centre of the financial operations of the 
world." — Speech at St. Louis, Sept. 5, 19 19. 

AS TO THE CHARACTER OF OUR ALLIES 

They have Never been Dishonorable. 

"I challenge anybody to show where, in recent years, . . . there 
has been the repudiation of an international obligation by France 
or Italy or Great Britain or Japan. Japan has kept her engage- 
ments. . . . There can be cited no instance where these governments 
have been dishonorable." — Billings, Sept. 11, 1919. 

Dishonorable Record is Cited. 

"Let me remind you of some of the history of this business. It 
was in 1898 that China ceded these rights and concessions to Ger- 
many. The pretext was that some German missionaries had bceii 



424 Appendix 

killed. . . . Two Christian missionaries are killed, and therefore 
one great nation robs another nation and does a thing which is funda- 
mentally unChristian and heathen! . . . Then, what happened, my 
fellow-citizens? Then Russia came in and obliged China to cede to 
her Port Arthur and Talien Wan, not for quite so long a period, 
but upon substantially the same terms. Then England must needs 
have Wei-Hai-Wei as an equivalent concession to that which had 
been made to Germany; and presently certain ports, with the terri- 
tory back of them, were ceded upon similar principles to France. 
Everybody got in, except the United States, and said: *If Germany 
is going to get something, we will get something.' Why, none of 
them had any business in there on such terms. Then when the 
Japanese-Russian war came, Japan did what she has done in this 
war. She attacked Port Arthur and captured Port Arthur, and 
Port Arthur was ceded to her as a consequence of the war. . . . 
Just so we could trade with these stolen territories, we were willing 
to let them be stolen. . . . She [Japan] has it [Shantung] as spoils 
of war." — San Francisco, Sept. 17, 19 19. 

EUROPEAN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA 

Governments Promised to Return Them. 

''Sitting around our council board in Paris I put this question: 
*May I expect that this will be the beginning of the retrocession to 
China of the exceptional rights which other governments have en- 
joyed here?' The responsible representatives of the other great 
governments said, 'Yes, you may expect it.' " — San Francisco, Sept. 
17, 1919. 

Governments did not Promise to Return Them. 

"Back of this provision, with regard to Shantung, lies, as every- 
body knows or ought to know, a very honorable promise which was 
made by the government of Japan in my presence in Paris, namely, 
that, just as soon as possible after ratification of this treaty, they 
will return to China all sovereign rights in the province of Shantung. 
Great Britain has not promised to return Wei-Hai-Wei; France has 
not promised to return her part." — Los Angeles, Sept. 20, 191 9. 



Appendix 425 

OBLIGATION TO HOLD STRICTLY TO PEACE PROMISES 

Pledge not to Compromise. 

''They [the issues of the struggle] must be settled — by no arrange- 
ment or compromise or adjustment of interest, but definitely and once 
for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle 
that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the 
strongest. That is what we mean when we speak of a permanent 
peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently. . . . No peace shall be 
obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles 
we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting." — Sept. 
27, 1918. 

Compromise is Admitted and Excused. 

"Old entanglements of every kind stood in the way — promises 
which governments had made to one another in the days when might 
and right were confused, and the power of the victor was without 
restraint. Engagements which contemplated any dispositions of ter- 
ritory, any extensions of sovereignty that might seem to be to the 
interest of those who had the power to insist upon them, had been 
entered into without thought of what the peoples concerned might 
wish or profit by; and these could not always honorably be brushed 
aside." — Address to Senate, in presenting Treaty of Versailles, July 
10, 1919. 

The German Peril 

WHO started the EUROPEAN WAR? 

Germany Started It. 

''The war was begun by the military masters of Germany." — Flag 
Day address, 191 7. 

Nobody in Particular Started It. 

"Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you 
have, I wish you would publish it, because nobody else has. So far 



426 Appendix 

as I can gather, nothing in particular started it, but everything in 
general." — Speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 19 16. 



MOTIVE DOMINATING GERMAN WARFARE 

A Desire to Impose Will upon the World. 

"The power against which we are arrayed has sought to impose 
its will upon the world by force." — Proclamation to American peo- 
ple, May 18, 1917. 

An Intense Conviction that it is Fighting for Justice. 

"Every nation now engaged in the titanic struggle on the other 
side of the water believes, with an intensity of conviction that can- 
not be exaggerated, that it is fighting for its rights, and in most in- 
stances that it is fighting for its life, and we must not be too critical 
of the men who lead those nations." — Speech at Des Moines, Feb. i, 
1916. 

REAL NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE 

Political, not Commercial. 

**The object of the war was to destroy autocratic power; that is 
to say, to make it impossible that there should be anywhere, as there 
was in Wilhelmstrasse, in Berlin, a little group of military men, who 
could brush aside the manufacturers, brush aside the Emperor him- 
self, and say: 'We have perfected a machine with which we can 
conquer the world ; now stand out of the way, we are going to con- 
quer the world.' " — Minneapolis, Sept. 9, 1919. 

Commercial, not Political. 

"Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here, or any woman 
— let me say, is there any child here — ^who does not know that the 
seed of war in the modem world is industrial and commercial 
rivalry? . . . This war, in its inception, was a commercial and 
industrial war. It was not a political war." — St. Louis, Sept. 5, 
1919. 



Appendix 427 

WHAT SORT OF PEACE WAS GERMANY FIGHTING FOR? 

The Very Opposite to a Democratic Peace. 

**They [the Central Powers] are striking at the very existence of 
democracy and liberty." — Message to Congress, Dec. 4, 19 17. 

A Democratic Peace as Outlined by Wilson Himself. 

"Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peo- 
ples and small states as secure against aggression or denial, in the 
iuture, as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful states 
now at war." — Note to belligerent governments, Dec. 18, 191 6. 

"Wilson Principles," General 

ON THE WISDOM OF CRUSHING ONE'S ENEMIES 

Germany must be Crushed. 

"The German power . . . must be crushed." — Dec. 4, 191 7. 

Neither Side should be Crushed. 

"Fortunately ... the statesmen of both of the groups of nations, 
now arrayed against one another, have said, in terms that could not 
be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind 
to crush their opponents." — ^Jan. 22, 191 7. 

FORCE AS A MEANS FOR ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 

Force is Acknowledged as a Policy of Action. 

"Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the 
righteous and triumphant force that shall make right the law of the 
world." — Apr. 6, 19 18. 

Force Never Accomplished Anything Permanent. 

"I have not read history without observing that the greatest forces 
in the world, and the only permanent forces, are the moral forces. 
We have the evidence of a very competent witness, namely, the 



428 Appendix 

first Napoleon, who said that, as he looked back in the last days of 
his life upon so much as he knew of human history, he had to record 
the judgment that force had never accomplished anything that was 
permanent. Force will not accomplish anything that is permanent." 
— Speech before New York Press Club, June 30, 19 16. 



ON THE EFFICACY OF GOING TO WAR TO GET PEACE 

The Way to get Peace is to make IVar. 

"What I am opposed to is not the feeling of the pacifists, but 
their stupidity. My heart is with them, but my mind has a con- 
tempt for them. I want peace, but I know how to get it and they 
do not. You will notice that I sent a friend of mine, Colonel 
House, to Europe, who is as great a lover of peace as any man in 
the world; but I did not send him on a peace mission; I sent him 
to take part in a conference as to how the war is to be won, and he 
knows, as I know, that is the way to get peace if you want it for more 
than a few minutes." — Speech at Buffalo, Nov. 12, 191 7. 

Peace so Imposed would not Last. 

"First of all it [the peace to be concluded] must be peace without 
victory. . . . Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a 
victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted 
in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would 
leave a sting, a bitter memory, upon which terms of peace would 
rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace 
between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is 
equality and a common participation in a common benefit." — Peace- 
without-victory speech, Jan. 22, 19 17. 

ON HANDING DOWN LIBERTY FROM ABOVE 

IVe claim It as our Motive. 

"We are to be an instrument in the hands of God to see that lib- 
erty is made secure for mankind." — Speech at Confederate veterans' 
reunion, June 5, 191 7* 



Appendix 429 

Yet It cant be Done, 

"I challenge you to cite me an instance In all the history of the 
world where liberty was handed down from above. Liberty always 
is attained by the forces working below, underneath." — Blythe inter- 
view, Saturday Evening Post^ May 23, 1 9 14. 

SHOULD THE PEOPLE OR THE GOVERNMENTS DECIDE WHEN PEACE 
MAY BE CONCLUDED ? 

War must not be Continued unless Public Approves Objectives. 

**No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility 
ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and 
appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond 
a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and 
parcel of the very life of society, and that the people for whom he 
speaks think them right and imperative as he does." — Message to 
Congress on war aims, Jan. 8, 19 18. 

Public Warned against Expressing either Approval or Disapproval, 
**I earnestly request every patriotic American to leave to the gov- 
ernments of the United States and of the Allies the momentous dis- 
cussions initiated by Germany, and to remember that for each man his 
duty is to strengthen the hands of these governments." — Statement 
to American people, Oct. 14, 19 18. 

ON DICTATORSHIPS IN WAR 

They are Inconsistent with the Traditions of America. 

**It is inconsistent with the traditions of the country that their 
[the people's] knowledge of arms should be used by a governmental 
organization which would make and organize a great army subject 
to orders to do what a particular group of men might at the time 
think It was best for them to do. That is the militarism of Europe, 
where a few persons can determine what an armed nation Is to do." 
— Statement to committee from American Union against Militarism, 
White House, May 9, 1916. 



430 Appendix 

Participation in Conduct of War is Denied even Congress. 

"I should regard the passage of this resolution as a direct vote 
of want of confidence in the Administration. . . . Such activities [a 
Senate Committee investigation of the conduct of the war] would 
constitute nothing less than an attempt to take over the conduct of 
the war, or at least so superintend and direct and participate in the 
executive conduct of it as to interfere in the most serious way with 
the action of the constituted Executive." — Letter to Senator Martin, 
May 14, 1918. 

THE TRUE BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY 

Material Interests Must not Determine Anything. 

*'It is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a 
nation in terms of material interest. It is not only unfair to those 
with whom you are dealing, but it is degrading as regards your 
own actions." — Speech at Mobile, Oct. 27, 1913. 

Material Interests Justify War. 

''There is a moral obligation laid upon us to keep free the courses 
of our commerce and our finance, and I believe that America stands 
ready to vindicate those rights." — Topeka speech, Feb. 2, 1916. 

WHAT AMERICAN INTERESTS NEED PROTECTION? ^ 

Spiritual Interests Only. 

"Therefore, what America is bound to fight for when the time 
comes is nothing more nor less than her self-respect. There is no 
immediate prospect that her material interests may be seriously af- 
fected, but there is constant danger every day of the week that her 
spiritual interests may suffer serious affront." — Speech at Chicago, 
Jan. 31, 19 1 6. 

Spiritual Indeed! 

"It would depend upon the patriotic spirit of the employers of 
the country whether they made it possible for the younger men in 



Appendix 431 

their employ to respond under favorable conditions or not. I, for 
one, do not doubt the patriotic devotion either of our young men or 
of those who give them employment — those for whose benefit and 
protection they would in fact enlist" — Message to Congress, Dec. 7, 
1915. 



THE EMPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES TO FURTHER PRIVATE 
ENTERPRISE ABROAD 

Repudiated as a Policy. 

*'A great many men ... are complaining that the government 
of the United States has not the spirit of other governments, which 
is to put the force, the army and navy, of that government, behind 
investments in foreign countries. Just so certainly as you do that, 
you join this chaos of hostile and competing ambitions [the European 
war]." — Speech at Cincinnati, Oct. 26, 1916. 

Endorsed as a Policy. 

''Americans have gone to all quarters of the world. Americans 
are serving the business of the world . . . and every one of these 
men ... is our ward and we must see to his rights and that they 
are respected." — Jan. 29, 19 16. 

THE COMPATIBILITY OF PATRIOTISM AND PROFITS 

They are Incompatible. 

"Patriotism leaves profits out of the question. In these days 
. . . when we are sending hundreds of thousands of our young men 
across the seas. ... no true patriot will permit himself to take 
toll of their heroism in money, or seek to grow rich by the shedding 
of their blood." — Appeal to business interests, July 11, 1917. 

They are not Incompatible. 

"Of course somebody is going to make money out of the things 
privately manufactured, manufactured by private capital. There 
are men in the great belligerent countries making, I dare say, vast 



432 Appendix 

sums of money out of the war, and I, for one, do not stand here to 
challenge or doubt their patriotism in the matter." — Speech at Des 
Moines, Feb. i, 191 6. 



International Law and Policies Leading to Belligerency 

THE efficacy OF ARMED NEUTRALITY FOR AVOIDING WAR 

Armed Neutrality not a Step toward War. 

"There may be no recourse but to armed neutrality, which we 
shall know how to maintain. ... I am not now proposing or con- 
templating war, or any steps that lead to it." — Address to Congress, 
Feb. 26, 191 7. 

Armed Neutrality certain to Result in War. 

"Armed neutrality ... is worse than ineffectual. ... It is prac- 
tically certain to draw us into the war." — Address to Congress, Apr. 
2, 1917. 

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREEDOM OF THE SEAS. 

Freedom of Seas is Provided by International Law and America is 
willing to Fight for Same. 

"The government of the United States notes with satisfaction 
that the Imperial German Government recognizes without reserva- 
tion ... the principle that the high seas are free. . . . The rights 
of neutrals in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expe- 
diency, and the principles are immutable. . . . The government of 
the United States will continue to contend for that freedom [of the 
seas] from whatever quarter violated, without compromise, and at 
any cost." — Note to Germany, July 21, 1915- 

Freedom of Seas is not Provided by International Law and Rules 
should be Altered by Agreement to Legalize It. 

"No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the 



Appendix 433 

rules of international practice . . . may be necessary in order to 
make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances 
for the use of mankind. ... It need not be difficult to define or to 
secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sin- 
cerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it." — Peace-without- 
victory speech, Jan. 22, 191 7. 



INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SUBMARINE 

The Submarine a Lawful Weapon for Operations against Commerce, 
**The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that 
it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations 
as have characterized the activity of the Imperial German Navy 
within the so-called zone, in substantial accord with the accepted 
practices of regulated warfare." — Note of July 21, 19 15, to Ger- 
many. 

"I do not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper 
use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce." — Letter 
of Secretary Lansing to British ambassador, Jan. 18, 19 16. 

The Submarine an Unlawful Weapon for Operations against 
Commerce. 

''Manifestly, submarines cannot be used against merchantmen. 
. . . without an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of 
justice and humanity." — Note of May 13, 1915, to Germany. 

"The use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce 
is . . . utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the 
long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the 
sacred immunities of non-combatants." — Note of Apr. 18, 19 16, to 
Germany. 

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED MERCHANTMAN 

Presence of Armament Creates Presumption of Offensive Purpose, 
"The presence of an armament and ammunition on board a mer- 



434 Appendix 

chant vessel creates a presumption that the armament is for offensive 
purposes, but the owners or agents may overcome this presumption by- 
evidence showing that the vessel carries armament solely for defense. 
Evidence necessary to establish the fact that the armament is solely 
for defense . . . must be presented in each case independently at 
an official investigation. The result of the investigation must show 
conclusively that the armament is not intended for, and will not be 
used in, offensive operations." — American memorandum of Sept. 19, 
1914. 

Presence of Armament does not Create Presumption of Offensive 
Purpose. 

"The determination of warlike character must rest in no case 
upon presumption but upon conclusive evidence. . . . The belliger- 
ent [submarine] should, in the absence of conclusive evidence, act on 
the presumption that an armed merchantman is of peaceful charac- 
ter. . . . Conclusive evidence of a purpose to use the armament for 
aggression is essential ... in the absence of which it is to be pre- 
sumed that the vessel has a private and peaceful character, and it 
should be so treated by an enemy warship." — American mem- 
orandum of Mar. 25, 19 1 6. 

ON THE RIGHT OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL FOREIGN 
PROPERTY WITHIN ITS BORDERS 

Confiscation Right for America. 

"By exercising in this crisis our admitted right to control all 
property within our territory, we do no wrong to Holland." — Public 
statement, explaining confiscation of Dutch ships, Mar. 20, 191 8. 

Even Right of Taxation is Denied Mexico. 

"The United States cannot acquiesce in any procedure ostensibly 
or nominally in the form of taxation or the exercise of eminent do- 
main, but really resulting in confiscation of private property and arbi- 
trary deprivation of vested rights." — Note of Apr. 2, 191 8, threaten- 
ing Mexico on account of oil tax decree. 



Appendix 435 

ON THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO ARM MERCHANT SHIPS 
AGAINST WAR VESSELS OF A COUNTRY WITH WHICH AMERICA IS 
TECHNICALLY AT PEACE 

President has not the Power. 

"At the same time the President authorized the further statement 
that what rendered the situation even more grave than it had been 
supposed that it was, was the discovery that, while the President un- 
der his general constitutional powers could do much of what he had 
asked Congress to empower him to do, it had been found that there 
were certain old statutes, as yet unrepealed, which raised insuperable 
practical obstacles and virtually nullified his power." — ^Supplemen- 
tary statement from White House, Mar. 4, 191 7. 

President has the Power. 

"The President is convinced that he has the power to arm Ameri- 
can merchant ships and is free to exercise it at once." — Statement 
from White House, Mar. 9, 19 17. 

Various 
was america in danger? 

Very Much in Danger. 

"We find ourselves fighting again for our national existence." — 
Independence Day, 191 8. 

'Not in Danger. 

"America was not immediately in danger. . . . America was not 
directly attacked."- — Speech at Billings, Sept. 11, 1919. 

DISINTERESTED OR INTERESTED? 

Disinterested. 

"It [our war] is absolutely a case of disinterested action." — Ad- 
dress to Mexican editors, June 7, 19 18. 

Very Interested, 

"Every man in every business in the United States must know by 



436 Appendix 

this time that his whole future fortune lies in the balance." — Address 
at Urbana, Jan. 31, 19 18. 

THE RULE OF THE KAISER OVER GERMANY 
The Kaiser need not Go. 

"It is no business of ours how that great people [the Germans] 
came under its [the German government's] control or submitted 
with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose." — Reply to 
Pope, Aug. 27, 191 7. 

"Neither do we presume to suggest to her [Germany] any altera- 
tion or modification of her institutions." — Message to Congress, Jan. 
8, 1918. 

The Kaiser must Go. 

"Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be, 
which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note 
of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a 
government responsible to the German people has yet been fully 
worked out. . . . It is evident . . . that the power of the King of 
Prussia to control the policy of the empire is unimpaired . . . The 
President deems it his duty to . . . point out that in concluding 
peace ... the government of the United States cannot deal with 
any but veritable representatives of the German people who have 
been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers 
of Germany." — Note of Oct. 23, 19 18, replying to further conces- 
sions by Germany. 

WAS BORGLUM OFFICIAL AIRCRAFT INVESTIGATOR? 

Bor glumes Appointment. January 2, 191 8 

"My dear Mr. Borglum : . . . I have conferred with the Secre- 
tary of War, and at his request and with my hearty concurrence, I 
urge you to come at once to Washington . . . and by your own 
investigation discover the facts in this business. The Secretary of 
War assures me that he will be delighted to clothe you with full 



Appendix 437 

authority to get at the bottom of every situation, and that he will 
. . . direct that every facility of inquiry be placed at your disposal. 
When you have thus investigated ... I would be most happy to 
have a report from you personally. . . . 

"Cordially yours, 

'^Woodrow Wilson." 

Borglum's Disappointment. April 15, 1918 

"My dear Mr. Borglum: I am afraid that you have for some 
time past been under a serious misapprehension. ... I never at any 
time constituted you an official investigator. . . . We have at no 
time considered you as the official representative of the Administra- 
tion in the investigation. If I had so regarded you I would, of 
course, have supplied you with such assistance as you feel that you 
have lacked. 

"Cordially and sincerely yours, 
"Woodrow Wilson." 

WHAT IS PRO-GERMANISM? 
U'his. ■ ' 

"They [certain Americans] declare this is a foreign war which can 
touch America with no danger either to her lands or her institutions 
. . . appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the policies of 
nations. ... It is only friends and partisans of the German govern- 
ment whom we have already identified who utter these thinly dis- 
guised disloyalties." — Flag Day address, 191 7. 

But Woodrow Wilson Said the Same Things, 

"A war [the European war] . . . whose causes cannot touch us." 
—Message to Congress, Dec. 8, 191 4. 

"Nobody seriously supposes, gentlemen, that the United States 
needs to fear an invasion of its own territory." — New York speech, 
Jan. 27, 1916. 

"We need not and we should not form alliances with any nation 
in the world." — Address at unveiling of statue of Barrv, May 16, 
1914- 



438 Appendix 



THEORY OF A PEOPLE S WAR 

Ours was a People's War. 

"The great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is 
a people's war." — Flag Day address, 191 7- 
There's no such thing as a People's War. 

"No people ever went to war with another people. Govern- 
ments have gone to war with one another. Peoples, so far as I 
can remember, have not, and this is a government of the people, and 
this people is not going to choose war." — Speech at Milwaukee, Jan. 
31, 1916. 

Mexican Policy 

motive for mexican meddling 

The Interest of Mexico Alone. 

"We act in the interest of Mexico alone, and not in the interest 
of any person or body of persons who may have personal or property 
claims in Mexico which they feel that they have a right to press." — 
Message to Huerta, conveyed through John Lind, Aug. I9I3« 
The Fortunes of Americans. 

"We should let every one who seems to exercise authority in any 
part of Mexico know, in the most unequivocal terms, that we shall 
watch the fortunes of those Americans who cannot get away, and 
shall hold those responsible for their sufferings and losses to a definite 
reckoning. That can and will be made plain, beyond the possibility 
of a misunderstanding." — Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 1913. 

SOVEREIGNTY VERSUS INTERVENTION 

Pledge to Respect Sovereignty. 

"It is our purpose, in whatever we do ... to pay the most scrupu- 
lous regard to the sovereignty and independence of Mexico. That 
we take as a matter of course, to which we are bound by every 
obligation of right and honor." — Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 19 13. 



Appendix 439 

Hint at Intervention, (Same Day) 

"You will convey to the authorities the indication that any mal- 
treatment of Americans would be likely to raise the question of inter- 
vention." — Instructions dictated by the President, and wired to all 
consuls in Mexico, Aug. 27, 191 3. 

TO COERCE OR NOT TO COERCE 

Promise not to Coerce, \ 

"We will aid and befriend Mexico, but we will not coerce her; and 
our course with regard to her ought to be sufficient proof to all 
America that we seek no political suzerainty or selfish control." — 
Annual message, Dec. 8, 19 14. 

What is This but Coercion? 

"You will understand that if our messages are occasionally couched 
in terms of strong emphasis, it is only because they contain some 
matters which touch the very safety of Mexico itself and the whole 
process of its future history. ... It is our duty to speak very plainly 
about the grave danger which threatens them [the Mexicans] from 
without. . . . To speak less plainly, or with less earnestness, would 
be to conceal from you a terrible risk, which no lover of Mexico 
should care to run." — President Wilson, in note to Carranza, Mar. 
14, 1915- 

WHO IS ENTITLED TO CHOOSE POLITICS OF MEXICO? 

Only Mexicans may Choose. 

"America stands, first of all, for the right of men to determine 
whom they will obey and whom they will serve; for the right of 
political freedom and of peoples' sovereignty. . . . She made up her 
mind long ago that she was going to stand up, so far as this 
western hemisphere is concerned, for the right of peoples to choose 
their own politics, without foreign interference of any kind'* — 
Pittsburgh speech, Jan. 29, 19 16. 



440 Appendix 

American Government May Choose. 

"I feel it my duty to tell them [the leaders of Mexico] that if 
they cannot accommodate their differences and unite . . . within 
a very short time, this government v^^ill be constrained to decide 
what means should be employed by the United States in order to 
help Mexico save herself and serve her people." — June 2, 1915. 

HOW LONG MAY MEXICO TAKE TO RECONSTRUCT HER GOVERNMENT ? 

As Long as she Pleases. 

"Until this recent revolution in Mexico, eighty per cent, of the 
people never had a 'look in' in determining what their government 
should be. . . . It is none of my business and it is none of yours 
how long they take in determining it. It is none of my business 
and it is none of yours how they go about the business. The country 
is theirs. The government is theirs. Have not European nations 
taken as long as they wanted, and spilt as much blood as they pleased, 
in settling their affairs? And shall we deny that to Mexico be- 
cause she is weak? No, I say!" — Indianapolis speech, Jan. 8, 
1915. 

This Long and No Longer. 

*lt is time, therefore, that the government of the United States 
should frankly state the policy which ... it becomes its duty to 
adopt. It must presently . . . lend its active moral support to some 
man or group of men, if such may be found, who can ... set up 
a government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world 
can recognize and deal with." — June 2, 19 15. 

THE RIGHT WAY TO HELP MEXICO 
It is not to Overwhelm her with Force. 

"I have heard some gentlemen say they want to help Mexico, and 
the way they propose to help her is to overwhelm her with force. 
. . . What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not 
believe as yet that we want to serve her. She believes we want to 
possess her. And she has justification for the belief in the way in 



Appendix 441 

which some of our fellow-citizens have tried to exploit her privileges 
and possessions. For my part, / will not serve the ambitions of 
those ffentlemen." — Address at Detroit, July lO, 1916. 

Threat to Overzuhebn Mexico with Force, 

''The government of the United States . . . desiires General 
Obregon and General Carranza to know that it has, after mature 
consideration, determined that if . . . Americans should suffer . . . 
because they fail to provide means of protection to life and property, 
it will hold General Obregon and General Carranza personally 
responsible [and] . . . will take such measures as are expedient to 
bring to account those who are personally responsible,^* — Note to 
Carranza, Mar. 9, 1915. 

WHY DID WE ATTACK VERA CRUZ? 

To Maintain the Dignity and Authority of the United States, 

''I, therefore, come to ask your approval that I should use the 
armed forces of the United States ... to obtain ... the fullest 
recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States. . . . We 
seek to maintain the dignity and authority of the United States." — 
Message to Congress, Apr. 20, 19 14. 

To Reestablish Constitutional Government in Mexico, 

"The feelings and intentions of the government in this matter 
. . . are based upon ... a profound . . . Interest in the reestab- 
llshment of their [the Mexicans'] constitutional system." — Reply 
to Carranza's protest against Vera Cruz attack. 

THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION 

Troops not to be Used in Interest of American Owners of Mexican 
Properties. 

"It Is my duty to warn the people of the United States that there 
are persons along the border who are actively engaged in originat- 
ing and giving as wide currency as they can to rumors of the most 



442 Appendix 

sensational and disturbing sort. . . . The object of this traffic in 
falsehood is obvious. It is to create intolerable friction between the 
government of the United States and the de facto government of 
Mexico, for the purpose of bringing about ifitervention in the interest 
of certain American owners of Mexican properties. This object can- 
not be attained so long as sane and honorable men are in control of 
the government." — Statement explaining object of expedition, Mar. 
25, 1916. 

Troops Remain in Interest of American Owners of Mexican Prop- 
erties. 

"The border troubles are only symptoms. Mexico needs system 
treatment, not symptom treatment. . . . The world has great re- 
spect for rights that are vested, and we shall go along with the 
world in protecting such rights. . . . Mexico will either do right 
without our help — or with It. This is her choice. . . . We do not 
wish to be forced Into intervention until this opportufiity is exhausted. 
To this end we must pass from the border matters to the conditions 
of Mexico which affect the lives and property of our nationals. 
These must be made secure." — Franklin K. Lane, speaking for 
Wilson, explaining non-agreement with Mexico In negotiations for 
withdrawal of American forces, Nov. 191 6. 



AS TO THE CONSENT OF CARRANZA TO THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION 

Carranza Gave Consent. 

"The expedition into Mexico was ordered under an agreement 
with the de facto government of Mexico." — President Wilson, in 
statement to the public. Mar. 25, 19 16. 

Carranza did not Give Consent. 

"It Is admitted that American troops have crossed the interna- 
tional boundary In hot pursuit of the Columbus raiders, and without 
notice to or the consent of your government." — American note to 
Carranza, June 20, 19 16. 



Appendix 443 

NEUTRALITY AND THE MUNITIONS TRADE 

Neutrality Requires an Embargo, 

'1 shall follow the best practice of nations in the matter of neu- 
trality, by forbidding the exportation of arms or munitions of war of 
any kind from the United States to any part of the republic of 
Mexico." — Message to Congress, Aug. 27, 19 13. 

Neutrality Forbids an Embargo. 

"The Executive order, under which the exportation of arms and 
ammunition into Mexico is forbidden, is a departure from the ac- 
cepted practices of neutrality. . . . The order is therefore rescinded.'* 
■ — Statement issued from White House, Feb. 3, 19 14. 

ATTITUDE TOWARD CONCESSIONAIRES 

''Eventually" he will Fight against Them. 

"Eventually, I shall fight every one of these men who are now 
seeking to exploit Mexico for their own selfish ends. I shall do what 
I can to keep Mexico from their plundering. There shall be no 
individual exploitation of Mexico, if I can stop it." — Blythe inter- 
view, Saturday Evening Post, May 23, 19 14. 

Eventually he Threatens to Fight for Them. 

"It becomes the function of the government of the United States 
... to call the attention of the Mexican government to the neces- 
sity which may arise to impel it to protect the property of its citi- 
zens in Mexico." — Note of Apr. 2, 191 8, threatening Mexico on ac- 
count of oil taxes. 



THE END 



INDEX 



Africa, 221, 222, 229. 

Alien enemies, 67, 69, 130-133, 304, 

402, 408. 
American International Corporation, 

298, 299, 301, 302, 321, •328. 
American Legion, 388, 392. 
Angary, law of, 137, 138. 
Angell, Norman, 248. 
Armed merchantman, law of, 109- 

"2, 433- 
Armed neutrality, 35-38, 432. 
Armed Ships Bill, 23, 28, 29, 31, 37, 

119, 142, 143. 
Armed ships dispute, 22, 42, 46, loi, 

102, 103, 105, io6. 
Armistice conditions, 158, 159, 169, 

241, 242. 
Atrocities, Allied, 205-207, 211, 212, 

392. 
Atrocities, American, 207-214, 389. 
Autocracy in foreign relations, 168- 

170, 175. 

Bagdad Railway, 231. 

Baruch, Bernard, 266, 268, 292, 293. 

Belgium, 186, 191, 199-206, 208, 209 

215. 
Bernhardi, 178, 179, 185. 
Bernstorff peace plot, 141. 
Borglum, Gutzon, 436, 437. 
Brailsford, H. N., 229, 233. 
British blockade, 33, 92, 99, 115, 116, 

117, 119, 122, 135, 136, 211. 
British democracy, 167, 168, 171, 217- 

221, 226. 
Broken submarine promises, 120, 124, 

213. 
Bryan, 21, 40, loi. 

Carranza Doctrine, 413, 
China, 203-205, 222, 224, 225, 327- 
329, 382, 395, 396, 402, 424. 



Clark, Champ, 22, 55, 292. 

Conscription, 48, 51, 55, 58, 63-66, 74, 
75, 417. (See draft.) 

Constitution of the United States, vi- 
olations of, 29, 51, 64-69, 174, 332, 
353> 391- (See Presidential usurp- 
ations.) 

Corporation statements of war profits, 
281-284. 

Council of National Defense, 42, 43, 
265-268, 289. 

Cravath, Paul D., 271. 

Cuba, 181, 182, 402, 406, 408. 

Davison, Henry P., 263, 277, 278, 

288. 
Debt to France, 105. 
Declaration of London, 92, 93, 95, 

123, 124, 133, 134. 
Defense as a war motive, 13-19, 

389, 398, 435- 
Dent, Chairman, 55, 63. 
Draft, 9, 55, 76. (See Conscription.) 
Dutch ships, confiscation of, 136-138, 

145-150, 214. 

Egypt, 200, 203, 205, 219, 225, 226, 

232, 252, 392. 
Election of 1916, 6, 43-46, 48, 104- 

107, 317, 318, 326. 
Embargo and European neutrals, 

145-150. 
Enlistments, 12. 
Espionage Act, 52, 57, de, 70, 73, 74. 

Farrell, James A., 267, 288, 292, 

321, 323, 324, 368, 375. 
Fear propaganda, 13, 19, 166, 178, 

i8'3, 235. 
Federal Trade Commission reports, 

281, 282, 283, 284, 304. 
Fisher, First Sea Lord, 185, 189. 



445 



446 



INDEX 



Food-control, 55, 59-61, 268, 269, 304, Hylan, Mayor, 9. 

363- 

Fourteen Points, 242, 244-248, 393. Imperialism of Entente Allies, 224- 

Freedom of speech, 2, 52, 70, 79, 418. 231, 393, 410, 411, 413, 415, 424. 

Freedom of the seas, 125, 179, 235, Imperialism of United States, 319- 

244, 252, 432. 361, 362, 363, 365, 367-370, 375, 

Future wars, 1-5, 166, 243, 253, 254, 384? 409, 4-^o, 413, 431. 

293, 392, 409, 418. Impossibility of a German victory, 

233, 234, 237. 

Gary, Elbert H., 256, 267, 288, 291, India, 205, 211, 217, 226, 232, 252, 

292. 392. 

German-Mexican plot, 14, 142-144, Industrial Workers of the World, 74. 

214, International law as an American 

German war plot, 178-198. war motive, 81-83, 102, 103, 104- 

German world peril, 18, 166-236, 107, 127, 128, 133, 150. 

250, 251, 399, 411, 419, 426. British offenses against, 115-127, 

Gibbons, Herbert Adams, 206, 230. i34j i35, 203, 204. 

Gibbs, Philip, 213. our reversals on, 108-114, 126, 127, 

Glynn, Martin, 43, 105. 432-434- 

Gompers, Samuel, 262, 403. our violations of, 128-142, 146-150, 

Gore, Senator, 22, 105. 204, 332. 

Grey, Foreign Secretary, 135, 171, International Mercantile Marine 

173, 220. Company, 36, 90, 258, 259, 268, 

Greece, 203, 204, 212, 219. 270, 385. 

Gregory, Attorney-General, 42, 56, Ireland, 392, 404. 

57, 70, 71, 72, 73, 309. 

Guggenheim, Daniel, 262, 282, 290, Johnson, Senator Hiram, 56, 68, 

292, 294. 75- 

Hague conferences and conventions, Keeping us out of war, 6, 44, 82- 

117, 129, 132, 149, 203. 84, 362, 363. (See responsibility 

Haiti, 172-174, 207, 331, ^, 334, of Wilson.) 

335, 344-346, 348, 355, 402, 404, Korea, 200, 392, 398. 

407, 408. 

Hanotaux revelations, 260, 261. LaFollette, Senator, 28, 36, 55, loi, 

Harding, President, 105, 308, 348, 331. 

364, 372, 402. Lamont, Thomas W., 258, 271, 367, 

Hitchcock, Senator, 62, 368. 368. 

Hog Island, 298-303, 306, 307. Lansing-Ishii Agreement, 174, 329, 

Honduras, 352, 355, 408. 407. 

Honor and American belligerency. Lawlessness of war administration, 

81, 83, 96, 102, 103, 135, 150, 255, 56-63, 70-79, 435- 

322, '362, 387. Lawrence, Professor, 32, 129, 131, 

Hoover, Herbert, 59-61, 268, 308, 137, 149. 

377, 380. League of Nations, 246-250, 255, 394- 

Howe, Frederic C, 230. 397, 402, 409, 422. 

Hughes, 44, 45. Liberty Bonds, 8, 76, 263, 288, 289, 

Hunger blockade, 211-213. 290, 391, 294, 386, 404, 405. 



INDEX 



447 



"Lusitania," 97, loi, 119, 209, 211. 

Mexico, io, 149, 150, 182, 209, 210, 

252, 322, '-3^3, 330-342, 355, 368, 

'383, 384, 395, 402, 412-416, 434, 

438-443- 
Militarism, 53, 153, 175, 176, 177. 

of France, 176, 188, 394, 395, 420. 
Mining the high seas, 99, 100, 119, 

124. 
Monroe Doctrine, 320, 322, 361, 368, 

398, 407, 411, 412, 413, 414. 
Morel, E. D., 185, 188. 
Morgan, J. P., 36, 90, 91, 258, 260, 

271, 275, 278, 288, 294, 306, 367. 
Morocco, 201, 205, 206, 227, 252. 

National Security League, 260, 322. 

Navy League, 260, 319. 

Neilson, Francis, 171, 179, 184, 186, 

189. 
Neutrality, American departures 

from, 41, 100, 122, 126, 128. 

and war loans, 40, 41, 327, 362. 

law of, 112, 113, 114, 129. 
New York election of 1917, 9. 
Nicaragua, 172-174, 201, 202, 208, 

209, 253, 331, 334, 348-361, 404, 
^407, 408. 
Non-partisan League, 77. 
"Now/-that-we're-in" patriots, 19, 

403. 

Obregon, 341, 342, 441. 
Opium War, 224. 
Overman Bill, 62, 63. 

Page, Robert N., 22, 362. 

Pan-Americanism, 182, 361. 

Paris Economic Conference, 239, 322. 

Passports, 10, 56, 390, 402. 

Peace without victory, 155-165, 236- 

238, 247. 
People's Council on Democracy and 

Terms of Peace, 73. 
Permanent business advantages from 

American belligerency, 319, 326, 

367-369, 375-387- 



Persia, 201, 220, 231, 232, 252. 
Philippines, 207, 408. 
Pledges of 1912, '314-318. 
Preparations for European war, 183- 

189. 
Preparedness legislation of 1916, 21, 

42, 324- 
Preparedness tour, 26, 41, 82-84, 326, 

362. 
Presidential usurpations, 26-31. (See 

Constitution, violations of.) 
Profits and profiteering, 279-284, 286- 

307, 364, 365, 386. 

Railroads, 57, 262, 269, 293-298, 306, 

311, 312, 314, '315, 364, 365, 373, 

381, 402. 
Red Cross, 9, 263. 
Reparations Commission, 369, 396, 

423- 
Republican party, 1, 6, 44, 361, 365, 

372, 401, 402, 403. 
Responsibility for European war, 189- 

198, 421-423, 425- 
Responsibility of Wilson, 20-25, '39, 

105, 106, 143, 170, 400, 401. (See 

Keeping us out of war.) 
Rhodes, Cecil, will of, 180. 
Rockefeller, 262, 264, 294, 340. 
Roosevelt, 200, 346, 347, 356. 
Russia since 1917, 149, 203, 204, 212, 

213, 245, 367, 395, 402, 409, 410. 
Ryan, John D., 267, 270, 282, 288, 

292, 293, 294, 306. 

Santo Domingo, 172, 173, 174, 207, 

253, '331, 333, 334-348, 355, 356, 

402, 407, 408. 
Schwab, Charles M., 258, 267, 270, 

288, 292, 303, 306, 309. 
Scraps of paper. Allied, 200-204, 221. 
Scraps of paper, American, 129, 201, 

202, 204, 242, 316, 407. 
Secret diplomacy, 170-175, 244, 293. 
Secret diplomacy, American, 172- 

175, 336, 337, 345, 346, '349, 397, 
417, 420. 



05 



448 



INDEX 



Secret of Wilson, 400. 

Secret treaties, 239, 243, 254, 396, 

397, 398. 
Self-determination, 243, 251, 253, 344, 

406, 436. 
Serbia, 190-192, 194-196, 221. 
Shantung, 396, 398, 424. 
Shaw, 193. 
Sims, Admiral, 188. 
Slackers and slacker raids, lo, 75. 
Small nations, 215-223, 243, 414. 
Socialists and Socialist party, 9, 73, 

77, 235. 
Standing behind the President, 4, 20, 

24, 38, 151, 257, 258. 
Stettinius, Edward R., 271, 288. 
Stone, Senator, 23, 34, 35, 102, 106. 
Stone & Webster, 272, 299, '301, 302. 
Submarine and American commerce, 

81-84, 86-96, 101-103. 

and American lives, 81, 97-103. 

dispute, 27, 81-138. 

dispute, German tractability in, 

92-95> 98, 99, 124, 125. 

law of, 28, 109, 120, 433. 
Supreme Court, 28, 64, 65. 



Terror, peace-time, 389, 392, 403. 
Terror, war-time, 52, 61, 68-79. 
Townsend, Senator, 146, 147. 
Trading with the Enemy Act, 67, 134. 
Treaty of 1828, X29-131. 
Tumulty, Joseph P., 106, 114. 

Underwood, 27, 62. 

Vanderlip, Frank A., 256, 264, 273, 
288, 303, 306, 321, 322, 323, 375. 

Versailles Treaty, 243-255, 367-370, 
394-399, 420-425. 

Virgin Islands, 172, 173, 343, 344, 
407, 408. 

War after the war, 322, 323, 324, 325. 
War aims of Entente Allies, 239, 240, 

243, 248, 251, 252, 254, 255. 
War prices, 91, 280, 316, 366, 367, 

377, 378, ■379- 
White Book, American, 29, 123, 124, 
127, 186. 

ZiMMERMANN letter, 142, 143, 144, 
145. 



Taft, 347, 349, 350, 352, 353, 355, 
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"" # 9? '^ o"". ! ^^ x^"^ Kreservaiion lecnno 

V '^''*°/ '^ ° " ^ V A WORLI> LEADER IRWPEB PRE 

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Neutralizing agent „.— 

Treatment Date: lyj^ 2001 

' ^ PreservationTechnologies 

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